AGUINALDO
In Retrospect

PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

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AGUINALDO IN RETROSPECT

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GENERAL EMILIO AGUINALDO

AGUINALDO
In Retrospect

A Volume Issued to Commemorate the Centenary of General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy

With Documents on the Philippine-American War, 1898-1901, and the First Philippine Republic

Edited by

MAURO GARCIA

Manila
PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
1969

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PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

HISTORICAL BULLETIN

Ambeth Ocampo

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FOREWORD

The Philippine Historical Association, true to its avowed mission of helping promote and propagate historical knowledge and studies, again takes its humble part in the commemoration of an important historic event — this time, the first centennial of the birth of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy (1869-1969), Father of our Republic and Liberator of our country.

Many will still recall that it was this Association that initiated the observance of the Golden Anniversary of the establishment of the First Philippine Assembly on October 16, 1957; the celebration of the Silver Anniversary of the inauguration of the Commonwealth National Assembly on November 15, 1960; and the commemoration of the Golden Anniversary of the establishment of the First Philippine Legislature under the Jones Law on October 16, 1966. Modesty aside, it was also this Association (through its first President, Prof. Gabriel F. Fabella, Sr.) that initiated the movement for the changing of the celebration of Philippine Independence Day from July 4 to June 12.

On August 7, 1967, the Board of Governors of the Association personally requested President Ferdinand E. Marcos in Malacañang to issue an executive order creating the Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo National Centennial Commission. Following their request, President Marcos signed Executive Order No. 92, dated October 23, 1967, creating the Commission and charging it to prepare the general program of the centenary of the birth of the illustrious general.

The Philippine Historical Association not only has spearheaded the observance of General Aguinaldo's 100th birth anniversary, but also has done its utmost in cooperating with the Commission in its activities and projects making the celebration a meaningful and fruitful one for our people, especially for the youth of the land. Thus our Association cooperated with the Student/Youth Committee of the said Commission in the hold-

ing of the First Malolos Youth Congress that took place at the historic Barasoain Church in Malolos, Bulacan (site of the Malolos Congress of 1898), from January 21 to 23, 1969. The Association also co-sponsored with the Commission the three-day National Convention on "General Aguinaldo's Role in Philippine History" at the SSS Building, Quezon City, held from March 19 to 21, 1969. Again, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Proclamation of Philippine Independence, the two entities jointly sponsored the Lecture-Symposium on the theme "June 12 and General Aguinaldo" held at Kawit, Cavite, on June 12, 1969.

To contribute something of permanent and lasting value to posterity and to the ever-growing body of literature on General Aguinaldo, the Association, in further happy collaboration with the Commission, dedicates to him this volume of the *Historical Bulletin,* fittingly titled "Aguinaldo in Retrospect".* As indicated in the Table of Contents, the articles in this volume cover a wide range of subject or topics dealing with the activities, achievements, hardships, personality, character, and other phases of the life and career of the illustrious warrior-statesman who played the leading role in our bloody struggle for freedom and independence against Spain and the United States of America during the closing years of the 19th century.

I would like to voice the heartfelt appreciation and profound gratitude of the officers and members of the Philippine Historical Association to those who, in one way or another, have generously and unselfishly extended their cooperation to the Association in the successful commemoration of the Aguinaldo Centennial. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge our unbounded gratefulness to President Marcos, Honorary President of the Association, for issuing at our request Executive Order No. 92, creating the Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo National Centennial Commission and declaring 1969 Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Centennial Year, and for giving the Association the material and moral support it has needed; to the Commission, particularly its Chairman, Gen. Ernesto S. Mata, and its efficient Executive

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* In 1961, in commemoration of the centenary of Jose Rizal's birth, the Association also published "Rizal in Retrospect" (ed. by Carlos Quirino) as Volume V of the *Historical Bulletin.*

Director, Col. Leonardo T. Miciano, and the latter's able staff; to Secretary of Education Onofre D. Corpuz, as chairman of the various contests on Aguinaldo; to Budget Commissioner Faustino Sy-Changco, for his valuable cooperation; to National Historical Commission Chairman Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil, as head of the Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo National Centennial Commission Committee on Research and Publications; to Philippine Historical Association Governors, Dr. Sixto Y. Orosa, Sr., Dr. Ricardo A. Arcilla, Dean Gloria M. Santos, and Prof. Jorge L. Revilla, all of whom performed invaluable services in the planning and implementing of the projects of both the Commission and the Association; to Mr. Mauro Garcia, for compiling and editing this volume of the *Historical Bulletin;* and to all other persons and entities whose names appear in the programs published elsewhere in this volume, that were held jointly by the Commission and the Association.

ESTEBAN A. DE OCAMPO
President
Philippine Historical Association

[illegible] Col. Leonardo L. Nicdao and the history and study [illegible] of Education; Quintin [illegible] Corpuz as chairman of the [illegible] Architecture [illegible] Development [illegible] [illegible] Chairman, [illegible] Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil, as [illegible] Emilio Aguinaldo National [illegible] Committee on Research and Publications; to Philippine Historical [illegible] Dr. Pedro [illegible] Dean Gloria [illegible] Santos, and Prof. [illegible], all of whom performed invaluable service in the planning and the directing of the projects of both the Commission and the Association; to Mr. Mauro Garcia, for compiling and editing this volume of the *Historical Bulletin*; and to all other persons and entities whose names, either in the programs [illegible] elsewhere in this volume, that were held jointly by the Commission and the Association.

ESTEBAN A. DE OCAMPO
President
Philippine Historical Association

Aguinaldo, Unsung Hero*

Ferdinand E. Marcos

"JEST NOT AT THE SCARS, you who have never felt the wound"

He lived as a soldier; he won glory as a soldier; as a victorious soldier he won the presidency of the first Republic in the Tejeros convention against Bonifacio, founder of the Katipunan; now his mortal remains lie before us in the uniform of a soldier — not of the general but of the simple REVOLUCIONARIO IN RAYADILLO with insignia of rank and without the decorations and medals of martial victory—for this was his last wish and final orders before death.

So today, in the pompousity and grandeur of public acclaim and recognition, we honor Emilio Aguinaldo a fallen soldier. Seldom in the history of soldiery has a fallen comrade received at his funeral such plaudits, not from his contemporaries but from his successors several generations removed.

But perhaps more than any other mortal of our lifetime, of him it can be said that the words of honor offered him now are a transgression upon his dignity—the pious protestations and the tardy recognition of his greatness and imposition upon his humility. The words we utter sound hollow and meaningless before his noble dedication, the greatness of his own creation.

Many years ago I asked him at his home in Kawit, Cavite, if in the anonymity of his retirement he felt he had been forgotten by the people for whom he had fought, and he said with a smile, "My son, have you been a soldier?", and when I answered that my generation had known its own Tirad Pass and

* Eulogy delivered by then Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos at necrological services held in honor of General Emilio Aguinaldo at the Session Hall, House of Representatives, 15 February 1964.

had been humbled in its own Palanan, he said, "After the battles are won and the dream of liberty attained, the people for whom the war was fought soon look to the new leader and soon readily consign the soldier to beggary and mendicancy. For such is the fate of the soldier, and a true soldier must accept such Fate."

And I remembered the line "they jest at scars, who have never felt a wound." And the man I was talking to had many scars—scars not only of the body but of the heart. And they scoffed at his scars. They scoffed at a young soldier of 29 who sought to build a new Republic. For such was the sad fate of this soldier. It mattered not that he belonged to the generation of Rizal, Mabini, Luna, del Pilar and Bonifacio—the constellation of Philippine revolutionary heroes which was the very first in the recorded history of subject people in Asia and Africa to raise the flag of revolution and to found a modern republic based on the ethics of Christianity—a temple built with human courage alone to the freedom and dignity of men in the vast wilderness of political apathy which was colonial Asia and Africa. It mattered not that this soldier was the leader of the men that beat the path for Asian nationalism of the twentieth century. For while Rizal was the prophet, while Bonifacio had organized the Katipunan, while Mabini built the political frame and Luna wielded the sword of combat, there was only one leader and that leader was Aguinaldo. It mattered not for he was a soldier.

Too long had Emilio Aguinaldo stayed with us almost unhonored and unsung. He lived to see the nation commemorate the centenaries of the birth of Rizal, Bonifacio, Mabini, and Luna. Monuments rose to men who fought with him like Gregorio del Pilar and Luna. But not a single bust of the revolutionary leader appeared in public plazas. For Aguinaldo was too alive, too vibrant to be considered of pantheon material. And later he was too self-effacing that he did not blend with the image builders' requirements of a rancorous and egotistical age.

And he will ever be thus—reproving of our puny efforts to raise him beyond the heights that he had already reached on the silent wings of his own achievements.

He was a soldier—and as a soldier now he watches us in silent disapproval as officialdom stains itself to clothe him with the solemnity and elegance of afterthought.

I watched him on June 12, 1963, as his proclamation of the first Republic on June 12, 1898, was acknowledged and recognized finally by our nation. I watched him as they offered the hyperbole and the exaggeration in memorial to his noble dedication. As he watched the caricature of his solemn proclamation and watched the soldiers march by, he must have said to himself, "You too, my sons. They too, shall jest at your scars, who have never felt a wound."

This he must have repeated to himself. Were not the scars he felt no longer just of his body but also of his heart? For he and his comrades had been forgotten for so long by an ungrateful people. Not only had he been forgotten. The soldier had been laughed at and his dreams derided. He had been pilloried and maligned. But he had kept his silence in quiet dignity. And this he knew—that while his body suffered, his cause had triumphed. For he had moulded with his hands and watered with his blood, the first Republic established by a brown people.

Legend as he was, his own people repudiated him, and the leaders of the new government humiliated him. His own race confiscated his lands from him, his own people deprived him of his pension.

And so he knew too the bitter wounds of frustration, the deep and galling wounds of the spirit and of the heart, but all these, too, he bore in silence. The era of Rizal, Mabini, Bonifacio and Luna was dead. He should have died with them, but he had not, so he remained to guard in quiet vigil the dignity and the greatness of their achievements. The era of Rizal, Mabini, Bonifacio and Luna was dead, but their dream was still there.

And while his own people continued to scoff at the scars, though the people had never felt wounds, he remained aloof for he was a soldier of the lost cause. But he knew, however, that no matter how he was humiliated the lost cause would ultimately triumph.

For were not these people free? Were not his children liberated from tyranny? Were not other Asians living in freedom? No matter the pains and wounds, the humiliation and the disgrace, the lost cause of freedom shall ultimately triumph, ultimately and at last, the lost cause shall triumph. When the *insurrectos* had raised the flag of defiance against the superior enemy forces in 1898, he knew then the war was lost but he had to plant the seed of greatness and daring amongst the Filipino race, and they had found root in the hearts of his people. So that every arm that faltered in combat regained strength with his own dream of ultimate victory.

Had not his grandsons and their brothers several decades after his revolution raised their own flag of intransigence against the invader? Had they not forgotten the lost cause of Bataan, the lost cause of Corregidor, and the lost cause of the underground? For he had taught his lesson well.

And so they now stand in the Hall of Immortality, the Philippine Valhalla — the symbols of the lost cause that ultimately triumphed. There stands Rizal, the prophet of the revolution; Bonifacio the organizer; Mabini, the political mentor; Luna, the wielder of the sword; and now there, too, stands Aguinaldo the leader, the first soldier, the first president of the first Republic of the Philippines.

They stand not only for their generation. They stand for all time and for all men.

They stand in silent reproof of him who would deny us the true meaning of liberty. They stand in quiet denunciation of him who would forget the substance of humility. They stand with eyes questioning those who have lost the value of self-abnegation.

To General Emilio Aguinaldo, first president of the Republic, we can only say, "We stand in honor and salute you. Go with God but remember that this generation who learned the lesson of the lost cause shall no longer scoff and jest at your scars because they, too, have felt the pain and bitterness of the wounds that you have known."

Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy: Father of the Nation*

Sabino Padilla

IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND THE PROPER WORDS to deliver a fitting tribute and eulogy to a man like Emilio Aguinaldo. To constrict almost a century of sterling achievements within the imperfections of language is like capturing a lifetime within the confines of a day. At this moment of national sorrow, recollection of his deeds and the various incidents in his outstanding career must come, and do come, in an unrelated order and under the stress of emotional partiality.

And yet, no one can deny that Emilio Aguinaldo lived, labored and sacrificed so as to leave imperishable landmarks of his lasting contributions in the founding and growth of our Nation.

It was Dr. Jose Rizal, who set the goals and defined the libertarian processes of a national upheaval. It fell on General Emilio Aguinaldo to lead the aroused consciousness of a people in the struggle to attain those goals.

Dr. Rizal, by his writings and martyrdom, infused the spirit in a slumbering people to aspire for freedom and human dignity. General Aguinaldo released that spirit, until it found its fulfillment in the birth of a unified, sovereign and independent country.

Rizal and Aguinaldo, therefore, constitute the main pillars of our independence. It was through their incontrovertible patriotism and pristine love of country, that the Filipino re-discovered himself — an equal to any man, in the eyes of God and in the hearts of men.

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* Eulogy delivered at the necrological services held in honor of General Emilio Aguinaldo at the Session Hall, House of Representatives, 15 February 1964.

Possessed of a perceptive intuition and gifted with a telescopic vision, Emilio Aguinaldo realized his place and saw his role in the unfolding of history. Perhaps, because of that realization, he never learned to exercise authority so as to abuse it, even at the height of his political and military power as head of the revolutionary government — when the lives and properties of men were literally in the palm of his hands.

He was a leader who refused to be deluded by the enchantments of vanity and the distortions of flattery. He knew his limitations and, in that knowledge, he sought the light of the best minds of his time. It is recorded that, when the Government under the Malolos constitution was proclaimed, Emilio Aguinaldo leaned on the advice of the venerable Cayetano S. Arellano and the counsel of the illustrious Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, and Apolinario Mabini.

As a leader, in peace and in war, Aguinaldo distinguished himself for the conscientiousness of his judgments. But when he reached a decision, he pursued it with an indomitable determination, equalled only by the courage of his convictions.

When the exacerbations of political pettiness attempted, in the years after the revolution, to bismirch his unsullied reputation and thereby relegate him to a minor position in our history, unflattering stories were heard about the disposition of the indemnity received by the revolutionary government from Spain under the Pact of Biak-na-bato. God could not allow this upright and untarnished character to close his eyes unvindicated. The United States government recently returned to the Republic of the Philippines documents seized during the Filipino-American War. Among such documents, now in the custody of the Bureau of Public Libraries, is a punctilious accounting of the indemnity received from Spain under the Pact of Biak-na-bato.

Venerated as a citizen and respected as a man, Emilio Aguinaldo never lost his disarming simplicity. He was humble as he was fearless. He was affectionate as he was uncompromising. I suspect that his great affection for the people, his unusual concern for their welfare, were anchored on a lifetime consciousness that he was an instrument of God for rendering service to

country and people. It was the same consciousness, I believe, that sustained him in moments of decision and in periods of disillusion. We recall that, several months before his demise, his loving wife who had stood by him, faithfully and well, passed on to the Creator. At the burial of Doña Maria, the General stood as a poetic figure of loneliness. It was only that sturdiness founded on resignation that sustained him for several months more. And even in the closing moments of life, he struggled to make himself useful for worthy causes, including that of the veterans who were nearest to his heart.

Time does not permit of the many more things that may be said of Emilio Aguinaldo. Those who enjoyed the distinction of his confidence and shared the privilege of his friendship can never forget him. He lived a full life, yes, and, at times, he appeared to defy even death at its numerous calls. But in the fullness of that life is carved the highest degree of devotion to the country he cherished and the people he loved.

It is to the credit of our present leaders that no tribute has been spared in acknowledging what this nation owes to Emilio Aguinaldo. For, indeed, it is in moments like this, when by a process of conscientious introspection, a grateful country must pause and a noble people must pray.

It is to be hoped, and we must hope, that the majestic praises that we lavish on our departed leader shall be translated into an effective pursuit of ideals he held and the causes he espoused.

When the fading notes of taps unite tomorrow with the parting shots of musketry, Emilio Aguinaldo, the Father of the Nation, will leave this generation, to belong to the ages.

The Humility of Emilio Aguinaldo*

Sabino Padilla

YOU HAVE ASKED ME to speak on Emilio Aguinaldo, obviously in connection with his birth anniversary which the nation celebrates today. The relative shortness of notice and the demands of other preoccupations will serve as an apology for the inadequacy of this dissertation. But as a Filipino, and as one who had the rare privilege of knowing the General in life, an opportunity for a dialogue, such as this, even if limited by time and space to just a few highlights in his life and character, is an experience to be relished than a duty to be fulfilled. And the experience is even more pleasant because the dialogue is with an association that communes with the past and unravels to the present the beauty of our traditions and the authenticity of our national identity and character.

General Aguinaldo had many outstanding qualities. He was honest, courageous, resourceful, noble, and many more. But to my mind, one of the highest stars in the constellation of his qualities, was an impeccable humility. When I say humility, I do not refer to that type of submissiveness synonymous to servility. Far from it I refer to that state of mind which defers to reasoned judgment, and regards authority not in the opportunities it presents, but in the responsibilities it demands.

And it was this humility that endeared him to the people of Kawit and which irresistibly urged them to select him as their undisputed leader.

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* Address delivered at the program held under the auspices of the Philippine Historical Association to commemorate the 99th birthday anniversary of General Emilio Aguinaldo, 22 March, 1968.

It was Emilio Aguinaldo's humility that urged him as *capitan municipal* of Kawit, to seek the friendship and cooperation of a rival faction in the town, that of Candido Tria Tirona, to the dismay of his own brother, Crispulo, who would have nothing to do with such other faction, because of its part in the imprisonment of their own father, Carlos Aguinaldo, for a false accusation of having buried arms in the convent in Kawit.

In that era, where the colonial interests prospered on the proposition of divide and rule, the unity of the two factions in Kawit ignited the fiery downfall of Spanish rule in Cavite and, later, in the country.

Parenthetically, it was this same humility of Emilio Aguinaldo that served to mislead the Spanish authorities into believing that he was a loyal and harmless *capitan municipal* and which enabled him to solidify the forces of the Katipunan, forming as its nucleus no less than the *cuadrilleros* of the municipality.

Emilio Aguinaldo, it may be recalled, recognized the authority of the Katipunan and submitted to the primacy of its founder and Supremo, Andres Bonifacio, despite his own resounding victories in the battlefields of Cavite, from which he could easily have claimed an early leadership of the revolution. Aguinaldo knew that the fight for freedom could not succeed in the midst of conflicting aggrupations within the ranks of the people. He was ready at all times to rally to the leadership of the movement. And the influence of this exemplary readiness ultimately persuaded the Magdiwang faction headed by Bonifacio himself to stake its own political fortune against the Magdalos headed by Baldomero Aguinaldo in the will of the majority at the convention of Tejeros.

Aguinaldo reacted almost adversely when he was first informed at the height of the battle of Pasong-Santol in Dasmariñas, Cavite, of his election to the presidency of the revolutionary government. His reluctance to leave the miseries of the front line in order to accept the honors of the presidency served, however, to inspire the delegates to insist that he accept and qualify immediately for the office to which he did not aspire.

Humility, even in the face of the almost absolute power he wielded as head of the revolutionary government, explains Aguinaldo's refusal, over the advice of his close associates, to proceed with the outright execution of the Bonifacio brothers for treason to the revolutionary government, without the benefit of hearing. Humility, in the sense of a realization that he was merely an incident to the larger interest of the revolution prompted Aguinaldo, despite his own feelings on the matter, but upon the insistence of other revolutionary leaders, to conclude with Spain the Pact of Biak-na-bato which afforded both a breathing spell to the revolution then engulfing the country and a test of Spanish sincerity in implementing belated but promised reforms.

This is not to say that humility alone brought Emilio Aguinaldo to his imperishable place in Philippine history. There were other virtues of the General, let alone events and circumstances that helped to shape his historical preeminence. But as one analyzes the man that Emilio Aguinaldo was, one comes to the firm conclusion that his decisions, momentous or perfunctory, were disciplined by his humbleness. It dominated his very way of life.

It is no wonder that, to the end of his days, he lived a life of remarkable self-effacement. He labored oblivious of self, to the end that the custodians of power may give what in justice is due to those who, nobly and without equivocation, fought and suffered under his inspired and inspiring leadership to restore to our people the priceless right to be free.

My Father*

Carmen Aguinaldo Melencio

THE *Philippines Free Press* requests that I write something pertaining to the daily life of General Aguinaldo — his habits, customs, opinions on various topics, his likes and dislikes. I gladly do so.

I shall begin with his daily routine whenever he is at Kawit. He gets up very early in the morning, often before five o'clock, except after a very long trip when, through fatigue, he oversleeps. But this seldom happens. He says he has already reached the age when he can sleep only from three to six hours a night. When preparing an important document, he sometimes does not sleep at all. He does not dictate his statements. He writes them out in long hand, closely spaced and in very fine letters. He goes at it paragraph by paragraph, perfecting each paragraph by rewriting it several times. He then goes on to the next, and so on. Whether in Spanish or Tagalog, that is his method. After finishing his own draft he turns it over to his advisers for polishing and revision.

At about six in the morning he takes his daily exercise, followed by a cold shower. Before he was given a chest expander, his exercise consisted in stretching his arms out above his head, then bending his body, with legs stiff, and then straightening to the erect position. He did that 113 times — because when he was operated upon for appendicitis some gauze was left inside and was found only on the 113th day. Now he has modified this by adding exercises with the chest expander. He began with two springs; now he uses five. When he has time he goes swimming in the small pool under his room to which he has a

* This article first appeared in the *Philippines Free Press* (Aug. 3, 1939), pp. 2-3, 4, 32, 33, from which it was reprinted by this *Bulletin* (March, 1959), v. 3, no. 1, pp. 40-45.

private entrance. After his shower he invariably pours plenty of alcohol on his head, wetting the hair and scalp thoroughly with it. I suspect that this is the reason why he has very few gray hairs, and I have been suggesting to Mr. Melencio that he follow suit in order to prevent incipient baldness.

About eight o'clock he takes his breakfast consisting mostly of fruit — mango, papaya or bananas, any kind — plenty of oatmeal with fresh carabao milk, two soft-boiled eggs and a cup of chocolate. When he is in a hurry he mixes the oatmeal, the eggs and the chocolate in a soup plate. He says the mixture is great!

Half an hour later, he is on his way to Manila. He seldoms fails to go to his office. If he cannot leave early, it is because there are veterans or other people at the house who would like to talk to him. It is a rare morning or evening that he does not have people waiting for him. Either they need his assistance on something or they want to consult him about diverse affairs. Sometimes he is even asked to play the role of soothsayer to locate a lost article. Among the older residents in the environs of Kawit, he holds the reputation of being able to indicate where lost things can be found by their owners. Evidently most of his guesses have turned out correctly.

MANY VISITORS

To reach the third floor of the Roxas building, where his Manila office is located [now his office is at Calle Lara, San Nicolas district], he prefers not to use the elevator; he walks up the numerous steps for the exercise there is in it. All day at his office he is literally swamped with callers — people of various hues, creeds, and political faiths; people who want recommendations; veterans with their troubles. With what patience he listens to each and every one!

There is no time limit to the calls either. The long-winded sometimes stay the whole morning or afternoon — conferences by instalments — occasionally stopping to allow others to finish their business. It has been suggested that there be strict orders setting time limits for those calls. "It can't be done," is the

General's reply, "it might be resented, especially by those of the older generation."

EATS LUNCH IN OFFICE

He does not go out for lunch. He takes it right in his office, a very simple affair by the way — a glass of milk, toast, and some cookies — day in and day out. He eats it usually at one o'clock, due to the numerous visitors.

Between six and eight o'clock in the evening he gets back home, with not a trace of fatigue in his appearance. He looks for his granddaughters the first thing, gives them whatever he has brought for them, often fruit or other tidbits, chats with them for a time, listens to their stories from school or makes them recite poems they have learned.

After the usual greetings, on days that he does not go to the farm at Timalan, Naic, he goes straight to the bathroom and takes a shower. After that, the alcohol scalp rub is repeated. Before dinner he attends to additional callers, and after dinner also, if there are any. Otherwise, he writes personal letters or writes his diary, or reads the papers or plays chess with either Mr. Melencio or Emilio Jr. Chess is the favorite pastime of the men at the house. Sometimes the game lasts until eleven o'clock at night. I seldom know who wins.

Dinner for the General consists mostly of fish, vegetables, salads, chicken, and boiled rice with milk. He hardly ever takes meat; it is usually tabooed in his diet. He eats very sparingly, being afraid of indigestion, because every time he gets an attack he becomes dizzy for hours and cannot do anything.

When he goes to the farm at Naic, he usually takes the last train. He motors over to Noveleta to catch it, leaving Kawit as soon as he hears the train approach the Kawit station. He never misses it as Noveleta, for the engine takes water there. At the farm he is always on the go. He is a good hiker, fast and tireless.

He has no vices to speak of. He does not drink, does not smoke, and does not gamble. There are no movies for him if he can avoid them. Since our return from Europe six years ago, he has been to the movies only two or three times.

He never loses his temper. No cuss words for him at all. His only exclamation when somewhat angered is *Tinamaan ng isang kanin iyan,* literally, "struck by a grain of rice." He controls his feelings remarkably well.

He is, I often think, too compassionate. When veterans or relatives come to him and plead for aid, they almost invariably get it. Even in the midst of his present financial hardships, he gives ten pesos here and twenty pesos there, unmindful of his own tomorrow. If he himself cannot do the thing asked of him, he goes around and requests someone to help.

Captive birds evoke his pity. How often Emilio Jr., and I cried when he would set free the birds which we had caught with so much hardship in our younger days.

SIGNS "VALES"

Far be it from him to harbor any grudge. When his bitterest foe comes to him and signifies willingness to patch things up, General Aguinaldo promptly forgets past injuries.

He has a deep sense of civic duty. During the present school year two barrios needed school buildings, but no funds were available. Neither was there any one who would answer for the materials needed. The General was approached, and straightaway he prepared the necessary *vales.* If the residents of the barrios concerned do not live up to their word to pay for the materials, there will be additional financial obligations for our "old man."

Every year the very first *cedula* that is sold at Kawit goes to General Aguinaldo. He has always made it a point to be the first to buy a *cedula.*

A FARMER

He abhors oppression of any kind whatever. If someone comes to him with a tale of maltreatment on the part of a public official, an investigation of the incident is usually requested from higher authorities.

His hobby is agriculture. He likes the life on the farm. His most recent investment is in pineapples. But this venture suffered the same fate that befell his other agricultural ventures,

a well-nigh complete collapse. He has always been unfortunate in agriculture as a matter of fact. Ten years ago he borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank. He invested heavily in hemp and sugar and *palay*. He bought machinery and he even had an irrigation dam built. When he was about to reap the harvest of his efforts, the hemp plantation was attacked by unknown pests, sugar prices dropped, and the dam for his rice fields was swept away by floods. He never recovered from the tremendous losses. But he is not disheartened. Agriculture, he still engages in, but he no longer venture in any business pursuit.

SPEAKS LITTLE ENGLISH

When he has made up his mind to a thing it is seldom that he can be dissuaded from going ahead with it. Exceptionally strong and decisive arguments must be advanced for that purpose; otherwise, he will not yield or change his decision. When attempts were made to prevail upon him to join the noncooperation movement against Governor-General Wood, he was adamant in his refusal. He said he had already lost faith in the leadership of that movement and that cooperation would triumph in the end, and it did. When subsequent efforts were exerted to disrupt the Veterans' Association he resolved to take the stump in order to explain his stand, even though he had not had much experience in public speaking. He has improved markedly in vernacular oratory since then.

He reads English a little better than he can write or speak it. He simply has not had the time to take it up wholeheartedly. This is one of his regrets in life, because so many Americans, tourists especially, came to call on him, and he always has to use an interpreter. Tagalog is the language he uses most; it is the language of his home. His diary, however, for he keeps one, is written mostly in Spanish.

The home at Kawit is very dear to him. If he is within driving distance at all, he always makes it a point to come home even if he were to get here as late as three or four o'clock in the morning.

LIFE OF THRILLS

Unless asked, he does not narrate his personal experiences during the revolutions. The many dangers he went through, how he was almost caught by the Spaniards when he had only one companion, how in the midst of several encounters he miraculously escaped being fatally shot, are thrilling in the extreme.

When he sided with Governor-General Wood in the political conflict which is still remembered by all, there were attempts made by his opponents to disposses him of certain parcels of friar lands which had been ceded to him but for which the formal deeds had remained unexecuted for more than six years. He insisted on his right to the possession and to the execution of the deeds of transfer. One day, however, his tenants were beseiged by the tenants of the opposing faction, armed with bolos and guns, and he himself was made to understand that if he resisted it would be all over with him. Upon hearing that, he immediately went to the spot, approached the armed men and in persuasive language, convinced them of the wrong they were about to commit, and they all left, much to the chagrin of their leader.

One day, a certain publisher came to see him to ask for an article especially prepared for his paper. The General, being a very busy man, failed to comply with the request. It was only when the publisher returned to the Islands that General Aguinaldo thought of his promise to prepare the article. Straightaway he went to the publisher and asked that he be forgiven for the neglect.

Some time before I went to the United States, efforts were made to dissuade him from joining Mr. Carl Hamilton in his oil ventures. He flatly refused to do so, saying that he had already given his word to Mr. Hamilton, and he was going to keep it.

TIME WILL TELL

The Bonifacio and Luna incidents for which he has been so severely criticized by his enemies are affairs he does not want to touch upon if he can avoid them. His invariable response to inquiries is that there are truths which as yet have not been made public, and that history will surely reveal those truths

some day. Some of the persons who know the truth are still alive.

About three weeks ago an American visitor at Kawit remarked that General Aguinaldo's is the only house where the figure of a carabao can be found right in front of it facing its street, and he asked the General the reason for putting it there. In a humorous mood, the answer came:

> It is because the carabao is the animal that best typifies my character; patient as long as things can be borne, when the limit is reached, I charge.

The Role of Aguinaldo in History*

Gabriel F. Fabella

EXACTLY THREE YEARS FROM TODAY, the Philippines celebrates the first centenary of Emilio Aguinaldo's birth. That may seem too soon considering that he was still with us a little over two years ago. But that is exactly what we must do—celebrate his centenary on March 22, 1969. General Aguinaldo certainly deserves a centennial celebration for he was one of the greatest Filipinos that ever lived. Former President Diosdado Macapagal even went to the extent of saying that he was the greatest, that is, *second* only to Jose Rizal.

Born on March 22, 1869, and died on February 6, 1964, the entire span of life of the great revolutionary leader was almost 95 years, or about three generations. None of our outstanding heroes and leaders ever attained such a venerable age. Osmeña died at 82; Quezon, at 66; Roxas, at 56; Magsaysay, at 50; Rizal, at 35; Bonifacio, at 33.

Yet, in spite of this very long life, only four years were actually devoted to active service to his country and people, i.e., from the time he was chosen head of the revolution at Tejeros, March 22, 1897, to the day of his capture by Colonel Funston on March 23, 1901. Those four years, however, are the most dramatic, perhaps the most glorious in the history of our country. A brief résumé of that episode of our history is in order.

Aguinaldo was catapulted from an obscure mayor or *capitan municipal* of a small town (Kawit) to that of supreme head of the revolution by a dramatic incident. At the Tejeros convention

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* Paper read at the program held under the auspices of the Philippine Historical Association to commemorate the 97 birth anniversary of General Emilio Aguinaldo on March 22, 1966.

(March 22, 1897) he was elected president of the revolutionary government superseding Andres Bonifacio, founder of the Katipunan, and Father of the Revolution. That important event coincided with Aguinaldo's 28th birthday. Incidentally, the old leader used to tell us that a good number of important events of his life occurred during his birthdays.

Why Aguinaldo triumphed at Tejeros is not hard to explain. The election was held in Cavite province, and naturally the people voted a Caviteño for president. Had the election been held at Morong (now Rizal province) the victory of Andres Bonifacio would have been a foregone conclusion. Even today there is such a thing as the solid Ilokano vote. How much more sectional feeling then existed in 1897 can thus be appreciated.

There was another reason for Aguinaldo's triumph. This is the fact that he had proven himself to be a great military leader. He had won a series of brilliant victories in Cavite, whereas Bonifacio was consistently losing his battles. Many Magdiwang followers must have lost their confidence in Bonifacio, and have voted Aguinaldo as the leader instead.

Bonifacio must have been greatly disappointed that he was not chosen president at the Tejeros Assembly. To him it was a mortification, a humiliation, much more so because he least expected it. Tejeros was a Magdiwang territory where his leadership was accepted without question. The majority of those present were of course members of the Magdiwang faction, and all those elected there were of the Magdiwang persuasion, except Aguinaldo. Bonifacio could not fathom the mysteries of his defeat. Maybe he did not quite understand the psychology of the voters, their narrow sectional spirit, that is. He must have come to the conclusion that he was a victim of a preconceived plot, of collusion and fraud. The next day, Bonifacio maneuvered the *Acta de Tejeros* which is described by Professor Agoncillo as seditious.

In justice to Aguinaldo it must be said that the Tejeros Convention was the first duly democratic election in this country. In the first place General Aguinaldo was not present during the voting. He was on the battlefield at Pasong Santol. In other words, he was elected *in absentia,* and if there were frauds as

alleged, Emilio could not have done it. Impartial testimonies, however, attest the fact that the voting was peaceful as well as honest, and the results were the true expression of the will of those present.

The Tejeros Convention was a turning point in the history of the revolution. It decided once and for all the question of leadership, and thereafter the patriots ceased to be divided. After a little while even the followers of Bonifacio joined the forces of Aguinaldo. In the battles that followed there was then coordination sadly lacking before this time. Unfortunately, it also resulted in the execution of Andres Bonifacio and his brother Procopio. I need not touch on this matter because that is the special assignment of our colleague, Professor Teodoro Agoncillo. Suffice it is for me to say, that the defense of Cavite under a single leadership was more determined than ever before. The superior arms of the Spaniards, however, forced Aguinaldo and his followers to abandon Cavite for a more impregnable place of defense. He decided that Biak-na-bato was such a place.

Biak-na-bato was probably a good choice. It is a part or a spot of the Sierra Madre Mountains to which the patriots could easily retreat when beleaguered. It was not easily accessible as it is now. Its distance from Manila is farther generally than that of Cavite. At this new headquarters Aguinaldo's forces were greatly augmented by accretions from central Luzon. From this vantage ground, Aguinaldo expected to wear out the Spaniards by a prolonged war, and force them to give up the fight, or grant the Filipinos certain concessions.

General Primo de Rivera who conducted part of the campaign in Cavite was not quite satisfied with the results of his efforts. He failed to capture Aguinaldo and the "rebellion" was not crushed; hence, his readiness to listen to Pedro A. Paterno who proposed to mediate between Aguinaldo and the Spaniards. It took Paterno more than five months before his efforts could bear fruit.

That Aguinaldo was not certain the Spaniards were sincere, is evidenced by the fact that on November 1, 1897, the revolutionists adopted a constitution at Biak-na-bato. Emilio Aguinaldo was made President, and the government thus established could have

continued to function were it not for the Pact of Biak-na-bato signed on December 14 and 15. As a consequence of this, hostilities ceased and Aguinaldo and some thirty followers went on a voluntary exile at Hongkong.

At Hongkong Aguinaldo deposited the P400,000 indemnity in two banks and there lived merely on the interest of the account. He refused to partition the money among themselves as demanded by Isabelo Artacho and others. He insisted that it would be used to purchase arms and munitions in case the Spaniards failed to carry out their commitments. Aguinaldo was right. The Spaniards were not sincere in their promises. It is now clear that the Spaniards wanted to get rid of Aguinaldo believing that once the leader was out of the country, the revolution would fizzle out. This was not the case, however. The revolution was actually renewed even during the absence of Aguinaldo from the country.

In passing, and as a further observation on the Pact of Biak-na-bato, it can truly be said that it was a triumph for the Filipinos. The insurgents demanded and secured hostages; they were given indemnity, although the amount was much less than promised; and they were also promised reforms. Of course, Primo de Rivera vehemently denied having promised reforms, but it is likely that there were verbal promises. Prescott F. Jernegan mentions reforms. Leandro H. Fernandez takes the promise of reforms for granted.

Perhaps the best proof that Biak-na-bato was a triumph for the Filipinos is the statement of the Spaniard and anti-Filipino author Manuel Sastron in his book *La Insurreccion en Filipinas.* He says that Biak-na-bato was the greatest factor that destroyed Spanish prestige and brought about the loss of the Spanish empire in this part of the globe. If this were so, then it was also a triumph for General Aguinaldo.

It has been intimated previously that even without Aguinaldo, the revolution would have been renewed under other leaders like Francisco Makabulos. It was Aguinaldo's return to the Philippines on May 19, 1898, however, that infused the greatest enthusiasm among our people, solidified the forces of the discontented and electrified the whole country. The *ilustrados,* the wealthy and the intellectuals joined hands with their plebeian

brothers in the common cause for independence. The first revolution in 1896 was not truly national in scope, and John Foreman can almost be justified when he said that it was a mere Tagalog rebellion. The second was a whole "nation in arms."

There is much speculation as to what induced Aguinaldo to return to the Philippines to cooperate with the Americans. Up to the time of his death General Aguinaldo maintained that consuls Wildman and Pratt promised him the independence of the Philippines as his reward. He was likely right considering the fact that the two of them received what may be called reprimands. Pratt in particular was quietly removed from the consular service later. Admiral Dewey must have made a similar promise, but he conveniently denied it to please his commander-in-chief William McKinley.

The question of promises has become academic. The case of an alliance is a little different. The supposed alliance may be inferred from the acts and actuations of both sides. George Dewey gave Aguinaldo certain rifles and ammunitions captured from the Spaniards at Cavite. Ships of Aguinaldo flying the Filipino flag were saluting and being saluted by American war vessels. Dewey and Aguinaldo were in constant conference in the early days of their cooperative efforts. The admiral encouraged Aguinaldo to fight the Spaniards while waiting for American reinforcements. Strangely enough Aguinaldo was successful, so that Dewey thought his achievements were wonderful. Filipino troops had actually cleared Luzon of Spanish forces, except for the city of Manila which was effectively under siege.

The cordial relations between Dewey and Aguinaldo abruptly changed the moment American troops arrived from the United States. Dewey could have nothing more to do with Aguinaldo who had fought American battles and saved possibly hundreds of American lives. To use a common expression, Dewey simply dropped Aguinaldo like a hot potato. Then came the capture of the city of Manila by the Americans on August 13, 1898, when Filipinos were not permitted to enter the city. In their disappointment and sullen anger some hotheads were for starting war with the American, but cooler heads prevailed. Nevertheless,

quite a number of Filipinos began to think that the American meant to substitute themselves for the Spanish masters. The capture of Manila then was the parting of the ways between Americans and Filipinos.

To avoid untoward incidents like this, Aguinaldo transferred the seat of his government from Bacoor, Cavite, to Malolos, Bulacan. There on September 15, a congress of representatives was convened. It proceeded to write a constitution for a republic of the Philippines. The constitution was adopted in October, but was not promulgated till January 23, 1899, when Aguinaldo became a constitutional president of the Malolos Republic, also known as the Second Republic of the Philippines.

Leandro H. Fernandez is authority for the statement that Aguinaldo was at the height of his power in the month of January 1899. There was truth in this statement for American travelers in Luzon testified that everywhere they went they found the people loyal to Aguinaldo. There was peace and order everywhere and this meant that Aguinaldo was backed up and supported by the Filipino people. It may be justified, therefore, to say that Aguinaldo's government was efficient as well as peaceful. This state of affairs, of course, was due to Aguinaldo's ability to choose the right man as his advisers like Apolinario Mabini. The "sublime paralytic", despite his physical handicaps, was made of similar stuff as Aguinaldo. He was honest, patriotically devoted to his country's interests, and incorruptible, with the added advantage of intellectual preparation and training. The success of Aguinaldo's government was in large measure due to Mabini. Not that Aguinaldo blindly followed Mabini's advice, for Aguinaldo had a mind of his own. Once convinced that he was right, he went ahead against the advice of his friends and co-workers. The declaration of independence was a case in point.

In an article appearing in the *Historical Bulletin* for March 1959,* our colleague Teodoro Agoncillo dealt at some length on one of Aguinaldo's traits — his humility — which he says is the base of much of his personality and greatness. "Aguinaldo's humility is wisdom itself," Agoncillo continues. Our friend is right.

* See below (this *Bulletin*) where article referred to is also reprinted.—*Ed.*

During some ten years of association with Aguinaldo, I found him to be modest, amiable, soft-spoken. He attracted instead of repelled people and one feels at home in his presence, occasionally embarassed only when as a young person, the old man would address him with the traditional Tagalog word "po", the unfailing sign of courtesy, of which Aguinaldo was a personification. He was also a perfect gentleman.

These are sure signs of greatness, and these are probably what our friend Emilio P. Virata meant when he wrote that brief article entitled "To be great is to be simple." And next to the family of the general, Virata should know what he is talking about.

The seeming idyllic situation described in a previous paragraph did not last long. On the night of February 4, or scarcely two weeks as constitutional president, war broke out between the Americans and Filipinos. While crossing San Juan Bridge that separates San Juan del Monte and Manila, Filipino soldiers were fired upon and killed by the American sentry. When this news was flashed to the United States, it was made to appear that Filipinos were the aggressors with the consequence that the Treaty of Paris then pending action was ratified by the United States Senate.

The Filipino-American imbroglio was long expected since the events of August 13th. As a matter of fact Philippine-American relations were growing from bad to worse as mutual suspicion developed. Then on December 21, 1898, President McKinley issued what was called the "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation wherein he claimed jurisdiction over the Philippines. It revealed once and for all that the United States meant to occupy the country with the use of force. This engendered a great deal of ill-feeling among the Filipinos, and the events of February 4th were but a culmination of pent-up emotions. There was even a suspicion that the shooting was premeditated for a purpose.

The outbreak of war with the indiscriminate killings that followed was protested by General Aguinaldo who asked the American military governor for a parley to settle the matter. Elwell S. Otis, however, would not listen saying that the "war having

begun let it continue to its grim end." Aguinaldo had no recourse but to declare war on the Americans. Had Aguinaldo and the Filipinos not defended their newly established republic, they would have been unworthy of liberty, and fight they did even if they knew they had no chance against the well-equipped and well-fed American soldiers. What surprised the Americans was the fighting tenacity of the Filipinos, so that the resistance lasted more than two years.

The so-called Filipino-American War was a one-sided affair. It was murder in the first degree, and Richard B. Sheridan, an English barrister who was in the Philippines during that period noted that "the Americans in forty-eight hours slaughtered more defenseless people that Spain did in two centuries." And he calls all those who died in that war as "martyrs" to the cause of freedom.

The subsequent flight of Aguinaldo was a story of hair-splitting escapes and untold hardships. Leandro H. Fernandez, who read the original diary of Dr. Villa* in the United States archives once remarked that just for Aguinaldo's sufferings during his odyssey, he deserved the pension that was granted him by the Philippine Legislature during the days of Congressman Emilio P. Virata already alluded to. But on a ruse which was the subject of Congressional investigation in the United States, Aguinaldo was captured by Colonel Funston on March 23, 1901. Not long after this event Aguinaldo took an oath of allegiance to the United States and counseled his countrymen to lay down their arms. Thus, Aguinaldo's active participation in our country's history ended.

In connection with the capture of Aguinaldo at Palanan, Professor Agoncillo, remarked that "Had he died in battle, had he fought back mercilessly when some of his own countrymen sold him down the river at Palanan and died fighting to the last ditch . . . his monument would have graced every town plaza."

This speaker is not aware if there is now a monument in honor of Aguinaldo in any town plaza of the Philippines. All he knows is that the Philippine Historical Association was the

* See below (this *Bulletin*) where the Diary referred to is published. — *Ed.*

first civic organization to order a bust of Aguinaldo, the same that now graces this occasion. The great Filipino sculptor Guillermo E. Tolentino did it for us for a thousand pesos, and we did not count the cost. We trust that other civic organizations may follow our example and work actually for the raising of monuments to Aguinaldo in as many towns in the Philippines as possible. Lesser figures in our history have their monuments. General Candido Tirona has one in the heart of the town of Kawit. Why not one for "Capitan Miong"?

But does it matter much if no monuments are raised in honor of Aguinaldo? Yes, it does.

It is necessary to have some tangible symbols of heroes and great men of our country to serve as constant reminders of our social, political, and other obligations. Human memory is short, and without monuments to our great, succeeding generations might forget them altogether. We have monuments to Jose Rizal in every town plaza, yet our leaders enacted R.A. 1425 prescribing the teaching of Rizal in all schools of the country. The reason is obvious. Our younger generations must be reminded of Rizal and what he did for our country. We should do the same for Aguinaldo and other heroes.

This country must not and cannot afford to forget Aguinaldo for all that he had done for his country and his people:

(1) Aguinaldo was the first man to make the world conscious of the existence of the Philippines by leading two revolutions against Spain, and a war of defense of their newly established republic against the United States. As a consequence, he is the first Filipino whose name appears in the world encyclopedias.

(2) He helped to weld the Filipinos into a nation through deeds rather than by pen or words;

(3) He was the first man to demonstrate that a Filipino is capable of running an orderly government of his own making;

(4) He set an example of honesty, integrity and incorruptibility in the government service;

(5) He left happy memories of the First and Second Republics of the Philippines; and finally,

(6) He bequeathed permanent legacies to our people.

(a) A Philippine independence day

(b) A Filipino flag, and

(c) A national anthem.

General Aguinaldo in History*

Teodoro A. Agoncillo

TIME MAY AFFORD a man the long perspective to reinforce his belief in personal destiny, yet it also works in such mysterious ways as to make any man, whatever his antecedents, its own plaything. Thus, General Emilio Aguinaldo, having played his role of leader, patriot, and hero at the most critical moment of the country's history, has been victimized by time. His long life-span, more than half a century of which he spent in comparative quiet, with desultory excursions into politics, gave him sharp perspectives and tragic-comic memories which enriched his personal experiences, but which robbed him of the chance to make himself the foremost Filipino hero. Had he died in battle, had he fought back mercilessly when some of his own men sold him down the river at Palanan and died fighting to the last ditch, like his young rear-guard commander, Gregorio del Pilar, his monument today would have graced every town plaza.

There was something in General Aguinaldo's destiny that marked him off, first, as a young upstart — able, patriotic, and even brilliant at times and, second, as a retired hero — quiet, unassuming, and calculating. Born into a family that was not distinguished either for intellectual attainments or for economic prominence, Aguinaldo tasted a little of Spanish education, taught for a while, and then took to commerce as a means of fortifying his family's sagging economy. He was until then an ordinary young man known only as straight-backed, quiet, and soft-spoken. And then the Katipunan, with its incendiary leaflets and revolutionary aims, extended its plebeian arms to Cavite, where the

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* Reprinted from this *Bulletin* (March, 1959), v. 3, p. 1, p. 7-14.

tradition of robust manhood is expressed in deadly combats. It was the eve of the Revolution against Spain, and Aguinaldo, having now achieved a sort of fame as a newly-elected headman of his town, took the first significant step in his life by enlisting as a member of the revolutionary secret society.

Individualists to a certain extent, the Caviteños divided themselves into two rival Katipunan factions, each vying to outdo the other. So far, the young mayor had not made himself conspicuous as a potential leader of Cavite. Mariano Alvarez, Baldomero Aguinaldo, and Candido Tirona were far above him in leadership. There was, in fact, no sign that young Aguinaldo would rise as the foremost leader of them all. Yet at one stroke, he succeeded in making himself their acknowledged leader in Cavite by the simple expedient of leading an assault group against the Spanish garrison a few days after the outbreak of the Revolution. For Aguinaldo, it was the beginning of his rapid ascent to power. Thus the upstart.

Some heroes are the product of their time; others create the circumstances of their time; while still others are both creator and the progeny of their age. Aguinaldo was the creature of his own age. Without any military education, his courage and fortitude led him to the arena where men's strength of character and physical endurance are tested. Circumstances, then, led him to develop his potential powers and to devise the means with which to translate latent possibilities into swift and meaningful action. Thus, the series of brilliant victories in Cavite marked him for future leadership not only in Cavite, but throughout the revolt-ridden areas of Central and Southern Luzon. The stage of creative activity had now shifted from organization to active military campaigns, and Aguinaldo, with an inherent capacity for military strategy, exceeded even his wildest dreams by putting the enemy on the run. Since November 9, 1896, when the battle of Binakayan was fought, Aguinaldo had made himself indispensable to the insurgents.

To a certain extent, his rise to power and popularity was tragic. For precisely because of this popularity, Bonifacio, the great organizer, saw his star sink into the horizon — never to rise again. It was, of course, through no fault of Aguinaldo that

the Supremo found himself displaced in the esteem of the Cavite revolutionists. With a man in their midst who had made the enemy feel the concentrated wrath of centuries of oppression it was inevitable that the Caviteños, like other Filipinos, should instinctively make an appeal to their regionalistic pride to make their man the leader of the entire revolutionary movement. And so, seven months after the outbreak of the revolution, the obscure mayor of Kawit found himself the lord and master of the revolution.

Modesty is not necessarily an ingredient of greatness, but to Aguinaldo it was the necessary base on which much of his personality and, perhaps, greatness, rest. It is not much of an achievement for a man of high attainments to practise or at least show a semblance of modesty, even if assumed, but it certainly is nothing short of superhuman for a common man to remain modest — and humble — in the face of success. For the common man as a rule does not have in his system that psychological brake which restrains overwhelming passions and exuberant enthusiasm that usually override his crude rational processes. Aguinaldo is a happy exception.

From the moment of his rise to power at the Tejeros Convention in March 1897, Aguinaldo remained unruffled and unaffected by the realization that he alone, among the millions of Filipinos, wielded extraordinary powers. In an age of crisis such as that in which he lived, he could have led the life of an Oriental potentate, surrounded as he was by loyal and hero-worshipping men and women. He could have put to the sword those he deemed dangerous to his personal security and power and acquit himself creditably by citing instances in world history in which the lesser man invariably was the victim of the grim struggle for power. Aguinaldo, however, did nothing of the sort. He could have ordered not merely the arrest but the outright execution of the Bonifacio brothers soon after the Great Plebeian masterminded the seditions *Acta de Tejeros*. Circumstances and raison d'etat favored Aguinaldo, but always cautious and humble in a way that could be easily taken for weakness, he allowed the Bonifacio brothers and their men to move about freely. It was not until he witnessed what he considered the dangerous drift toward coun-

ter-revolution that he ordered the arrest and trial of Bonifacio. Far from exercising his absolute powers, he commiserated with the condemned men and blunted the edge of the sharp military tribunal's decision by changing the death penalty to banishment. The impulse to take the law into his hands was strong, for Bonifacio, to Aguinaldo's way of thinking, had threatened not Aguinaldo, but the revolutionary movement. Yet he preferred to temper justice with mercy even at such a stage when complete unity in the ranks was necessary. If this decision was not carried out, it is not so much because of loss of faith in the condemned as because strong pressure beyond his control forced him to bow to the inevitable.

It was not only Bonifacio who crossed Aguinaldo's path, but his men as well. To a practical man with savage passions, Bonifacio's henchmen, General Artemio Ricarte and General Pio del Pilar, would have been liquidated in the name of unity. But Aguinaldo, more understanding than practical, not only tolerated them but, more significantly, gave them positions of responsibility in the army. That this step was wise was shown by the loyalty of the two generals to the ideals of the Republic and by leading men of faith and valor in the field against the Americans.

Time and again, during his career as the foremost Filipino leader, Aguinaldo showed his humility to the extreme. Few men with limited academic background could have risen above their source. Both in Hongkong as an exile and in the Philippines as the Republic's President, he showed an awareness of his shortcomings and tried to overcome them by understanding, tolerance, and humility. Thus, he surrounded himself, while at Hongkong, with brilliant and academically prepared Filipinos, listened to their advice, and made significant decisions based on their advice. He never gave himself to lending an ear to some latecomers; nor did he change his decisions on the basis of rumors timed to reach him at the proper psychological moment. He gave his love and faith to the men he instinctively knew to be honest and implicitly believed in their wisdom.

Apolinario Mabini, a sick and unknown lawyer, won his admiration and confidence in a way that shows how power, in Aguinaldo's case, failed to stifle the humility that was inherent

in him. Unknown to him, Mabini came to his notice when Felipe Agoncillo, then in Hongkong, advised him to enlist the Paralytic's services. Back in Cavite in May 1898, Aguinaldo, learning that Mabini was an invalid resting in Los Baños, had hundreds of men take turns at carrying Mabini's hammock to Kawit. The next scene was dramatic. Before him was an emaciated man, a paraplegic, whose sensitive face told him that the man was hardly qualified to take the risks required of men made of sterner stuff. Deep inside him he thought that it was a mistake to have asked Mabini to come. Of what use would such a very sick man be to him and to the cause of the revolution? Moments of silence intervened. Then the sick man spoke. That was enough. Mabini's voice — sure, composed, quiet but firm — broke Aguinaldo's icy feeling. From there on, until Mabini's fall a year later, Aguinaldo's humility became captive to Mabini's brilliance and integrity.

He listened to Mabini, referred serious matters to him, informed him of his moves and counter-moves, and made decisions independently of Mabini's advice when he thought that he was right. Even when he disagreed with his advisers, particularly with Mabini, he never lost his temper; neither did he express his disagreement or feelings in a manner that would hurt them. Always in his notes and letters to his subordinates, he addressed them politely, using the second person plural (*inyo, ninyo*) and the particle *po*, which in Tagalog is the mark of good breeding.

In some cases, humility is but a mask to cover up mediocrity. In others it is a hallmark of wisdom. Aguinaldo's humility is wisdom itself. Though humble, he could disagree with his wise men and make his decisions all by himself. Thus, he proposed the proclamation of independence to which Mabini was strenuously opposed on the ground that it was premature and that the first duty of the government was to reorganize the departments and to strengthen the internal organization. Aguinaldo demurred and argued that the proclamation of independence would, first, arouse the enthusiasm of the people and so rally them to the cause of the revolution, and second, it would draw the interest of the foreign powers to the struggle of Filipinos for freedom. There was a strong pressure on Aguinaldo to give up his idea of proclaiming

Philippine independence, but he stuck to his conviction and won. Here is humility asserting itself without exciting the pain of a wounded pride.

There were times when Aguinaldo's nerves, already frayed by military and administrative burden, almost snapped at the rumors and intrigues that would have destroyed a lesser man. Antonio Luna, who had earlier denounced the revolution, was taken in as a field officer and director of war on the recommendation of Felipe Agoncillo to whom Luna appealed in Hongkong when he was on his way back to the Philippines. Now in power, Luna, with his tempestuous temper, began pushing everybody around, disarming officers and enlisted men whose courage did not appeal to his military ideals, and ordering houses occupied by the Americans burned to the ground. On top of this, he left his post at Kalumpit, Bulakan, at a time when the Americans were about to launch an offensive against the town, and hurried to San Fernando, Pampanga, with his infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to take punitive action against General Tomas Mascardo for insubordination. His unceremonious withdrawal led to the debacle at Bagbag and to the capture of Kalumpit by the enemy. As commander-in-chief, Aguinaldo could have ordered Luna's court martial. Again, it was his humility and tolerance that led him to leave Luna unpunished. He knew he had the situation well in hand and, therefore, could afford to tolerate Luna's tantrums. I do not believe that Aguinaldo showed weakness of character in this instance, for had he been weak, as others suppose, he could not have welded the army, the politicians, and the people together for long, particularly at a time when a sector of the intellectuals and the wealthy was trying to undermine the administration either by secretly dickering with the Americans or by passing laws inimical to the economic stability of the harassed Republic. What Aguinaldo showed was tolerance and extreme humility which some people thought spelled weakness. Humility is essentially an act of courage; it takes courage to appreciate one's shortcomings and to recognize brilliance in others, however blinding this brilliance may be, if only because the Philippine army needed it to bring its hidden qualities to a polish. And Luna was undoubtedly a brilliant man.

There is another quality of leadership that Aguinaldo possessed but which most of the Filipino leaders sadly lack. It is his uncanny ability to choose the best man for each position. Under any other Filipino executive, Mabini would have been laughed at as a useless cripple. Luna would have been tarred and feathered for his denunciation of the revolution against Spain. Felipe Buencamino, Sr., an arch reactionary, would have been executed for having been the tool of the friars. Paterno would have been jailed for arguing, during the negotiations prior to the Truce of Biak-na-bato, in favor of Primo de Rivera. Cayetano Arellano would have been arrested or at least ostracized and denounced for his betrayal of the cause of the Republic. Benito Legarda would have been jailed for his pro-American sentiments. But Aguinaldo knew better than to punish the "erring" intellectuals and men of wealth. With an even temper that never, even under extremely trying circumstances, rose to a pitch, he succeeded in prolonging the life of the Republic for almost three years, harassed as he was by the bickerings within and by superior enemy force without.

There was something in his personality, as in his deep humility, that made men around and below him respect his integrity and honesty. Bad politics had imputed to him the sin of having a grasping hand — that he had appropriated for himself the ₱400,000 given to him by the Spanish government in the Philippines as payment for his exile to Hongkong. Yet the original records dispel such doubts in his integrity and honesty. He kept the money in two Hongkong banks, withdrew only a part of the interest to pay for his and his men's modest subsistence, and noted down every centavo spent by the exiles. There was, in fact, dissatisfaction among the exiles because Aguinaldo was too strict with the money. He could have divided the money among the rebel leaders, as suggested by Isabelo Artacho, and lived in peace and plenty either in a foreign land or in the Philippines. But Aguinaldo, having a one-track mind and infused with the revolutionary ideals, chose to suffer and to wait.

When, late in 1898, Aguinaldo, tired of the bureaucratic entanglements and fed up with administrative duties, expressed his desire to resign as President and to remain merely as a field

commander, Felipe Buencamino, Sr., getting wind of it during dinner, dashed off a long-winded letter imploring his chief not to do much a rash thing as, he said, Aguinaldo alone stood "as a symbol of the unity of the Filipinos in their struggle for independence." If this letter can be taken as a yardstick to measure the faith and loyalty of the Filipinos to their chief executive, then one can deduce that only Aguinaldo stood between unity and chaos. This deduction is not at all far-fetched, for upon the capture of Aguinaldo active Filipino resistance against the Americans collapsed.

With his capture, the tenuous thread that held together the disparate temper and tendencies of the Republic snapped and a new construct was formalized into an era of suppressed nationalism.

What, then, is Aguinaldo's stature in history?

Undoubtedly, he was the foremost figure of the revolution from 1897 to his capture in 1901. It was a short period of exactly four years, and yet what a period! Within that short span of time, Aguinaldo had made the world take notice of the small archipelago whose inhabitants were heretofore considered as nothing less than savages. He had made the cocky Americans wonder at the grit of the "little brown men" whose inferior weapons brought death to thousands of the enemy. Despite sanguine predictions of the American military commanders that the Philippine campaign would "end soon," it took them two solid years to conquer Aguinaldo's ill-equipped and poorly prepared army.

Whatever mistakes Aguinaldo had committed, it seems certain that his place in Philippine history is secure. The Philippine Republic which he shaped and led gave the Philippines its most glorious and significant epoch. His failings are insignificant compared with his achievements. A man, whether he be an artist, a writer, a historian, or a chief executive, should be judged in his totality. Viewed in this light, one may say: "Well done, General Aguinaldo."

If I were to visualize the form-history of the Philippines, I would draw a prism on one side of which several rays of light converge to form the focal point and on the other side another

set of rays emanating from this point. The converging rays represent the factors that led to discontent; the focal point represents the Philippine Revolution; and the rays emanating from the focal point represent the significant events after the fall of the Republic.

Aguinaldo certainly occupies a distinctive place in that focal point from which all other achievements of the Filipinos have their origin.

Aguinaldo and the Death of Bonifacio and Luna*

Teodoro A. Agoncillo

WHEN GENERAL EMILIO AGUINALDO died on February 6, there followed some loose talks about so-called revelations on the mysterious death of Andres Bonifacio, Father of the Katipunan, and General Antonio Luna, the most brilliant Filipino officer during the Filipino-American war. I have been asked by friends to say something about those tragic events, and even newspaper columnists — among them my friend and *comprovinciano*. Jose L. Guevara of the *Manila Times* — hinted to me and to Carlos Quirino to write the "now-it-can-told" stories. This fact is rather distressing at least to me, for the so-called mystery of the death of the two Filipino heroes has already been cleared in two of my books: the death of Bonifacio in *The Revolt of the Masses* and that of Luna in *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic*. That there should be an ardent wish even at this date to know the whys and wherefores of those two similar events is a measure not of our people's sense of history, but of their peripheral interest in historical writings. At any rate, I am here to recapitulate the facts and interpretations of the two events and to add a few belated thoughts on the subject.

Up to the outbreak of the Revolution in 1896, Andres Bonifacio had been the dominant figure of the revolutionary Katipunan which gave force and direction to the Filipino mass movement. He was a great organizer who, stepping beyond the limitations of his scholastic status, gathered together the loose strands of the people's faith and wove them into a rope of unity that bound

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them to the ideals of an emerging nation. His usefulness and significance ended here, for he showed little aptitude in the clash of arms and the din of battles — an almost fatal deficiency. He nearly lost his life and, in perspective, gradually lost his prestige as leader of the people in wrathful agony.

As if Death had marked him for poetic tragedy, he crossed the rough terrain of Rizal to Cavite upon the invitation of the rival revolutionary factions in this province not to harness and direct the revolutionary potential, but to mediate between the warring leaders and their followers. The spirited welcome he received from the Caviteños enthused Bonifacio, for on this soil tainted with the deep-red blood of the recently fallen comrades-in-arms he found exhilaration in the acclamation of his countrymen. But this enthusiasm, however, was fatal. In the eyes of the proud Caviteños, he acted imprudently, like a king, they said and so they looked upon him more as an intruder than as a peacemaker. The seed of envy and discontent was sown which subsequently occasioned the birth of tragedy in Tejeros.

Bonifacio was uncompromising in his revolutionary posture, while the rising Emilio Aguinaldo was elastic in his. The two temperaments clashed when Aguinaldo, moved by a sense of humanity, ordered the release of the Spanish prisoners of war. Bonifacio looked upon this act with a hostility that compelled him to order the arrest of the prisoners and their Filipino escorts. Viewed from this distance, his act in countermanding Aguinaldo's order was justified, for it was a season of death, a period of seasoned fear and danger and war. The armed disturbance had made the enemy more unjust and more brutal and, therefore, not disposed to forgive and forget. Must the Filipino rebels meet this attitude with softness? The paramount question, insofar as Bonifacio was concerned, was "we or they." It could not have been otherwise, for all was fair in war.

There is no evidence to show that Aguinaldo took any drastic step to win back what he had lost in face. With an inscrutable poise, he continued leading his men to battle after battle, allowing Bonifacio to enjoy the uncertain security of the soil that had been drenched with the blood of Caviteños. He did not force the issue against Bonifacio, for he knew that many of his *com-*

provincianos were already seething with anger that would be released in time to engulf the Supremo. The Caviteños behaved accordingly, and soon, rumors, all unfounded and unverified, circulated that Bonifacio had been keeping the people's conrtibutions for himself and that he was a Mason, an unbeliever. The rumors were fantastic, but they nevertheless served to project a distorted image of their Supremo. Rumors have their potent uses during a period of disturbance when the minds of men are easily unhinged by fear. And so, the Caviteños instinctively resorted to rumors to cut down Bonifacio to size. His being a Mason was magnified, distorted. The propagandists of this campaign of hate did not realize or refused to see that their own *Heneral* Miong was a Mason. Yet, in the context of the period and in the physicai backdrop that lent respectability to rumors, Bonifacio's Masonry was considered devilish, while that of Aguinaldo was angelic.

The silent conflict between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo burst into the open during the tumultous Tejeros convention of March 22, 1897. It was Aguinaldo's birthday, and he was spending it quietly waiting for the enemy attack against the barrio of Salitran, Dasmariñas. He was not aware that an election was being held that afternoon, for nobody notified him of the event. Yet, in his absence, the convention assembled catapulted him to the highest position — that of president of the Revolutionary Government. The election would have gone on peacefully had it not been for the imprudence of Daniel Tirona who, ignoring the gentlemen's agreement concluded previously to respect whoever was to be elected to any position, questioned Bonifacio's fitness to occupy the position of secretary of the interior. The Supremo's nerves had already been frayed by the rumors accumulating and circulating about him and by his failure to persuade the convention not to supersede the Katipunan with a new government. Tirona's imprudence snapped Bonifacio's nerves, and the latter forthwith denounced the proceedings and nullified the results of the election in his capacity as Supremo. Bristling with anger, he left the session hall with his followers.

The following day, March 23, Bonifacio and his leading men, including General Artemio Ricarte — who was elected captain-general the previous day — met at the same estate-house in

Tejeros and drew up a document, known as the *Acta de Tejeros*, wherein they denounced the election as rigged and, therefore, null and void. Subsequently, Bonifacio and his men, including General Pio del Pilar and Mariano Noriel, met at the estate-house of Naik and drew up a document setting forth their intention to establish a new government and army independent of that of Aguinaldo. These two documents clearly and unequivocally announced the decision of the signers not to recognized Aguinaldo's government and, on the other hand, to establish another government with a separate military arm. Legally, Bonifacio's position was weak, but legal niceties are not taken seriously in turbulent times.

Aguinaldo was informed of Bonifacio's meeting with his men at the estate-house. Although on the rack, Aguinaldo hurried to the estate-house to confront the Supremo. A man of steel nerves, Aguinaldo quietly rebuked Bonifacio, in very polite language for keeping him out of the meeting. Aguinaldo had hardly left the estate-house when Bonifacio and his men sought refuge in Limbon, Indang.

Aguinaldo's surprise at Bonifacio's splinter movement was, I believe, a mock one. He probably expected it. His surprise was feigned for effect, that is to say, he wanted Bonifacio to believe that he, Aguinaldo, wanted a reconciliation with the former — a reconciliation which would strengthen, not lessen, his presidential position. Aguinaldo may have been tainted with naivete, but he was shrewd and cunning. He had not, so far, moved against Bonifacio for he probably knew that Bonifacio would, sooner or later, fall to the ground like a ripe fruit. He had no intention of pursuing the Supremo, for he knew that he was lord and master on Cavite soil. But his men exerted pressure on him to arrest Bonifacio and his brothers, for they posed a danger to the rebel cause. To allow Bonifacio to leave Cavite was tantamount to giving him the opportunity to divide the rebels into two rival camps -- a situation that would be tragic in view of the spirited offensives the enemy had been conducting against them. Under this pressure, Aguinaldo commissioned Colonel Agapito Bonzon, Jose Ignacio Pawa, and Felipe Topacio to arrest Bonifacio.

The arresting officers and their men succeeded in capturing Bonifacio and his men after a skirmish. Bonifacio was wounded in the throat and left arm. His younger brother, Ciriaco, was shot down, and his brother, Procopio, was arrested. The Supremo was borne in a hammock to the municipal building of Indang. On April 29, the wounded Supremo was transferred to Naik, where the trial began on the same day. I shall not go into the details of the trial; I have translated the proceedings of this trial in my *The Writings and Trial of Andres Bonifacio.* It is sufficient for the present purpose to say that only the testimony — and a perverted one — of Bonifacio's own man, Pedro Giron, was believed in by the men who investigated Bonifacio. There is nothing in the testimonies of the other witnesses that could condemn Bonifacio and his brother Procopio to death. Bonifacio was not even allowed to confront the hostile witness on the ground that he was killed in battle. The truth, however, is that Giron outlived Bonifacio by many years. Above all, Bonifacio's defense counsel, Placido Martinez, wrapped up his client in a plethora of denunciations, pleaded only for pardon for the man who had "done the evil deeds." In the history of jurisprudence, civil or military, Martinez's actuation was unprecedented and uncalled for. Under such circumstances — trial in a hostile territory by persons who acted as accusers and judges at the same time — Bonifacio's fate had been sealed from the beginning. Even his brother Procopio who, by all testimonies, including that of Pedro Giron, had nothing to do with the counter-revolutionary movement and with the alleged attempt to usurp the powers of the established government, was condemned to death.

On May 8, upon the receipt of the death sentence, General Aguinaldo commuted the death penalty to banishment. Thus runs the commutation:

> I deem it proper to pardon Mr. Andres Bonifacio and Procopio Bonifacio from the penalty of death and to change this to an indefinite exile, a punishment which will be served in an isolated place and they will be guarded by prison officials and not allowed to talk to each other and likewise to other persons . . .

On the same day, the commutation order was presented to the defense counsels Placido Martinez in representation of An-

dres Bonifacio, and Teodoro Gonzalez, in representation of Procopio. Yet the document stating that the death penalty was shown to Andres and Procopio shows only two signatures; those of Lazaro Makapagal, the secretary of the council of war which tried the Bonifacio brothers, and Procopio. There is no signature of Andres. Which means that he was not notified of the commutation. In a separate document, it was made to appear that the commutation order was shown to Andres, but the document has neither the signature of Andres nor of Makapagal who, in all documents of the trial, attested to the veracity of the proceedings.

The documents, therefore, are clear: Bonifacio and his brother were not to be shot but to be banished to some designated place. But on May, 10, General Mariano Noriel handed Major Lazaro Makapagal a sealed envelop whose contents spelled the death of the brothers.

I quote this document in full:

Major MAKAPAGAL:

In accordance with the order of the Council of War held at Maragondong on May 8, against the brothers Andres and Procopio Bonifacio, who have been sentenced to be shot to death, you and your soldiers under you are ordered to carry out the judgment.

You are hereby warned that for any negligence or carelessness that you commit in carrying out this order, you will be held responsible and subjected to the rigor of the laws in the code of Spanish Military Court.

May God guard you for many years.

(Sgd.) M. NORIEL

Maragondong, May 10, 1897.

In accordance with this order, Major Makapagal had the Bonifacio brothers shot at the foot of Mt. Buntis, recently identified as Mt. Nagpatong.

For many years, the question that disturbed the scholars of Philippine history was: If there was a commutation order, as indeed there was, why were the Bonifacio brothers executed? Teodoro M. Kalaw, in ruminating upon this mystery, pointedly asked: "In brief, if the accused had to die, why were they pardoned? And if they were pardoned, why were they executed?"

During my college days, I applied myself to the task of solving the so-called mystery, and, in an article, "The Tragedy of Tejeros and Its Aftermath," published in 1934, I pointed out that there was a discrepancy between the testimony of General Pio del Pilar, who maintained that the commutation order was not received at General Noriel's headquarters in time to stay the execution of Bonifacio, and the facts of the case. I advanced the theory that since Noriel's headquarters and those of Aguinaldo were in the same town, it was impossible for Noriel not to have received the latter's commutation order on the same day. Since there was a lapse of two days between the issuance of the commutation order and the execution, it would seem, I added, that General Pio del Pilar's excuse was lame.

I pursued this line of thinking when I was preparing my book *The Revolt of the Masses* in 1947 to 1948 and, to clear all doubts, I interviewed General Aguinaldo at his San Nicolas St. headquarters several times. I coaxed him into making a clean breast of it all in order to clarify matters before he passed to eternity. Obviously, the General was impressed with my passionate appeal, for in a few minutes he was telling me what appeared to be the whole story. It was the first time that he opened up on a subject which he considered "delicate". Here is his explanation for the so-called mystery.

The very day that he sent his commutation order to General Noriel, the latter and General Pio del Pilar — both of whom, it must be remembered, were with Bonifacio concocting the Naik military agreement which laid the plans for the establishment of an army independent of that of Aguinaldo's Revolutionary Government — rushed to his headquarters and pleaded with him to withdraw his commutation order. He was made to understand that his order would place the revolutionary forces in an untenable position, for there would be a bifurcation in their ranks — a dangerous situation in view of the impending Spanish offensive against Maragondon. The poet and historian, Clemente Jose Zulueta, and General Mamerto Natividad — both of whom Bonifacio had accused of being stooges of the friars — threw the weight of their reputation by seconding Noriel and del Pilar's importunity. Aguinaldo was young and not outstanding in in-

tellectual matters, and faced with a potential danger within and an actual danger without, he acceded to his subordinate officer's request. He withdrew the commutation order — verbally — and allowed the original decision to be carried out. Hence the execution of May 10.

The mystery, therefore, of the execution of the Bonifacio brothers is no longer a mystery. But a problem has taken its place — one that can no longer be solved since the participants are all dead. Studying all the facts of the case, one may ask why General Noriel and General Pio del Pilar, during their lifetime, did not say that General Aguinaldo withdrew his commutation order upon their representations. There are two possibilities: first, they did not want to appear as villains at a time when Bonifacio was being revered as hero and patriot; or second, they did not really make any representations with General Aguinaldo to withdraw his commutation order. There is here an understandable lying either on the part of Noriel and del Pilar, or on the part of General Aguinaldo. On the former's request for Aguinaldo to withdraw his commutation order, we have only the self-serving testimony of Aguinaldo. Was he telling the truth? We have no way of knowing, for Noriel and del Pilar are all dead and can no longer answer Aguinaldo. This is one of the questions of Philippine historiography that cannot, for the moment, be resolved satisfactorily.

At least to my mind, one thing is certain: Bonifacio and his brother were not given a fair trial. It is quite clear to perceptive students of the Revolution that there was an intrigue against him and that there was an ill-concealed intention to liquidate him for personal reasons or for reasons of state, or for both. If the commutation order was really shown to Bonifacio, why does not his signature appear on the document? Makapagal explained this away by saying that the Supremo could not sign it "on account of the fact that his hand has some serious trouble," meaning, of course, that Bonifacio's hand had a wound, and therefore, could not use it for the purpose of signing the document acknowledging that he had read it. This is an excuse that cannot be accepted, for the very documents themselves relate that Bonifacio was wounded in the left, not in the right hand. And he

was a right-handed man, according to the testimonies not only of his wife, but also of his friend and former neighbor, the late Guillermo Magsangkay. We can only deduce that the commutation order was never shown to Andres Bonifacio. Why? Here my answer is speculative, namely, to keep Bonifacio in ignorance of the document and, therefore, to keep him from protesting his execution.

So much for the death of Bonifacio. We now come to the equally tragic death of General Antonio Luna. There has been whispered innuendoes that General Aguinaldo, not satisfied with the liquidation of Bonifacio, extended his bloody arm to General Luna who, it has been claimed, stood in the way of the President of the first Republic. The mystery in the case of Luna's death is more baffling than that of Bonifacio, which is now, I hope, accounted for and explained.

Antonio Luna, who belonged to the *ilustrado* class, was a man of explosive temper. In 1896 when the Katipunan was discovered and the Spanish response to it was swift and vigorous, he impressed the Spanish inquisitors with his strong denunciation of the society which he and a large segment of his class considered boorish. Exiled to Spain, he read military history and imbibed a martial spirit that imparted on him the air of a conqueror. He was in Hongkong when the Spanish-American war broke out. Like the perceptive members of the Hongkong Junta, Luna foresaw the coming of the Filipino-American conflict. He approached Felipe Agoncillo for a letter of recommendation to Aguinaldo, for he was then convinced that he was needed in the coming struggle with a new conqueror. In Manila, he presented his credentials to Aguinaldo who, needing men with a military background, appointed him brigadier-general and director of war in September, 1898 — over the sullen objections of Aguinaldo's veteran comrades-in-arms. In less than two months, Luna rose to division general and, at the opening of the Filipino-American hostilities on February 4, 1899, to chief of operations and commander-in-chief to Central Luzon.

Luna tried to improve not only the discipline but also the organization of Aguinaldo's army. It was a tremendous task, for the Filipino troops had nothing but raw courage and fierce love

of country to speak of. He was still trying to solve these military problems when the incident at Balsahan Bridge, San Juan, exploded to terminate the shaky Filipino-American cooperation and friendship.

Luna's tempestous temper first flared up during the operations aimed at re-taking Manila from the Americans. On February 24, Luna, upon returning from San Fernando, Pampanga, where he visited his sick sister, saw his lines breaking down and immediately ordered Captain Pedro Janolino, commander of the Kawit company, to join the fray. Janolino refused, saying that he had been instructed to obey nobody but Aguinaldo. Luna's first impulse was to shoot down Janolino for insubordination, but the proverbial cooler heads intervened. Instead, Luna disarmed the Kawit company and sent them to Malolos, expecting Aguinaldo to punish the erring officer. To Luna's surprise and chagrin, Aguinaldo reinstated the Kawit men. Luna was furious and looked upon Aguinaldo's actuation as an insult to his honor and dignity. He tendered his resignation as chief of operations, but Aguinaldo did not accept it.

Meanwhile, President McKinley sent the Schurman Commission to the Philippines to lay down the bases of Filipino-American relations. One of the bases was the enforcement of the "authority of the United States throughout the Philippines" — which was promptly rejected by the party of irreconcilables headed by Mabini and Luna. When Aguinaldo expressed his desire for a cessation of hostilities in order to give the people and his colleagues the opportunity to decide on the matter and, consequently sent a commission, headed by Manuel Arguelles, to Manila to talk things over with the American authorities, Luna promptly ordered the arrest of Arguelles and clamped him in jail. When the Mabini Cabinet fell in May, Paterno took over the premiership. Buencamino became the foreign secretary. The political orientation of the Republic, then passed from one of independence to one of appeasement. Luna, who shared Mabini's political ideology, was furious and had the members of the Cabinet arrested. Aguinaldo released them later.

Luna's anger increased when he met Buencamino who was then with Aguinaldo and other high officials of the government.

Luna accused Buencamino of being a traitor and an autonomist. The latter, stung by the pointed accusation, reminded Luna of his desertion of Kalumpit when the enemy was about to launch an attack against this town. Buencamino was referring to the defeat of the Filipinos in the battle of Bagbag in April when Luna withdrew his artillery and cavalry from Kalumpit and went to Guagua in order to subjugate General Tomas Mascardo who refused to heed his orders. Luna's withdrawal was not sanctioned by General Aguinaldo and was, in military law, desertion punishable with death. Luna's temper got the better of him, particularly because the defeat at Bagbag was caused by his unauthorized withdrawal of almost half of the Filipino troops from the sector that was exposed to the American artillery and infantry. He lunged at Buencamino and slapped him across the face.

Luna, then, was making enemies right and left. Even Mabini, who sided with him when Aguinaldo reinstated the Kawit company, commented in a letter to the latter that he, Luna, was "unfit to command an army . . . because he is a despot." In another letter to Aguinaldo, Mabini, scandalized at Luna's abuses, suggested that the fiery general be removed from office. It was during this time that rumors flew thick and fast that Luna was eyeing Aguinaldo's position. More, Luna was represented as having circulated the ugly rumor that Aguinaldo was incompetent. It is impossible to believe that Aguinaldo was unaware of these rumors, for he had loyal officers and men under Luna. In a letter to Aguinaldo, Jose Joven Alas, Baldomero Aguinaldo's aide-de-camp, pointed out that Luna was "forming a party whose purpose is to replace you as President." Mabini, on the other hand, received an anonymous letter warning him against Luna who, the letter writer said, was plotting a *coup d'etat*. "Remember," continued the letter, "that Luna was an informer and owing to his denunciations Rizal, N. Adriano, Franco and others, were executed." This passage refers to Luna's testimony before the Spanish inquisitors after the outbreak of the Revolution in 1896 wherein he denounced the Katipunan.

The web of intrigues was thus woven around Luna who, it may be presumed, was not aware of it. That the rumors were idle and baseless is shown by the fact that Luna, before leaving

Bayambang for Kabanatuan, dismissed as inconsequential an anonymous letter warning him of a plot against his life and that the plotters were the annexationists. Luna, in fact, left for Kabanatuan without any premonition of tragedy.

The mystery of Luna's death hinges on a telegram that he purportedly received from Kabanatuan. This telegram is missing. The question arises: Why did Luna leave for Kabanatuan on June 5? The testimonies of those close to him said he received a telegram from Kabanatuan, presumably from Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo, in his *Second Look at America*, claimed that it was Luna who sent him a telegram saying that he wanted to confer with him. If this is so, where is this telegram? I failed to locate the alleged telegram here and in the United States.

At all events, Luna left Bayambang early in the morning of June 4 for Bautista, where he and his staff boarded a train for Victoria, Tarlak. From here, they proceeded to Licab, Nueva Ecija, where they took a light breakfast. Their stop was in Aliaga, where Luna left his cavalry escort. With Colonel Francisco Roman and Captain Eduardo Rusca, he boarded a *carromata* for Kabanatuan. They arrived in town between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Luna alighted and proceeded to the convent, where Aguinaldo had established his headquarters. Upon entering the convent hall, his temper rose to a pitch when a sentinel, surprised at his presence, did not know what to do. Luna slapped the poor man and proceeded upstairs. Here he found Buencamino and his already frayed nerves snapped. Not finding Aguinaldo, he was alleged to have insulted the absent President and Buencamino. "Why call for me," he was reported by an eyewitness to have exclaimed, "when he could not keep his appointment!" He expressed exasperation: "My time has been wasted!"

Luna and Buencamino were exchanging heated words when a rifle shot broke the stillness of the warm summer day. Luna's fury was augmented by the rifle report, and he rushed downstairs to investigate. He found Captain Pedro Janolino, the man he disarmed in February for insubordination, at the foot of the stairs. Janolino, thinking Luna would harm him, unsheathed his bolo and hacked the general in the head. The other members of

the Kawit company followed suit, firing and striking at the wounded general with their daggers. Luna rushed out of the convent into the street and there fell, muttering: "Cow . . .ards! His aide-de-camp, Colonel Roman, rushed to his aid but was mowed down by the furious Kawit company.

An eyewitness, Gregorio Fajardo, noted that Buencamino emerged from the convent and inquired whether any of the Presidential guards had been hurt. Then he allegedly added: "At least they are dead. Go see the body and get all the papers from his pockets especially the telegram. Don't be afraid; we will take care of you."

One problem crops up in this connection. Director Carlos Quirino, in his "The Aguinaldo Story" (*The Manila Times*, February 18, 1964), approvingly quotes Manuel L. Quezon as saying that on June 5 the Aguinaldo party, to which Quezon belonged, "proceeded in the direction of Bautista (sic) where we arrived at night." (Quezon said Bayambang, not Bautista). On the other hand, General Venancio Concepcion, in his unpublished diaries, *Apuntes y Diario de Operaciones*, said that at 2:30 in the afternoon of June 5, he received at his headquarters in Angeles, Pampanga, a telegram from Aguinaldo notifying him that he, Aguinaldo, had provisionally established his headquarters in Bamban, Tarlak, and that he was taking over the command of all military operations in Central Luzon. Concepcion further stated that Aguinaldo and his party arrived in Angeles at 7:00 in the evening of the same day. The conflict in these two testimonies lies in the fact that while Quezon maintained that the Aguinaldo party spent the night of June 5 in Bayambang, Pangasinan, General Concepcion recorded in his diaries that Aguinaldo's party arrived in Angeles at 7:00 in the evening of June 5.

I am inclined to believe the accuracy of General Concepcion. Quezon wrote his memoirs, *The Good Fight*, (New York and London, D. Appleton-Century and Company, 1946), during the Second World War, while General Concepcion's account was a day-to-day report of his activities during the turbulent years of the Filipino-American war. With General Concepcion's account as basis, I deduce that General Aguinaldo never went as far as Bayambang, Pangasinan, but on the contrary left Kabanatuan

for San Isidro and from here to Bamban, Tarlak, and, finally to Angeles, Pampanga. It was here, on June 6, that General Concepcion, having received a telegram from Paterno, who was then in Kabanatuan, learned of Luna's assassination. It was from him that General Aguinaldo learned of Luna's death.

We now come to the crucial question: Was Aguinaldo responsible for Luna's death? The pieces of evidence show he was not. In one of my sessions with General Aguinaldo, in 1948, I asked him point-blank if he had anything to do with Luna's assassination. The old general answered with another question: "If I wanted Luna murdered, do you think I would be foolish enough to have him liquidated right in my own headquarters and so draw the suspicion to me?" Then he added: "It was easy to have him killed by the simple expedient of ordering my loyal men to shoot him in the midst of battle and then blame the Americans for his death. No, I did not even know of his death until General Bina showed me Paterno's telegram announcing Luna's death."

"But," I said, "were you aware of Luna's machinations, if any?"

"Not that I knew of," was his curt reply.

I did not believe him then. I still do not believe his statement. There is no doubt that he had been infected with the virus of anti-Luna rumors as evidenced by the following facts:

1. Aguinaldo circularized his officers telling them of an internal danger and asking them to remain loyal to him. General Francisco Makabulos of Tarlak was one of those who received a copy of the circular.

2. He placed under arrest General Concepcion and the latter's officers — Colonel Cavestany, Lieutenant-Colonels Quirog and Cajanding, and Majors Vister, Cruz, Estanislao, and Ochoa, on the night of June 5, that is, before the receipt of the telegram announcing Luna's death. These officers were alleged to have been pro-Luna.

3. On June 6, after learning of Luna's death, Aguinaldo elevated his man, Colonel Luciano San Miguel, to the rank of brigadier-general and then unceremoniously replaced Concepcion with San Miguel. The two companies under Concepcion which

he presented to Aguinaldo were disarmed and discharged on suspicion that they were pro-Luna. Concepcion was then detailed to the Office of the Captain-General (Aguinaldo), where he and Colonels Leyba and Hizon were known as "the punished ones."

4. On June 9, Aguinaldo issued a decree for the arrest of Luna's commissioners for alleged robbery.

5. The brothers Jose and Manuel Bernal, Luna's junior aides, were treated cavalierly after the death of their chief. Angel Bernal, youngest brother of Luna's aides, was disarmed, slapped, and jailed in the convent of Dagupan on orders of General Gregorio del Pilar, Aguinaldo's trusted man. Manuel Bernal was stripped of his uniform and military insignia and bastinadoed. Later, Manuel was shot to death. Jose Bernal, on the other hand, was transferred to Angeles, Pampanga, where he was murdered by the soldiers of Colonel Servillano Aquino.

All these, however, do not point to Aguinaldo as the culprit. But they point to this: that despite Aguinaldo's disclaimer, he suspected Luna of having ambition to replace him as President of the Republic. His suspicion had no basis in fact, for there is so far no evidence to show that Luna ever plotted a *coup d'etat.* If he had any plan to overthrow Aguinaldo, he would not have gone to Kabanatuan with only two men — Colonel Francisco Roman and Captain Eduardo Rusca — as aides. More, Luna left his nineteen-man escort in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.

We return to the mystery of the telegram. Who sent the telegram: Luna or Aguinaldo? If Luna did, where is it? Why did not Aguinaldo keep it as he kept the other documents of the revolutionary period which were later captured by the Americans and turned over to the Philippine government in 1958? If, on the other hand, Luna received the telegram asking him to see Aguinaldo in Kabanatuan, where is this telegram? If the eyewitness of the bloody event, Gregorio Fajardo, can be relied upon, it was Buencamino who ordered the soldiers to get all the papers from Luna's body. This explains the disappearance of the telegram to Luna. But who sent the telegram, assuming that Fajardo's testimony is reliable? Aguinaldo denied he ever sent a telegram to Luna. It is possible, then, that Buencamino sent the

telegram to Luna in Aguinaldo's name, but without the latter's knowledge. In a letter dated November 9, 1928, Buencamino swore in the name of God and his parents that he "never had any hand, directly or indirectly, in the deplorable incident." He asked Aguinaldo, through Bishop Gregorio Aglipay, to issue a denial of his (Buencamino's) part in the assassination of Luna. Aguinaldo was reported to have promised to issue such a statement, but up to the time of his death in February, 1964, he never made any statement clearing Buencamino.

The following conclusions are, therefore, inescapable:

1. Aguinaldo had nothing to do with Luna's assassination; even so,

2. He knew that there was a plot to liquidate Luna but did not discourage the conspirators, who must have been close to him, from carrying out their bloody deed.

That Aguinaldo was not averse to Luna's liquidation is shown by the fact that he never punished the Kawit soldiers who simultaneously attacked Luna.

Aguinaldo and Mabini*

Cesar Adib Majul

IN THE HISTORY OF A COUNTRY when radical changes in it represent both a shift in and an increase of the basis of power, many talents inevitably spring up ready to control or participate in this power. In other occasions, such talent would have normally been stifled or remained unknown. Needless to say, therefore, if the Philippine Revolution in 1898 had not occurred, the capacity to lead and to govern, among some Filipinos, would have never been known to have been possessed by them. The events of 1898 showed that there were at least two men who demonstrated that they could effectively wield political power to bring about, to some extent, what each conceived to be the political and social emancipation of the Filipino people. These two were Emilio Aguinaldo and Apolinario Mabini.

In most of the great movements of history, leadership has always been of two forms. There is the leadership that manifests itself by the possession of ideas, and there is the leadership of the man of action. These two forms of leadership could be complementary, for the ideas of great thinkers have sometimes become instruments in the hands of leaders of men. Thus the concerted work of Aguinaldo and Mabini would have been a major desideratum in order to bring about the realization of the ideals of a long-oppressed race. Yet, the complex character of the Philippine Revolution prevented these two men from working together indefinitely. Their different social and educational backgrounds; the basic difference between an intellectual leader and a man of action; and the existence of certain economic groups that deliberately tried to alienate both men from each other—all this brought about differences between them that became difficult to reconcile.

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But the most important fact to consider regarding both men was that they conceived differently the nature of political power regarded as a means. Possibly, they even had different conceptions as to what the revolution purported to attain. Aguinaldo represented the control of that power that was needed to expel from the Philippines those elements preventing the Philippines from becoming an independent country. Political power was used mainly to do away with what was considered to be an oppressive foreign domination in both the civil and ecclesiastical spheres. It was deemed important to build a strong army that would not only be able to defeat Spanish forces in the country but also prevent American troops from endangering a newly discovered sense of sovereignty. The main basis of Aguinaldo's political power was a military one. The loyalty of his troops to him, his exploits, and the martial atmosphere of the time, all contributed to the increase of his prestige. It was a prestige which few could question with impunity.

In the case of Mabini, political power was regarded primarily as a tool not only to remind the revolutionists of the moral commitments of the Revolution but also to bring about the creation of that atmosphere where tyranny and exploitation would be absent. Political power was to be exercised by men of authority to make possible what good government was supposed to give. And these were: security of the individual, protection of his rights, the best possible education, and maximum economic satisfaction. Whereas to Aguinaldo the expelling of foreign oppressors was of prime importance, to Mabini, what was of greater importance was that the new leaders, besides having the consent of the people, would not generate or perpetuate that kind of behavioral pattern of the Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical officials that initially sparked the Revolution.

It is important to emphasize that before Aguinaldo's arrival in Cavite in May 1898, he and Mabini did not personally know each other. What brought Mabini to Aguinaldo's attention was that even before the latter landed in Cavite, the former was already agitating for a renewed effort to continue the Revolution that began in 1896. When hostilities broke out between Spain and the United States, due to the Cuban affair, Mabini, with

good perception anticipated that hostilities would reach the Philippines. He thus advised the Filipino revolutionists to organize themselves in a more efficient manner and outlined for them a program to be followed, if and when American troops would land in the country. He suggested that they group themselves around a leader of their choice to make it possible for them to present concerted action. Thus, in his own way, Mabini helped to bring about among the people expectations regarding a leader. He did not suggest a particular leader but only pointed out the necessity for a leader. This was the role which Aguinaldo perfectly fitted in.

Before Aguinaldo's arrival, Mabini had already presented his "True Decalogue" to the people in order to bring about what he termed their "social regeneration." He likewise had presented his "Constitutional Program' for a future Republic, if and when the Revolution triumphed. His manifestos and letters to revolutionary chieftains reached Aguinaldo's ears, so much so that Aguinaldo was impressed to the extent that he invited Mabini to become his private adviser. Mabini arrived in Kawit on June 12, 1898. He became private adviser to Aguinaldo until January 1899, when he became the first prime minister of the first Philippine Republic.

As adviser to Aguinaldo, Mabini played an important role in the affairs of the Revolutionary Government. Firstly, it was Mabini who suggested that the dictatorial form of government should be transformed into the Revolutionary Government. Secondly, it was Mabini who penned the laws establishing provincial and municipal organizations, and the organic laws that established the Revolutionary Government and the Revolutionary Congress. The system for electing the delegates to the Congress was also of his making. Actually, most of the official proclamations of Aguinaldo from June 1898 to December 1898 were prepared by him. The foreign office was his creation, and since the department of foreign affairs was directly under the office of President Aguinaldo, in practice, Mabini controlled it. All this demonstrates that to some extent Mabini did share political power with Aguinaldo.

There is no doubt that both men needed each other, at least in the formative stage of the creation of the rudiments of a govern-

mental system. Aguinaldo needed Mabini, for not only was Mabini willing to work for a cause in which he believed, but he also had the legal training and the organizational ability to create a government for internal and external purposes. Besides this, many Filipinos, whose talents and educational achievements the Revolution needed, refused to cast their lot with the revolutionists, and instead preferred to seek the security of American rule behind the ramparts of Manila. In the same manner that Aguinaldo had a high prestige as a military leader, Mabini had prestige as an intellectual. His personal infirmity prevented him from being thought of as a rival to Aguinaldo's political and military leadership. However, such an infirmity served to strengthen his decision to serve his country better with his mind. Mabini's patriotism was unquestioned and his integrity unchallenged. It is to be recalled that Mabini was about five years Aguinaldo's senior. Considering this and the fact that Mabini's educational background was greater than that of Aguinaldo, Mabini was in a position to exercise some influence on Aguinaldo regarding governmental policies. As an *ilustrado,* Mabini was looked up to as a man whose training entitled him to be consulted. Yet it was Aguinaldo who was the charismatic leader.

That Aguinaldo took Mabini as an adviser represented, in an important sense, a triumph of Liberalism in the Philippines. Because the Filipino masses were following a traditional way of thinking, Mabini took it upon himself to see to it that the governmental machinery served as an effective tool to spread liberal ideas among the people, so as to bring about new social relations. Since Aguinaldo was the chief executive and had the coercive powers of government at his bidding, nothing could be accomplished through the governmental machinery without Aguinaldo's cooperation. Consequently, Mabini also needed Aguinaldo. No large-scale plan to bring about social amelioration would be possible without Aguinaldo's aid.

Mabini realized well that Aguinaldo did satisfy the search of the Filipinos for a leader. As he put it: "Since his return from Hongkong, the Filipinos looked to him as the personification and the agent for the realization of their noble ideals and as-

pirations . . ."[1] But it was precisely on account of this role which the people bestowed upon Aguinaldo that made Mabini assert that Aguinaldo had assumed the burden of a heavy responsibility. This essentially considered in the preservation and defense of those rights of the people that belonged to them by natural law.[2] Mabini was not only reminding a leader of his duties but severally judging his actions in relation to what was conceived as a higher law.

Mabini was essentially a moralist. He viewed the revolution as a movement with moral aims. Thus he was determined to see to it that the leaders of the revolution dedicate themselves to certain basic commitments, signifying those ends for which the revolution was launched. Mabini could help accepting the fact that Aguinaldo's political leadership was of a permanent character as long as the military element remained as the predominant factor in Filipino society. The conditions of war in the country inevitably made the military element as a basic force to consider in the country. Therefore, Mabini was determined that Aguinaldo would not in the first place fall prey to the machinations of certain economic groups which were aiming to control Aguinaldo, and hence the revolutionary movement, for their own personal or class interest. In the second place, he was watchful that the actions of Aguinaldo would not be motivated by personal motives or ambition as to be against the interest of the people. For if certain economic groups controlled the government, they would use the government for their own interest and not for that of the people. If Aguinaldo would use his political power for his own interest or for that of his friends, such power would not redound to the well-being of the people. In any case, the aims of the revolution would have been nullified.

That the aims of the revolution might be perverted by the actuations of special groups of Filipino society was a constant fear of Mabini. When some rich Filipinos, Pedro Paterno among them, wanted to take advantage of the poor financial situation of the Revolutionary Government, Mabini's fears were realized.

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[1] "Kruger y Aguinaldo", *La Revolucion Filipina*, (Manila: Bureau of Printing) Vol. II, p. 207.

[2] *Ibid.*

What happened was that a decree of Aguinaldo dated November 30, 1898, authorized the formation of a permanent committee (Junta) to be part of the national treasury that would take full charge of collecting the canon from former friar lands, which had become government lands, in order to see to it that a particular governmental loan and its interest be paid to the creditors. The decree also provided that if the collection was not sufficient, the Junta was authorized to resolve the difficulty by issuing personal cedulas. Mabini immediately wrote to Aguinaldo, warning him about the possible consequences of the decree. He felt that certain rich people, who were the ones best qualified to be members of the Junta on account of certain stated legal qualifications, would control the Junta and hence the Treasury. To quote: "Considering that the rich from Manila, in connivance with one another, will compose this Junta (and I understand that they have been already approached by Paterno), I already fear that we will have something worse than what we had during Spanish times. For the very reason that the treasury is that which sustains you, if you allow it to be controlled by the rich, you will necessarily fall into their power . . ."[3] Mabini further warned Aguinaldo that these rich people were going to form a bank in Manila which would be the agency to loan the government the money that the government needed.

What can be inferred from Mabini's cryptic remarks is that it seems that when the Revolutionary Government decided to float a loan, a group of rich people were willing to form a bank and loan the money to the government. It can also be inferred by the remarks of Mabini, that these same men, in order to assure themselves that the loan be paid, wanted to be members of the Junta in order to do the collection of the canon from former friar lands and issue cedulas personales. This means that those who controlled the bank were the ones to control the Junta.

With these inferences the following remarks of Mabini can be better understood: "When the Bank is formed, it will truly control the government because the government is its debtor. If Manila were under our power, I would not have any fear, because

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[3] "Carta a Aguinaldo", *Cartas Politicas de Mabini,* (Manila, 1930), p. 94.

you would have jurisdiction over the Bank." What further followed revealed some of the decisive elements that were found in the Revolution, that is, the attempt of the rich to control the government. Mabini's sympathy with the masses was also revealed. He stated: "I did not expect these things will happen. I never expected that you would have given the rich these concessions. We have all worked without salaries, but they would not like to come across with their money without having a hand in the treasury. It is probable that the members of the Junta will ask for a salary. In this case, it is always the rich that have all the advantages while the soldiers remain hungry. They will exert pressure on the tenants to pay — the administrators will pocket part of the revenues and little will go to the treasury. As the revenues will not be sufficient to pay the loan and its interests, they will be led to resort to the personal cedula. You will be left with nothing to pay the people. Finally, the tenants and employees will blame you for everything and the rich will get a good laugh!" [4] Mabini also pointed out the urgent necessity for Aguinaldo to exercise great caution in the appointment of the secretary of the treasury who had to be a person not susceptible to bribery. Incidentally, this letter of Mabini revealed that his influence on Aguinaldo was waning, for Mabini mentioned many other advisers that Aguinaldo now had, whereas, before, he had no one to consult except Mabini who "worked in spite of . . . sickness."

The above letter demonstrated the acumen that Mabini possessed regarding class interests and conflicts. It also showed Mabini's warning to Aguinaldo in order that the latter would not be used as a tool by certain groups intriguing to grab economic power for themselves in a manner that the net result would add to the further impoverishment of the poor people.

But Mabini, in his belief in the Rule of Law, more than once assumed the role of mentor to and conscience of Aguinaldo. In a letter dated January 29, 1899, written, in all probability, to Aguinaldo, he cautioned Aguinaldo regarding the giving of a piece of land to a certain General M. for the reason that the land had already been leased to someone else in accordance with a decree

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

of July 18, 1898. This letter also said: "I believe that you know well enough that the government has been given authority in order to see to it that the laws are obeyed. If you do not support us in what we believe to be legal, we shall arrive at nowhere . . . This letter has no other purpose but to state that all authority, whether civil or military, should conform themselves to justice, and also prestige may be maintained."[5]

Mabini certainly found it important to remind government officials, even the highest ones, that government should not be run by arbitrary or whimsical desires. This also implied that persons should not use their high positions for personal benefits as against the benefits of the people. This brings up some remarks about another basic fear of Mabini. What is meant in particular is that Mabini feared that the aims of the revolution might be perverted to the personal aims of the leaders of the revolution. Thus he continually warned Aguinaldo as to the evil effects to the nation if power was not properly and judiciously exercised. Furthermore, if Aguinaldo would use his position to enhance his personal interest or if he would guide his actions by personal ambition, the people would be the first to withhold their loyalty from him. In one of his answers to a series of questions from General Wheeler, Mabini wrote: "Now the Filipinos recognize General Aguinaldo as President because he personifies their aspirations, but the moment they observe that he is solely motivated by personal ambition, they will withdraw their support from him and recognize another who demonstrates that he is most deserving of their confidence . . ."[6] This was written on December 25, 1899, when Mabini was a prisoner of the Americans and while Aguinaldo was still waging a losing struggle against the American troops.

Mabini's principle was that a leader remained a leader only insofar as he truly personified the aspirations of the people and that the moment the lack of identity between the leader and the followers ensued, the people would cease to look at him as a leader. Thus in the same article he wrote:

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[5] "Carta a ... [Aguinaldo?]", *Cartas Politicas de Mabini,* pp. 154-155.

[6] "Contestaciones a las Preguntas del Gral. Wheeler", *Cartas Politicas de Mabini,* p. 262.

All the Filipinos recognized him [Aguinaldo] as leader, in order to avoid quarrels and internecine rivalries. The Revolution is not the work of Aguinaldo, but of the people. He took advantage of circumstances and will preserve his popularity as long as he merits the trust of his people. [7]

Here, like in so many of his letters and articles, Mabini showed his democratic principles. Insisting that one's personal or selfish interests should never be mistaken for those of the country, Mabini, in his retrospective analysis of the events of the Revolution, blamed part of the failure of the Revolution on this mistaken identity.[8]

Of paramount importance, therefore, was the consent of the people in order to secure a strong basis for good government and a successful revolution. Without this consent nothing of national significance would be accomplished. Also, without consent of the people, what guarantee would there be that another revolution would not occur the moment the people felt oppressed? As Mabini put it in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated February 28, 1899:

If the people are with us, we can rest assured that if we do not triumph today, we shall do so tomorrow or after tomorrow. If they are not with us, we shall be decimated. If the Americans represent serious dangers to us the greater dangers are those from our own countrymen on account of abuses that can be committed against them — abuses which are the frequent causes of revolution.[9]

Mabini was fully aware that a government that disregarded public opinion or that was unaccountable to the people would sooner or later degenerate into a tyrannical one. Also, tyranny was believed to survive under conditions where the people were either ignorant or corrupt and when the army became so powerful as to be unchecked by public opinion. Mabini maintained that education could counteract ignorance and corruption. He also wanted Aguinaldo's power strengthened in order to check and control possible abuses of the army. When the question was raised by members of the Malolos Congress as to what could check the possible abuse of power in Aguinaldo, Mabini answered that an

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 263.
[8] "La Revolucion Filipina", *La Revolucion Filipina*, Volume II, p. 318.
[9] "Carta a Aguinaldo", *Cartas Politicas de Mabini,* p. 157.

enlightened public opinion could do it. However, in Mabini's time, this public opinion would only be the opinion, not of the majority of the people, but that of the *ilustrados*. It is possible, too, that Mabini believed that Aguinaldo would always give heed to his advice or to that of the other *ilustrados* who would then be able to exercise a restaining influence on him.

It is difficult to discover how much of the personal element if any, on Mabini's part is found in the policies that he propounded in state affairs. That the strengthening of the executive power in the person of Aguinaldo, which he believed was necessary, would automatically strengthen his position — provided his advice to Aguinaldo carried weight — might not be doubted. But that Mabini's intentions were always for the stabilization of an independent Filipino state need not be doubted. The facts of the revolution show that Mabini always remained a poor man.

In trying to construct a new way of life, Mabini found Aguinaldo willing to experiment with a novel system of governmental organization. Actually both men were trying to emancipate themselves and their people from bondage, and, in so doing, they were laying the foundation stones for a new historical transformation. This attempt is enough to secure for them a position in the history of our country.

Aguinaldo as Public Servant*

Leopoldo R. Serrano

OUR PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW that General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, who became one of the most brilliant figures in our history, and who celebrated his ninetieth birthday on March 22, 1959, began his public life at the age of 17, when he was appointed *cabeza de barangay* of Binakayan, one of the barrios of his native town, Kawit.[1]

The next public position that he occupied during the Spanish regime was that of *capitan municipal* of Kawit. Early in January 1895, while on his way home after he had visited Mindoro, he was met at Binakayan by a delegation of the *principales* of the town to inform him of his election (appointment should be the proper term) as the municipal captain of the town. He was still occupying that position when the Philippine Revolution broke out.

In the general assembly of the Katipunan leaders belonging to the Magdiwang and Magdalo factions in Kabite, which was held in Tejeros, San Francisco de Malabon (now General Trias) on March 22, 1897, General Aguinaldo was elected president of the Revolutionary Government which was established to replace the Katipunan. Again, when the constituent assembly that met at Biak-na-bato approved the Biak-na-bato Constitution and established the Philippine Republic (other Filipino historical writers call it the first Republic or the Biak-na-bato Republic) on November 1, 1897, General Aguinaldo became its president. And when it ceased to exist because of the signing of the Pact of Biak-

* Reprinted from this *Bulletin* (March, 1959) v. 3, no. 1, p. 46-54.

[1] Manuel Aguinaldo, "Ilang Mahalagang Tala sa Buhay ni Heneral Aguinaldo," *Aliwan*, March 26, 1958, pp. 16-17.

na-bato in December of the same year, he led the Revolutionary leaders in their life of exile in Hongkong, which began when they landed on that British Colony on December 29, 1897.

Returning to the Philippines after the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, General Aguinaldo, in a proclamation issued on May 24, 1898, announced the establishment of the Dictatorial Government, with himself as head. As it was only temporary in character, and pursuant to a decree signed by him on June 23, 1898, the Dictatorial Government was replaced by the Revolutionary Government. This was also headed by him. In turn, the Revolutionary Government was replaced by the First Republic which was established in Malolos on January 23, 1899. General Aguinaldo, as had been expected by his countrymen, was unanimously elected its president by the Revolutionary Congress that met in Malolos, second seat of the Revolutionary Government, to frame its constitution and ratify the Declaration of Independence made in Kawit on June 12, 1898.

The last public position held by General Aguinaldo was that of chairman of the Board of Pensions for Veterans, which position he had to relinquish several years ago because of his age and eye ailment.

So this famous son of Kawit occupied important public positions during three different epochs of our history.

Of course, many of our countrymen, especially those who studied or are still studying in our schools, are acquainted with the role he played during the revolutionary period, the most glorious chapter in our history. But do many of them also know about him as a public servant? Was he efficient? Did he take advantage of his position, especially when he occupied the chief magistracy of the land? Did he serve the government and the people faithfully?

It will be remembered that General Aguinaldo did not finish his secondary education in the College of San Juan de Letran in Manila. Yet, during the most critical period of our history, our people turned to him to lead them, and not to any of those who had completed their university education in Manila or abroad.

Surely, there must be reason or reasons for the people's confidence in his leadership.

Edwin Wildman, an American war correspondent, who observed the history-making events that occurred here before and during the Filipino-American War, had the following to say about the attitude of our people toward Aguinaldo in his book titled *Aguinaldo: a Narrative of Filipino Ambition:*

> The people worshipped him and covered his path with flowers, and the natives doffeed their hats in reverence. Their loves of feasts, music, and dancing was given full rein, and Aguinaldo made triumphal tours in the cities along the railroad line, his appearance arousing the Filipinos to a fervor resembling religious frenzy. Triumphal floral arches were erected, mass meetings or enormous proportions were held, and the prettiest girls in the village, dressed in the colors of the Filipino flag blended with the stars and stripes, were hailed and cheered with delight...

As head of the Revolutionary Government and commander-in-chief of the Filipino forces challenging the armed might of Spain in the Philippines, General Aguinaldo was reputed to be cold and calculating. When, because of the better discipline, weapons, and organization of the Spaniards, his forces began to suffer one defeat after another in Kabite, the center of Filipino resistance during the first eight months of the Revolution, he transferred his headquarters to the national fortress of Biak-na-bato in Bulakan. At the head of 200 men, he evaded the vigilance of General Lachambre's division, and in Puray he inflicted heavy losses on the Spanish columns, under Colonels Dujiols and Primo de Rivera, which were pursuing and trying to intercept his march toward Central Luzon.

Evidently, Aguinaldo's purpose in going to Biak-na-Bato was to continue the war with more vigor and greater determination in another theater of operations: Central Luzon. Anent this shifting of the theater of war during the first phase of the Revolution, he said at the convocation held in the Arellano High School on August 13, 1953:[2]

> And there (at Biak-na-bato) still triumphant, the flag of the Revolutionary Republic was again hoisted and it played with the breeze there until a treaty of peace was concluded with Spain.

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[2] *The Chronicler* (official organ of the Arellano High School, Manila), September, 1953, p. 2.

We know that the first seat of the Revolutionary Government was Bakoor, Kabite. But because of the worsening relations between the Americans and the Filipinos, in view of the fact that the former had deprived the latter of the right to enter the Walled City when Manila was surrendered by the Spaniards to the Americans on August 13, 1898, General Aguinaldo moved his capital to Malolos, Bulakan, on September 10, 1898. He was well aware of the fact that Bakoor was at the mercy of the American big guns at Kabite and also easily accessible by land force from Manila. The guns of Dewey's ships could easily reduce it to ashes. Indeed, Bakoor lay "right in the lion's jaw should the lion happen to get hungry," as an American writer of the period said.

General Aguinaldo's patriotism and integrity as the leader of his people were put to a severe test when he received ₱400,000 from the Spanish Government in accordance with the Pact of Biak-na-bato. In a statement issued in Kawit on September 3, 1929, he made the following revelation:[3]

> I make it known that the amount of ₱400,000 exclusively belonged to me, in accordance with the conditions of the Treaty of Peace of Biak-na-bato.
>
> However, moved by the desire to save our country from the state of vassalage, I invested said amount for the resumption of the Revolution to win for our people their previous liberties.

The above revelation of General Aguinaldo was corroborated by Miguel Morayta, a well-known Spanish liberal and friend of the Filipino reformers in Europe, who stated:[4]

> Aguinaldo is a singular man. On surrendering, he asked nothing but reforms for his country; but as he was offered money, he accepted and received it, and far from profiting from it or dividing it among those close to him, he lived in poverty in Hongkong, telling all that that money could not be touched because it belonged to the insurrection and should be kept so that it could be used when they would take to the field again.

According to General Jose Alejandrino,[5]

> There had not been until now is our history another instance of a man who being in a foreign country and in possession of ₱400,000 in a

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[3] *Lingguhan ng Mabuhay,* April 15, 1934.
[4] Mauricio, *La Gran Traicion* (Barcelona, 1899), footnote, p. 81.
[5] Jose Alejandrino, *The Price of Freedom* (Manila, 1949), p. 217.

bank under his name, the equivalent of more than one million pesos now had the integrity and the unselfishness to return to his country to expose his life for an ideal which is the *ideal of his people and his race.*

It is very clear that General Aguinaldo, during their exile in Hongkong, made his companions agree not to touch the money received from the Spanish government and to live mostly on the private funds they brought with them and the interest of the money deposited in the bank. Follows General Alejandrino' description of the kind of life they had in Hongkong:[6]

He (Aguinaldo) leased a big house where all his companions, together with the families of those who had any, were given the right to free board and lodging. Malvar, who came later with his family, stayed there. Those who preferred to live somewhere else were given a monthly pension of twelve pesos each. Almost all were forced to live in the house which they called General Headquarters inasmuch as with twelve pesos monthly, it was completely impossible elsewhere to pay for board, lodging and laundry, and still buy cigarettes. Only those who had private income could do so, and those were few. The monthly pensions of twelve pesos was not extended to those of us who were already in Hongkong when they arrived, irrespective of the reason for their stay in the Colony. However, none of those already in the Colony when they arrived intimated their desire to be helped like those who recently arrived.

I am little inclined to admiration, because I consider that sacrifices suffered in compliance with a duty are the most natural things in the world, but I could not help but admire those young men as I constantly saw them attired in woolen suits, sleeping on the floor, eating miserably, devoid of all forms of recreation, but always contented, buoyant in spirit and resigned.

General Aguinaldo's integrity as a leader is shown by the following statement of a rich Chinese merchant in Manila who, according to General Alejandrino, "was really corrupt and a very able corrupter" at the time Aguinaldo was at the height of his power and fame:[7]

That Aguinaldo no person, is angel; I speak to him of a business where we make much money. I provide brains, the labor, the money; he alone put up saliva, but he does not like. That man, him no person, that angel.

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[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 81-82.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 227.

One important thing that should be mentioned about Aguinaldo is that, as head of the government, he succeeded in bringing about the unity of our people, sometimes by "resorting to peaceful means and in other instances by using energetic measures," as one of his contemporaries said. And when the Filipino-American war began, the American troops, much to their surprise, found themselves fighting a united people. The war, which they had expected to last several weeks, dragged on for more than three years and caused heavy losses to both sides.

In Bakoor or Malolos, General Aguinaldo was visited and interviewed by several American war correspondents, observers, or ranking officers of the United States armed forces in the Philippines. But they could not get anything from him that would be valuable to the United States government should be Filipinos refuse to accept American sovereignty over the Philippines. Mr. McCutcheon wrote:[8]

> Nothing can be determined by interviewing Aguinaldo, who is hard to see, and who says nothing when he talks. In the number of interviews which I have had with him he has never said anything which had the slightest value. On one occasion he did give the distribution and strength of his different troops, but this information was so manifestly wrong that it was useless. In respect of keeping his own affairs and the movements of his troops and his sentiments regarding the Americans strictly to himself, Aguinaldo is a conspicuous success.

How different Aguinaldo, as a leader, was from some high officials of the present Republic, who, when interviewed or seen at their swanky offices by some American or foreign officials or visitors, often become loquacious and reveal even confidential matters about our country and government.

No historian will attempt to say that General Aguinaldo was a swivel-hair president. He was not. He often left Malolos, as Mr. Wildman stated in his work cited at the beginning of this article, in order to acquaint himself with the problems confronting the government. During the Filipino-American War he was often seen visiting our defense positions and encouraging our embattled soldiers.

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[8] John T. McCutcheon, "An American in Old Manila," *Philippines Review*, May, 1955.

In one of the early days of October 1898, he was invited by General Tomas Mascardo, military commander of Pampanga, to visit that province. He went there at the head of a big delegation that left the railroad station of Malolos at nine o'clock in the morning. Those who accompanied him were: General Pantaleon Garcia, commander of the fourth war zone; Secretary Gregorio Araneta; Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, director of diplomacy; Pablo Tekson, secretary of the Malolos Congress, General Isidoro Torres; Aguinaldo's staff; the secretary of finance; the acting secretary of war; the director of public instruction; members of the Malolos Congress; and some foreign visitors.[9]

Again, on December 24, 1898, at the head of another delegation, he left Malolos by train at four o'clock in the morning to visit the towns near Manila. He was accompanied by his staff, General Antonio Luna, General Gregorio del Pilar, General Isidoro Torres, and some other high officials of the Revolutionary Government and the Army. At the railroad station at Kalookan, they were met by many people led by the local officials, with a brass band and flags. They also visited Marikina, San Juan del Monte, and Santa Ana. Then they proceeded to Kawit.[10]

After the rupture of relations between the Americans and the Filipinos, General Aguinaldo made frequent visits to the war front. On February 12, 1899, accompanied by Pablo Tekson, he visited Hagonoy and Marilao.[11] Two days later, he had a long conference with the chief of operations north of Manila, General Luna.[12] On February 18, 1899, he went to Polo where General Luna transferred his headquarters after the fall of Kalookan on February 10, 1899. Reason: he desired to be familiar with our defense positions there.[13] On March 10, 1899, accompanied by his staff and escorted by the presidential guard, Aguinaldo made an inspection of our lines in several places. He gave definite instructions to remedy some defects and to make a thorough study of the terrain.[14]

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[9] *El Heraldo de la Revolucion,* October 13, 1898.
[10] *Ibid.,* Dec. 29, 1898.
[11] *La Republica Filipina,* Feb. 17, 1899.
[12] *Loc. cit.*
[13] *Ibid.,* February 21, 1899.
[14] *Ibid.,* March 11, 1899.

After the fall of Malolos on March 13, 1899, he did not stop visiting our lines. Follows a report in one of the dailies of the times.[15]

The President of the Republic does not rest in his task of inspecting personally the lines of defense. He often holds conferences with the valiant general-in-chief, Mr. Luna, who always manages to provide the soldiers with all possible conveniences of life during the campaign, compatible with the most rigid military discipline.

One criticism hurled against General Aguinaldo as president is that in his Cabinet there were

Men who neither had nor could have any initiative because they were subservient to the will of the President who had assumed all the powers of the State, making himself in fact a dictator when the war was declared.[16]

But it will be remembered that, in a decree issued by Aguinaldo on January 2, 1899, or more than a month after the rupture of relations between the Filipinos and the Americans, he created the "Council of Government" to help him tackle the problems of administration.[17] It was composed of the following members: Apolinario Mabini, secretary of foreign affairs; General Teodoro Sandiko, secretary of the interior; General Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary of war and navy; General Mariano Trias, secretary of finance; and Engracio Gonzaga, secretary of development. The Council had to meet once a week at the office of the president to discuss the general trend of events here and abroad and the problems confronting the country. The secretaries or members could also meet on the days designated by the president to exchange impressions and to stress the unity and harmony of the offices under each of them.

As to the deliberations in the Malolos Congress, Aguinaldo said in a speech he delivered in the Union College of Manila in 1939 that he did not intervene in them. There were no yesmen in the Malolos Congress, according to him. He cited the vote on the provisions of the constitution about the separation of Church and State. After several votes, which had resulted in a

[15] *Ibid.*, April 22, 1899.
[16] Jose Alejandrino, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
[17] *El Heraldo de la Revolucion,* January 4, 1899.

deadlock, those in favor finally won by a plurality of only one vote.[18]

When Pedro A. Paterno went to Biak-na-bato to discuss peace terms with General Aguinaldo, the latter summoned to Biak-na-bato, for consultation, his generals then scattered in the provinces of Central and Southern Luzon. In fact, even when he was a prisoner of the Americans in Malacañang Palace, following his capture in Palanan on March 23, 1901, before issuing a manifesto calling upon his countrymen in the field to lay down their arms, he still wanted to call a meeting of his generals fighting the Americans and suggested the return of Mabini from his exile in Guam to sound out their views.

After the liberation of our country from the Japanese, General Aguinaldo, although burdened by old age and troubled by eye ailment, accepted the position of chairman of the Board on Pensions for Veterans, believing that while he had still strength it was his duty to serve his living former comrades-in-arms. That was the last public position he occupied, which he relinquished several years ago, following the advice of his physician.

It has been shown in this article that General Aguinaldo, as a public servant, did what, under the circumstances, he could have possibly done for his country and people. As he said in an interview more than half a century ago, he always endeavored "to serve the people faithfully."[19]

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[18] *Ang Ebangheliko,* October, 1939, pp. 17-18.
[19] *The Manila Times,* October 7, 1907.

Aguinaldo's Relations with Pratt and Wildman *[1]

Honesto A. Villanueva

GENERAL EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY conducted in 1896 a war against the Spanish authorities in the Philippines with an ill-equipped and poor army. Faced with such dilemma, Aguinaldo came to terms with Spain — thus the well-known Truce of Biak-na-bato was concluded in December 1897. The amount of 800,000 pesos was offered to Aguinaldo by Primo de Rivera, the then governor general of the Philippines. Aguinaldo and his staff had to leave the Philippines into an exile. Aguinaldo was prevailed upon to accept the money on condition that Spain would institute reforms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the press, amnesty to all Filipinos who took arms against the authority of Spain, and expulsion or securalization of the monastic orders.

There was a systematic attempt to discredit Aguinaldo and the members of his cabinet on account of the questionable terms of the agreement in the Truce of Biak-na-bato. It was said that they sold out their country for gold. This was, however, disproved by the famous speech of Governor General Rivera in the Spanish Senate on June 11, 1898.[2] He said that Aguinaldo undertook to submit to the terms provided that the Spanish government would give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the revolutionists. Rivera admitted that only a part of the money was given to Aguinaldo. He did not find it expedient to fulfill the other promises. Actually the amounts of 400,000 and 200,000

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[1] Rounseville Wildman was an American Consul General in Hongkong and E. Spencer Pratt was an American Consul General in Singapore.

[2] *Sen. Doc.,* 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess., 337.

pesos were given to Aguinaldo and to the revolutionists in Biak-na-bato, respectively.

The Aguinaldo party left the Philippines for Hongkong on December 27, 1897. Other revolutionists were left at Biak-na-bato to take care of the execution of the agreement.[3] On the following day, the governor general cabled Madrid that the truce with the revolutionists in the Philippines was already concluded. The surrender arms began on December 31, and continued during the months of January and February. Peace was proclaimed in Manila by Primo de Rivera on January 30. The restoration of peace was only in theory. The Spaniards failed to comply with the terms of the arranged peace. The Truce of Biak-na-bato was ridiculed when it was presented to the Spanish Cortes. Spain actually paid Aguinaldo only 600,000 pesos of the promised amount. The promised reforms were not introduced by the government. This violation of the terms of peace gave Aguinaldo a good excuse for resuming the revolution at the first opportune time. A decision was reached by Aguinaldo and his staff to use the money for the purchase of arms. The amount of 400,000 pesos was later deposited in a Hongkong bank. The money was kept intact in the bank and the interest earned was used by the exiled group for minor expenses.

It was in Hongkong where Aguinaldo had his first contact with the Americans. Before the arrival of Aguinaldo in Hongkong, friendly relationships between Rounseville Wildman, an American consul, and Filipinos residing there had already been established. They followed closely the diplomatic difficulties between Spain and the United States over the Cuban question.

Felipe Agoncillo, perhaps the ablest of all the diplomatic agents of the Revolutionary Government then in Hongkong, called upon Mr. Wildman several times. He was commissioned by Aguinaldo with absolute powers to conclude treaties with foreign governments. On this official call he proposed an alliance, both offensive and defensive, between the Philippines and the United States should war break out with Spain. He also wished that the

[3] General Emilio Aguinaldo, with Vicente Albano Pacis, *A Second Look at America,* 28. See also: Honesto A. Villanueva, "Diplomacy of Spanish-American War," *Phil. Soc. Scien. Human. Review.,* Vol. XIV, No. 2 (June 1949), 175.

United States would send to some designated ports of the Philippines, 20,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition payable upon the recognition of the Philippine government by the United States. He also pledged the security of two provinces and the custom house at Manila.[4]

This proposal made by Agoncillo was officially sent by Wildman to the secretary of state for advice. The third secretary of state, Mr. Thos. W. Cridler, in his diplomatic instructions to Wildman dated December 15, 1897, stated that he "may briefly advice Mr. Agoncillo, in case he should call" again "that the United States does not negotiate such treaties and that it was not possible to forward the desired arms and ammunitions."[5] He was further instructed that he should not encourage any advances on the part of the Filipino diplomat and he should courteously decline to communicate with the department of state further regarding his alleged mission to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty.

The Filipinos now became more concerned when the *Maine*[6] was blown up in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898. The whole world was startled by the catastrophe. Two hundred and sixty-six of the crew perished. Brief dispatches to all American embassies about the disaster were sent throughout the civilized world. The American public was inflamed because unscrupulous journals laid the responsibility for the disaster on official Spain.[7] Theodore Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the navy, was most unhappy over the loss of the *Maine,* a feeling shared by the other members of his department. He was in favor of going to war with Spain, if the explosion had been due to outside forces. At the same time he wrote that the solution to the problem lay in Cuban independence by peaceful means if possible, or, failing that, by war.[8] The public was asked to withhold judgment. Ex-

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[4] Rounseville Wildman to Day, Nov. 3, 1897, Department of State, *Consular Letters,* Hongkong, Vol. XIX. Also *Sen. Doc.,* 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 2 sess., 333.

[5] *Sen. Doc.,* 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess., 334.

[6] Aguinaldo, *op. cit.,* 29.

[7] Harry F. Guggenheim, *The United States and Cuba — A Study in International Relations,* 40-42. Also see Villanueva, *op. cit.,* Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Sept. 1949), 328.

[8] "Roosevelt to White, March 9, 1898," *White Papers,* Library of Congress.

pressions of condolence were sent by foreign governments and officials, including the Queen Regent Christina and various officials in Spain and Cuba.[9]

The Filipino group of exiles who lived in Hongkong closely followed the course of events in Cuba and in their homeland. They all held a uniform opinion that war had become inevitable. Rumors and persistent predictions were made by the leaders of the revolution that war was liable to break in March. The hour of decision was at hand. Aguinaldo's small staff and other Filipinos in the British Colony began to discuss freely what course was to be taken should the United States and Spain go to war. They explored all possible ways by which they could go back to the Philippines.[10] They kept close tab on what was happening in the Philippines at that time.

The American consular reports to Washington clearly pictured the real situation in Manila and other parts of the Islands. The horrors inflicted by the Spaniards upon the Filipinos were unspeakable. Oscar F. Williams, an American in Manila, in his letters to Washington said that "conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are almost daily occurrences, . . . Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law."[11]

During this period when war between the United States and Spain was expected, Mr. Williams further observed that Filipinos, Chinese, Spaniards, and others engaged in business were ready to welcome and to swear allegiance to American sovereignty. Because of the worsening conditions, Aguinaldo decided to return to the Philippines.

The Filipinos in Hongkong had now made many plans. One group called for immediate purchase of arms out of the money they deposited in a Hongkong bank. They would return to their fatherland fully armed and would renew the revolution to coincide with the long-expected war between the United States and

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[9] *United States Foreign Relations* 1898, (pp.) 1929-1932.

[10] Aguinaldo, *op. cit.*, 29.

[11] See O. F. Williams' letter to the Department of State, *Sen. Doc.*, 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess., 319.

Spain. There was, as usual, no unanimity of opinion. One group looked towards Japan for a possibility of alliance. Japan might ask for greater diplomatic concessions. When the subject of alliance with the United States was suggested, all felt that it was impossible because they believed that fighting between Spain and the United States would be confined only to Cuba.

On or before April 6, 1898, one of the gunboats of the American flotilla, the *Petrel,* arrived in Hongkong. Its captain, Commander Wood, sought Aguinaldo for a conference. This led to a series of secret conversations with the knowledge of Commodore Dewey. Captain Wood urged Aguinaldo to return to Manila to reassemble his troops. They would be supplied with arms by Dewey. According to Aguinaldo, Captain Wood confided to him that Dewey was to proceed to Manila to destroy the Spanish fleet there.[12]

These conferences and contacts of the Filipino general with the Americans were cut short because of the presence of Isabelo Artacho in Hongkong. Artacho, the former chief subordinate of Aguinaldo at Biak-na-bato, sued the general for no less than 200,000 pesos for his services. This was almost equivalent to one-half of the money which was deposited in a bank in Hongkong. In order to avoid scandal Aguinaldo decided, with the advice of his minister, Felipe Agoncillo, to leave Hongkong immediately. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund. It was to remain on deposit until the Spaniards carried out their promised reforms. If they failed, it was to be used to purchase arms to renew the insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho 5,000 pesos according to the memorandum of General Francis Greene submitted to President McKinley on September 30, 1898.[13]

General Aguinaldo left Hongkong for Singapore and was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Gregorio del Pilar, and his private secretary, J. Leyba. Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore from Saigon on April 21, 1898. The main purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to consult other friends, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray who had resided in the Philippines for fifteen years. He wanted to find out from Bray the state of

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[12] Aguinaldo, *op. cit.,* 30.
[13] *Sen. Doc.,* 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess., 421.

affairs in the Islands, particularly the possibility of the occurrence of hostilities between the United States and Spain.[14]

In Singapore, Bray arranged a meeting between Aguinaldo and American Consul General E. Spencer Pratt. According to Aguinaldo in *A Second Look at America,*[15] Pratt requested the pleasure of the general to a conference with him on a very vital problem. At this time the United States and Spain were already in a state of war. At this conference Pratt tried to convince Aguinaldo that now was the propitious time to strike. Cooperative Filipino-American efforts were necessary, according to Pratt, in order to insure complete victory over the Spaniards in the Philippines. "America will help you if you help America . . . You need not have any worry about America. The American Congress and the President have just made a solemn declaration disclaiming any desire to possess Cuba and promising to leave Cuba after having driven away the Spaniards . . . As in Cuba, so in the Philippines."[16]

Aguinaldo was very much elated over the wise counsel of the American consul-general in Singapore to whom he revealed that if Dewey was to invite him officially and would confirm Pratt's statement, he would go back to the Philippines and fight side by side with the Americans. Now that Pratt had obtained the promise of the general (Aguinaldo) for joint American and Filipino attack against Spain, Pratt cabled Commodore Dewey of Aguinaldo's attitude. Immediately, Dewey without further consulting Washington, asked Aguinaldo to come to Hongkong for a conference.[17] Pratt confided to Aguinaldo that Dewey would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines under the protectorate of the United States. This was confirmed by Commodore Dewey on May 19 on the flagship *Olympia* in Manila Bay.[18] However, all this was subsequently denied by the American consul-general and by the commodore himself. It is indeed very clear that the consuls in the Far East, Pratt and Wildman, without waiting for orders from the department of state, busied them-

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[14] "Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day, May 5, 1898, No. 217," Department of State, *Consular Letters,* Singapore, XXII.

[15] Aguinaldo, *op. cit.,* 33.

[16] *Ibid.,* 34.

[18] Aguinaldo, *op. cit.,* 39.

selves in using all resourcefulness toward the fulfillment of Dewey's expected mission. However, Pratt and Wildman later received instructions from the department of state not to make pledges or discuss policy.[19]

Aguinaldo's party left Singapore on the night of April 25, and arrived in Hongkong on the first of May.

Rounseville Wildman, the American consul, was requested by Dewey to meet Aguinaldo with the instructions that since the commodore had already proceeded to Manila he would send a battleship to fetch Aguinaldo. This gave time for the Filipino General to round out his affairs with Wildman, who later became enthusiastic about another matter of purchasing arms. They became fast friends. Aguinaldo trusted him to purchase arms that were greatly needed to continue the revolution against Spain. He left 50,000 pesos for the payment of 2,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition and for a launch boat that may be needed to transport service in the Islands. Later another 67,000 pesos was entrusted to his care because of the "sincerity and honesty of Mr. Wildman," which elicited Aguinaldo's confidence. All this was effected before Wildman and U.S. Minister John Barrett to Spain escorted Aguinaldo to the U.S. gunboat *McCulloch*.[20]

The personal relations between Wildman and Aguinaldo started when Felipe Agoncillo, holding a commission signed by Aguinaldo as his chief minister abroad, presented himself to the American consul. Agoncillo suggested the idea of a Filipino-American alliance. This proposal was later declined by the United States. Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong with his group of exiled leaders of the revolution in December 1897. Aguinaldo became acquainted with Wildman. Today there exists in the Department of State files a letter sent by W. F. Sylvester dated December 16,

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[17] "Pratt to Day, April 28, 1898, No. 212," Department of State, *Consular Letters*, XXII. See also *Sen. Doc.* 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess., 241.

[19] *Sen. Doc.*, 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess., 340 and 354.

[20] Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, *True Version of the Philippine Revolution*, 15. See also Villanueva, *op. cit.*, 177. It is worthwhile to explain here that Aguinaldo had never recovered from Wildman the last amount of ₱67,000 entrusted to him. Aguinaldo states . . . "My contact with Wildman may be said to have cost me ₱67,000."

1898, with an enclosed forged photograph of Wildman juxtaposed with Aguinaldo's.[21]

Sylvester revealed that Wildman went to a Chinese photographer in Hongkong with a negative film of General Aguinaldo's. He asked that an authorized photograph be made of him and Aguinaldo together, stating that "he wished to send same to America for the newspaper."

Wildman wrote letters to Aguinaldo after the general had arrived in Cavite. He acted as if in the capacity of a select adviser to the Filipino general. Some of his letters would end with such a phrase as, "I am as ever, Your Friend, Rounseville Wildman, Consul General." Like Pratt, who congratulated himself in triumph over the Spaniards, Wildman congratulated himself too. He even went to the extent of advising Aguinaldo as to what to do concerning the treatment of Spanish prisoners.

> In case . . . you find any of them break oath and you capture them with arms in their hands, give them the full penalty . . . do not let any of your prominent prisoners escape. Keep them as hostages . . . Never mind about feeding them three meals a day. Rice and water will be a good diet. They have been living too high for the last few years.[22]

Mr. Wildman, in his dispatch to the department of state dated July 18, 1898, also made reference to General Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, Sandiko, etc., as good men who could all be leaders in their separate departments in any country. He pictured them as superiors to the Malays and the Cubans.[23] This statement was similar to the estimate of Commodore Dewey about the Filipinos.

The letters of W. F. Sylvester to Dewey on Dec. 16, 1898 and to President William McKinley on February, 1898, throw further light on the matter. Sylvester claimed that Wildman refused to return the money to Aguinaldo because he (Wildman) disclaimed to have received it. Sylvester believes that Wildman had part of the money. Wildman's action, according to Sylvester, had been prejudicial to good relations between the United States and the Filipinos. Sylvester has identified himself as the agent of the Penn. Steel Co., Savage Co., and the Sims Duddly Dynamite Gun Co., and was engaged in the transactions in Hongkong with the Filipino revolutionists. See Dept. of State, *Miscellaneous Letters*, pt. 3, 1898. . . .

[21] See Sylvester's enclosure in his letter on December 16, 1898, Department of State, *Miscellaneous Letters*, pt. 3, 1898.

[22] "Felipe Buencamino to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives," 20th August 1899. Library of Congress.

[23] Wildman to Moore, July 18, 1898, *Consular Letters, Hongkong* XIX.

Later, Wildman was reprimanded by the assistant secretary of state, John Bassett Moore on August 6, 1898, for having had correspondence with Aguinaldo, as reported by a Hongkong newspaperman. He was forbidden from making pledges or talking on policies, for policies, he was reminded, belonged to the department of state and not to consults abroad.[24]

Mr. Wildman made a firm denial that he ever made pledges or discussed the policies of America with Aguinaldo. He said all that he tried to do was to hold him to his promises made before Dewey had brought him to the Philippines.[25] Since the records are now available, it is established that he had been writing letters to the Filipino general. The most famous of this letter was written on June 25th, 1898:[26]

General Aguinaldo
Cavite

My Dear General,

. . . Your work and ability have been fully recognized not only by the people of the United States, but also by the entire civilized world. Since the Cuban leaders have fallen to quarreling among themselves and General Garcia has declined to have any further dealing with the United States to free Cuba and the Philippines from the cruel yoke of Spain, it all remains with you to retain this proud position.

Do not forget the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suffering and not for the love of conquest or hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feeling towards the Philippines . . .

Sincerely yours,

Rounseville Wildman
Consul General

The policy that this revealing Wildman document voiced was precisely the policy that the United States had entertained toward Cuba. Consul General Wildman was implying in his letter to General Aguinaldo that such a statement of policy would be applied to the Philippines. It is hard to believe that after John Bassett Moore had advised Wildman to stop talking on foreign

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24 *Sen. Doc.*, 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3 sess. 338.
25 Wildman to Moore, Aug. 9, 1898 No. 66, *Consular Letters,* Hongkong, XIX.
26 Buencamino, *op. cit.*.

policies, he (Wildman) now turned his big guns against Aguinaldo. He had considered Aguinaldo's letters as childish and described him as a man who was "far more interested in the kind of cane he will carry or breastplate he will wear than in the figure he will make in history."[27] Of course Wildman was upset for being reprimanded by his chief in Washington and it is easy to understand his later attitude towards Aguinaldo and other Filipinos whom he had labelled in Hongkong as superiors to the Malays and the Cubans. It was also known that Wildman refused to return the money he received from Aguinaldo, who said that "my contact with Wildman may be said to cost me 67,000 pesos."

[27] *Sen. Doc.* 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 3d sess., 339.

Filipino War Against the Americans*

Emiliano L. Laus

IN THE BEGINNING, owing to his understanding with Consuls Wildman and Pratt, and Admiral Dewey, President Emilio Aguinaldo had been optimistic that the United States would ultimately recognize Philippine independence. Unfortunately, unpleasant developments, like the capitulation of Manila, Treaty of Paris, President McKinley's assimilation proclamation, and the collapse of the Filipino-American negotiations, compelled the Filipino President to declare war against the United States.

In the first place, the capitulation of Manila to the Americans on August 13, 1898, in which the Filipinos were not allowed to participate, marked the beginning of the parting of the ways of the two peoples. After fighting so hard in overthrowing the Spanish armed forces in Luzon and the Visayas, the Filipinos expected to crown their victory by capturing Manila, their capital city. Hence, they were disgusted and disappointed when, by a tricky arrangement entered into by the Spanish and American authorities, Aguinaldo's forces were studiously excluded from effecting the surrender of Manila. Thus in the evening of August 12, 1898, General Aguinaldo was puzzled to receive from General Anderson, the American commander, the following telegram,

> Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission of the American commander. On this side of the Pasig river, you will be under our fire.[1]

Another factor which prevented Aguinaldo from continuing friendly relations with the Americans was the signing by the

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* Reprinted from this *Bulletin* (March, 1959), v. 3, no. 1, p. 35-39.

[1] Emilio Aguinaldo with Vicente Albano Pacis, *A Second Look at America*, p. 76; James LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, Vol. I, p. 239.

American and Spanish commissioners of the Treaty of París on December 10, 1898, in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. This was a blow to the Filipinos' aspiration for political emancipation. General Aguinaldo energetically protested against this treaty. He accused the Americans of duplicity and ingratitude and through his representative, Don Felipe Agoncillo, asserted that Spain, having been ousted from the Islands, had no right to enter into a cession agreement with the United States with respect to the Philippines. It was recalled that the Filipino leaders in the beginning were asked by the American officials, including Pratt, Wildman, and Dewey to cooperate and help fight against Spain with the promise that the independence of the Philippines would be recognized when victory was achieved. Hence, the ceding of the Philippines to the United States was no less than an act of treachery to the Filipino people.[2]

Another factor which contributed to the strained relationship between the Americans and Filipinos was the "Benevolent Assimilation" policy officially announced on December 21, 1898 by President William McKinley. This policy indicated forcibly that the Washington Administration was to retain the Philippines and not to recognize its independence. Among other things, it stated that with the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, the disposition, control, and government of the Philippine Islands were turned over to the United States. The military commander was therefore enjoined to extend by force, if necessary, American sovereignty over the entire Philippine archipelago, giving assurance, however, to the inhabitants that the mission of the United States was one of benevolent assimilation.[3]

It was therefore clear that the Filipinos would be deprived of their independence and that their bloody struggle had brought them only a change of masters. They, therefore, became furious when the American military command attempted to extend to, and impose their authority and sovereignty on the Visayas. Protesting against this attempt, Aguinaldo said:

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[2] For a summary of the "Memorial" of Felipe Agoncillo which he submitted to the United States Senate on January 30, 1899, as a protest against the Treaty of Paris, see Leandro H. Fernandez, *The Philippine Republic*, pp. 118-121; also Maximo M. Kalaw, *The Case for the Filipinos*, pp. 64-78.

[3] For the text of McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, see Maximo M. Kalaw, *The Development of Philippine Politics*, p. 169.

My government cannot remain indifferent . . [to] such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title of champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands [meaning Iloilo]. I denounce these acts [of the Americans] before the world in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the oppressors of the nations and the tormentors of mankind.[4]

Following instruction from Washington, General Otis, the American military governor of the Philippines, proclaimed on January 4, 1899, although in a modified form, the implantation of American sovereignty over the Philippines. The following day, January 5, 1899, General Aguinaldo answered General Otis in the following words:

General Otis styles himself, in the said proclamation, the military governor of the Philippines, and I protest a thousand times and with the energy I possess against such authority.

I proclaim solemnly that I have not entered into any agreement, neither in Singapore nor in Hongkong, nor even here in the Philippines, either verbally or in writing, to recognize the sovereignty of America over this land.

As, in the proclamation of General Otis, reference is made to instructions from the President of the United States regarding the administration of affairs in the Philippines, I solemnly protest in the name of God, the supreme arbiter of right and justice, who has evidently granted me the power to guide my countrymen in this difficult task of our regeneration against the intrusion of the American government in the sovereignty of these islands.[5]

In order to iron out the differences between the two peoples, Aguinaldo and Otis agreed to the formation of a mixed commission composed of General R. P. Hughes, Colonel James F. Smith, and Colonel E. H. Crowder, representing the American Army; and Florentino Torres, Ambrosio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, representing the Revolutionary Government. The mixed commission held conferences from January 11 to 31, 1899. The Filipino commissioners explained that the American declaration of sovereignty in the so-called "Benevolent Assimilation" pro-

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[4] William Thaddeus Sexton, *Soldiers in the Philippines*, p. 48.
[5] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution*, p. 157.

clamation was not only contrary to the understanding between the American representatives and Emilio Aguinaldo, but also was a hard blow to Filipino political aspirations. The American commissioners pointed out that the sovereignty over the Philippines was vested in Spain which has ceded the Islands to the United States by virtue of conquest. Since the Filipino commissioners would not recognize this contention in consonance with definite instructions from Aguinaldo, the negotiations collapsed. The outbreak of the Filipino-American war became inevitable.[6]

Thus on February 4, 1899, when the Americans started the aggression by shooting a Filipino officer at the San Juan del Monte bridge, President Emilio Aguinaldo formally declared war against the United States. He issued the following edict:

> 1. Peaceful and friendly relations between the Filipino and American forces of occupation are at an end, the latter to be treated as enemies within the limits prescribed by the laws of war.
>
> 2. The American soldiers captured by the Filipino forces are to be treated as prisoners of war.
>
> This edict shall be brought to the knowledge of the Consuls in Manila, and of Congress so that it may suspend constitutional guarantees and declare a state of war.[7]

The Nation, a liberal and irrepressible magazine in the United States, in its issue of April 4, 1901, paid Aguinaldo this tribute:[8]

> Whatever fate may be in reserve for him (Aguinaldo), he will be known to history only as a defender of liberty under desperate circumstances and against terrible odds. With little money and scant resources in arms, ammunitions, and supplies, he has maintained the fight for more than two years against an organized army of more than 65,000 men, possessing every appliance of modern warfare and having entire command of the sea. That in this heroic endeavor he was moved solely by patriotism and that his character was above reproach is the testimony of officers of our own, both military and civil. Nor has his career been stained by an act of cruelty. At the time when the responsibilities were thrown

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6 Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present,* pp. 974 *et seq.*

7 Kalaw, *op. cit.,* pp. 165-6.

8 Sexton, *op. cit.,* p. 277.

upon him he was only twenty-seven years of age. History can show few brighter examples of patient endurance, intellectual resource, and high principle. We feel sure that such virtues will stir the admiration of every lover of liberty in the world and that the name of Aguinaldo will find a place eventually in all American hearts.



FILIPINO INSURGENTS

The Flight and Wanderings of General Emilio Aguinaldo from Bayambang to Palanan 1899-1901; a Diary*

Simeon A. Villa

Translated by J. C. Hixson

THE FOLLOWING DIARY is the work of Simeon A. Villa, who, as medical officer on Emilio Aguinaldo's staff, accompanied him on his flight and finally became his chief of staff. Along with other papers it fell into the hands of the

* The following letter dated April 13, 1926, written to the Editor of the *Philippine Education Magazine,* a leading local monthly, by the then Director of the Philippine Library and Museum, is reproduced because of its bearing on the diary.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Philippine Library and Museum
Manila

Manila, April 13, 1926

The Editor
Philippine Education Magazine
Manila, P. I.

Dear Sir:

You ask me in your letter what my opinion is of Dr. Simeon Villa's diary during the retreat of Aguinaldo and his men before the Americans.

Fortunately, I read the English version some time ago. I prefer the original of the second period of the Philippine Revolution (November 13, 1899 — March 22, 1901). It is not only the one chronicle of the fifteen months odyssey of Aguinaldo, but it contains his best biography, and displays his many personal merits and his natural leadership. The document, too, lacks the bitter spirit which might have been expected to develop under the desperate circumstances under which it was written, and shows throughout not only good sportsmanship, but even humor. It is packed with anecdotal charms, yet what is related never degenerates into the clandestine. It is an execellent specimen of Philippine literature, and rare of its kind.

The diary should be read in connection with the report of General Otis, General MacArthur and others. The American Army, wishing to terminate the revolution, planned to capture Aguinaldo and his forces before the latter had

American authorities when Aguinaldo was captured at Palanan, P.I., on March 23, 1901. The diary seems to be a semi-official record, kept by Villa with the knowledge and consent of Aguinaldo, if, indeed, not under his special direction.

JOHN R. M. TAYLOR,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry
In charge of the Division of Military Information

November 13. — We left Bayambang by night in a special train for Calasiao, and here we disembarked. The Honorable

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had time to complete the Paruao line and the defense system of the Bambang hills. But Aguinaldo, with the same facility he displayed in his contest with Primo de Rivera, fooled the Army of Occupation, which consisted, according to Secretary Root, of 65,534 men, and in January, 1900, of 74,094 men. The surrounding movement was planned in August, and carried out in October and November. MacArthur was to operate along the railroad line, and Wheaton, coming by water and disembarking at San Fabian, Pangasinan, was to connect with Young and Lawton in Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan. But Wheaton could not connect with Young on time, and Aguinaldo and his men, moving in swift columns and taking with them supplies, etc., carried the war farther north, resulting in two more years of war, at the cost of an immense sacrifice of life and money on the part of the Americans. When MacArthur captured Tarlac on November 12, he found the town absolutely deserted. The failure of the plan greatly irritated Lawton. His troops and those of Young and Wheaton were divided, each of them began the hunt for Aguinaldo separately. But Aguinaldo, was so elusive, that although at times he was almost with them, the Americans never found it out until it was too late. General Otis in Manila did not know what to make of the mess. He found it necessary to defend Wheaton and Young against the criticism leveled at them, alleging that it was always easy for a small "guerilla band" to escape capture by larger forces. It was known to only a few that Aguinaldo was retreating with 2,100 men, and that the topography of northern Luzon was as unfamiliar to him as to the Americans.

Aguinaldo's vanguard, commanded by General Gregorio del Pilar, was composed of 250 men, and with it went Aguinaldo himself, his wife and sister, the two sisters of Colonel Leyba, Colonel Sytiar and his wife, Colonel Concepcion and his adjutant, Majors Tirona and Jeciel, the Governor of Pangasinan, and Doctors Barcelona and Villa. The rear guard was composed of 900 men and with it went the son and mother of Aguinaldo, and Colonel Leyba and his mother. When in broad daylight, at four o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, the vanguard entered the town of Manaoag, which they found already occupied by the Americans, they quietly got away without being seen. The family of Aguinaldo and all the women who traveled with the retreating army, found to be an impediment to the rapid movement necessary, after previous notice presented themselves, accompanied by Colonel Sytiar and Major Paez, to the Americans at Talubin about the 25th of December.

The retreat was certainly bitterly hard. Aguinaldo and his men on several occasions went without food for four or five days, and at other times ate only what they could pick up along the way — vegetable roots and unripe guavas. They painfully ascended steep mountains and slid down the other side, only to have to climb other ranges lying beyond. They endured cold and heat, hunger, thirst, fatigue, weakness, sickness. Several times they were caught between deadly

President was accompanied by the secretaries of the interior, treasury, and foreign affairs, and by General Concepcion and aids, Colonel Leyba, Lieutenant-Colonels Topacio and Quesada, Majors Tirona and Jeciel, and Colonel Sytiar, of the staff, the governor of Pangasinan, Barcelona, Villa, and others, the Cavite battalion and one company of artillery. The Honorable President's wife, his sister and mother, the sister and mother of Señor Leyba, and the wife of the Colonel Sytiar were also with the party.

It was 12 o'clock at night, and we were all assembled in the plaza of the church at Calasiao. At about 1 o'clock a.m. we resumed the march for Santa Barbara. The mud was terrible, reaching up to the knees. We made a forced march and succeeded in reaching this town at 3 o'clock a.m. and continued the journey. In this town our forces were joined by the "Mixed" battalion under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Joven, and by General Pilar's brigade, commanded by the general himself. So our column was now composed of more than 1,200 armed men. We continued our journey toward the extensive forest of Manaoag, and reached it at dawn. After everybody had breakfasted the Honorable President ordered that our forces be divided into two columns, one to serve as a vanguard under the command of General Pilar himself, and the other to form the rear guard commanded by Colonel Montenegro.

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converging rifle fire at a range of only a few yards. Once, Aguinaldo noticing that the trail of his men could be followed through the soft ground, made them march in the bed of small river, and while their enemies were combing the river's banks hunting for them, they zigzagged between the hostile forces, and escaped. At times, however, Aguinaldo's band enjoyed a few days or even weeks of comparative quiet and rest. Finally, Aguinaldo made his headquarters at Palanan, and from there communicated with his scattered men throughout Luzon, with Manila, and with foreign countries, also receiving news from America, with the American army entirely ignorant of his whereabouts.

The entries in the diary under dates of the 7th and 8th of March 1901, are most revealing. Everybody knows the iron character of Mabini, and his irreconcilable pro-independist mind. Nevertheless, it appears from the diary, that although Mabini indirectly suggested that the Filipinos accept local autonomy instead of independence because of the reelection of McKinley as President of the United States, Aguinaldo replied that the Filipinos in arms desired nothing less than the independence of the Philippine Islands.

Yours very respectfully,

(Sgd.) EPIFANIO DE LOS SANTOS
Director, Philippine Library and Museum

The Honorable President, his wife and sister, the two sisters of Señor Leyba, Colonel Sytiar and wife, General Concepcion and adjutant, Majors Tirona and Jeciel, the governor of Pangasinan, Barcelona and Villa all accompanied the vanguard. Some 250 troops composed the vanguard.

With the rear guard were the Honorable President's mother and son, Colonel Leyba and mother, and Lieutenant-Colonel Joven and his battalion.

November 14. — It was 12 o'clock noon, but we kept up the march. At 4 p.m., with our vanguard, we entered Manaoag, a town already occupied by the Americans. We passed through it without seeing any Americans at all and marched on toward Pozorrubio, arriving in the town at 6 p.m.

Our rear guard was very far behind us and we knew nothing about its movements. We were chewing sugar cane all day. At night we took supper in Pozorrubio without incident. General Tinio came up to pay his respects to the Honorable President and spent the night with us.

November 15. — At daylight it was raining. At 9 a.m. we received the news that the Americans were at the entrance to the town and as we only had a small force, our rear guard not having yet arrived, we at once took up the march for Alava, where there are some of General Tinio's forces. We arrived in that town at about 12 o'clock in the day and kept up the march toward Rosario, the next town, passing through woods.

The President's wife had a fainting spell or swimming of the head. We halted. She was soon all right. We arranged a bamboo cot for her. Then all at once appeared General Tinio with his troops, announcing to us that the Americans were pursuing us. We at once took up the march. The rain was heavy and we were drenched. At 3 o'clock p.m. we reached Rosario. We passed on, commencing for the first time to ascend the mountains of the Famy settlement or ranch. The rain was incessant and there was a great deal of mud. The hard wind and the cold made us shiver. We continued the ascent of the mountain, and, as we had already reached an elevation of 500

meters, it seemed that we were at a great altitude and pretty close the sky.

But 5 o'clock in the morning arrived, and still we had not reached the summit. We kept up the march in the midst of a pouring rain, and just about 8 p.m. we arrived at the Famy settlement, located on the peak of the mountain. We were all wet and had no clothes for making a change, as the rear guard soldiers had our luggage with them.

Being half dead from the effects of the rain, wind, and cold, and wishing to avoid bad results, we had to immediately enter the houses that were here, and without delay we kindled fires in the *calans,* or native stoves, of the houses. We at once drew near the fires so the warmth might relieve us, and at the same time we took off our clothes in order to dry them.

As soon as we were somewhat restored by the warmth, we ate; that is, each of us ate a little, since there was not sufficient to satisfy the cravings of our stomachs. Afterwards we again turned our attention to the *calans,* or native stoves, in order to continue drying our clothes, but we only finished this at about 1 o'clock in the morning, and then we went to sleep.

November 16 — Daylight came in the midst of rain. At 7 o'clock we were all awake, and Lieutenant-Colonel Joven, one of the rear guard commanders, presented himself to the Honorable President, saying he had arrived last night after we were all asleep. He also reported that the rear guard soldiers disbanded and scattered in the town of Manaoag, on account of being surprised by a large American column while they were passing through that town, and that he had only been able to collect 17 of his men, whom he brought on with him to this place.

At 9' o'clock a.m. we left Famy and shaped our course for Tubao, keeping always in the mountains. After a continuous march without either breakfast or lunch, except the sugar cane we found along the roadside, we reached this town at 4 o'clock p.m. As we were worn out with fatigue and hunger, and unable to continue our journey, the Honorable President arranged for us to spend the night here.

November 17. — After eating a hearty breakfast for fear we might be unable to eat at noon, we left Tubao at 8 a.m. and marched toward Aringay in La Union province. After a comfortable journey — for some of us were in vehicles and some on horseback — we arrived at that town, where all the leading people turned out to greet us. After the Honorable President had urged these to be patriotic, we continued the march toward Caba, and thence directly to Baoang.

We reached the last-named town at 2 o'clock p.m. After resting for one hour, we set out for Naguilian, La Union province, arriving at 6 p.m. Here a band of music, all leading men of the town, and a great crowd of people turned out to meet us.

November 18. — We are still in this town.

November 19. — Under instructions of the Honorable President, Major Jeciel went out this morning. At 5 p.m. he returned and informed the Honorable President that Americans had succeeded in taking the town of Santo Tomas, and had even arrived in Aringay. As this latter town is distant only two or three hours from Naguilian, the Honorable President arranged for all to start that very night.

So, then, we left the town at midnight, following the road through the mountains to San Fernando, San Juan, and Bacnotan, until we reached the town of Balaoan at 9 o'clock that night, after a continuous and painful journey.

This afternoon the Honorable President dispatched Señor Villa to the town of Baoang on business of importance, and hence Señor Villa could not accompany the Honorable President on the journey he has just finished. During the night following this day Villa concluded his mission.

November 20. — Villa, after breakfasting in Baoang with General Tinio, started alone for San Fernando de la Union, traveling the main road, which passes along the coast at a distance of half a kilometer from the sea. He did not see an American vessel that was lying off the shore until it fired several cannon shots at him. The shooting continued, the American perhaps believing that Villa was a general or colonel because he was on horseback. For fear he would be wounded he dis-

mounted, left his horse, and got in the midst of the *cogon* patches. (*Cogon*, a high weed or grass, J. C. H.) On foot he slowly made his way to San Fernando, where he met General Tinio at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The two, being utterly worn out through hunger and fatigue, went to sleep. About 3 o'clock they suddenly awoke, startled by the firing of guns inside the town itself. As it kept up, they went out into the street to see what it was. Great was their astonishment on finding that the American cavalry was passing and firing on the town. Tinio and Villa escaped by running away immediately; but they had the misfortune to be seen by enemy who pursued them. They went up in the mountains and hid.

It was 4 o'clock in the afternoon. They continued the march to San Juan arriving there at 6 p.m. The soles of Villa's feet were bleeding on account of his being without shoes. Villa left General Tinio at San Juan, and, without stopping, marched on to Bacnotan. On arriving there he ate supper, and then continued his journey on to Namagpacan, which he reached at 3 o'clock in the morning.

November 21. — At 7 a.m. Villa set out for Namagpacan; and at the same time the Honorable President and his party left Balaoan. The destination of all was Bangar, where they simultaneously arrived at 8 o'clock. They continued the journey until arrival in Tagudin at 11 o'clock, where we had lunch, and then immediately set out toward the towns of Sevilla, Santa Cruz, San Lucia, and Candon. We arrived in the last mentioned town at 8 p.m. We had supper and spent the night here without incident.

November 22. — At 8 a.m. we renewed our march towards Salcedo, reaching the same at 11 a.m. We spent the noontide here. Afterwards we journeyed on toward Concepcion, arriving in this town at 5 p.m. We passed the night here without incident.

November 23. — At 7 a.m. we continued our journey. At this stage we began to gain elevations, now rising and then descending among the mountains. We never halted on our march; and after passing over Mount Tila, which is 1,300 meters high,

we arrived in Angaqui at 2 p.m. We stopped at this settlement for seven days.

November 30. — We left Angaqui for Cervantes at 10 a.m. passing over the mountains, bare of vegetation, with the result that the heat of the sun made our heads ache. At 1 o'clock p.m. we arrived at Cervantes. As this town offered good conditions for defense, an abundance of food, and a beautiful view, the Honorable President decided to stay there for a long time and defend himself. To that end, then, the detachments were placed so as to cover the points where the enemy might try to enter; trenches were constructed and offices for headquarters were arranged.

We are having a pleasant time in the town.

DECEMBER

December 1. — At 6 o'clock this morning General Pilar requested the Honorable President to let him visit the trenches located on Mount Tila. The general immediately mounted his horse and started for the mountain, 1,300 meters high. At 10 o'clock that night he sent the Honorable President a report, informing him that from Mount Tila he saw the enemy as they were entering Concepcion.

December 2. — At 5 o'clock in the afternoon the Honorable President received a verbal report from two officers coming from Mount Tila to the effect that the Americans had taken all our trenches in Tila; that General Pilar had been killed by being shot through the head; that the other soldiers had also been killed; and they, the officers, were sure the Americans must be in Angaqui at this very hour. According to the statement of the officers, General Pilar died at 10 o'clock a.m.

At 8 p.m. the Honorable President, his retinue, and the remaining troops marched out of Cervantes and started for the Cayan settlement, reaching there at 12 o'clock midnight, immediately going on toward Tadian. At this last-mentioned place we took a direction toward Bagnen.

At every step we found the mountains getting higher and the cold more chilling. It was 3 o'clock in the morning. A strong

wind was blowing. The cold becoming more and more intense was penetrating almost to our bones. Our skins had become dead to feeling and our lips drawn and purple from cold. We traveled on over the precipices, which every moment seemed to get deeper because we were getting higher and higher. The first rays of the sun shone dimly in the east and night bade us farewell; but the intensity of the cold was the same.

The *Kañao* is a feast which the Igorrotes celebrate in each ranch or settlement, when one or any number of them secure the head of an enemy in battle or treachery.

The extensive mountains of northern Luzon are inhabited by a great number of savages, amounting to over 60,000, according to our information. These live in barrios or ranches at considerable distances from one another. They exist on *camotes*, or native potatoes, and anything. At times and on extraordinary occasions they have rice to eat. They are a people who go naked, and all of them, men and women alike, wear in their ears huge ornaments, which may be made of copper wire, teeth, etc. Their bodies are adorned with black points, or painted with divers figures. On their necks they always wear collars of copper wire or cords with pieces of broken plates and other such stuff attached. They only cut their hair in front, letting it grow to a length of about one and a half feet. For greasing their hair they use the fresh fat of the hog.

They live in settlements, each one of which may contain as high as 1,000 Igorrotes. Two settlements can never be on good terms; and there is always enmity between all of them. The inhabitants of one settlement can not visit those of another; they would be killed at once.

Each Igorrote always goes armed with a spear. The Igorrotes have a deep hatred for Christians, but can not fight them face to face; hence are very treacherous.

The *Kañao* is celebrated when they have taken the head of an enemy, the ceremony being as follows:

They cut the head from the dead body and likewise the hands and feet. The head is carried to the house of the chief of the settlement and then is attached to a pole some twelve feet in

length and placed inside the house. All the Igorrotes of the ranch, wearing on their heads the white feathers of a rooster, assemble at the house in which the head has been placed. Each Igorrote carries in his hand a spear and a short stick resembling a bandmaster's wand. Before going to the house for the feast they assemble in groups of 40 or 50; and as they take up the march they form a line in single file, and all dance as they go along, striking and beating the wands against the lances.

The dance consists in this: Keeping time to the march, they carry one leg to the front, executing movements, contracting and extending the other leg meantime which supports the weight of the body in the act of leaping. The body forms an outward curve. The arms support the lance and the wand, with which they execute movements to the sound of the dance. Several Igorrotes executing this dance and wearing plumage on their heads present a confusing scene to the vision at first glance.

Once arrived at the house of the festivities, the Igorrotes all dance around the amputated head. They use the hands and feet of the corpse for scrubbing their faces.

This ceremony lasts for six days, and so it happens that the hands and feet enter a state of putrefaction. At the end of six days the hands, feet and head are buried. The corpse itself is buried after the end of the third day. All the Igorrotes of the stttlement take part in the ceremony.

At the termination of the celebration the hands, feet, and head are buried near the house. After the lapse of sufficient time to allow the soft and fleshy parts to rot away they dug up the skull and the skeletons of the hands and feet, using them as valuable ornaments for the house.

CAMOTES

In this ranch there is an abundance of camotes, but there is a scarcity of rice, and hence our meals have been reduced to two a day, the first at 9 a.m., consisting of camotes, and the second at 3 p.m., consisting of water-cooked rice and other foods. We only allow half a chupa (about a fourth of a pint) of rice for a ration, the result being that we never get enough to eat and when

we can not get other foods on account of their great scarcity we supply the deficiency with *talbos,* or shoots of the camote and with unhulled rice cooked in water and salt. The second meal sometimes consists of camotes when there is no rice, so that we have nothing but camotes during the entire day.

THE PARTY LOOKS FORWARD TO BETTER TIMES

On a moonlit night, the Honorable President, Sytiar, Jeciel, B. and V., the two Leyba sisters and the Honorable President's sister were discussing the matter; and we decided that once the independence of the country is declared we will take a trip to Europe, with an allowance of a million dollars to pay our expenses.

December 16. — At 6 p.m. the Honorable President named the following as members of a council to take place this night, viz: Colonel Sytiar, Señor Barcelona, director of the health department; Villa, sub-inspector of the staff; Paez, second chief of staff; Majors Jeciel and Gatmaitan, and Captain Juan H. del Pilar. After these had assembled at a meeting presided over by the Honorable President, in a thicket not far from our camp, the Honorable President explained the very critical state of things: that the Americans had taken Bayambang and hence we could not go farther forward; that there were Americans behind us; that they were pursuing us and had already arrived at the Sagada settlement; that our situation here in Banaue is very dangerous, because not only are enemies the Americans who are in front of us and behind us, but the very Igorrotes around us, including those of Banaue, are also our enemies only waiting for the opportunity to cut off our heads, just as happened to Captain Villareal's soldiers, who, sent on in advance to the settlements, were attacked by the Igorrotes of Pagayapaig, and as a result we had to lament the loss of three guns captured by the Igorrotes, besides three soldiers and a woman wounded.

Having explained all these things, the Honorable President asked Captain Pilar what opinion he had to express. The latter replied hat he had no opinion to express, but that he agreed with the Honorable President's declarations. But Colonel Sytiar answered this, saying that Captain Pilar's answer was not to the

point, as we are all under the Honorable President's orders and ready; what was desired was that the Captain should freely express his own personal opinion. On hearing this Captain Pilar replied in the very same phrases he had first used. Therefore, seeing that he could draw out nothing that would throw light on the question under discussion, the Honorable President asked Major Gatmaitan for an expression of his opinion. This gentleman replied that as for him he would wait for either the Americans or the Igorrotes who might come and attack us in this settlement; and that he, in conjunction with our soldiers, would maintain the defense until death. The Honorable President seeing that this opinion was not conducive to the desired end, then said it was Señor Villa's turn to express any opinion which might be deemed expedient. This gentleman replied that, considering the remarks and observations of the Honorable President, together with the moves for the meeting, he was of the opinion, first, that we should separate from the women, who constitute such a great impediment or obstacle to any plan we might form; and as to that, if the Honorable President would not consider it in a bad light, he could send these women to Manila, accompanied by two trustworthy officers selected by himself. And, in the second place, if the Americans who are behind us and in front us wish to advance toward us, they could do so very easily with the cooperation of the Igorrotes of these ranches — in which case the person of the Honorable President would be endangered. In view, then, of these considerations he believed that we should march away from this ranch as soon as possible, and either set out for Abra province or else join forces with General Tinio; so that the Honorable President having arranged in this manner for an available force of 2,000 men, nobody could poke fun at us, but we, on the contrary, would have to be reckoned with and respected.

After the expression of Señor Villa's opinion, the Honorable President told Major Jeciel that he might say what he considered the best thing to do. This gentleman said that for his part he would recall from the town of Cervantes the 37 soldiers under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Joven, and incorporate that detachment with our forces here, so we could defend ourselves in case of an attack by the enemy coming here. After hearing this

opinion the Honorable President called Señors Paez, Barcelona, and Sytiar to express themselves. All these replied that they agreed with the opinion expressed by Señor Villa.

After hearing the opinions of those who formed the meeting, the Honorable President stated that as many had voted for the plans of Señor Villa, believing them to be the most efficacious, he himself had the same belief. In this way the meeting was brought to a close at 9 o'clock at night; and before the members retired to their houses the Honorable President charged them all to keep secret the proceedings.

December 19. — Speaking of our life in this ranch — all get up at 6 o'clock in the morning, and afterwards breakfast is prepared. Breakfast takes from 9 to 10 o'clock, after which the time is devoted to conversation, groups of eight to ten individuals being formed. At 3 o'clock they go away and prepare dinner. When it is cooked we wait until 5 o'clock in the afternoon to dine. After dinner there is conversation again until 8 o'clock when we go to rest.

"The Banaue breakfast" — so has been termed the breakfast eaten every morning during the stay of the Honorable President and his family at this settlement. It is of a flavor agreeable to the palate, light and very digestible, cheap and easily prepared. This breakfast is preferred by all those who tried it, and also by the Honorable President everywhere he has gone in these mountains. It consists of the following: coffee with milk; fried camotes, 5 to 7 milimeters in diameter; butter. It was named by the Honorable President.

December 21. — Yesterday afternoon about 5 o'clock news came through an Igorrote that many armed forces had arrived in Babuyan. He could not say for certain whether the forces are ours or those of the enemy, since he is not yet accustomed to distinguish them, but he says their faces are similar to ours. Two Igorrote spies were immediately dispatched to said point, to reconnoiter and determine if the forces are our own or those of the enemy. Our spies returned the following day, the 21st, at about 8 a.m., reporting that there was no such force. Immediately on receipt of the information that there were forces in Babuyan, all our troops got ready for the march to Ambayan,

with the ladies who are accompanying us. But the ladies will go forward with Captain Villareal's soldiers, who will serve them as a guard. Colonel Manuel Sytiar, of the staff, has gone along with them. Afterwards the remaining forces will march with the Honorable President. The departure of the women, including the P. (must have intended "M", mother — J.C.H.) and the sister of the Honorable President took place at 7:20 this morning; and they had scarcely gone a distance of 2 kilometers when our spies arrived (from Babuyan — J.C.H.). On being informed that there was no such force in Babuyan, the Honorable President changed his plan of taking up the march and told Barcelona and Villa that as the day was already well advanced, and hence night would overtake us on Mount Polis, he for his part preferred to start on the following day.

The sun is beclouded; it is a sad day to us. The fresh breeze gently moves the trees. The separation from the women — from those beings who give us life and courage — or better said, our solitude in this mountain, throughout every part of which is seen only the abyss of death — sorely afflicts us.

That atmosphere of grief compelled Barcelona and Villa to express their opinion to the Honorable President to the effect that having decided to march it would be best to do so as it was very probable we would have to spend the night in Ambayuan anyway. In view of these statements the Honorable President agreed that we should continue the journey. So in fact we started from Banaue at 10:45 a.m. We commenced to ascend that lofty Mount Polis, which is 2,700 meters high. Continuing our march without cessation, at 5 o'clock in the evening we passed a beautiful spring and there we ate a little to refresh ourselves. But we had not yet covered half the ascent.

After dinner, which never required as much as fifteen minutes, we resumed the march.

Night is coming upon us; our vision grows dim, our legs and knees are already weak and tremulous, our breathing laborious, and our thirst is intense. The clinging mud increases our troubles. The night is very dark. The leafy mountain trees shut out the starlight of the heavens. We no longer see one another. Along that narrow path — 18 inches wide — which we

travel, lie the deep precipices of death; and looking down into their depths suffices to make one have a feeling of faintness and swimming in the head, or to imagine himself on the edge of death. Each one of us uses as a guide the branch of a tree, probing into the darkness with the point of it for the location of the path.

It is 9 o'clock at night. We are perhaps at an elevation of 2,300 meters. Greater heights are still awaiting us. Hunger! thirst! We are sick and faint. Corporeal fatigue prostrates us; darkness terrifies us. At 10 o'clock we see the firmament, since the top of the mountain is not covered with trees.

Our breathing is more easy. We stop on the summit to rest a little. We are exhausted; we lie down on the ground without a *petate*. The intense cold makes our teeth chatter. Soon a profound slumber and great exhaustion has robbed us of consciousness.

At 2 o'clock in the morning the Honorable President awoke and ordered that we should continue the march. We all awoke with clothes wet with dew.

The march is not painful now, because we are descending this lofty mountain, which is 2,700 meters high. We pay no attention to the hunger and thirst; it is only the cold that troubles us.

The aurora of the day scatters her first rays upon the universe; and the light gives us courage. Our march is more rapid in proportion as the daylight advances. We are also nearing the foot of the mountain. We continue the descent.

December 22.—It was 7 a.m. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.

We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.

The Honorable President had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.

At 9 a.m. we left this settlement, going toward Talubin, and leaving in Ambayuan all the troops that were accompanying us. These followed with the women under the same escort as when we left Banaue, viz., Captain Villareal and his soldiers, Colonel Sytiar and the two Leyva sisters, the Honorable President's wife and his sister, the Honorable President himself, Barcelona, Villa Paez, and Jeciel. We arrived in Talubin at 1 o'clock in the afternoon and dined at the house of a Christian named Valenciano.

We have remained in this ranch until the 24th without incident.

December 24. — We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o'clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The Honorable President told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the Honorable President prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.

The Honorable President left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the morning. his family and the other women remaining behind with the two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.

When the Honorable President reached the river half way between Talubin and Ambayuan, he stopped there and remained pensive on the bank. But afterwards he called for B. and V., and expressed his opinion concerning the presentation of his family to the enemy; he thought it might greatly influence the imperial policy of the United States. These two doctors, B. and V., then explained that they agreed with him on this point but that they had not mentioned the fact before, as they did not desire to oppose his ideas. Immediately the Honorable President charged V. to go to Talubin at once and get his family, and he

wrote a letter to Señor Sytiar, in which he said he had quite decided on carrying his family into the mountains, because of the fact that their presentation to the enemy would greatly influence the imperial policy.

Señor V. at once went away to Talubin, and when he arrived there he delivered the letter to Señor Sytiar, saying that those who wished to do so could remain, except the family of the Honorable President, and that his (V.'s) only object there was to get the family. Señor Sytiar answered that he himself had dispatched a letter to the Americans at Bontoc, informing them that the Honorable President's family would present themselves to the Americans, and that therefore he (Señor Sytiar) would be compromised as soon as the Americans arrived, because they would look at him to produce the family of the Honorable President, referred to in the letter. Señor V. replied that the letter sent to the Americans in no wise concerned him, as he had only come there for the sole purpose of getting the family of the Honorable President. Under these circumstances, then, the family of the Honorable President and the two Leyba sisters at once marched away with Señor V. for Ambayuan to rejoin the Honorable President's party. And Señor Sytiar and Paez, fearing the Americans would "fix" (sic) them on account of the deception practiced, followed in rear of the Honorable President's family until they once more reached their old companions on the mountain.

We are all united in Ambayuan at this moment. It is 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The Honorable President is meditating over the route we should take. There are enemies in front and behind. The Honorable President expressed his opinion to Señor B. and V. and the three agreed that we should set out for Barlig.

Night came on. We could not make the trip because we suspected that there were enemies in Barlig, since there is a road from that point to Talubin. At 9 o'clock at night a letter came for Colonel Sytiar from the commanding officer of the American forces saying that they had already arrived in Talubin and were expecting there the family of the Honorable President.

As we did not know which way to go, by reason of the nearness of the enemy, and because the women constituted a great

impediment on this kind of journey, the Honorable President, in view of the critical situation, again ordered that his family should retire accompanied by the gentlemen before designated as their escort.

It is 2 o'clock in the morning. We have spent the night awake and on watch. The women are ready to march.

The watch indicated 2:30 o'clock, and the women marched off to Talubin to present themselves to the enemy. What a most wonderful parting. The Honorable President and ourselves remained on the mountain of Ambayuan. The Honorable President, having bade adieu to the women who constitute such a great burden on this kind of a trip, and not being able to go by a different route to the Barlig settlement as he had thought of doing, now decided to return to Banaue. Therefore, at 3:30 a.m., we resumed the march, passing over the mountains we had traversed on the night of the 21st of the same month.

December 25. — At daybreak we found ourselves at the foot of Mount Polis. We continued the ascent, although under painful difficulties, as our bodies were already weakened by loss of sleep and continuous marching. Through constancy and patience we at last reached the summit at 11 o'clock in the morning. Without halting we commenced the descent of the mountain. We arrived at Banaue at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and at once cooked some food and ate it.

After eating the Honorable President and Señors B. and V. discussed among themselves what direction we should take. As we were unable to determine which route would be the best as the enemy were in front of us and behind us — the Honorable President said that the only remedy left was for all to make up our minds for death; that we should resist them and undertake to break their columns, even though it might cost many lives, since in this manner we might pass their lines and go to the mountains of the north; whereas, on the contrary, if we did not resist they might capture us alive. Seeing the reasonableness of the Honorable President's idea, and being convinced it was the only way to save ourselves B. and V. concurred in it, and agreed to continue the journey at early dawn tomorrow, even though we might meet the enemy.

This afternoon, at 5 o'clock, we learned that the Americans behind us had arrived at Ambayuan, the place from which we had just come. At 10 o'clock at night our sentinels reported to us they saw many lights in the mountains in the direction towards Ambayuan. "Can it be the Americans?" was the first suspicion we had, for Ambayuan is very close to this place, Banaue. So we all got up and went to look, but the lights were very far away. We expected them to come closer, but 11 o'clock and 12 o'clock at night passed without their approaching.

Exhausted by fatigue and loss of sleep, we again lay down wearing our equipments, that is, our shoes and revolvers; likewise the soldier lay with their guns and cartridges ready.

December 26. — The soldiers had breakfast at 7 a.m. At 8 o'clock the Honorable President ordered the companies formed, and he explained to all that the only remedy left was for all to be resolute and face death; that on the morning we should have to continue the journey to the front; that it was very probable that we would encounter the Americans; that we should resist them, even though they might kill us all; that we should endeavor to break their columns so as to pass out toward the mountains, in the north. Afterwards he said: "Do you swear not to abandon me?" The soldiers cried out that they preferred death rather than to abandon him into the hands of the enemy.

After those speeches — which were made at 8 a.m. — we set out on the march for Babuyan settlement. We ascended and descended mountains; and after a continuous march we reached the settlement at 12 o'clock sharp.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon an Igorrote from Banaue brought a report informing the Honorable President that the Americans had reached that settlement in their search for and pursuit of General E. Aguinaldo. We passed the night very badly, since the Americans to the number of 300 were on our trail while our forces scarcely amounted to 100. We therefore kept awake and on the alert almost all night.

Speaking of the forces accompanying the Honorable President since the day the women and some of our men left to go to Manila, the Honorable President had available the following forces:

Aides of the Honorable President — Major Raymundo C. Jeciel, First Lieut. Telesforo Carasco.

Chief of Health Department — Dr. Santiago Barcelona.

Subinspector of Military Hospitals — Dr. Simeon A. Villa.

Commanding Officer of the Troops — Major Geronimo Gatmaitan.

First Company of First Bulacan Battalion — First Lieut. Teodoro Dayao, Second Lieut. Vicente Morales, and 49 soldiers.

Second Company of First Bulacan Battalion — First Lieut. Santiago Catindig, and 27 soldiers.

Sixth Company of First Bulacan Battalion — Captain Juan H. del Pilar, Second Lieut. Lucio Valentin and 18 soldiers.

Fifth Company of First Ilocos Sur Battalion — Captain Ildefonso Villareal, First Lieut. Alberto Bautista, Second Lieut. Sulpicio Luna, Second Lieut. Leoncio Alejandrino, and 33 soldiers.

Bureau of Military Supplies — Second Lieut. Braulio de la Cruz, Second Lieut. Anselmo Subido (attached).

Total — One field officer, 11 line officers, and 107 men. These, then, constitute the only forces accompanying the Honorable President.

December 27. — At 2 o'clock in the morning the soldiers had something to eat, and at 4:30 was resumed the journey toward the mountains of the north. After a continuous march, with a great deal of descending and ascending among the mountains, we reached Nagani settlement at 2 in the afternoon. We never rested here a moment, but kept up the march toward another ranch, Ayangan, meantime passing through mountainous regions higher and higher every minute.

It seems that our strength is becoming exhausted, due perhaps, to hunger, thirst, and fatigue. It is already 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and the guides tell us that Ayangan is still very far off. We keep on marching. The day is fading away; copious perspiration covers us from head to foot; we have not yet eaten anything; night falls upon us, and we find ourselves in the midst of several very high mountains, unable to see a thing on account of the intense darkness. Suddenly, the soldiers that are

in advance announce to the Honorable President that it is impossible to continue marching, as the trail they are on is too narrow, and they are in danger of falling into the precipices. It is 8 o'clock at night.

In view of the situation the Honorable President ordered a rest here. All the soldiers at once sought water for drinking purposes and to cook their rice — each one carried a little rice — but unfortunately none was found; thus, it happened that in spite of our having eaten nothing all day and of not being able to eat on this night, we had to make the best of our fortune, or misfortune. We tightened our belts, and half dead, we went to bed on the ground, among rocks and trees, which for the time were our bedding. Toward 2 o'clock in the morning, the Honorable President, awoke and got up. What a surprise he had on seeing an Igorrote, armed with a spear, standing at our feet and ready to "do us up" (sic). On seeing that one of us, the Honorable President, was awake, the Igorrote ran away and let himself fall into the mountain precipices. He had saved ourselves from one misfortune.

It had commenced to rain gently at about 11 o'clock that night; hence we were all wet throughout the entire night, and the cold, too, was killing us.

During the night the Igorrotes succeeded in stealing one of our guns.

December 28. — We are up at 5 a.m. The rain continues. Our strength seems to be completely exhausted. At 6 o'clock the Honorable President ordered us on the march. So we begin the journey, though we slept in the water last night, had nothing to eat all day yesterday, and without even a breakfast now. We are wet.

The rain stopped at 8 o'clock, and the sun is coming out, lessening our suffering from the cold. We have found a large camote patch, and we are all making a breakfast on raw camotes.

The path we have been traveling is so very narrow that we had to repair it at some points. One of the Honorable President's horses fell into a precipice and was killed. Finding no food in these regions to appease our hunger, we laid hands on the horse

and utilized him for our luncheon. Afterwards we continued the journey until suddenly attacked by Igorrotes. The lances which they were throwing at us came from many points. The Igorrotes were occupying the dense part of the woods. The road along which we were passing was so narrow we could only travel in single file.

It was 5 o'clock in the afternoon, night was coming on, and so the Honorable President, wishing to give these people a lesson, ordered 25 soldiers to go back and fire a volley at those who were pursuing us or followed on our trail. And so the 25 soldiers returned and fired several volleys at the Igorrotes. But as these people are much accustomed to the mountains, they ran away and dodged about in the precipices until the pursuing soldiers lost sight of them.

Night came on us, and as we feared that the Igorrotes, under protection of the dense woods, might cause us some losses, the Honorable President decided we should seek a secure spot for pitching our camp. Having already found a good place we have halted here to spend the night.

December 29. — At 6 o'clock in the morning we all hunted for camotes, and made our breakfast on them. We resumed the march at 8 o'clock.

The Igorrotes again attacked us on the road. Our troops replied with their guns; but as our people traveled on, the Igorrotes followed, attacking us with their lances and yelling lustily as if they wished to terrify us. We came to a river on the side of a high mountain, and while we were passing down the mountains toward said river, suddenly a rain of rocks fell upon us, lasting considerable time.

Fortunately for us, we had no casualties. The Igorrotes who were throwing the rocks were occupying the top of the mountain, and so we were unable to see them.

We crossed the river and again went on climbing among the mountains until, after a three hours' continuous march, we arrived at the Ayangan settlement. The Igorrotes of the settlement behaved themselves well toward us. That same night they gave us rice and pork; so we were able to have dinner.

We have passed the time pleasantly in this settlement, having tarried here for two days.

December 31. — The troops had breakfast at 5 o'clock in the morning, and at 8 o'clock we set out on the march for the next nearest settlement. We reached Alimit at 3 o'clock that afternoon without incident, save the penalties of the journey; that is, hunger, thirst, and heat.

JANUARY, 1900.

January 1. — We left Alimit at 8 o'clock in the morning, going toward Mayaoyao. This day is a memorable one for us. We continue the march through mountains, which are higher than former ones and which present difficult ascents. Heat, hunger, and thirst give us a nauseating sickness. Excessive perspiration is wasting our energies, and our legs and knees are weak and tremulous. The ascent forms almost an acute angle. Many of our soldiers faint.

When we arrived at the top of the mountain range which we saw from below, we find that there are other ascents still higher. This fact worries us, because we are already very much exhausted; but we can not stop, since, there being no vegetation on this mountain, the heat of the sun would kill us immediately.

We continue the journey in spite of these difficulties. It is 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The soldiers are crawling along on all fours and weeping. But they are afraid to stay here, and hence notwithstanding their great suffering, they force themselves along on the march.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon we are able to make out the settlement to which we are going. We forced the marching, and at 6 o'clock p.m. we arrive at Mayaoyao.

We have succeeded in buying rice and pork in this settlement, and so we have passed a comfortable night. But we have to eat without salt — a thing somewhat difficult for one unaccustomed to it.

We have stayed here in this settlement two days.

January 4. — We left Mayaoyao at 8 o'clock this morning, taking the direction for Buncian, and going always through the

mountains. What we suffered on this trip makes it equal in every respect to the trip of yesterday.

We reached Buncian without incident at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. We spent the night in that settlement.

January 5. — We left Buncian, going toward Bayabas, and this latter settlement was reached at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. And what great enthusiasm we felt on seeing from this settlement the extensive plain of the provinces of Nueva Viscaya and Isabela! Joy filled our palpitating hearts.

The Honorable President decided that we should continue the trip on the following day, and we rested through the night. Hours seemed like years to us, as we longed for daylight to come at once, so we might continue the march and reach the first town in Isabela inhabited, not by Igorrotes, but by Christians.

Now, indeed, we have finished the lofty and extensive mountains — finished, after three months of living in the depth of the woods and using the scarce camotes as our food. Now our lives, indeed, are saved from those Igorrotes, who are always armed with spears and arrows, and ready at the least carelessness to rob us of our lives. Hunger, thirst, heat, cold, laborious breathing, nausea and swimming of the head, exhaustion, the dark nights, and the trembling of our legs and knees — all of this is past, and we are through with it for good. Morning came.

January 6. — The Honorable President ordered First Lieut. Carasco and four soldiers to make a reconnoissance to Oscaris and see if any enemies were there, in order that we might resume our march after 6 o'clock. These marched away at once. The Honorable President and the rest of us remained.

Six o'clock came and we were all impatient.

The watch indicated 12 o'clock. We hunted for Igorrotes to serve us as guides to the town of Oscaris. We could find none, because they had all hidden themselves.

Three o'clock arrived. The Honorable President ordered all the soldiers to scout the mountains in search of Igorrotes. One was caught and brought to the Honorable President. To prevent his escaping, Barcelona tied a rope around the Igorrote's neck, hands, feet, and waist, and then placed a guard over him. We

were quite happy. Night came on; we went to rest, and everything passed off without incident.

January 7. — At 8 o'clock in the morning we set out on the march; everybody jubilant. The soldiers sung to their light footsteps.

We ran across many deer and wild carabaos in the mountains —animals that indicate life. The Honorable President shot two of the former.

Three o'clock arrived, but we paid no attention to the hunger, thirst, and heat. We kept up the march; enthusiasm filled us.

When we had passed over half the road, we made out in the distance three men on horseback. We called to them; they approached, and we recognized them as the soldiers who had accompanied Lieutenant Carasco. They brought us an envelope containing a report. We opened the letter, which informed us that there were no enemies in Oscaris. We then hurried the marching.

The afternoon wore away and 6 o'clock arrived. The journey was too long; the soldiers were already tired and exhausted, and hunger and thirst was killing us. Night came on. We reached a river, crossed it, and kept up the march, becoming a little more light-hearted on account of the fact that we were already near. At 9:30 p.m. we arrived at the town of Oscaris. The night was very dark. The "lieutenant" of the barrio, who is a true patriot, at once prepared a little something to eat for us all. When the rice was cooked we ate it immediately with salt, as we could not wait for the pork, because the hunger was causing us a feeling of nausea. We passed the night without incident.

January 8. — About 10 o'clock in the morning deputations from the several towns within the jurisdiction of Oscaris commenced to arrive to pay their respects to the Honorable President, bringing with them rice and other food for us. We passed the time divinely in the town until the 18th instant.

January 18. — About 2 o'clock in the afternoon a report was received from Ilagan to the effect that 400 Americans had left that town for the purpose of attacking us. At any rate, we only

had with us some 100 small men, the greater part of whom were sick, and so we had to retire this afternoon, moving across the river into a *camarine,* or storehouse, previously constructed four days ago. We passed the time in the camarine, without incident.

January 19. — A report was received from Echague informing us that 17 Americans were in that town, with a convoy, enroute to Bayombong. On being informed of this, the Honorable President immediately sent 40 soldiers to Carig, under command of Captain Villareal, to await the Americans at that point. The latter, perhaps having notice of our forces in Carig, did not choose to leave Echague during the entire day.

January 20. — Captain Villareal and his forces remained in Carig waiting for the Americans.

The forces being well arranged in convenient places, at 4 p.m. the people of the town notified them that two Americans had arrived, accompanied by a Chinaman and had gone to the house of the telegraph operator. Our forces at once went to the telegraph office and really found the two Americans. These on seeing our soldiers, at once said "Cosa tu Insurrecto?" (Jargon for "Who are you, insurgents?") The Americans said, "America mucho bueno" (Jargon for "America is very good." — J.C.H.), and immediately ran. Our soldiers pursued them and fired some shots, and in a few moments the two soldiers were dead. Our soldiers took possession of their guns and ammunition. Just then Captain Villareal received an order from the Honorable President commanding him to return with all his forces. Therefore he at once withdrew, and reached our camp at 11 o'clock that night, carrying with him, besides the Chinese companion of the Americans, five carabaos and some 20 horses captured from the American convoy.

This morning we also captured near our camp two spies of the enemy, which we now hold as prisoners.

January 21. — At 8 o'clock this morning the Chinese companion of the Americans at Carig was executed, after a court-martial. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon we were assured that the 400 Americans proceeding from Ilagan had arrived at Echague, a town within the same jurisdiction as Oscaris, and distant

from it only four hours by road. We all were ready for an attack. The Honorable President and his two doctors B. and V., held a secret conference at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of this day, and for several reasons they agreed that we should leave the valley and take a route toward Abra province in order to unite ourselves with the forces of General Tinio.

January 22. — We got up at 4 o'clock in the morning and all the soldiers at once had a little to eat; we waited for the enemy. We knew that they were still far away at 4 o'clock on the preceding afternoon. At 11 a.m., this day, the local *presidente* and the telegraph operator of Carig both presented themselves to the Honorable President to join our forces. They left their town on account of fear over the occurrence of the afternoon of the 20th instant.

January 23 to 29.— Without incident.

January 30. — According to our spies and a letter from a patriot the Americans burned Echague and Carig. It is also reported that according to the enemy's plans they will attack this afternoon or tomorrow.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the Honorable President and his companions went out on horseback to the top of the mountainous ridge. On reaching there it was apparent that from its heights all the towns of Isabela could be observed, but nobody was seen coming to attack us, and even the field glasses disclosed nothing. About half an hour later our attention was attracted to the fact that our soldiers at the quarters were catching all the horses. A few minutes later we saw a mounted man start from our camp and come rapidly toward us. In truth, he arrived and told the Honorable President that, according to Lieutenant Carasco, the latter by the aid of his glasses saw the enemy were already in Oscaris, a town half the distance of a kilometer from our camp. The Honorable President, astonished at the news, then looked toward the town of Oscaris with his glasses, and what a surprise he had on seeing the enemy were then and there deploying as skirmishers to attack our forces. He immediately gave the order for everybody to march away and go to the mountain where he was; hence, as soon as the soldiers were ready, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, they undertook the

march toward that mountain, and as soon as they reached the mountain the Honorable President said that as night had already arrived it was probable the enemy would not come to attack us, and therefore it would be best for everybody to first cook something to eat and afterwards to resume the march. We all acted accordingly.

After supper, which was at 8 o'clock we commenced the march. After five hours of marching the Honorable President gave orders that everybody could rest. This was at 2 o'clock in the morning. So we all slept in some woods until 7 in the morning.

January 31. — When the forces were inspected it was seen that the orderlies of both B. and V. had made their escape, that of the first having stolen ₱50 and the Honorable President's woolen blanket.

We then resumed the march at 7 a.m. About 9 a.m. we found a beautiful spring, and here the Honorable President ordered that everybody should look something for breakfast. The Honorable President desired to return to the camp we had left at Oscaris, and as he did not know whether the enemy was still there he ordered a courier about 12:30 in the afternoon to go to Oscaris to see if they were there. The courier immediately left on horseback.

The day wore away, and we found ourselves at the same spring. Night came, and we rested among the cogon patches. At 7:30 p.m. the courier returned and told the Honorable President that the Americans had already left Oscaris, having divided their forces into two columns. One column took the direction toward Reina Mercedes and the other one returned to Echague. On being informed of this, the Honorable President gave orders that we should return to Oscaris on the following day.

We passed the night without incident.

The *Kañao* is a very great celebration held by the Igorrotes of a settlement when by means of battle or treachery they wound or take the head of one or many of their enemies, which enemies may be Christians or the Igorrotes of some other settlement. On securing the head of an enemy they carry it to the house of the

most offended or aggrieved Igorrote of the settlement to have the celebration, and in default of any such aggrieved or offended person the head is carried to the house of the chief of the settlement. After first arranging the upper portion of a cut banana stalk in the house where the celebration is to take place, the head is put on the upper end of this stalk and held there by means of six little sticks which are tied to the stalk. Afterwards a lighted cigar is placed in the mouth. The participants in the celebration then approach the head successively and suck the dripping blood. When this act of cannibalism is over they place a native hat on the head. All the Igorrotes then march round and round the head, dancing the meanwhile.

(*Translator's Note.* — This additional description of the *Kañao,* differing somewhat from the first description given in the body of the diary, is written on a separate sheet and inserted in the book without having any connection with the unbroken daily narrative which is continued below. — J.C.H.)

FEBRUARY, 1900.

February 1. — At 6 o'clock in the morning, and without eating breakfast, we started on the march for Oscaris. After five hours of marching we again arrived in our Oscaris camp at 11 o'clock, nothing important having occurred on route.

We had been informed some days before that many of our forces were in Nueva Viscaya, and this was the motive which led the Honorable President to think of returning to Oscaris. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon a courier was dispatched to our Viscaya forces with orders for them to come and join us; likewise orders were given for the capture of the two deserted orderlies.

February 2. — Nothing important.

February 3. — In the afternoon, at about 3 o'clock, we got news that the Americans, who were en route Bayombong, had retired and concentrated at Carig, because numerous Philippine forces were at San Luis on their way to join us at Oscaris.

This news was confirmed at 7 o'clock at night by some persons who came from Carig. These also informed us that the Americans were keeping close watch through every street of that

town for fear, perhaps, of a surprise. Our enthusiasm was great, because aid was coming to us, and hence we spent the night in amusements. Moreover, our informants had told us that our forces would arrive the following day without fail.

February 4. — We got up early, expecting the arrival of our forces. At 8 o'clock in the morning the courier returned. As for the news we had received, he told us that there were no such forces of ours, for he had gone as far as the neighborhood of Bayombong without having seen any Philippine troops at all. Our joy, or, better said, our illusion, was converted into sadness.

At 10 a.m we received some more news, still worse, to the effect that there were many Americans in Camarag, a town in the neighborhood of Oscaris, and distant from it two hours by road. We were unable to ascertain what direction they would take.

The Honorable President secretly expressed his opinion to B. and V., saying that we should go to Bayabas in case the enemy came. V. said that in such an event we would die of hunger, because, in the first place, the towns that were then aiding us could no longer send us anything whatever, as Oscaris was the key to Bayabas, and, in the second place, the scarcity of rice in that settlement was so great that it was impossible for us to maintain ourselves there at all. B. strongly supported this opinion, so that the Honorable President was convinced, and it was agreed to set out on a march for Abra province if it should become necessary.

February 5. — About 12 o'clock today there arrived in our camp, coming from Tuguegarao, Manuel Guzman, ex-lieutenant of the unfortunate battalion of . . . This officer, after telling us all that occurred in the surrender of Cagayan Valley — an act due to the infamy and cowardice, and shamelessness of General . . . — also told us that the said general is still with the American captain to whom he surrendered. It has been observed by everybody that the said general, in order to ingratiate himself with his master, the American captain, is acting as his personal servant — now trying to secure for him the most exquisite meals possible, and now washing the dishes and quarrelling

with the cook and private servants of the captain; and then, again cleaning the captain's writing table. And when the hour arrives for the captain to write, General . . . goes into the office ahead of him and gets the pen and inkstand in his hands ready to offer his master, the captain, the pen when he wishes to write. Also that this general was occupying himself every morning in cleaning the captain's shoes — in one word he was promoted to be majordomo. General . . . performed these acts without hesitation in the presence of many of the people.

He also stated that . . ., standing near his master, the captain, on the day of the surrender, was insulted by all the Cagayan people, and especially by the ex-officers, natives of that province, belonging to the unfortunate battalion of which he was the commanding general — in the presence of a great public gathering they called him a thief of the blackest dye, a man of dishonor, a coward, etc. But . . ., perhaps through ignorance of their meaning, paid no attention to these insulting words.

When the officers of the battalion lately commanded by that rascally . . . went to embark for Manila on board a ship where there were friars and Spanish prisoners, the latter, on seeing the former approach in small boats or lighters, commenced cat-calling and hissing, saying: "Away with the dishonorable officers! Away with the thieves: away with them, lest we kill them!" and Away! Away! Away with the thieves!

Those unfortunate officers, on seeing the conduct of the Spaniards, had to retire without saying even one word in reply, because what was said was the truth. They returned ashore to wait for another ship.

These officers, during their stay in Aparri, got news of our arrival in the valley and hastened their departure for Manila, fearing, perhaps, that we might catch them: and really we do not know what punishment we would have inflicted on them had we caught them — those valiant thieves!

By order of the Honorable President, I commenced this day to make a "black list." All the inhabitants of this valley say that from the date when Señor Leyba, colonel of infantry and Señor Villa, sub-inspector of military hospitals, withdrew from this valley and retired to Malolos, General . . . and all the lead-

ing officers of the two battalions under his command dedicated themselves to traffic or trade in rice, tobacco, salted fish, matches, etc. In a word, they monopolized all the business. The price of the rice rose to 25 dollars a cavan, salt to 25 dollars a cavan and petroleum to 25 dollars a case. Everything went up considerably, and in such a way that during the nine months General . . . had gathered together some 200,000 dollars and his officers some 25,000 dollars. This money is what brought about the loss of . . . and his officers.

During the governorship of . . . in the valley the house of a wealthy man in Tuguegarao was robbed of jewels of great value and a considerable sum of money, without the authors of the robbery being captured or their identity determined, notwithstanding the investigations made by . . . himself. After the expiration of two months it was seen by everybody in the town . . . was wearing the jewels on his own body. Everyone was astonished, for it was at once known that . . . was the author of the robbery.

The ex-official from Tuguegarao who came to pay his respects to the Honorable President, offering him his services and support returned to his town the following day with a commission conferred upon him by the Honorable President to organize guerrillas among his people, he to be their commanding officer.

From the time of our arrival in this town up to the present date the local provincial commanders, the neighbors, and patriots, continue visiting the Honorable President, bringing with them all kinds of gifts for our suffering army.

So far the Americans, who are at Camarag, do not come to attack us; neither are we informed that they are going to do so. They must have gone to Bayombong.

February 6. — We have been informed that the mother and son of the Honorable President are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the Honorable President. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the Honorable Pres-

ident and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.

On this day the Honorable President, Barcelona, and Villa sent letters to their respective families in Manila.

At 6 o'clock this morning the deserted soldier Domingo Calinga arrived in this camp as a prisoner.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the instance of Señor Villa there was a race between his horse and that of the "Count of Camote," (Evidently a nickname for some member of the staff. — J.C.H.) The race was won by Señor Villa's horse, a present to him from the Honorable President.

February 7. — Domingo Calinga, the deserter who arrived yesterday, was tried by drumhead court-martial this morning at 8 o'clock, and sentenced to death for said desertion. The execution will take place at 5 p.m. by decree of Señor Villa. The prisoner was formally notified of his sentence at 10 o'clock this morning.

(*Translator's Note.* — In the original copy it appears that the words "decree of Señor Villa" at the end of the last but one sentence above, was first written "decree of H.P." — the letters "H.P." being used throughout this book for "Honorable President" — and afterwards changed as they now stand.—J.C.H.)

At 3:30 this afternoon there was another horse race, in which the horses of Señor Carasco, Subido and Cansio took part, the latter's horse winning.

At 4:30 the troops were formed to take part in the execution. At 5 o'clock sharp the criminal was escorted to the field where the troops were formed. The Honorable President, on seeing the criminal had already been carried out to be executed, at once wrote out an order of pardon, and immediately dispatched it by courier, so as to save the criminal's life. When the courier arrived at the place of execution, he found that the criminal was already blindfolded and ready to be shot. The judge advocate, after perusing the pardon, read it aloud in the presence of all, and immediately everybody cried out: "Hurrah for the Honorable President! Hurrah for independence!" When this was over the troops retired with the criminal.

At midnight the Honorable President received several letters from Manila and from Hongkong, informing him of the political status of the present war and disastrous effects produced upon the enemy by our army, which is very satisfactory for our cause.

The said letters were sent by our committee at Hongkong and by Señor Espartaco, of Manila. The latter also mentioned the frenzied condition of the Manila people, who were ready to drink the enemy's blood.

February 8. — At 11 a.m. the Honorable President received a verbal report to the effect that the Americans coming from Cauayan are going to attack us; therefore from that moment we remained on the alert, but that did not preoccupy us, and hence we had our amusements at the customary hour. At 3:30 p.m., we all went to the race course of our camp, taking along all the horses that were going to run; the first race came off at 3:30 p.m., between the horses of Señor Barcelona and Señor Cansio; it was hotly contested during the first moments and until Señor B.'s horse bolted off to the left without the rider being able to control him, owing to the vicious nature of the animal; on this account the judge had to declare the race off, postponing it until after the third and last race.

In the second race the horses of Señor Villa and Captain Pilar were started; Señor V.'s horse gained from the start and finally won.

The horses of Señors Carasco and Subido started in the third race. This race was a sprightly contest between the two horses, because they started out neck and neck, and it could not be told which would be the winner until they neared the finish, urged on by the riders; Señor Carasco's horse won.

The fourth race was between the horses that started in the first race — the one declared off by the judge; that is, between the horses of Señors Barcelona and Cansio. Señor Cansio's horse had already gained his distance even at the half-way stretch, and finally won.

Our horse-racing diversion ended at 6 p.m., all those who had attended it being satisfied.

February 9. — The Honorable President started out at 9 o'clock in the morning to examine our outposts, being accom-

panied by his adjutant, Lieutenant Carasco, Señor Villa, sub-inspector of military hospitals, Captain Pilar, and a squad of cavalry; he returned about 12:30 o'clock quite satisfied over the good spirits of the soldiers.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, as customary, two horse races took place. The first one was between the horses of Señor Jeciel and Pilar. It was hotly contested by both horses, But Señor Pilar's horse won by a length.

The horses of Señors Gatmaitan and Cansio entered for the second race, the horse of the latter winning with great ease; the Honorable President honored this afternoon's races with his presence, as he did those of yesterday; there was heavy betting and a great deal of animation.

February 10. — Speaking of our life in this camp, it may be reduced to the following: All awaken, on the sound of the bugle, at 5 a.m., and arrange everything in order, so that at any given moment we will not have to preoccupy ourselves with anything but our defense. At 7 o'clock we have breakfast, after which each one gives his attention to the duties assigned him. At 12 o'clock we take dinner or luncheon. Afterwards we rest a little until 3 or 3:30 o'clock, at which hour the horse racing commences. At 6 o'clock we have supper.

About 1 o'clock this afternoon we received, from a source somewhat trustworthy, the grateful news that our independence has been recognized by five nations, though we do not know who these five nations are, but we made the news pass from one ear to another. In spite of the fact that it was much desired by us all, we are quite bored with continually hearing this news.

At 4 o'clock the horse races came off, the first one being between the horses of Señors Jeciel and Pilar, in which Señor Jeciel's horse won. Señors Carasco and Subido entered their horses in the second race, and the former won. The horses of Subido and Villareal ran the third and last race, won by Señor Villareal's horse.

At 9 o'clock the Honorable President received several newspapers from Manila, among them *El Progreso*, as late as the 9th of January. We also received a letter from a patriot at Ilagan

informing us that in said provincial capital the hostile forces, two companies of infantry and one of cavalry, were preparing, in combination with their forces at Bayombong and Echague, for an involving forward movement toward our camp, so as to catch (they say) the Honorable President. Being informed of the plan of the enemy, he secretly conferred with V. and B., showing them the letter. Señor V., after reading the letter, then spoke to the President about the danger of our situation, saying that our camp was in the midst of three towns to which the enemy was going to come; that not only the person of the Honorable President was greatly endangered, but that they, the enemy, could also cut off our retreat; that we could not even defend ourselves, as the forces accompanying us scarcely numbered one hundred; and that the said forces were only sufficient for his personal guard. This opinion was indorsed by Señor B. and thus the Honorable President, in spite of his insisting that we should defend ourselves, was finally convinced that we ought to leave our camp, take a course toward Abra in search of General Tinio in that province, ask that general for 500 armed men, and then once more return here to Isabela. In was then agreed that we should leave the following morning.

February 11. — Everybody woke up at 6 o'clock in the morning. There was a slight rain. We made all ready for the march, and then, at 7 o'clock, took breakfast. The rain continued, thus preventing us from starting. It was now 8 o'clock in the morning. Ten o'clock and 12 o'clock came. We took luncheon. The rain now ceased. The Honorable President then rested a little. About 1 o'clock in the afternoon, accompanied by his adjutant, Carasco, he set out for the outposts to take a view with his field glasses. He returned about 2 o'clock and told us that some groups of animals were faintly seen at a great distance, but he could not make out exactly what they were. However, he believed they were herds of animals in some pasture fields.

About 3 p.m. a man came from Oscaris, reporting that at a settlement about two hours distant by road he had seen many enemies enroute to our camp. Immediately the Honorable President gave orders for everybody to march to the settlement of the Kalingas known as Sili. We commenced the march, there-

fore, at 3:30 p.m., passing through the woods and some mountains. After we had traveled for nearly an hour — this is about 4 o'clock — a heavy rain fell, accompanied by a strong wind, so that we not only got wet, but also shivered from cold at the same time.

This rain never stopped until 6 p.m. when night came on. We kept up the march without halting, passing through those woods and mountain steeps. About 9 o'clock at night we reached a point where the guide no longer knew the road, and so we were undecided what to do, as we found ourselves in an unknown place.

About 9:30 we ran across two deer hunters, who thank God, knew the road to Sili, and who then accompanied us as guides. We then resumed the march, and pressed on, so as to reach the settlement quickly and be able to rest.

The road was so long that 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock at night passed by without our guides giving us any hopes of being near the place. At 2 o'clock we came to a river at the foot of the mountain steep. After crossing it we encountered a very difficult road, which, on account of its narrowness and deep mud, could not be passed by the horses, even in single file. Under these circumstances the Honorable President gave orders for us to rest and wait for daylight, which we did, sleeping among the cogon patches.

February 12. — We had breakfast at 7 o'clock. At 8 o'clock we again commenced the march in the same direction — a march without a halt, even for a moment, yet we only arrived in Sili at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. We suffered on this trip, mostly from hunger, as we never had even a bite to eat. Hunger and the heat combined caused us sick headache and nausea.

The Honorable President, considering the fact that the journey undertaken by us was a long one, and that as we left Oscaris behind we had always gone farther into the mountains and hence were now far enough away from the town of Gamu and Reina Mercedes, ordered them to immediately send here sufficient rice to provide each one of our soldiers with about 3 quarts at least, and to also send us some food in the mountains which we were going to traverse. Meantime, pending the arrival of the rice

requested from the two towns, we remained in this settlement and passed the night without incident.

February 13. — This morning one of the Kalinga men living at this settlement presented the Honorable President six fish of the *talilong* variety, which we had served us for lunch. Our cook fixed them, making the renowned *sinigang* dish. The meal was scarcely ready when we all seated ourselves on the ground in a circle, prepared to eat in an extraordinary manner, because it should be borne in mind that from the month of November, when we commenced our flight to the present date we had only seen the appetizing pictures of fish, so we were joyful when we commenced eating. We said among ourselves — the Honorable President,, V., B., Jeciel, and Carasco — that we were in Manila during those moments, and especially so seeing that we were covered with perspiration at the end of the meal. That was a great day for us.

About 1 o'clock the Honorable President became restless over the non-arrival of the soldier who the day before had been sent to Gamu and Reina Mercedes as the bearer of dispatches and who should have been back by 8 o'clock this morning.

The soldier returned at 10 o'clock at night, bringing with him a considerable quantity of rice.

February 14. — At 7 o'clock in the morning quite a lot of rice came up from Gamu. We now had some 38 bushels of rice.

At 3 p.m. there arrived here two farmers from the Nieto hacienda and made complaints against the manager of that hacienda and other persons for holding unpatriotic ideas and always abusing the cause that we are defending. As for the manager, the Honorable President had already received various denunciations against him. Therefore this afternoon he could no longer restrain himself, and so he ordered one company, under command of Lieutenant Tiago, to at once march to the hacienda and capture those unpatriotic persons.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon the rice which has been collected was distributed among the soldiers, a little more than 3 quarts being alloted to each soldier for us on the trip.

We arranged to leave Sili the following morning at daylight to go to Butigui, the next nearest settlement.

February 15. — We left Sili at 8 o'clock a.m. and march toward the Butigui settlement. From that hour till 12:30 o'clock we passed through woods, but at the latter hour we commenced the ascent of the mountain ridges — an ascent which to us seemed endless, since while the sun was getting hotter and hotter, hunger and excessive fatigue was killing us, and all of this combined to make us sick with headache and nausea. We continued marching.

It was 3 o'clock and many of our soldiers were complaining of hunger and fatigue. The Honorable President ordered us to the marching so as to reach Butigui as soon as possible.

The sun was commencing to set. All the soldiers, now exhausted from hunger and fatigue, begged the Honorable President to allow them to cook just a little something to eat and have a short rest from their fatigue. The Honorable President agreed to do so, and ordered everybody to halt and cook and eat.

It was 5 o'clock in the afternoon when we found ourselves on top of the mountain ridges. We had dinner at 6 o'clock, after which we went to rest among the cogon.

February 16. — All awoke at 3 o'clock in the morning. We had breakfast at 4 o'clock, and at 5:30 o'clock, almost before it was good daylight, we resumed the march for the Butigui settlement. In view of the fact that we would soon arrive at Butigui, the Honorable President thought it would be well to save time by not halting long in this settlement, but to keep on until night should overtake us.

We reached Butigui at 10:40 in the morning. The Honorable President gave orders for all to halt, eat, and afterwards march on to Balinsugan, another settlement, which was already in sight.

We left Butigui at 12:40 o'clock and reached Balinsugan 15 minutes before 3 p.m., after having crossed some very high mountain ridges. It is inhabited by the Kalingas.

It was only 2:45 p.m., and hence very early to rest, and the Honorable President considered it expedient that we should con-

tinue the march to the next settlement called Mabalao. Meantime we rested in Balinsugan for some minutes while the rice offered us by the Kalingas was being packed up. At 2:50 p.m. we resumed the march, passing through the Cavalry mountains, and ascending and descending among them. In short, after a great deal of suffering, we arrived in Mabalao at 5:35 in the afternoon.

Here we found nobody, as the Ifugaos had gone off and hidden themselves, carrying along their things. Owing to this fact, we were unable to find even a single Ifugao to act as our guide to the next settlement. Neither did we have anything here to eat; and it should be especially borne in mind that nothing but lofty mountain ridges could be seen in every direction. Surely we had gone very far into the interior of this mountainous region, since we had been traveling among them for four days.

The Honorable President said that our situation was very critical and deplorable, because our chief enemy now was hunger, and, moreover, we should not continue our projected journey to Abra without having a guide through these mountains. "What shall we do?" said the Honorable President.

It was agreed that on the very next morning we should set out for the Bonafa settlement, using as our guide the Ifugaos we brought with us from Balinsugan to Mabalao. Therefore Major Gatmaitan was charged, under the strictest responsibility, with keeping watch over the said Ifugaos.

The Honorable President gave orders that night for everybody to get us at 4 o'clock the next morning. He also sent 12 soldiers in search of 12 other soldiers who had not yet arrived on account of their having remained behind in charge of the two cows and a horse.

February 17. — At 4 o'clock in the morning we all got up to take a bite to eat. At 8:20 we set out on the march for Bonafa, going through the mountains always. After many ascents and descents we finally reached the settlement at 11:30 a.m. As the trip we had just finished was a very short one, we had to continue on to Parasili, the next nearest settlement of the Ifugaos. Nevertheless, we rested in Bonafa for one hour and a

half. So, at 5 minutes to 1 o'clock p.m., we continued our trip through these mountain ridges, arriving at Parasili at about 5:10 p.m., after having suffered much pain enroute because the Ifugaos had placed in the road many pitfalls or staked sticks beneath the ground to be trod on by our feet. On account of this savagery on the part of the Igorrotes we had to lament three accidents in the shape of wounds to the feet resulting from those stakes or spikes.

February 18. — On this date the Honorable President ordered that we would not leave this settlement before collecting sufficient rice to last us for a trip of three days. Hence orders were given for all the soldiers to go out and gather up all the unhulled rice the Ifugaos had left in their *camarines*, or storehouses, and then to clean or hull it, until each soldier should have about 9 quarts of rice. The soldiers did nothing but hull rice throughout the whole day. On the following day we were to resume the march.

February 19. — As the soldiers were unable to prepare enough rice for our journey, the Honorable President ordered the marching suspended for today, so the soldiers could continue cleaning rice. We were to march on the following morning.

At 4 p.m. a gentle rain commenced, and the sky was covered with clouds. The rain continued all night long.

February 20. — At daybreak it was still raining. The mud in the mountains is horrible, making it impossible, or, at least, very troublesome, to go up and down them. Our soldiers have no rain coats, and for this reason the Honorable President suspended our projected march for today until further orders.

In a conversation which the Honorable President had with an Ifugao this morning he found out that the road he was traveling on toward Abra is a very long one, and that there is a short road passing by the Bonafa settlement. Therefore, in view of this, the Honorable President ordered that whenever we left Parasili we should return to Bonafa, and from that point continue our journey to Abra Province.

February 21. — We were all up at 2 o'clock in the morning. At 4 o'clock we had breakfast. When we were ready to start the

Honorable President called for the Kalingas who were to act as our guides and asked them if the horses could travel the road we were going to take. They answered, "No," and said the horses could only pass by way of Guinabuan. In view of this difficulty, the Honorable President ordered us to take the Guinabuan road. So, then, at 6 o'clock in the morning we started on the march for that point. We had scarcely gone any distance before encountering another very lofty mountain; it cost us three and half hours' work to ascend to its top. Besides, we had to lament many accidents which happened to the soldiers. Señor Barcelona was attacked with a spell of heart trouble, and the same thing happened to many others, it being caused by the excessive fatigue and intense thirst.

We continued our march through these mountain ridges under the clear sun, and after many number of ascents and descents during a continuous march we reached the Guinabuan settlement. Without resting there we continued our march, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon arrived at the Latang settlement. We, passed on to the Maralag settlement, reaching it at 3:20 o'clock. After resting for half an hour we left this settlement and set out for Caragdag, which we reached at 5 p.m. Throughout the day we had only eaten some sugar cane which we found along the roadside, but we had eaten no rice.

The Honorable President issued orders for us to spend the night in the last named settlement, and we did so, the night passing without incident.

February 22. — Everybody was up at 4 o'clock in the morning. At 8:30 we left Caragdag and set out for the settlements located on the road to Abra. We reached the first one, Malabig, at 10:10 a.m. We did not rest at this one, but continued on to the succeeding settlements. In a few words, after a lot of ascending and descending among the mountain ridges, we came to the Boac settlement at 3 p.m.

As the majority of the soldiers were already played out on account of hunger, fatigue, heat, and especially their sore feet — for these mountain ridges are of rock — the Honorable President gave orders for us to rest until tomorrow.

February 23. — As is customary on our trips, everybody got up at 4 o'clock in the morning and commenced cooking something to eat. We ate breakfast at 6 o'clock, and at 7:30 we left Boac and marched toward Bila, the next nearest settlement of the Ifugaos.

After traversing lofty mountain ridges, we reached Bila at 10:25 a.m. The Honorable President calculated that if we should continue the march toward the next settlement we should not arrived there that day, never mind how much effort put forth. Hence he deemed it expedient for us, in spite of the earliness of our arrival, to spend the rest of the day in Bila and to resume the march on the morrow.

This is the first Ifugao settlement that we have found very full of coconuts; everywhere on the mountain range nothing else is seen but coconut trees.

At 4:30 p.m. we received notice from the Ifugaos that unless we went away they would burn our *camarines* and come to attack us that night, as they say there are more on the next mountain ridge. That never bothered us, as they were only armed with lances and bolos.

The night passed away without incident.

February 24. — Everybody arose at the customary hour. At 8 o'clock sharp we commenced the march to the Manducayon settlement, passing over mountain heights darkened by the trees that grew there.

Ascending and descending without halting, we reached a beautiful spring near the foot of a great mountain spur at 1:30 in the afternoon. The Honorable President, on seeing that many soldiers were already quite faint both from hunger and fatigue, ordered us to take dinner here. Immediately afterwards about 2 o'clock, we resumed the march, and began to cross the river we had found. The velocity of its current was so horrible that we had to support one another in order to prevent being swept away by the current. As it was one of the horses of our officers was drowned and swept away by the current. The water did not come up to the groins.

Once on the other side we again happened upon this river having followed its direction. Passing through the same water again, we found ourselves half-drenched. We made great efforts to counteract the force of the current, as the river is full of large rocks, the size of small houses, and hence if one should fall a victim of the current his head would be split open by striking against the rocks.

Hours passed away, and we continued traveling along the river. At 4:30 p.m. we commenced to climb a great mountain ridge. We arrived on its top at 5:30, and found the shacks of the Ifugaos. Night came on. The Honorable President gave order for us to rest here in Manducayon and resume the journey the following morning.

February 25. — Owing to the fact that many soldiers had become sick on the trip, and as others were still exhausted from fatigue, the Honorable President, to give them rest, ordered the suspension of our march for this day, to be resumed on the morrow to Dakalan, the next nearest settlement.

February 26. — All got up at the customary hour. We left Manducayon at 7:25 a.m., and set out for Dankalan settlement. We at once ran up against a great, lofty mountain ridge. We ascended it, the ascent occupying us until 1:30 p.m. We had to open up roads for our passage, as large trees surrounded us on all sides. When we reached its top we at once commenced the descent.

We reached the foot of the mountain and found a river with current of an atrocious velocity. It probably must be the continuation of the one of Manducayon, where we all swam.

After resting fifteen minutes we resumed the march and commenced to climbed another mountain. There was no road, we had to open a way for our passage. The ascents were steep. The mountains were covered with large rocks which we ascended on all fours. Night was drawing near, and we commenced to decend the mountains.

On remembering that it was always very cold in these mountains, the Honorable President was certain that the bamboos must contain water on account of the sweating and condensation. So

we cut open some and found them full of water. So that was a discovery for the relief of our troubles in these mountains, when we . . .

(*Translator's Note.* — At this point ends the first "volume" of the memoirs, the incompleted sentence running over into the second volume. On the inside of the cover of the second volume is the following:

Field officers and officers accompanying the Honorable President. First Bulacan Battalion, Maj. Geronimo Gatmaitan, Second Company, with 27 soldiers, First Lieut. Santiago Catindig; First Company with 49 soldiers, Second Lieutenant Vicente Morales, First Lieut. Teodoro Dayao; Sixth Company, with 18 soldiers, Second Lieut. Lucio Valentin, Capt. Juan H. del Pilar.

First Battalion of Ilocos Sur: Fifth Company, with 36 soldiers, Capt. Ildefonso Villareal First Lieut. Roberto Bautista, Second Lieutenant Sulpicio Luna, Second Lieutenant Leoncio Alejandrino.

Total soldiers for the firing line, 107.

Bureau of military supplies: Second Lieut. Braulio de la Cruz, Second Lieut. Anselmo Subido, attached.

But the unbroken narrative commencing on page 1 of "volume" 2, continues as given below. — J.C.H.)

. . . are thirsty. At the foot of the mountain we found a spring. It was 5:30 p.m., and we were unable to continue the march. In view of this the Honorable President ordered that we should sleep at this place.

We passed the night very badly, because we could not find a foot of level ground. Owing to the large rocks each one of us had to sleep on top of a rock.

While we were ascending the first mountain encountered in our march this morning, the Honorable President noticed that all our faces were pale and covered with abundant perspiration, our respiration laborious, that there were complaints of thirst, obscurity of vision, and nausea, and in loud voice he said to all: "What a costly thing is independence! How we are suffering!" On hearing these words, everybody cried out, "Hurrah for independence!"

One of the insects that has given us most trouble during the trip through these mountains is the *limatic*, an animal resembling the leech but much smaller. It abounds in these mountains, and hence not a one of us has escaped being bitten by them. They introduce themselves inside of the clothing, and even attack the face, as happened to the Honorable President.

February 27. — Everybody got up at the regular hour. At 7:25 a.m. we resumed the march for the Dankalan settlement. On commencing to ascend the mountain ridges we again encountered large rocks which we had to pass over on all fours. We opened up a path for our passage.

About 9 a.m. we were attacked on the road by the Kalingas. Our soldiers got even with them for their foolishness and also captured a Remington gun from the Kalingas, who fled at our first volley. When this was over we resumed the march, continuing to ascend the mountain.

Hours passed by as we marched on without halting. Many soldiers complained and lay down on the ground on account of hunger and fatigue of climbing. It was 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and still we had not reached the summit. Then they said that we were only half way up the ascent. We pushed on so as to avoid being overtaken by night on this vexatious mountain, where there are so many *limatics*.

We reached the summit at 3:30 p.m., sick from hunger, thirst and fatigue. Without eating anything we commenced descending the mountain. The ground was slippery, and at every moment was heard the sound of falls and wailing. The descents were very steep. We hastened our footsteps in order to reach some point where there was water to quench our thirst.

At 5 p.m. darkness commenced to hold sway in the midst of the mountains. Our patience to find water was being converted into desperation. Night arrived, and we could no longer see anything. We kept on walking, but with great fear of falling into the exceedingly deep precipices. We heard no sound of any stream of water.

The *limatics* were numberless. Our desperation was great, because, after having neither eaten anything all day long nor

tasted a drop of water, now the *limatics* were ready, in case we slept in these regions, to suck out the blood that was still sustaining our strength. As it was really impossible for us to continue the marching except under grave risks of breaking our necks, we had to yield to our fate. So the Honorable President gave orders for us to halt here and wait till the following day. Already resigned to having our blood sucked out by the *limatics* we all went to bed among the rocks and tree trunks adorning the soil of this mountain. But before getting to sleep, hunger and thirst made us sick and nauseated, for we had eaten nothing throughout the day. Drowsiness and fatigue overcame all, and we succeeded in sleeping until the following day.

February 28. — We got up at 5 a.m., and at 6 sharp we resumed our march, going farther and farther down the mountain. Fasting throughout the previous day had greatly weakened us; hence we suffered falls at every step. At 8 a.m. the hunger again made us sick, but worse than last night. Our vision became blurred, and the falls were more frequent. Our bodies became mere useless bundles of weakness. Ah, what a costly thing is independence!

By force of will power we kept on walking. Our bodies had already become sore from the great number of falls. At 10 a.m. we reached the foot of the mountain. A short distance farther was the Dakalan settlement, but halfway between it and us was a river with a current of atrocious velocity. From the foot of the mountain we observed that the Gaddans or Ifugaos of the settlement were in great movement, perhaps on account of our presence, and also doing a lot of yelling. On seeing the hostile attitude of these people, the Honorable President sent forward one of our Ifugao guides to inform them of our friendly intentions. After half an hour he returned, accompanied by two of the Dakalan Ifugaos bringing a bundle containing a lot of cooked rice. When we — that is the Honorable President, V., B., and J. — saw this rice, it seemed that heaven had opened to us, and we actually ate it up at once, even without meat or anything.

To reach the settlement, it was necessary to swim across the river; hence to economize in the matter of clothing, we stripped naked.

At about 11:30 we arrived at the settlement. In it there was not a single Ifugao or Gaddan, as they also termed themselves. We took up our quarters in their shacks, and immediately cooked something to eat.

About 1:30 p.m. we saw many Ifugaos, armed with lances, coming to attack us. These were on top of the mountains. We took the necessary measures, and in view of their hostile attitude the Honorable President ordered two of their houses burned.

So as to let the soldiers have a rest, the Honorable President gave instructions for us to remain here for two days and then resume the march toward the Lubo settlement.

We spent the night without incident.

February 29 (sic). — About 10 a.m. six Ifugaos of this settlement, among them their chief, presented themselves to the Honorable President. He detained them with kind words in order that they might act as our guides to Lubo, the next nearest settlement, and he let go those from Maducayan, who had guided us to Dakalan.

There is a great deal of sugar cane at this settlement. As our salt, the only "extra" which we served at meals, gave out some time ago, Señor V., at the suggestion of the Honorable President, devoted all of his time this day and yesterday to making syrup. During these two days he produced about 6 quarts which will be used by us — the Honorable President, V., B., and J. — during meals.

In all the settlements or places visited by us we have always observed that if you look upward toward the sky it scarcely seems to be a hundred yards away. This must be caused by the lofty mountains surrounding us on all sides, and it is certain that we only see a small portion of the firmament. Likewise the sun and the moon, it seems, are not visible to us until 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning and about 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon (sic), they commence disappearing from our sight, hiding among the mountains.

The night passed without incident.

MARCH, 1900

March 1. — Everybody got up at 4 a.m. They cooked and ate breakfast. At 7:20 o'clock we left Dakalan and took up the march for the next settlement. Each one of us was provided with a tree branch for a walking stick, which we used in ascending and descending the mountains in order to sustain ourselves and avoid frequent falls, causing bodily injury. We traveled among mountains of ordinary height, perhaps not over 800 meters. The roads being closed, two Ifugaos opened the way for us.

In these mountains there is much vegetation and so we did not suffer from the heat nor anything, though we never halted on the march.

At 2:30 p.m. we reached a river. We ate here and immediately afterwards resumed the march. At 5 p.m. we arrived at the Gaang settlement, a place completely deserted because its inhabitants had left on account of our approach, and before abandoning their houses they had taken away the floors and hidden them. Therefore we arrived here without being able to find lodging in their huts. Our journey this day has been an easy one and we did not suffer as on other days. Tomorrow we will go on to Lubo.

The headman and others of Lubo came up to see us at this Gaang settlement. Speaking of the singing of the Gaddans, this is the first night we have had the pleasure of hearing them. The singing is very similar in every respect to that of the Chinese. The Gaddans serving as our guides and those who came over from Lubo sung in chorus this night until about 8 o'clock.

March 2. — We got up at the usual hour and cooked and ate breakfast. As soon as everything was ready to go, the Honorable President, wishing to demonstrate to the Gaddans of the Gaang settlement the fraternal feelings with which we had come, sent out the headman of Lubo to call them and suggest they should present themselves. But notwithstanding so many flattering words, the inhabitants paid no attention to us during the two hours in which the Honorable President was waiting for them.

Those from the neighboring settlement, Lubo, who came to see the Honorable President, displayed great enthusiasm and affection. Hence at daylight this morning they were singing in chorus as they did last night.

We left Gaang at 9 a.m. and started out on the march to Lubo. We passed through some pretty mountain ridges which have roads, and which are not very high. Our march was more rapid, and after two hours and a half, that is at 11:15 o'clock, we reached Lubo, and that, too, without any of its inhabitants fleeing and hiding themselves. On the contrary, they greeted the Honorable President.

During our march from Gaang to this place, the Gaddans of Lubo who went to meet us at the former settlement, followed behind singing in chorus.

After luncheon and during the hour of rest, the Honorable President had a conversation with B. and V. about our situation and the present war against the Americans, saying, that, even though greater suffering should come than those we now have, he would endure and accept them with pleasure until the realization of the independence of our country. He fears there will be a civil war afterwards.

During the time of this conversation, the Honorable President received word that the Gaddan guide who had served us from Maducayan to Gaang had been assassinated, together with his two companions, by the Gaddans of the Lurung settlement, while the former were returning to their own settlement. The Honorable President, bearing in mind that those three guides had served us very well, that, above al, they would not have come to these places but for our having taken them, and that, to a certain degree, it might be said that they died on account of serving us, considered it proper to punish the murderers. So he sent five men, under command of an officer, to the Lurung settlement. The detachment started out for that place at 2 p.m. and returned here at 5 o'clock, having carried out the orders.

According to the soldiers, they saw the bodies of the murdered guides in the river, but without heads, hands, and hearts, since, as is known, the Gaddans take away these parts of the

body for the *Kanao* feast and eat the hearts. The soldiers also stated that the bodies of the victims were made into mincemeat, as there was no part of the same that did not show lance wounds.

As for the trip we made this morning, it passed off very well, seeing that we suffered nothing — neither heat nor hunger except that consequent upon fatigue — since in the mountains through which we passed there was much shade and few steep places.

Tomorrow we will resume the march for Mangali.

The night passed without incident.

March 3. — All having grown accustomed to getting up at 4 a.m., we awoke at that hour. We left Lubo at 8:15 o'clock and commenced the march to Mangali.

On starting out from the Lubo settlement, our march was at first a descending one, because this settlement occupies large and elevated mountain ridges. Afterwards we commenced ascending and descending mountain ridges encountered en route.

We reached the river at 11:15 o'clock and rested until 12 o'clock, on account of the insupportable heat, and then marched on. The river was quite deep, and we had to cross it by swimming. Those who did not wish to get wet passed across on a footway about six inches wide, located on one of the bluffs of the mountain — an exceedingly dangerous passage, since if one should chance to slip and fall, a thing easily done, he would naturally break his neck. Hence, very few passed over that way; almost all swam the river. Once across and following the direction of the river, we once more had to get down into it since the banks are lined by high mountain ridges, having bluffs almost perpendicular. So we continued walking in the river, the bottom of which is composed of large rocks, some being slippery, others jagged.

The soles of our feet were soon paining us. The current was very strong, and we sustained ourselves with the walking sticks we carried. We had to endure this traveling in the river until 2:15 o'clock, when we climbed out onto a mountain ridge,

on top of which is located the Mangali settlement. We reached that settlement at 3:30 p.m., finding it completely uninhabited, the Gaddans having on our approach removed the floors of their houses, before abandoning them.

Although the hour of our arrival was too soon to take a rest, nevertheless the Honorable President, bearing in mind what the soldiers had suffered during the day's march, deemed it well for us to rest and continue the journey the following day.

About 4 p.m. the Gaddans of the settlement presented themselves to the Honorable President, and after he had expressed his fraternal sentiments to them, they quietly retired into their houses.

March 4. — We left Mangali at 8 a.m. and began to march to Taloctor. On starting out from Magali, we went down to the river that winds between several high mountains, and crossed it by swimming.

To reach Taloctoc we took the direct line of the road passing along the river. But we had hardly gone 200 yards before we had to again cross the river, swimming it on account of its great depth. Once across, we continued the march, passing along the river bank at the foot of those mountains, and treading in the midst of large rocks which hurt our feet all the time. By reason of this sort of marching many of the soldiers had the soles of their feet swollen on this day. Although the sick were prohibited from wetting themselves with cold water they not only took baths once or twice at unseasonable hours, but briefly speaking, they kept it up until our arrival at Taloctoc, since in order to reach that place we had to cross the river seventeen times, and therefore each one took seventeen baths.

While crossing the river the velocity of its current was so atrocious that we had to grasp one another in order to keep from being swept away; and while the cold was killing us we sought to distract attention from our suffering by saying, "What troublesome jokes are those of Otis!"

Finally, after so much bathing and swimming exercise, we arrived in Taloctoc at 12:20 o'clock. The Gaddans inhabiting it did not run away, not one of them. They paid their respects to

the Honorable President, who asked them for rice and pork for the soldiers, which they brought for us without delay.

During a conversation with Gaddans of the settlement about 5 o'clock this afternoon it was found out that Abra had already been taken by the Americans, and that the Filipinos who were defending that province had retired to the Guinaang settlement, and more recently gone to Bontoc province.

Owing to the carelessness of the Gaddans, those in this settlement of Taloctoc insist that Aguinaldo is a supernatural man; that he flies through the air, and that he ordinarily stays with the thunder.

We now find ourselves on the edge of the Abra portion of the Cagayan valley, and hence when we march tomorrow morning our feet will touch the soil of Abra province.

March 5. — At 7:45 a.m. we left Taloctoc and set out for Mabontot. We had scarcely left the settlement when we commenced to ascend high mountains. Hours passed away, seeming like years to us. The sun was approaching the zenith; our perspiration was copious; it was 10 o'clock — and still we had not reached the summit. We continued ascending, but with painful difficulties. We got to the top at 11 o'clock and commenced the descent.

At 12:10 o'clock we arrived at the foot of the mountain. Then we ascended another mountain, this one of medium height. On reaching its top we descended, as the Mabontot settlement lies at its foot. The Gaddans of this settlement presented themselves to the Honorable President. We arrived at 1:30 p.m. The Gaddans of the settlement who came from Abra assured the Honorable President that the province had already been taken by the Americans.

As the hour of our arrival here was quite early to stop, the Honorable President deemed it expedient to continue the journey until arrival at the Lubuagan settlement which is very near here. So at 3 o'clock we were about to begin the march when it was noticed for the first time that a sick soldier was missing, he having undoubtedly remained behind on the road because of want of strength during the ascents we had made. The

Honorable President suspended the march until the next day, and sent a squad of 12 soldiers to search for the sick man along the route we had come among the mountains.

The soldiers returned at 4 p.m., bring with them the sick man, whom they had found lying down on the mountain.

This Mabontot settlement is located at the foot of several high mountains, being surrounded completely on all sides, and is the first settlement across the line in Abra province, where we now are.

Notwithstanding all our inquiries among the Gaddans here concerning the whereabouts of General Tinio, we got nothing from them. Therefore the Honorable President did not know how to find the General unless we went direct to Abra, which would not be prudent, as we had few troops, and it was certain that the province had already fallen into the power of the Americans. So there was a conference between the Honorable President, Señors V., B., and Captain Villareal, the latter being commissioned to go into the provincial capital or any other town of Abra province to ascertain there the location of General Tinio, and inform him that the Honorable President desired a conference with him at the Lubuagan settlement, where we would remain.

It not being prudent for us to go beyand the Lubuagan settlement lest we find ourselves too near the enemy, the Honorable President thought it would be expedient on our reaching Lubuagan to establish there our headquarters pending the return of Captain Villareal or the arrival of General Tinio for the conference.

Besides many other considerations, the chief object of the conference solicited by the Honorable President is to learn from General Tinio whether the provinces under his jurisdiction are occupied by the Americans in large forces. If they are, then the Honorable President will order our troops to retire from those provinces and go to the provinces of Cagayan and Isabela, through which we have just come; because we noticed that there are very few American detachments in these provinces. Our guerrillas, therefore, will undoubtedly be able to accomplish good re-

sults; and in case the enemy reinforces the provinces (of Cagayan and Isabela — J.C.H.) then our guerrillas will once more return to Ilocos.

March 6.— We left Mabontot at 7:50 a.m., and took up the march toward the neighboring settlement, Lubuagan. On leaving the settlement we commenced to ascend a very high mountain. Looking at its summit from below was enough to put one in despair; but we could not stop and remain, for that meant the *Kanao*. So we climbed onward, but at a slow pace, meantime getting our eyes blinded by the heat of the sun. Our clothing was drenched with perspiration, our breathing became short and laborious, and our knees tremulous. By 9:30 we had nearly reached the summit.

It was not possible to rest, as the mountain is without vegetation and the heat of the sun makes one sick. So we kept on ascending. At 10:15 we reached the summit, where the Lubuagan settlement is located. Then our enthusiasm was great, for we knew we were going to rest here for some days.

Not a one of the Gaddans left the settlement; they greeted the Honorable President. It is very probable that the altitude of this setlement is about 7,500 feet, and it is inhabited by some 800 or 1,000 Gaddans.

(Here ten lines in the original book are purposely blotted out and so deeply written over that they are undecipherable — J.C.H.) — and, perhaps, there can not be severer pains than these.

This afternoon the headmen of the Pugon settlement presented themselves to the Honorable President. As for the news given us by them, they say that the forces of General Tinio are in Bayugao mountains, between Bangued and Vigan.

Captain Villareal, accompanied by 15 soldiers, will leave day after tomorrow.

March 8.— At 9 a.m. Captain Villareal, with 15 soldiers, left on his mission. He also carried with him two packages from the Honorable President — one to be sent to Manila and the other to the Hongkong committee. We expect the captain to return here within the space of twenty-five days.

About 1 p.m., through one of the Gaddans of this settlement, the Honorable President received the news that 300 Americans had arrived in Lubo, a neighboring settlement; and they must certainly be coming in our direction, for upon no other hypothesis can we understand why the Americans should come into these mountains and high craggy regions, undergoing the severest hardships, unless they had as their object the capture of the Honorable President, trusting, perhaps, that their forces are greater than ours, and especially so at this time when we have just sent away some of our soldiers this morning to Abra province. Therefore the Honorable President, in view of all these phases of the case, at once dispatched a communication to Captain Villareal ordering him to immediately send back some soldiers and he himself to remain in the Guinaang settlement to secure information, in order that, uniting our forces in this manner, we would be able to resist the approach of the enemy following us. Then, too, we are in a good position, on the summit of a lofty mountain ridge having an altitude of 7,500 or 8,000 feet; and if we fail, we will make a retreat to the other mountains, which today are our towns. How enamored they are with the Honorable President!

We very much doubt the truth of the report that the Americans arrived in Lubo. The Gaddans of Lubuagan, the settlement where we are at present, have for some days been wanting us to go away, and we believe they have circulated the report in order to accomplish the end desired; for the mere thought of the condition of those mountains through which we have passed is enough to make one tremble.

Speaking of our lodging in this settlement — we do not all live together, because the houses of the Gaddans, Ifugaos, or Igorots, which we inhabit, are very small — we live in separate groups of from three to four individuals at the most in each house; the officers are grouped in the same manner. The inseparable companions of the Honorable President in any house occupied by him are V. and B., and the Honorable President's adjutant occupies another house.

About 10 o'clock tonight the soldiers requested of Captain Villareal arrived.

March 9. — Owing to the bad state of the mountains through which we have passed the Honorable President does not believe that the Americans are following us, and hence this morning he sent instructions to Captain Villareal to continue his journey to Abra. At the same time he forwarded a communication to General Tinio ordering him to send here two companies of his soldiers and instructing him that in case of our leaving this settlement he should undertakes to find us.

March 11. — The Honorable President received a report from Captain Villareal saying he had arrived in the Banao settlement, and that according to the Tinguians of the settlement General Tinio is in Coliong. Therefore Captain Villareal will take the direction to that point.

As to the Americans reported as being at Lubo, they have not yet come here. Then if that report is true, their delay must be due to the continuous rains which have fallen from day before yesterday until now; because the mountains are impassable.

This morning we felt in these mountains a strong earthquake which lasted about four minutes.

March 12. — A gentle rain keeps us. The Gaddans of the settlements near here continue presenting themselves to the Honorable President.

The Honorable President entertains himself with the two companions of his house, V. and B., by studying English, as we have nothing else to do.

March 13. — About 10 o'clock this morning the Honorable President received a report from Captain Villareal, saying he had arrived in Dolores, Abra province, and that according to information there Generals Tinio and Natividad are both on Bulagao mountain.

In this settlement of Lubuagan there is a great deal of malaria. Hence nearly a third of our soldiers are sick with it, and the worst of it is that we have no medicine here for this disease. In these mountains we can only rely on the protection of Divine Providence.

March 14. — The Honorable President went about 9 o'clock this morning accompanied by Lieutenants Bautista and Subido and a number of soldiers, to reconnoiter the mountains toward the Guinaang settlement. They came back about 3 p.m., the Honorable President being quite indisposed, owing to the effects of the hunger he had suffered. Tonight the Honorable President is still sick at the stomach and has nausea, with slight headache and so he has been given the appropriate treatment.

March 15. — The day dawned beautifully. The Honorable President has quite recovered his health and is once more devoting himself to his routine duties.

March 16. — By the order of the Honorable President, this morning at 5 o'clock 25 soldiers, under command of officers Del Pilar and Valentin, set out for the Guilayen settlement to secure in said settlement some 20 carabaos to furnish us all meat, and likewise some salt, since for some days we have been eating neither meat nor salt, though we have never been in want of rice, which exists here in abundance.

By order of the Honorable President, all the sergeants and corporals have been practicing with the heliograph since 9 o'clock this morning.

After supper, which was at 6 o'clock, the Honorable President, in a conversation with B., V., and Lieutenant Carasco, told them that as soon as the independence of our country was declared he would give each one of them an amount of land equal to what he himself will take for the future of his own family, that is, he will give each one of the three señores 13,500 acres of land as a recompense for their work; and also that these plantations will be located adjoining one another in such a manner that they will lie in the same province. In all probability they will be located in the San Jose Valley, province of Nueva Ecija, and the principal products will be coffee, cocoa, sugar, rice, and cattle.

About 8:30 Señor Carasco withdrew in order to go to sleep. When he was beginning to go to bed, Lieutenant Carasco, the adjutant, came calling for the Honorable President and crying out "A coup! Good news!" Then the Honorable Pres-

ident and his two companions, V. and B., got up at once, struck a light and bade Lieutenant Carasco to enter. The Lieutenant came and delivered to the Honorable President an official report from Captain Villareal, dated 13th instant, in which he informs the Honorable President that in the Pias settlement, in the jurisdiction of Abra, our forces, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Villamor, had successfully couped 200 Americans. It came about in this way: By means of their spies the American troops in Abra got news that the Filipino forces were in quasi hiding at the Pias settlement. The United States military commander in Abra province at once ordered 200 Americans to go to said settlement for the purpose of capturing or pursuing said insurgents. Those brave Americans started out immediately, without paying any attention to the difficulties of the mountain through which they were to pass. Night came on, and they were still a long way from Pias settlement. So they had to rest in the rice fields where night overtook them, probably intending to resume the march on the next day. But at midnight Lieutenant-Colonel Villamor's column took advantage of the sound sleep of the Americans, closed in on them in a small circle, and then opened fire from all sides. The Americans finding themselves in the center where the Filipino balls converged, could not even fire their guns. A great panic reigned among them without their knowing what to do, many dying and others being wounded after half an hour's firing by our troops. Only one of the Americans was saved.

By that victory our forces gained 200 guns and cartridge boxes, with a considerable number of cartridges and also a large quantity of food supplies.

March 17 — By order of the Honorable President, the above-mentioned victory of the Filipino arms was published this morning in the camp here at Lubuagan, for the information and satisfaction of our soldiers.

March 18. — At 6 o'clock this morning the Honorable President received another report from Captain Villareal informing him that Lieutenant-Colonel Villamor's column had been occupied for some days in attacking the American detachment in Bengued, Abra province. Captain Villareal knows nothing as to the result

attained, but it is supposed that they are favorable to us, as our forces were still keeping up the attack on the day he wrote his report, that is, the 11th instant.

He also mentions in his report that, according to the people in Abra, General Tinio is on the Bulagao mountain with a large column, and that he has hoisted the Filipino flag on that mountain.

March 19. — Our soldiers who, on the 16th instant, went to the Guilayen settlement came back this afternoon at 2 o'clock bringing the Honorable President one carabao and one shoat. They had been unable to secure the twenty carabaos, as was their intention, since these were not to be found. They also brought with them as prisoners two Christians, captured by them in the mountains before reaching Guilayen, and suspected of being American spies.

March 24. — Today is the thirty-first birthday of the illustrious Filipino chieftain, Señor Emilio Aguinaldo, who was born March 22, 1869, in the town of Cavite Viejo, Cavite province, his parents being Carlos and Trinidad Famy, very respectable and well-to-do residents of that town.

From his childhood Don Emilio Aguinaldo displayed great affection and veneration for his parents, even going to the extreme of fighting with his elder brothers when they, in fits of bad humor, used to reply to their parents in impudent terms. When he was 11 years old, his parents sent him tto Manila to receive preparatory instruction for entering college. During the second year of the Latin course he had the misfortune of losing his father by death.

As his wedowed mother considered Don Emilio the only one of her sons who could be intrusted with managing the estate left by her husband, she told Emilio that he would have to quit his studies and devote himself to superintending the work on the farms which his deceased father had left for the family. In spite of the tender years of the son who had been chosen over his elders, Don Emilio managed farming interests with such zeal and activity that he won the admiration, not only of his mother and his brothers and sisters, but also of his fellow-neighbors.

When 22 years old, he gave up farming, and commenced traveling through the provinces of Mindoro, Romblon, and Capiz, devoting himself to large business enterprises in all the products sent from those provinces to Manila. The decision and bravery shown by Aguinaldo on his first sea voyage is surprising, since with eight companions as oarsmen, he embarked in a *parao*, or large native boat, passed across the China Sea (sic), and after an eight day's voyage on that perilous ocean arrived, by the grace of God, at Romblon without accident. He continued his voyages, going and coming, for several years. Then, in 1895, he was unanimously elected municipal captain (native mayor under the Spanish regime — J.C.H.) of his town. Not being able to refuse the office offered him by the town, he saw himself compelled to give up his voyages to the southern provinces.

He took charge of his office, and although he was very young, not over 25 years old, he gained the admiration of his town, not only by the rectitude and justice of his administration of the office, but also on account of his charitableness of heart toward the poor.

In January 1896 — that is, the year following his election to office in the town — he married Doña Hilaria del Rosario, a young lady distinguished in the town not only for her moral work, but also for her physical beauty.

The memorable month of August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo was "master" of the Cavite Lodge. Moreover, he was a member of the Katipunan Society and the chief of the many members who were in the town of Cavite Viejo. What was to be done? Aguinaldo, not knowing what to do, mindful of the fact that the curate there knew positively that he was not only a Mason, but also the chief of the Katipunans of his town, considered it expedient on the night of August 29 to at once call a meeting of all the compromised persons in his town. Aguinaldo made clear to them their grave situation.

They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, their chief, should make representations to the governor of Cavite; so he went away very early the following morning, presented himself to the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo offered him their respects and their loyalty to Spain, at

the same time requesting him to condescend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men for his security. The governor replied that he would first consult the captain-general, and if the proposition was approved he would send the garrison at once.

As Aguinaldo was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife, they offered him wine and sweetmeats. As soon as this was over he took his leave and returned happy to his town. On arrival in the town he assembled all the compromised persons and informed them of the brilliant result of his efforts. Continuing, he told them then was the opportune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To this they unanimously replied by saying it was terrible, because no arms were available, and that for this reason it would certainly prove to be a disaster for them.

But Aguinaldo, in company with his godfather, the lamented Candido Tirona, insisted on convincing them with their strong arguments. They made them understand that Spanish cruelty would annihilate them without fail, and for no other reason than that they were members of the Katipunan.

As it happened, at that very time there were two *Guardia Civil* soldiers in the courthouse. So at about 2 o'clock in the morning Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the courthouse. Arriving there, these two determined insurgent chiefs intimated to the guards that they should surrender their equipments. These replied that it was impossible, and said they would die first.

Instantly a struggle ensued between the four men, which lasted nearly an hour. But it resulted in favor of the insurgent chiefs, who succeeded in taking the guns and cartridges. Once in possession of these armaments, the two chiefs, accompanied by a number of the town people, directed themselves to the convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortunately for them, the curate was no longer there when they arrived; he had made his escape. While the struggle was going on with the guards in the courthouse he received the news, and fled at once by embarking in a native boat.

The insurgent chiefs then returned to the courthouse and immediately prepared a communication to all the municipal cap-

tains in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna, inviting them to at once rise against Spain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo was already freed from slavery.

Each one of these communications was sent out by a mounted courier, so that before the expiration of many hours all the towns in Cavite province were informed of what had taken place in Cavite Viejo.

On the following day some of the towns took up arms. At the same time Aguinaldo, in company with many people from his town marched on Imus in order to attack the Spanish troops who were there. When he arrived in Imus the people of this town at once joined him and they all went to the convent, in which were the friars and the soldiers of the *Guardia Civil.* Just as he arrived at the atrium of the church his companions did not wish to follow him, for fear that the soldiers were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced alone until he reached the door of the convent. Once here, he called his companions to aid him. But these were not so determined as he was, and only about five responded. When these got where Aguinaldo was, he commenced breaking in the door, which was soon open. They went upstairs, but they found nobody, since the friars had crossed over the treasury building.

Aguinaldo's companions were now numerous, because the others followed him when they saw that nothing happened to those who went up into the convent; and all of these went immediately to the treasury building in which were the friars and soldiers whom they were hunting. When they reached it they found the doors closed, so they could not pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in hiding inside the house were without any other remedy and had to surrender; but meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these a lieutenant of the *Guardia Civil.* By this victory Aguinaldo succeeded in taking 17 rifles and two 1½-pounder guns.

Such are the first pages of Aguinaldo's brilliant military history; and until it may be completed those seeking further details are referred to the "Historia Veridica de la Revolucion Filipino," or "True Account of the Philippine Revolution."*

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* Published in this issue of the H.B.

Then on account of today being the birthday of the invincible chieftain and liberator of the Philippines, all the officers and soldiers who are accompaying him on these mountain journeys have come to congratulate him since yesterday evening at 5:30 o'clock; and 25 soldiers have organized a band of music, using as instruments the bamboos, *musicong bumbong.* Their congratulations were solemn and imposing, because the Honorable President, after receiving them affectionately, offered sweatmeats, cigars, and wines to all; and when all had assembled and taken seats, First Lieutenant Bautista read an eloquent address, concluding it by congratulating the Honorable President in the name of all. Sergeant Luis Gages also read an address of similar import. The Honorable President answered them both with a single speech, declaring his profound gratitude toward all, and at the same time urging everyone to maintain constancy in the sacred cause we defend, in order to secure the independence of our country.

After the speeches the musicians continued playing. Our animation is immense because, in spite of our being in the midst of this ocean of mountains and surrounded by them on all sides, this happy day arrived when we all could gather together and give outward expression to our sentiments, which are all converging upon one purpose — the defense of the independence of our country, who finds herself in the claws of an ambitious nation. We prefer to live in these mountains rather than submit to foreign rule.

At 7 o'clock a regular supper was served to the feast makers. After this the music kept up until about 8 o'clock at night, when the audience withdrew, one by one, all quite satisfied.

The 22nd day of March dawned with a beautiful sky. At 5 o'clock all the burglers sounded the reveille. All of the officers were in full uniform, and the soldiers had on clean clothes. At 10 o'clock all the officers and soldiers accompaying the Honorable President in these mountains went to his house to pay their respects to him. At 11 o'clock the Honorable President went away with all the soldiers to some woods near the top of the mountain, where, in the midst of shady trees, was a triangular table for 150 persons, which was covered with the richest viands.

At 12 o'clock the Honorable President and all the officers and soldiers seated themselves at the table.

The following was the menu:

Valencia rice a la good result, spring chicken stuffed with native potatoes, delicious strawberry sauce, suckling pig, stew a la Mauser, apritada, roast beef a la bayonet. Wines, the grand *basi* of the mountains; fruit sof the season; sweets—orange, sherbet, thunder jelley.

(*Translator's Note.*—"Valencia rice," rice cooked with a sort of dry meat and vegetable hash, as is done in the province of Valencia, Spain; *apritada,* no such word; but it is erroneously used here in place of *fritada,* a Spanish dish composed of fried meats and vegetables. *Basi,* a Tagalog corruption of the Spanish word *basia,* an alcoholic liquor. It is a dangerous intoxicant. "Thunder jelly," unknown as a dish, but the term is probably used here in facetious reference to volleys fired by the soldiers at the conclusion of the meal.—J.C.H.)

After dinner all the officers composing the meeting proposed toasts, with cries of "Hurrah" for the Honorable President, the liberating army, and independence.

The happy meeting broke us at 1:30 o'clock, all the soldiers having gone away satisfied as far as their stomach were concerned, but not so morally, because Señor Barcelona, in his toast, told them as Bulacan soldiers they ought to imitate him who was their general, the valiant General Gregorio del Pilar who died on Mount Tila while defending the person of the Honorable President. As that general was greatly beloved by all his soldiers (the Bulacan battalion), these on hearing Señor Barcelona's expression were reminded of how he had died, and many of them burst into tears.

About 9 o'clock this morning the Honorable President received a report from Captain Villareal informing him that he had left at the barrio of San Juan the 15 soldiers who were accompaying him, and that he and Captain Ramoso will go on to where General Tinio is. He also mentions in his report that at the barrio of San Juan he found Captains Ramoso and Panel with 41 soldiers; that these officers say that the Ilocos provinces

are ours, notwithstanding their occupation by the Americans; and that General Natividad and Father Aglipay are in the mountains of Badoc, and General Tinio in the mountains of Kabugao. The report is dated 13th instant.

March 23. — This morning about 9 o'clock the Honorable President received a report from Captain Villareal, dated the 16th instant, in the town of Badoc, province of Ilocos Norte, in which he communicated to the Honorable President, the sad news of the death of Señor Quesada, provincial commander of Pangasinan, which occurred the 24th of January in one of the settlements of the Tinguians, in Abra province. Malarial fever was the cause of his death.

Señor Quesada was one of our companions when we started out from Bayambang on November 13, 1899. He continued with us in the mountains until our arrival in Naguilian, where he with Father Aglipay and Señor Celestino Aragon was commissioned by the Honorable President to go to the northern provinces and collect war contributions. Since then the said señors have not been with us, and we have never received any news of them until now. Thus died the patriotic Señor Quesada, far from his family, and outside the limits of American domination, having preferred to live in the mountains until his last breath.

Captain Villareal also mentions in his report that, according to information, General Tinio is neither in Kabugao nor Bulagao, as formerly stated, but in the Narvacan mountains; but he is not even sure about this last news.

March 25. — About 8 o'clock this morning we received news that in the Licuan settlement distant four days from here, there are American troops who have come from Abra province; but we know nothing of their destination. Are they seeking us? How those people do love us!

March 26. — The Honorable President, accompanied by Major Gatmaitan, Lieutenant Carasco, and a squad of soldiers, went out this afternoon about 2 o'clock for the purpose of reconnoitering the mountains toward Licuan.

At 2 o'clock this morning the Honorable President was attacked with severe gastralgia accompanied with vomiting and

cold sweats, but thanks to the administering of remedies, the disease yielded readily about 3 a.m.

March 27. — The Honorable President is completely restored to health. At 8 o'clock this morning we received notice that there are troops in the Guinaang settlement, which is very near our camp, being distant only two hours by road, and we do not know who these troops are. It may be that they are Americans who were formerly in the Licuan settlement, or they may be Filipino troops. In view of this doubt, the Honorable President ordered our sentinels placed on top of the mountain so they may see the newcomers at a distance whenever they approach.

At 12 o'clock this morning the Honorable President received a report from Captain Villareal, dated at Kabugao, Ilocos Sur, the 19th instant, informing him that on that date he was still ignorant of the whereabouts of General Tinio, as the Ilocanos had told that the general was making a tour of the guerrillas. He also makes mention of daily encounters between the Americans and our guerrillas, the results being favorable to our side by reason of the protection afforded by the thickly wooded mountains.

March 29. — The Honorable President has decided to descend into the plain as soon as the rainy season commences, in view of the difficulties of travel in the mountains during that season. He also has another motive for doing this, namely, the establishing of his communications; for really, from the time that we fled toward the mountains until now we have remained in complete ignorance of what is going on in the present war.

March 31. — About 9 o'clock this morning there arrived in our camp here in Lubuagan 12 of Captain Panel's soldiers, they having come from the San Juan settlement. These brought a dispatch from the captain to the Honorable President informing him that he, the captain, had captured a report written by an Igorot in the Naneng settlement to the commanding officer of the United States forces. This report states that 200 armed Katipunans have arrived at the Lubuagan settlement, taking up their quarters there, and are now devoting themselves to assaults,

robberies, and murder throughout many settlements, in view of which the writer urgently asks for American troops for the said settlements in order to expel those Katipunan soldiers. The said Igorot is the headman of the Naneng settlement, his seal being fixed to the report, which is dated the 15th of March.

Moreover, along with the report of the said Igorot, whose name is Binuangan, was also a report from two Christians named Jacinto Velasco and Jacinto Baluan (this name was first written Antonio Melad and then changed.—J.C.H.) who declared themselves in favor of the Americans. All these documents accompanied Captain Panel's dispatch, and are now in the hands of the Honorable President, being examined by him.

It happened that the said headman, Binuangan, and several people from his settlement came to our camp about 8 o'clock this morning, bringing a little rice as a present. So, when Lieutenant Carasco handed Captain Panel's dispatch to the Honorable President, the Igorot Binuangan was present and saw that the Honorable President was reading the report he had written for the Americans. He immediately started off, without anyone noticing him, and attempted to escape. As soon as the Honorable President was informed of the Igorot's conduct, he at once sought him; but he had already gone. So he immediately ordered the soldiers to pursue him, and these overtook him after going one kilometer, and carried him to the Honorable President. The day of his deserved punishment will arrive soon.

The Honorable President suspects that the two Christians caught by Captain Pilar when he went to Guilayan, on the 16th instant, are the authors of the document which accompanied the report written to the Americans by the Igorot Binuangan.

APRIL, 1900

April. — Through investigation made by Lieutenant Valentin it became known this morning that the Christian prisoners captured by Captain Pilar on the 16th of March, and who were suspected by the Honorable President, are the accomplices of the Igorot Binuangan, and the originators of the information report which he wrote.

April 2 and 4. — Nothing of importance in our camp at Lubuagan. Our meals are greatly improved. There is an abundance of carabao meat and rice, and even chocolate, which we took from these settlements.

April 5. — At 7 p.m. the Honorable President received a report from Captain Gregorio Panel informing him of his arrival at the Guinaang settlement with all his forces. The Honorable President at once sent a reply ordering him to come on here and join us.

April 6. — At 12 o'clock today Captain Panel (Gregorio) and 71 soldiers, proceeding from the San Juan settlement arrived in this camp for the purpose of joining the Honorable President's bodyguard. The total number of our forces is now 168.

Through Captain Panel, who belongs to General Tinio's brigade, we have now learned that several field and line officers of that brigade have presented themselvs to the enemy, the following being a list of those officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Guzman, Maj. Joaquin Natividad and 25 soldiers under his orders; Maj. Gregorio Santiago, Major Tombo, Capt. Emilio Soriano, Capt. Pedro del Carmen.

Besides these there are many officers and soldiers whose names he does not now recall.

The aforesaid captain also says that, according to the statement of an American lieutenant, it has become known that Otis has been called home by his government, and that he is even now en route; also that five American commissioners appointed by their government will arrive in Manila very soon.

April 7. — After having been tried by an ordinary court-martial on the charge of "high treason against the country," and sentenced to death, Jacinto Bangane, the criminal, was executed this morning at 7 o'clock. After his death the troops marched around him one by one. The execution took place on top of a mountain ridge some 300 yards distant from our camp.

April 8 and 9. — Nothing of importance.

The Honorable President is preparing for a decisive attack on Bangued.

On the afternoon of the 9th the Honorable President attended the drilling by the soldiers, and his attention was attracted to a 16-year-old boy among them, who, besides being well versed in tactics, showed by his bearing that he was of noble refined parents. The Honorable President, unable to resist his affection for the boy, had Major Gatmaitan called, and then asked him who that boy was. The major told him that the boy was a son of the lawyer Ventus, of Nueva Ecija province, who was shot by the Spaniards during the revolution of 1896. Then the Honorable President at once sent for the boy, who did not delay in presenting himself, and asked him who he was, and how and by what means he had entered the army. The boy replied that his name was Paquito Ventus, a son of a man shot by the Spaniards; that his father was a paralytic years before the misfortune; that his mother had also been dead some time; that he had eight brothers; but five of these were minors like himself; that impelled by the profound grief under which he was suffering he entered the Filipino ranks of General Tino's brigade; that this present rank was that of corporal; and that during a fight with the Americans in Ilocos he was on the point of being captured, but owing to the fight taking place in the mountains he had been able to escape by climbing up the precipices.

When asked by the Honorable President if his ideas were firm and inflexible, he replied that he would prefer to live and die in these mountains rather than submit to foreign rule. The Honorable President immediately ordered the captain of the company to strike Ventus' name off the rolls, as the Honorable President would take charge of him. Since then Ventus has been in the Honorable President's quarters, being well treated and considered as a veritable son.

April 10 and 11. — Nothing of importance.

About 11 a.m. the 11th instant a soldier from Bangued, Abra province, arrived in this camp, bringing a dispatch addressed to General Tinio. Through this soldier we have learned of the continuous victories of our guerrillas in the Ilocos provinces. The newly arrived soldier also states that Captain Villareal, who is on a special mission, has now found General Tinio.

About 1 o'clock at night the Honorable President received a report from General Tinio informing him of his arrival at the Guinaang settlement, and saying that early tomorrow morning he will resume his march for this place.

April 12. — Major Gatmaitan, Señor Villa, Lieutenant Carasco, and all officers off duty started out with the Honorable President's cavalry at 8 o'clock this morning to meet General Tinio. After going some five kilometers they met General Tinio.

After an affectionate greeting they all went to the Honorable President's camp. General Tinio was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Salazar, Captains Villareal and Ramoso, and an escort of 25 soldiers. At 12 o'clock the Honorable President received the newcomers, and all the officers had a regular dinner.

General Tinio told the Honorable President about the victories won by his guerrillas. He also gave him the sad information that Colonel Leyba had been assassinated, though he does not know whether it is true or not.

At 5 p.m. the Honorable President received a letter from Don Julian Gerona, informing him that he and Don Pedro Paterno are in the Benguet settlements, and under the protection of Señor Cariño.

April 15. — The Honorable President gave a splendid luncheon in honor of all the forces that are now in our camp, and many officers proposed toasts.

April 16. — At 3 o'clock p.m. General Tinio, with all his his escort, left this camp to return to his own field operations.

April 19. — At 7 a.m. the Honorable President ordered two sergeants of our column to be deprived of their insignia for having played *monte* last night. The degradation was duly carried out.

About 9 o'clock this morning the Honorable President received a report from General Tinio informing him that Captain Calvo's guerrillas had had an encounter with the Americans in the town of Lapog, Ilocos Sur, capturing from the enemy a convoy of four mules. We had one man slightly wounded.

April 21. — At 7 a.m. Lieutenants Luna and Alejandrino, with 25 soldiers, started out from this camp for the neighboring settlements to get rice and anything else that is eatable.

April 22. — It was discovered this morning that the Honorable President's personal servant had escaped last night, carrying away with him a Remington carbine, 40 cartridges, clothing and other things. This servant is an Igorot, a native of Banaue, and has been serving the Honorable President since we were in that settlement.

April 23. — At 7 this morning the Honorable President, accompanied by Señors Barcelona, Gatmaitan, Carasco, and a squad of cavalry, set out to reconnoiter the roads leading to the settlements of Guinaang and Balimbing. At 8 o'clock at night Señor V. received a message from the Honorable President, stating that they had arrived in Guinaang without incident, and that they would spend the night there.

April 24. — About 2 p.m. Señor V. received a hasty note from the Honorable President, stating they had left the Guinaang settlement and were then in the Balimbing settlement, which they would leave between 2 and 3 p.m. on their return to this place. About 5 p.m. the travelers arrived here, quite satisfied.

April 25. — During the night of this date Private Gregorio Carpio, a native of Bigaa, Bulacan province, who was a member of the First company of the Bulacan battalion, died from the effects of malarial fever.

April 26. — At 8 a.m. the Honorable President, accompanied by his cavalry, went to the outposts to direct the construction of the trenches that are being built. He spent the entire day there. At 3 p.m. Señor Villa, Barcelona, Lieutenant Catindig, and some of the cavalry men went out to meet the Honorable President, finding him near the trenches.

April 29. — The Honorable President received a dispatch from General Tinio inclosing a list of the offcers who have deserted from his brigade.

April 30. — V. is sick, and has been so for the past four days.

MAY, 1900

May 1, — At 3 a.m. the Honorable President received a report from Guinaang settlement to the effect that some 100 Americans are en route here to attack us. This news was confirmed about 5 o'clock in the afternoon by two letters; one from Dolores and the other from Balbalasang, both of which state that the Americans are going to attack us.

May 3. — We received news that the Americans learning of our superiority over them in numbers, returned to Bangued, perhaps fearing that their plans would result in failure.

May 6. — The Honorable President received a report from Major Panel saying that according to the Igorots there are 100 Americans in Bontoc, a settlement four days distance from here.

Work on our trenches is being pushed forward.

May 7. — At 8 a.m. the Honorable President received a dispatch from Señor Juan Villamor, in Abra province, informing him that 100 Americans had left Bucay bound for our camp at this place, Lubuagan, and that according to the bearer of the said dispatch these Americans were yesterday in Labaan, a settlement near this one.

With the presence of those Americans in Labaan and another 100 in Bontoc, it is clear that the Americans desire to surround us on all sides in order to capture the Honorable President.

The Honorable President has decided to make a stand in this camp against the Americans, and for this reason the work on our trenches is being urgently carried on; but in case of our being unable to withstand the advance of the enemy, we will hide in one of the thick woods of these mountain heights.

May 9. — At 6 a.m. the Honorable President received a report from Maj. Juan Villamor, of the Abra guerrillas, saying that the hostile column en route to Lubuagan having been beaten by his guerrillas, was forced to return to Abra the 5th instant with some wounded soldiers.

We also have private information that there is a column of 100 Americans in the settlement of Banao and Balbalasang near here.

May 11. — About 5 p.m. the Honorable President received several letters and dispatches from General Tinio informing him of the victories of his guerrillas, and also of the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Cavestany had arrested Vicente del Prado, principal commanding officer of the Pangasinan "guards of honor."

The Honorable President also received a letter from Manila informing that 17 wagons had been captured by us in Laguna province and in Silang, Cavite province; each of the wagons captured in the first province contained $5,000 in gold, while each one of those captured in the later province contained $7,000 in gold, and also ammunition and food supplies. The letter also states that on the date it was written, the 9th of April, the Honorable President's family continued living in the Leyba house, and that a representative of Englishmen, Germans, and Catalonia Spaniards went to Manila, conferred with several of our fellow-countrymen, left for Washington for a conference with McKinley, and afterwards returned to Manila for a conference with the Honorable President of the Philippine Republic.

About 9 o'clock at night the Honorable President received a report from Major Villamor informing him of the latter's presence at the Balbalasang settlement, and that he will keep up his reconnoitering until he arrives here. He also states that they are free from the enemy. As a consequence of that communication tranquility again reigns among us.

The Honorable President has decided to prepare during these days a manifesto, entitled "To the Filipino People," which will soon be published.

May 13. — About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Honorable President received a verbal report from an Igorot to the effect that there are soldiers in the Naneng settlement, but it is not known whether they are Katipunans or Macabebes. Captain panel and 50 soldiers were ordered to go and find out who they are.

The Honorable President about 3 p.m. went out to inspect the outposts. His cavalry and Lieutenants Carasco and Bautista accompanied him.

About 4 p.m. Señor Barcelona received a private letter from his friend Villamor informing him that there are rumors in circulation in those settlements (Balbalasang) to the effect that Americans are coming to attack us. He also says that, as for himself, he and his guerrillas will obstruct the coming of the enemy.

Here comes alarming news almost before we have had two days of tranquility.

May 14. — The Honorable President received several letters from Manila. A letter received by Señor B. from General Tinio made known the fact that the Honorable President's only son had died in Manila from the effects of the smallpox.

The Honorable President's mail for Manila and foreign countries left this afternoon about 5 o'clock, together with letters from persons here to their respective families in Manila.

May 16. — Our special commissioner in Abra, Captain Villareal, arrived at 2 o'clock this afternoon and informed the Honorable President that at the Balbalasang ranch he had received trustworthy news that the Americans with a vanguard of 60 men and a rear guard of 200 were coming to attack us.

Every puff of wind seems to carry in suspense news about the coming of the Americans.

May 17. — Just as the Honorable President awoke this morning at 6 o'clock he found an Igorot of this settlement, who told him that in Sumadel, a settlement distant one hour from this, there were Americans en route here. As soon as we were aware of the presence of the Americans in Balbalasang we knew that their plan was to shut us in all sides for the purpose, perhaps, of capturing the Honorable President. He, on receiving this news, at once sent a courier to Sumadel to see if the Americans were already there.

The men returned at the end of an hour and told the Honorable President that the Americans were eating breakfast when he left that settlement.

The Honorable President thought of making resistance, but as he did not have sufficient forces for that, nearly half of our soldiers being sick, he deemed it expedient to abandon the camp.

In fact, at 8 a.m. we left the settlement, following the route to Guinaang, in order to gather up some of our soldiers on duty there.

We reached the guardhouse of the first outpost at 10 a.m., and halted here to observe the movement of the enemy. At 10:30 Major Gatmaitan arrived, having come from the trench on top of the mountain ridge facing Sumadel, and said that he left Lieutenant Morales and fourteen soldiers in that trench.

At about 11:30 Lieutenant Morales arrived with his soldiers. He reported that the enemy did not reach the trench, but flanked it to the left, and had succeeded in going as far as Mabontot, a settlement on the other side of Lubuagan, and distant from it only one hour. Being unable at this moment to further avoid the coming of the enemy, the Honorable President ordered that we should continue the march for Guinaang, which we reached at 1 p.m.

This morning the Honorable President did not know how to carry our sick soldiers who, on account of the seriousness of their condition, can not walk. He found no remedy except to give instructions for them to be left behind. Accordingly, he particularly charged the headman of the settlement to take good care of the soldiers who are going to remain, saying that he and all the people of his settlement will have to answer with their lives for these sick men. The Honorable President delivered money to the headman of the Igorots to buy food for the sick soldiers, and he also gave 3 dollars to each one of the latter. It can not be imagined how sad and desperate they are, through fear that the Igorots may have a *kanao* feast at their cost. But these can not follow us, because they are too weak to walk. Divine Providence will protect these defenders. After eating at 2 o'clock p.m. we left Guinaang, passing through thick woods on the mountain ridges, and going up and down among these.

At 3:30 we arrived at the Pugon settlement and kept up the march, continually descending and ascending, toward Maguilang, which we reached at 5 o'clock. Being unable to spend the night there on account of the nearness of the enemy, the Honorable President gave orders for us to go on till we reached the next settlement.

We kept on. But daylight was already disappearing. We were traveling very slippery roads, and at every minute could be heard the sounds of soldiers and officers falling down. We ascended a very high mountain, several of our pack horses falling down into the precipices and becoming utterly useless. In spite of the painfulness of the journey. we kept on climbing till we reached the top, everyone being exhausted, wet with perspiration, and so out of breath that he could not pronounce a single word. The top once gained, we followed the direction of the mountain ridge. Night came on, and the darkness was so intense that we were unable to recognize one another. Besides the road being very slippery, it was very narrow, crossed by thorny trees, and close to deep pecipices, which appeared to be only waiting to receive some lives into their depths. But with our five senses we gave all our attention to our walking. Nevertheless, some of the pack horses became victims of the precipices.

We reached the place where we had to begin descending the mountain ridge. The road was so steep that it seemed to be vertical. Many of us taking a step had to prolong it for 50 yards — that is, we fell and rolled over and over like a ball. Thanks to the thick branches of the trees covering the mountain ridge, as they defended us from the precipices and counteracted the diversions (sic) of falling.

Nine o'clock arrived and the light of the moon enabled us to see. Though the moonlight scarcely penetrated the interior of the mountain ridge, owing to the bushes and trees, yet it was of great assistance to us.

In spite of the difficulties of the road and the great number of falls, we kept the march without halting, until at 11:30 p.m. we reached the foot of the mountain ridge, where the Cagaluan settlement is located.

We ate supper at 12 o'clock and then went to sleep. It should be noted that the greater part of our soldiers had not yet arrived, as those constituting the vanguard (sic) arrived about 3 a.m.; and also that First Lieut. Alberto Bautista left this morning for Cagayan valley, having been especially commissioned by the Honorable President to establish the Katipunan society in those regions.

May 18. — Everybody got up at 6 o'clock to resume the journey. About 7 o'clock, when everybody was preparing to start, an Igorot arrived from Lubuagan informing the Honorable President that the Americans, after firing a number of volleys into the settlement without seeing anybody — since all the people had hid out — burned all the houses in the settlement, and march off in our direction. He also said that on the morning of this date the Americans were at Ableg settlement, very near us, being at a distance of only one and a half hours' march. He said that the number of the enemy amounted to 1,000.

This information caused us great terror, not only on account of the large number of the enemy, but also because they had been able to close all the passes everywhere, and had already come on to attack us. The Honorable President at once gave order for a hurried march, and almost flying we left the settlement. We soon came to a river having violent current; we crossed it by swimming. But in order to reach the Dupag settlement, which was our destination, there was no other route except the one along the river, which has a snake-like course. So we had to ford the river as many times as it has curves, which can not be less than 20, and at all these fords we had to swim.

We got to Dupag about 10 o'clock, and immediately continued on toward the Naneng settlement, traveling always along the river and swimming it because of its great depth. We reached Naneng at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. We ate luncheon, and at once resumed the march for the Tabuk settlement. At this time Major Gatmaitan reported to the Honorable President that a soldier of ours named Salazar had disappeared, he having been drowned in the river. We kept on marching.

We came to a river which, besides being very wide and having a violent current, was too deep. No one would venture to cross it for fear of certain death. In this predicament the Honorable President on seeing that the river could not be crossed in any manner, changed the course of our direction, and gave orders for us to make for the Asibanlan settlement. We turned then and took the road for that settlement, commencing to ascend high mountain ridges, and walked without stopping till 6 p.m., when

night came on. Observing the fatigue of us all, the Honorable President issued instructions for us to spend the night in that place, which was a thick wood.

We supposed at that time that if the Americans had followed us, they must have suffered personal misfortunes similar to ours crossing the river, and that they were then in Naneng.

May 19. — We passed the night without incident, the soldiers having slept among the patches of cogon grass.

At 6:30 a.m. we left the place and taking up the march commenced or rather continued ascending the mountain ridge. After we, who were in the vanguard, had walked a mile or two, the Honorable President noticed that the soldiers forming the rear guard were missing. He immediately ordered a halt and made a search for the rear guard, which in reality had become lost in the thick woods, having taken another direction. He then ordered the bugle sounded, so the rear guard might know we were waiting for them. But the surrounding mountain heights prevented them from hearing the bugle, and so they kept going. The Honorable President at once sent a section of soldiers to hunt for them while the vanguard waited. After we had waited two hours the lost soldiers of the rear guard arrived.

As soon as we were all together we once more struck out on the march, continuing the ascent of the mountain. We were still a long way from the top. There was no road, and so we had to open one for our own passage. It was so steep that every moment we saw our pack horses fall into the precipices for want of having sufficient strength to ascend.

Hours passed by, but we climbed upward on all fours without halting until we reached the top at 1:30 in the afternoon. At this moment a heavy rain began falling. The Honorable President did not wish to rest on this peak lest night should overtake us. So we continued the march, descending. The road had become more slippery on account of the rain. Many of us on taking a step had to prolong it for a hundred yards or so rolling. All the soldiers were wet, and the cold was causing them intense suffering.

The hours of 3 and 4 p.m. passed and still we had not reached the foot of the mountain. The march was forced at every step for fear that night would overtake us on the mountain ridge, where *limatics* abound.

At 5:30 we found ourselves at the foot of the mountain, where there is a river filled with large rocks. We traveled the river for some 500 yards, and commenced ascending another mountain ridge, which, although it was yet day, was very dark on account of the luxuriant trees growing there. Amid great difficulties, we forced the climbing until at 6:30 o'clock we arrived on the summit, where we found many houses abandoned by the Igorots. It was the Sanga settlement. We took up our quarters in these houses for the purpose of spending the night.

By this time only a few of the soldiers had rice, so the majority devoted themselves to hulling rice for supper.

May 20. — Everybody woke at 6 a.m. The Honorable President, on seeing the exhausted condition of the soldiers, gave instructions for us to remain here. He also had in view the procuring of rice for the consumption of us all.

At 1 p.m., when everybody was provided with rice and our clothing quite dry, we set out for Asibanlan, a neighboring settlement, which we reached after one hour's travel. This settlement occupies the top of a mountain ridge, and is higher up than the former settlement. The Honorable President without resting immediately set out to reconnoiter our position.

At 4 o'clock the Honorable President had not yet returned from his reconnoitering. About 4:30 Señor Villa, who had remained in the settlement with the troops, received a report from Lieutenant Alejandrino saying the Americans were moving on our camp in skirmish formation and were some 200 yards distant. Señor Villa ordered everybody to march, and he himself rushed forward in search of the Honorable President without knowing where he had gone or where he was at that moment. But Villa went up toward the top of the mountain ridge where he thought the Honorable President was. He actually did find him on the top, and informed him of the enemy's presence.

Behind Villa came the soldiers. Scarcely ten minutes passed before the enemy opened up on us with their volleys. Our rear-guard soldiers returned their fire in order to hinder them from advancing rapidly. The Honorable President and his cavalry escort retired ahead of us; but the enemy's bullet traversed the whole length of our column, as the firing was short range, perhaps only 200 yards. The soldiers of the first and second companies of the Bulacan battalion looked after the safety of the Honorable President, and by their bravery prevented the enemy's advance until he got away. In this flight our casualties were: Second-Lieutenant Morales killed, two soldiers wounded and Lieut. Lucio Valentin of the sixth company and some soldiers of the same missing.

It was 6 o'clock. We continued the march toward the Guday settlement. On arriving there our horses could go no farther, owing to the road being impassable. The enemy was pursuing and firing at us. There was no remedy except to abandon our horses; and so we really left them all. We passed on through the settlement, and in a place near it the Honorable President gave orders for us to wait for soldiers. The night was very dark. After waiting for half an hour the soldiers of our vanguard arrived. We then followed the route toward the next nearest settlement, passing on top of the mountain ridge.

After going a little over a quarter of a mile we saw that many lights were coming from the settlement to which we were en route; and we at once supposed that there was another hostile column coming to meet us, with the intention of shutting us in. The Honorable President ordered us to make a detour to the left, so as to get out of sight of the enemy, and we did so immediately.

The night was intensely dark. By the thorny branches of trees which wounded our bodies we perceived that we were in a very thick woods, and we went into its interior. But unfortunately we found we were on the edge of deep precipices, and hence many of us fell into them. On account of the darkness our soldiers had disappeared in small groups of from four to five individuals, there having remained with the Honorable President

only 19 soldiers and Señores B., V., Jeciel, Carasco, and two other officers.

From the interior of the woods we were observing the lights, but as they approached we saw that they were following our footsteps and drawing nearer every moment. So we went out by the other side of that woods and took a direction to ascend to the top of another mountain ridge, reaching it after one or two hours' walking. From this peak we observed that the lights were still pursuing us. Then we continued the march and entered another woods. We suffered not only from wounds made by the branches of trees across the road, but also from the fatigue consequent upon climbing. As soon as we were hidden in the woods we rested for a little while. It was 11 o'clock at night.

At 12 o'clock the Honorable President gave order for us to leave that point in order to get beyond the military lines of the enemy. So we resumed the march, but everybody kept silent, in order to prevent discovery by the enemy. We ascended and descended several mountain ridges. Hours passed by, and still we hastened the marching, in order to get far away from the enemy.

May 21. — Daylight dawned, but we continued our journey. At 4 a.m. we found ourselves in an uninhabited settlement, and here we cooked a little, each one eating half a mouthful.

About 6 o'clock we again struck out on the march. We went down into quite a deep gulch, at the bottom of which we found a stream. At this point the Honorable President vacillated as to what route to take, as we did not know what direction we were going; and, fearing that the enemy would coup us up in this place or in the stream, he decided to go back and take another direction. When we were about to ascend the mountain ridge our soldiers saw on its top other soldiers whom they suspected were the Americans pursuing us, but the Honorable President, serene in his ideas, did not wish to go back, and hence waited to see those soldiers with his own eyes. Then it was discovered by him that they were Captain Villareal and nine soldiers coming in search of us. The captain having again joined us, we learned that he, not knowing the direction we took on the

night of our separation, had deemed it best to go toward the east, and thus had reached the place where we met him.

After half an hour's conversation we ascended to the top of the mountain ridge, passed down the other side, and ascended a still higher ridge. After descending it we found a settlement, but we kept on marching without halting.

At 10 a.m. we found another settlement, but in our desire to get far away from the enemy we marched on without halt. We came to a river, and followed its course. About 11 o'clock we reached Tuktuguin settlement.

As we had eaten nothing since the previous night, the Honorable President gave orders that we should take dinner at this settlement, and so everybody set in to cooking. When dinner was about ready the Honorable President suddenly received a report from a sentinel to the effect that the Americans were in line of skirmishers about 100 yards away, then without having been able to eat, we hurriedly left the settlement.

It was 12 o'clock in the day, and the sun was scorching hot. We ran up into a high mountain range. Once on its top we encountered a still higher ridge, which we ascended. During this running Señor Barcelona, for want of strength to withstand the fatigue frequently fell in a faint, with complete loss of consciousness and power of speech. Owing to the lamentable condition of that patriot, the Honorable President ordered a rest for a while on the top of the ridge. There after one hour and half . . .

Translator's Note. — Here ends the second "volume," on the fly leaf of which is written, mostly in cipher, the following: "August 13th a dream. Rest in peace 1900. August 13, 1900, I dreamed at night that I had lost two of my upper jaw teeth, and according to old people this signifies the death of parents or relatives. During the night of November 1, 1900, I dreamed that I had lost a back jaw tooth, which came out through my throat. November 26, 1900, I dreamed that I had lost a back jaw tooth. December 1, 1900, outside half of upper eye tooth. January 3, 1901, burial of my father, I being present." Then,

commencing on first page proper of "volume" third of the diary, the unbroken narrative runs as follows. — J. C. H.)

. . . of rest, Señor Barcelona recovered consciousness and we again set out on the march, going down into quite a deep precipice.

When we had scarcely gone a quarter of a mile, and while still in thick woods, we suddenly heard the volley firing of the enemy near by. This was at 2 p.m. The firing came from three points; that is, it came from three large hostile columns, who were occupying the top of the mountain ridges surrounding the precipice where we were. From those tops the enemy were descending into the precipice and bring to bear on us a converging fire. But we did not answer it, as we numbered very few, scarcely having thirty guns. At this critical moment desperation came over us. As we saw no opportunity of getting out, and had no hope of our salvation, there only remained to us the tenacious idea of defending ourselves unto death, rather than surrender alive.

Divine Providence desired to conduct us to a stream at the bottom of the precipice, and we arrived there. It was 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The converging advance of the enemy drew nearer to us. They were saying among themselves, of course, that their victory was assured, and that the capture or death of Aguinaldo was evident.

We were ignorant of the direction of the stream in which we found ourselves, but the Honorable President deemed it well for us to follow its course to see if there was really any chance of escape. All of us rapidly followed the course of the stream, and at the end of half an hour discovered that it emptied into a river called Buaya. The mountain in which the enemy had corralled us now lay to our rear. We at once forded the river. According to the guide's statement it was full of crocodiles, but that made no difference. We got across, and, without halting, followed its course.

At 5 p.m. a heavy shower of rain commenced falling, and the cold caused us great suffering. Traveling in the water was very troublesome. But we cared nothing for all this so long as we did not fall into the hands of the enemy.

We reached a point of the river where the mud was nearly waist deep, and everybody passed through it with great difficulty. At 7 p.m. we rested on the bank of the river, as all of us were quite exhausted from the effects of hunger and loss of sleep. Although saturated with water, we all threw ourselves down on the water-soaked bank of the river and immediately went to sleep.

At 2 o'clock the Honorable President ordered the continuation of the march. We then commenced ascending a very high mountain ridge. Once on top of it we followed the range toward the east. The hours passed by; but we kept on traveling without a halt, all of us barefooted, including the Honorable President, for nobody had a shoe. Daylight came.

May 22. — We were already far from the Americans. We ascended mountain ridges, going toward the east, that is toward the Cagayan valley until about 7 a.m., when we found a stream. From this point on our guide was acquainted with the different trails leading to Cagayan, and hence we traveled without vacillation. On leaving the river we encountered an extensive plain, on the righthand side of which were the mountain ridges we had just left.

During two entire days we had nothing, and hence hunger, the fatigue of continued marching, and loss of sleep had exhausted us. Our guide told us that after twelve hours more marching we would reach the Magapasi settlement, where we could get food. Since there was no other remedy but to go on, we struck out on the march at 7 a.m., passing through that plain in the direction of Magapasi. Our bodies becoming more vigorous, we were forcing the marching.

About 11 o'clock we came to a river. The Honorable President could walk no further, because he was sick and faint on account of hunger and his strength had given out. At this moment all of us, including the soldiers, felt these same troubles, and no one could travel any more. Owing to this lamentable state of affairs we all sought tender herbs, which we ate. The most palatable of these and hence the most consumed were the *paco* herbs and the guava shoots, or buds. When we had filled ourselves with these herbs we resumed the journey, paying

no attention to the heat of the sun, and our marching was more rapid on account of it being through level country.

About 12 o'clock, on reaching a river near a mountain ridge, we observed a number of armed men on the top of the ridge. Viewed through the glasses they appeared to us to be wearing black shirts but when we saw them deploy as skirmishers in our direction we were quite convinced that they were our enemies. We then turned off to the left to ascend a mountain ridge which we saw, having left the fifth and sixth companies to protect the retreat of our Honorable President, who before his leaving placed the soldiers in good strategical positions. The Honorable President also gave instructions to the captains of the said companies relative to the direction in which they should retreat in order to find him.

After marching for an hour we saw one of our soldiers following us, and calling to us. Then we waited for him. When he arrived he told the Honorable President that the soldiers we had seen deploying as skirmishers on the mountain ridge were our soldiers of the first Bulacan battalion who had separated from us on the night of the 20th. We returned at once. Great was our pleasure on meeting our soldier companions of the rocks. After chatting for an hour we resumed our former direction toward Magapasi. This was at 2 p.m.

We marched without halting until 5 p.m., when we arrived at Magapasi. But what was our surprise on seeing that in the next settlement, Tabog, 200 yards distant, there were 300 Americans waiting for us. In order to avoid our being couped up, the Honorable President gave orders at once for two soldiers to ascend to the top of a high mountain ridge, which was near, so as to act as sentinels. Meantime we saw the Americans in our front do the same thing, they, perhaps, believing that we had come for the purpose of attacking them. Night came on. Our soldiers and the Americans only gazed at one another at a distance without firing their guns. We were in the middle of an extensive field; on the righthand were mountain ridges and on the left the beautiful towns of Cagayan province.

The American soldiers and ours stood face to face with their guns but silent. At 6:30 p.m. we left the settlement with-

out having eaten anything, for we found nothing there but Americans. We then went back by the route we had come for there was no other road or pass. Here the military cordon of the enemy was well extended and once more we found ourselves in its center.

The Honorable President did not know what to do, because in front of us were the 300 Americans at Tabog, forming a cordon; on our left 300 more Americans from Tuao, who were also in cordon, and to our right and rear were the 4,000 (sic) who were pursuing us and who had corralled us among the mountain ridges. How were we to save ourselves? While we were going back along the road we had come, the Honorable President, Señores Villa, Barcelona, and Pilar were engaging in a discussion as to what direction we should take, and whether we should be able to get through the hostile military lines. Each one was meditating on what should be best. Finally, as there was no time for so much discussion, the Honorable President said that it would be best for us to simply hide in the thick woods in those places, and that from then on we would travel no more by day, but only by night, so as to avoid being discovered by the Americans.

About 5 a.m., after having marched continually through the night, we found a thick woods among some small mountain ridges.

May 23. — We went into the woods. After getting quite a distance inside the Honorable President selected a place for us to rest. At 8 a.m. we all lay down on the ground and were sound asleep in a few minutes. This made the fourth day we had eaten nothing but herbs. Neither had we slept any or rested. Hence our faces were cadaverous, our complexions pallid, our eyes hollow, our cheeks shrunken — in fact, there was a complete debilitation of the body, attended with profound physical and mental prostration.

During the whole of this day the greatest silence prevailed among us in the interior of the woods, and we slept the entire time, but we ate nothing, for we had no food supplies.

At night when it was quite dark we left the woods where we had been hiding, and set out for another woods more suitable for concealment. Although we had caught up on sleep the hunger had caused us faintness and giddiness. After walking

continuously all night, at about 5 a.m. we found the woods we were seeking.

May 24. — We went into the interior of the woods, where we found some Igorots. We begged them to bring us some cooked rice, in consideration of being paid whatever price they might desire. Indeed, after two hours they returned, each one bringing us a little cooked rice in packages containing about a fourth of a pint, and exacting 50 cents for each package. On account of our situation we had to pay the price demanded for the rice; and all of us bought some, the Igorots selling about $200 worth out of the two or three jars of rice they had brought us.

We spent the day hiding in the interior of the woods, with our stomachs full but our bodies still weak. At 7 o'clock at night, when it was quite dark, we resumed our journey, leaving the woods and taking the direction for the Magaogao settlement, to reach which it was necessary to cross three rivers. As they said the first was deep, we looked for a place where it was fordable. Our guides led us toward the south along the river. The current being somewhat swift we lashed ourselves together in order to ford the stream. As soon as we crossed over, we struck the second river. Tying ourselves together, we immediately entered it but as the velocity of its current was somewhat greater than that of the previous river many of us were swept away; however, everybody was saved.

We struck the third river half an hour later. The noise made by its current was sufficient to make known its terrible velocity. Being strongly lashed together, we threw ourselves into the river, which they say is infested with crocodiles. The strength of the current was estimated at being equal to that of twenty horses. We resumed the march as soon as we got across, having only lost — thanks to God — the Honorable President's rifle.

We entered the Magaogao settlement, where they told us were thirty Americans. It was now quite 3 o'clock in the morning, and we passed through the settlement in absolute silence and at rapid gait, so as not to be seen by the enemy. After passing the settlement, we ascended a mountain ridge. As soon as we reached its top, the Honorable President counted the men in order

to see if all were present. It was found that Lieutenant Dayao and nine soldiers were missing. When the Honorable President inquired as to what had become of them, some soldiers answered that they thought the missing companions had been drowned as with their own eyes they had seen Lieutenant Dayao and the nine soldiers in question swept away by the current while we were crossing the last river.

May 25. — We had no other remedy but to continue the march, and at once resumed our journey, lest daylight should overtake us on the road.

Then we ascended the mountain ridges which were in our front, and never halted. When 7 a.m. came, we found ourselves far from the settlement and in the midst of mountain ridges. Our guide led us to a river and we went down into it. The Honorable President saw that according to the compass he was carrying we had made a mistake as to the road, and our guide himself then became aware that we had lost our way. We then returned and hunted for the trail leading toward the east, but it was 11 a.m. before we found it and resumed our course.

After walking three or four hours we again lost the trail; but we were then in a thick woods. We rested here a little, and about 4 o'clock p.m. we resumed the march, passing through the interior of the woods. Afterwards we ascended a high mountain ridge and followed its range. The moon being bright, we were able to see the trails of the Kalingas, along which we traveled without halting until 9 o'clock at night, when, on account of our complete exhaustion, we could march no farther. The Honorable President gave orders for us to rest where we were on top of the mountain ridge. Having had nothing to eat but herbs alone to satisfy our hunger during the past five days, we immediately went to sleep. All of us slept among the cogon grass which covered the mountain ridge.

May 26. — Everybody got up at 5 o'clock in the morning, and we at once set on the march, reaching the last mountain ridge after walking for three hours. As soon as we had traversed this the extensive Cagayan plains came in sight, and we descended from the mountain ridge at 10 a.m., placing ourselves

in a thick woods. Here we found a herd of cows, the herders of which at once carried us on toward their houses, we forcing our marching in order to get something to eat. We reached the house at about 11 o'clock. The Honorable President immediately ordered two cows slaughtered for our food. There was no rice, but that made no difference. As soon as the cows were cut up each man grabbled what he could, baked it in the fire, and ate as long as he was able.

Although there was an abundance of meat, our hunger was not satisfied, owing to the absence of rice and salt. Then, on the following day we observed that we were all weaker than before, and the majority had intestinal inflamation.

May 27. — As the enemy would have been able to surprise us in that house, the Honorable President ordered us to move over into the woods at the foot of the mountain ridge. So at 7 a.m. we set out for the woods, reaching it at 11 a.m. Having no rice to eat we fed ourselves on beef alone, as we had done on the previous day, without using salt. Throughout the day we slept on the ground in this piece of woods.

About 6 o'clock, when night was approaching, we left the woods, returned to the house of the cowherds, and about 8 o'clock at night continued our journey toward the mountains of Maduluson.

After having traveled all night long without a halt we reached Maduluson at 9 o'clock in the morning.

May 28 — At the foot of this mountain of Maduluson is located the town of Enrile, being separated from Tuguegarao by a river. Wishing to celebrate his rejoicing on this day, the Honorable President ordered Señor Villa to go on to the town in advance and prepare a house and other necessary things for the celebration. Señor Villa is well known throughout the Cagayan valley on account of his having been provincial governor of Isabela province for nine months, and as soon as he reached the town he assembled all the patriots in order that they might assist him. The house having been prepared, he sent out invitation cards to all his acquaintances, male and female, requesting them to take part in the celebration that very afternoon. Two brass bands and an orchestra came. At the same time he

arranged sentries at all points of the town where the enemy might enter.

All being made ready Señor Villa returned about 12 o'clock to the place where the Honorable President was, in order to get him. At 12:30 the Honorable President and all his escort entered the town, being received by a large crowd of people during the playing of our national march. In the house were more than 60 young ladies who composed the aristocracy of Tuguegarao and Enrile. Dancing commenced at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until 3 in the morning.

May 29. — At 3:30 in the morning the Honorable President and his escort left the town. Without returning into the mountain of Maduluson, whence we had come, we took the straight route for the Aroma settlement, passing through those extensive fields of Cagayan. We reached the settlement at 10 a.m. After eating a light luncheon, we all went to sleep until 3 p.m.

At the celebration yesterday we learned that the Americans who had attacked us in the mountains were still staying there and hunting for the Honorable President, because they say they have him corralled, he being able only to hide himself on the mountain ridge in a piece of woods that has no outlet — hence he would be caught very soon. Such was the news circulated by the enemy in the town — and yet at that time we were dancing in the town.

We left Aroma at 5 p.m. and took the route for Agob, a barrio of Cabagan Nuevo. It being too far to the barrio, we had to sleep in the field, as we only traveled till 2 a.m. We slept among *cogon* patches.

May 30. — We resumed the journey at 5 a.m., and at 9 a.m., we reached the woods near Agob. We went into the interior of this and passed the day there. About 4 p.m. we left the woods and started for the barrio itself, reaching it at 7 o'clock in the evening.

The Honorable President desired to give a still greater blow to the enemy who, up to this date, were continuing their hunt for him in the mountain ridges where they had had us corralled, they believing us to still be in hiding there. So he ordered

Señor Villa, with 36 soldiers, to attack the enemy's garrison in Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela Province, that same night about 2 o'clock. In this attack the enemy had 3 men killed and 9 wounded. On our side we had 3 men wounded; and one of the residents of the town killed by a stray bullet. On the same night our guerrillas attacked the garrison at Maluno and Tumauini. In the first town the enemy suffered a loss of 9 burned to death and 3 wounded, and we had 3 wounded. In the second town the enemy had 2 men wounded.

May 31. — Fearing that the enemy would be largely reenforced on account of the attacks made by our troops on the previous night and also because Agob barrio is very close to the town, the Honorable President gave orders for us to return into the same woods. So at 5 a.m. we started for the woods, and on arrival went into their interior.

JUNE, 1900

June 1. — We remained in the interior of the woods. We received the news that many hostile reenforcements had arrived in the towns attacked.

June 2. — At 5 a.m. we left the woods and directed our march toward the Aeta settlement of Bagui, arriving there at 10 a.m.

June 3. — At 6 p.m. we left Bagui and took the direction for the Banluco settlement. It not being possible to arrive there that same night owing to the exhausted condition of the soldiers, we halted at 12 o'clock and slept in a patch of *cogon* grass.

June 4. — It was discovered this morning that our guide had escaped during the night. At 7 o'clock we resumed the march, guessing at the roads leading to Banluco. We traveled all day without halting. When evening came we found ourselves not very far from the place where we had slept the night before. So we had missed the road and were lost. Night came, but nevertheless we kept on hunting for the road until 9 p.m. Being unable to find it we then stopped to rest and slept in the *cogon* grass.

June 5. — We all got up at 5 a.m. and set out hunting for the road. At 8 o'clock one of our soldiers, a native of Isabela prov-

ince, presented himself to the Honorable President and informed him that he had found the road. We then resumed our march at once, and after traveling without halting we reached Banluco at 12 o'clock noon.

At 6 p.m. we left Banluco, taking the direction for the thick woods in the neighborhood of the town of Naguilian. Having marched all night without a halt and forded three rivers, at 8 a.m. we reached the woods we were seeking.

June 6. — In the interior of the woods we found three or four huts. The rumor of our presence at once reached the town of Naguilian; and about 12 o'clock, while we were all asleep, Señores Ramires and Montevirgen with many other patriots of the town, came out to the woods to visit us in our hiding place, bringing us gifts.

About 10 a.m. our sentinels reported that 40 Americans from Cagayan were passing along the road by which we had come to Naguilian.

June 7. — We remained in the woods. The patriots of Naguilian and Gamu continued their visits without cessation, bringing us rice and every kind of food in abundance, as well as clothing.

June 8. — It being dangerous for us to continue our residence at a fixed point, we left this woods at 6 a.m. and took the direction for another woods that was more dense. We had hardly gone more than two or three miles, and were still in an extensive field, when we saw following and running after us a multitude of women. On this account the Honorable President ordered us to halt and wait for them. After we had waited two hours these women arrived, some accompanied by boys. Each woman brought shirts, all kinds of clothing, tobacco, etc., for our soldiers. These women patriots were from Naguilian. After expressing to them his gratitude, the Honorable President recommended that they advise their daughters to accept no man as a fiance who did not know how to defend his country. The woman withdrew at 11 a.m., and we resumed our march toward the woods which we were hunting for, reaching it at 12 o'clock noon.

June 12. — In spite of our being in hiding in the woods the patriots of Gamu were always coming to see us.

June 17. — Señor Mariano Ramires left for Manila on a special mission.

June 20. — At 2 p.m. Lieutenant Alejandrino and his company, with Manuel Tomines, set out to make an attack on the hostile garrison at Reina Mercedes.

June 29. — This morning the Honorable President's special messengers set out, carrying circular letters to all generals.

About 6 p.m. the Honorable President's aid, Señor Tomas Magsarile, arrived from Manila bringing many family letters and a package of foreign mail having reference to peace negotiations. The Honorable President also learned that his son is alive.

JULY, 1900

July 4. — About 8 o'clock at night the Honorable President was attacked by a sort of ague.

July 5. — The Honorable President has a bad case of malarial fever.

July 6. — The Honorable President is improving.

There came up for trial in the camp this morning the case of Junior Major..., a deserter from the escort of the Honorable President. The major had also carried away with him some soldiers, and as soon as these knew of his bad intentions they escaped from him, returned, and presented themselves to the Honorable President, informing him that while they were with Major . . . he was always trying to seduce them into surrendering ot the enemy, and to give up their guns; and as they persistently refused to do so, he went away without taking leave of them, for which reason they knew nothing of his whereabouts. In view of these grave offenses the Honorable President this morning ordered all the field and line officers in the camp to form a council to deliberate as to what penalty ought to be inflicted upon the said major. The council was composed of Maj. Raymundo C. Jeciel, Capts. Juan H. Pilar and Ildefonso Villareal, and First Lieut. Tomas Magsarile and Teo-

doro Dayao, Señor Simeon A. Villa presiding. They unanimously agreed that the penalty should be death.

The record having been signed by all, was presented to the Honorable President, who at once signed approved the proceedings. At 2 p.m. Major . . . was shot, as is shown in the following report.

Hon. Captain-General:

He who was charged with fulfilling your high decree of this date concerning the infliction of the death penalty upon the person of Major . . . has the high honor of informing you that the execution in question was carried out in accordance with military regulations and laws at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of this day.

God guard you many years.
Tierra Virgen, July 6, 1900.

Raymundo C. Jeciel, *Major*

July 8. — This morning First Lieut. Teodoro Dayao went away as special commissioner to receive the guns at the town of Palanan which are going to be disembarked there, according to letters No. 24 and No. 25, from Hongkong.

July 26 (sic). — The Honorable President received a report from Señor Logan, interpreter, giving him the information that the Americans at Echague had received official correspondence saying that commissioners (sic) called *Cazadores,* or scouts, will come with the object of seeking him and having a conference.

July 22. — Special agent Señor Silvestre Tominas left for Manila, carrying the Honorable President's official mail, and the reply to letters Nos. 24 and 25 of the Hongkong committee dated the 1st of May.

July 29. — The Honorable President received newspapers from Manila the dates of which reached to the 4th of this month; and he learned to the great grief of his soul that Señor P. Paterno, usurping the authority of the Chief of the revolution, was publishing and pretending that he had full powers from said Chief and was actually forming an autonomist party in Manila.

July 30. — C. Ronquillo, ex-major of Tirona's brigade arrived in this camp.

AUGUST, 1900

August 1. — Special agent Señor Mariano Ramirez, who went to Manila on the 17th of June last, returned to this place. He brought back letters from Lino, which are very important, because he says that Señor Lino had gone to Hongkong.

This afternoon the Honorable President received a report from Lieutenant Dayao dated in Palanan the 18th of July last, saying that according to information from the natives, a week before his arrival two steamers passed there firing at one another and flying different flags.

August 6. — Major Ronquillo left this camp, having been designated as chief of guerrillas in the province of Cagayan. He also carried with him from Manila and foreign countries the Honorable President's orders and manifestoes.

There are many rumors to the effect that the Americans are coming to attack us in this camp.

August 10. — A report has been received from a patriot at Naguilian stating that through the Americans themselves it has become known that they are going to attack us in this camp some of these days.

This makes the seventh day that the Honorable President has been sick with malarial fever, complicated with bronchitis and gastroenteritis.

August 11. — At 3:30 o'clock this afternoon First Lieutenant Vitallano left this camp for Manila, carrying the Honorable President's official correspondence for the generals and for foreign countries. This special agent also carried an official document in the Honorable President's own handwritting for Señor Apolinario Mabini, granting him full powers to arrange for peace on the basis of the independence of the Philippine Islands. Bartolo Mansarte also went as a special commissioner.

August 15. — On this date the Honorable President received a letter from Señor Engracio Gonzaga, in which he expressed his loyalty and placed himself subject to the orders of the Honorable President.

August 16. — The Honorable President's condition is rather bad, and he is unable to leave his bed.

August 17. — A report came from Naguilian yesterday informing us that two large rowboats full of Americans had passed that place.

The Honorable President has recovered his health.

August 20. — A report was received from Gamu informing us of the arrival of many Americans at Aparri, and eight very large row boats were enroute to this section.

The Honorable President, wishing to avoid the attack of the Americans, decided that we should leave here and take the direction for Palanan, carrying only 16 guns, the others to remain in charge of Captains Pilar and Villareal, who stayed behind to engage in a system of guerrilla warfare in this province.

August 22. — On the night of this date we received trustworthy news that the American negroes who are coming up are going to take the place of the whites, who are already leaving.

August 24. — We received newspapers and learned that on the 28th and 29th of July a great peace celebration, initiated by P. Paterno, took place in Manila.

August 25. — This morning we received several letters from Gamu and Naguilian, announcing that the Americans by threatening to shoot the leading citizens of the towns compelled them to take the oath of allegiance and recognize the sovereignty of the United States.

August 26. — About 1:00 p.m. we received a report from Naguilian, informing us that there had arrived in Gamu a company of cavalry, which in conjunction with some infantry was coming to attack us under the guidance of one of our soldiers who was wounded and taken prisoner some days ago.

August 27. — Everything being conveniently prepared in order to cause a failure of the Americans' plan of attack we, at 5:30 a.m., abandoned this camp of Tierra Virgen, after having lived there peacefully for two months and twenty-one days. Capt. Juan H. Pilar, chief, and Señores Villareal, Carasco, Catindig, Subido, Ruiz de Leon and the greater part of the soldiers remained be-

hind in the province to operate as guerrillas. The Honorable President only took with him 16 sharpshooters and Señores Villa and Barcelona and Lieutenants Magsarile and P. Reyes.

In order that our direction to Palanan would not be perceived by anyone, on leaving the camp we took the route along the river in the interior of the woods. We followed the river's course, all of us getting wet. After marching continuously in the river for five hours we left it and took a course through the interior of the woods for the settlement of the Kalingas at Catalangan. About 5 p.m. we encountered an old Kalinga man, who had come from the settlement. On being asked if there was anything at the settlement, he told us that this morning 25 Americans were there — for what purpose he did not know — and that these left about 10 a.m. We took this Kalinga for our guide, telling him to conduct us by a route far from the settlement. After a conversation of fifteen minutes we resumed the march through the interior of the woods. About 4 o'clock after our having marched continuously, the Kilanga announced to us that we would have to emerge into the open field as the woods ended at that point. The Honorable President then ordered that we should halt here first, while the guide went on to the settlement to inquire among the other Kalingas respecting the movements of the Americans. After an hour the Kalinga returned with his son, a Christian, informing us that 25 American cavalry men were stationed on two rivers near us; but they did not know for what reason.

The presence of the Americans on the river was undoubtedly for the purpose of cutting off our retreat. Then the Honorable President ordered us to hide in the woods; and at 5 o'clock we resumed to march. After seeing several woods, entering and passing through them, about 7 o'clock we placed ourselves in one of these, where we found a little house inhabited by a Kalinga man and his wife.

We slept very uneasily throughout the whole night, because the Kalinga man said we were distant only about one hour from Maluno where the Americans have their central camp, and therefore they could have surprised us at midnight.

August 28. — All of us had breakfast at 5 a.m.

The Honorable President did not know what direction to take, because in addition to those Americans who were blocking our passage, it seemed probable that there was another column in our rear pursuing us and pushing on toward this point, namely, those who were to have attacked our camp yesterday morning. After questioning the Kalinga as to details, the Honorable President chose the route leading to Taboyan settlement in order to get around the places where the Americans were waiting for us, and at 11 a.m. we set out for that point. We traveled through the interior of various woods, avoiding passing along any roads or trails which the Kalingas travel, so as to prevent the enemy pursuing us.

After marching without a halt we reached the settlement at 2 p.m. We did not go into it, but stopped in a place of woods near it, so as not to be seen by anyone.

When night came we resumed our march, not along the roads, but in the interior of the woods, where, owing to the complete darkness, we had to grasp one another while walking in order to keep from being lost.

About 9 o'clock we commenced ascending the mountain ridges one above the other, and about 11:30 we encountered on the summit a little house inhabited by a Kalinga man of marriageable age. Owing to the tired condition of our soldiers, we rested here and spent the night.

August 29. — At 6:30 a.m. we resumed the journey, ascending the mountain ridges, but always keeping in the interior of the woods. We took the direction for the Ambabu settlement. At 12 o'clock sharp we found ourselves at the place called Alabadabad. We stopped here looking for guides. We resumed our journey at 4 p.m. About dark we met a Kalinga boy who told us he had come from the American settlement; and that an American column had arrived there a little after midday. This news was ominous for us as the column had blocked our retreat. We continued the march.

After walking for half an hour, the officer of the vanguard informed us that the guide was vacillating as to the route and was trying to lead us to the other side of the river, because on

that side lay the road to Ambabu. But the enemy was also there, since in that neighborhood is located the Ambabu settlement. In view of all this we stopped here; and the Honorable President ordered Lieutenant Magsarile and six soldiers to seek another Kalinga who might serve as our guide.

About 10 o'clock that officer returned and reported he had found no Kalinga, but has met a Christian, a native of Casiguran, who informed us the Americans who arrived in Abatan had continued their march on to Ambabu. This news confirming our previous suspicions that our retreat was already blocked, caused the Honorable President to forego the idea of going to Ambabu, and to arrange for us to conceal ourselves in the woods for the time. So we slept where we were, without any other roof than the sky to cover us; and with the ground as our bed, our caresses being the bites of the numerous mosquitoes and *nicnics* which prevented us from sleeping during the night.

August 30. — We left that place at 6 a.m. and returned to woods near Alabadabad, arriving at 8 a.m., and placing our selves in its interior. Many Christians from Casiguran came to this woods to pay their respects to us, some of them calling us that the Americans who were at Ambabu had already returned to Maluno, while others said that another hostile column had arrived at Ambatuan.

We spent the night in this woods, but all were on the alert for fear of a surprise, since we were within one hour's march of Ambatuan.

August 31. — At 6 a.m. we abandoned the woods and took up the march for Ambabu; but on arriving in another woods we stopped to wait for the return of an individual we had sent to Ambatuan to investigate the movements of the enemy. About 12 o'clock two Christians, women, came and informed us that the Americans who were in Ambatuan had gone on to Ambabu.

Our messenger returned about 2 o'clock informing us that there were no Americans in Ambatuan. In view of this trustworthy information, at 4:20 we resumed the march for Ambabu passing through woods and fording three rivers, during one and a half-hour's travel. We came to a fourth river on the side of which was a thick woods which we were about to enter. But in

view of the fact that night came on, and we were unable to go into the interior of the woods in the dark, we spent the night on the bank of the river.

SEPTEMBER, 1900

September 1. — We resumed the march at 6:40 a.m., passing along the river until 8 o'clock, when we ascended a mountain ridge. At 9:30 we reached a beautiful spring, where we stopped to rest. This place is called Dibuluan.

At 10:15 we resumed the march, passing through the spring. At 11:30 we climbed the mountain ridge, the ascent of which was exceedingly steep. At 12:15 we reached the top, and at 1 o'clock we found some houses of the Kalingas, in which we took our siesta. This place is called Dilumin. After resting in the woods, at 4 p.m. we resumed the march. We had to ford three rivers between which were great high mountain ridges that we crossed. At 6 p.m. we arrived at a place called Ditabag, where we found a little house inhabited by Kalingas. We stopped here and all set in to cooking supper.

We spent the night here in the open air.

September 2. — We commenced the march at 5:55 a.m. After going a short distance, we suddenly went down into a river and followed its course. We walked in the river until 11 o'clock without halting and then we ascended a high mountain ridge. On reaching its top we commenced descending the other side. On arriving at a river we halted in order to rest and eat our midday meal. This is the place called Ambabu.

At 3:30 p.m. we resumed our journey, passing along mountain ridges and ascending and descending their sides. At the last of these slopes we found a river between two high mountain ridges, and here we halted, as we were unable to continue the journey for reason that no more water could be found in those regions through which we were passing, and for the additional reason that it was night. Everybody set in to cooking. We slept on the bank of the river.

We reached this place at 5:15 o'clock.

September 3. — At 7 a.m. we resumed our journey for Palanan. There are no Americans in that place, according to reports of travelers from there whom we have met on the road.

Our first direction was along the course of the river. Then we ascended the mountain ridges and descended on their opposite sides, where we found a river, and soon, passing alternately rivers and mountain ridges.

At 11 o'clock we found ourselves on the river at the foot of a great mountain ridge, the ascent of which, according to our calculations, would require five hours. So we first halted and ate in order to strengthen our bodies. When the meal was over we took up the march at 11:35. At this time a heavy shower commenced to fall, wetting all the soldiers. We climbed up the mountain ridge on all-fours, so as to avoid falling over the precipice. We were shivering from the cold, due to the continual downpour of the rain.

Traveling on without halting, and suffering great hardships, not only on account of the horrible cold due to the rain but also on account of the annoyances caused us by the *limatics,* we finally reached the other side of the mountain ridge at 4:20 p.m., where there is a river. Then the rain ceased.

Owing to our exhausted condition we rested on the banks of this river, which flows between two mountain ridges. We passed the night badly, since it rained heavily all night, and because we were sheltering ourselves beneath the trees where at each moment we were catching on our faces or other parts of our bodies the *limatics* which abounded in that place.

September 4. — At 8 a.m. we resumed our journey, passing through the river. At 10 o'clock we commenced ascending a mountain ridge. The rain continued; the *limatics* were abundant. Without a halt we continued the ascent, even crawling at some points, and reached the top at 12:20. We at once began descending. At every moment was heard the noise of falls on account of the slippery ground. The soldiers were complaining of hunger; some were sick, among these Señor B., who was attacked with the malarial ague, but we never halted a moment, and at 3 o'clock we reached the foot of the mountain ridge, where there is a river.

Here we halted to rest and eat. At 3:30 we resumed the march. We ascended one mountain ridge and descended on the other side, where there is a river, and so on, alternately passing among rivers and mountain ridges. We kept on marching until 5:30 p.m., when we reach a river on the bank of which we rested and spent the night. This river is located between two woods.

September 5. — The great part of the soldiers having finished their supplies, many of them had no breakfast this morning.

Lieutenant Magsarile was attacked with severe malarial fever; therefore we were not able to start out this morning at 7 o'clock, as we should have done; but at 8 o'clock, although the lieutenant still had fever, we were forced to abandon the place for want of food supplies. We traveled among rivers, mountain ridges, and woods until about 12:30, when we halted to rest and eat.

At 2:30 we resumed the march, and ascended a mountain ridge. On descending on the other side we met the *vice presidente* of Palanan and some travelers on their way to Isabela province. Animated by an excited patriotism, he turned back and accompanied us.

At about 6:30 we found ourselves at the ranch of Dumasari, distant only one hour from Palanan.

September 6. — About 8 a.m. the presidente local of Palanan presented himself to the Honorable President. As had been previously arranged, Dr. Barcelona was introduced as the chief of our column under the assumed name of "Capt. Santos Baltazar," his secretary being Lieutenant Esteban, who was really the Honorable President, and Señor Villa posed as the hospital steward of the column, assuming the name of "Señor Alvaro," with the rank of a sergeant. This change of names was made because it is well known by the inhabitants of these provinces, and by the Americans themselves, that Señores Villa and Barcelona are the Honorable President's inseparable companions. This arrangement as to change of names was made known to all soldiers and officers composing the escort of the Honorable President.

At 9:30 we left the Dumasari ranch and proceeded on to the town of Palanan, accompanied by the *presidente local* and

the *vice presidente.* At 11 o'clock we entered the town itself, being met by a band of music and a large crowd of people. This then is the first time that we have entered a Christian town since November, 1899, when we went into hiding. Therefore our enthusiasm is immense.

The troops took up their quarters in the convent, and the Honorable President and Señores Barcelona and Villa in a private house.

As to the condition of the town, it is completely uninhabited because according to the *presidente local* and the leading men, the inhabitants of the town as soon as they heard about the Americans taking possession of our towns went off into the woods and mountain ridges. There they built their huts; and all being armed with lances and darts, they are waiting for the American invasion of the town in order to show these that they prefer living in the mountains to submission to foreign yoke.

September 9. — Having been previously invited by "Lieutenant Esteban", all the inhabitants of the town with a band of music, assembled in the convent. At 12 o'clock a lunch given by the Honorable President was served for them all. When this was over the Honorable President made a brilliant speech, arousing the patriotism of them all. At 3:30 the delightful reunion terminated.

September 13. — Owing to the excited patriotism of the Palanan people they are always furnishing us with all kinds of necessaries. Hence we have eatables in abundance and especially such viands as large fish, chickens, etc.

Almost all the houses in town have tumbled down on account of being abandoned by their owners. For this reason, and on account of the bad arrangement of the streets, the Honorable President, or "Esteban", has sketched a plan and recommended the *presidente local* to erect a new town in accordance with the plan as soon as our independence is declared.

September 16. — This morning some travelers from Casiguran arrived in the outskirts of the town, but they were not permitted to come into the town, this action being taken to avoid their having knowledge of our presence. According to these

travelers the Americans stationed at Baler go twice a week to Casiguran to secure pigs, chickens, and other kinds of food, returning when they are quite satisfied with their barbarities. That is due perhaps to their not having received their rations and pay.

September 19. — At 7:30 a.m. the Honorable President, Señors Barcelona and Villa, and some soldiers of the escort went out to the place called Sabang, where Lieutenant Dayao and five soldiers are on watch for the steamer that is to bring arms. After a march of three hours — that is, at 11 o'clock — we reached that place, which is on the Pacific coast. Having rested for a while the Honorable President and Señores Villa and Barcelona went in bathing in the sea.

At 3:15 p.m. we started out on our return trip to Palanan, arriving at 6 p.m.

September 20. — The Honorable President is again suffering from malarial fever.

September 21. — By invitation of Señor Benjamin Cortes, *vice-presidente* of this town, this morning the so-called "Captain Santos" and "Hospital Steward Alvaro", with Lieutenants Magsarile and Jeciel (sic) went to the ranch where the *vice-presidente* lives, which is distant about two hours' walk from Palanan. On account of his illness the Honorable President could not go.

September 22. — The Honorable President is completely well.

September 24. — The Honorable President, Señores Barcelona and Villa, Lieut. P. Reyes, Major Jeciel, and some of the escort soldiers spent the day on the ranch where lives the *presidente local* of this town.

September 29. — Today being the anniversary of the ratification of independence, all the inhabitants of Palanan, pursuant to a previous announcement by "Lieutenant Esteban", assembled at 9 a.m. in the church where with great emotion in their souls they listened to the brilliant addresses inciting them to patriotism, which were delivered by Señores "Baltazar", Jeciel, Magsarile, Reyes, and "Esteban A. Bienvenido". After these solemn exercises, rendered beautiful by a band of music, all went up into a convent where there was dancing for a short time.

Then a luncheon was served to everybody, a triangular table seating 200 persons having been erected in the atrium of the convent.

After luncheon dancing again commenced and was continued until 4 p.m., when began the racing by the boys, greased-pole climbing, and parading of the streets crying "Hurrah for independence."

September 30. — In spite of this being a coast town, there is a great deal of malaria prevailing here; hence many of the soldiers are suffering from this disease, as well as the Honorable President.

OCTOBER, 1900

October 3. — Picnic day. The Honorable President and his companions spent the day in Dicabayo, one of the ranches near Palanan.

October 6. — We spent the day on another ranch. It has been raining in torrents for eight days.

October 10. — This morning the Honorable President received some foreign mail and several letters from fellow patriots in Manila, as well as some personal effects and medicines.

October 13. — We spent the day on a ranch.

October 15. — This afternoon Maj. Raymundo C. Jeciel left us, he having been commissioned chief of the guerrillas operating in Isabela province. He carried with him our mail for Manila and foreign countries.

NOVEMBER, 1900

November 12. — We have received official letters from Mabini from the Hongkong committee, the Washington committee, and from Ambassador Agoncillo, as well as personal letters from many Manila people and from our families. People in Isabela province also write us that the Americans are coming to attack us here very soon.

Lieut. Miguel de los Santos, of Cavite Viejo, has arrived here, having come from Manila.

November 18. — Our special agents have left, carrying with them correspondence for the generals, for foreign countries and Manila, and family letters.

The Honorable President having learned that the power-of-attorney document which he sent to Señor Mabini was taken by the ambitious Paterno and burned, sent another signed copy by today's mail. By this same mail there will also arrive in Manila the nominations of executive committee of the "Filipino Central Red Cross Society."

November 21. — About 7 o'clock at night the Honorable President received a report from our outposts stating that there was an American column on the road very near here, and coming in this direction. Our special messengers, who left Sunday, the 18th instant, also returned, bringing back with them the packages of mail.

The Honorable President at once gave order for making a defense of the Gisaguet mountain ridges, where is situated the entrance into the town. So then throughout all the night the soldiers were preparing their food supplies and equipment. At 3 o'clock in the morning Captain Magsarile, with half of the Honorable President's escort, marched off toward these mountain ridges to make a defense there. Many residents of the town voluntarily accompanied him, being armed with arrows, and having as their leader the chief of police, Señor Olimpio Cortes.

November 22. — During the day the residents unroofed the houses and moved their houses and every kind of food, and even their cattle, into the mountains and woods. By 3 p.m. nothing was left in the town, because we also abandoned it and moved to a ranch on the other side of a big river.

At the last moment the Honorable President gave orders for Second Lieut. Leandro Paz and three soldiers to remain in the town as a guard, in order to receive reports from our outposts. The night passed without incident.

November 23. — All day long we were waiting for news from the fight. At 7 p.m. a report came directly from the trenches to the effect that the fight commenced at 10 a.m. that day, many white Americans and a guide named Vicente Agabao, who

was leading them on the road, having fallen at our first volley. Then ensued a panic among the enemy, and they at once took flight, and hence when our informant left the trenches the firing was over.

At 9 p.m. Señor Olimpio Cortes, an officer who was commanding one of our trenches, arrived, bringing as prisoners captured by him two burden bearers of the Americans. He informed us that the Americans had been able to flank our forces, and hence these had left the trenches; and he also said that Captain Magsarile had retreated in a different direction, having been unable to join forces with Cortes.

The captured burden bearers assured us that the Americans who had been killed were the commanding officer of the column and a lieutenant, a doctor, and some soldiers, besides their guide, Vicente Agabao, because these always went in the vanguard. Señor Cortes retired with his forces to the second battery to wait the arrival of the enemy.

It should be noted that Señor Cortes is chief of the Palanan police.

November 24. — We were expecting Captain Magsarile all day. In the afternoon the Honorable President sent the Dumagats or Aetas to search for him in the mountains near the town.

At 10 a.m. we received a report from the guards in the town, saying that the Americans reached the first ranch in the afternoon, and that they were continuing their march by night, burning all the houses encountered en route.

In view of this reliable information, and on account of the proximity of the enemy, at 1:45 the same night we left the ranch where we were encamped. After fording several rivers, and marching continuously until 2:45 in the morning, we arrived at the house of one Santiago. Here we rested until morning.

November 25. — We resumed the march at 6 a.m., and after walking for an hour we found a large woods called Dicadium. We went into its interior, and about 9 o'clock stopped for a rest and to cook something to eat. At this hour we saw the Americans fire on the town.

In the afternoon of this day Señor Cortes, commissioner of justice in the town, and also sergeant of the guerrillas operating in the same, came to present himself to the Honorable President, informing us of his having had an encounter with the enemy at the entrance to the town. He was unable to state with certainty the losses of the enemy, but he himself had none. He said that the Americans were firing into every piece of woods encountered.

From this time on our rations were reduced to two meals a day for the sake of economy.

November 26. — We continued staying in the woods without incident. Captain Magsarile and his soldiers did not put in an appearance. None of the townspeople show themselves to the enemy, as they continue hiding in the mountains, having left nothing in their houses. The people have been continually visiting the Honorable President in these woods where he is located.

November 27. — Still in the woods; nothing new.

November 28. — One of the companions of Captain Magsarile came to the woods to present himself to the Honorable President, informing him that the captain and his soldiers are on the Dimasaret ranch. The Honorable President at once sent for Captain Magsarile.

A report came from Sergeant Olimpio Cortes announcing that the Americans were no longer in the town, and saying that he did not know where they were, but supposed that they were reconnoitering the ranches.

About 8 a.m. Señor Villa, chief of the Honorable President's staff, went out with four soldiers farther up into the interior of the woods, and there at the foot of the mountain ordered a small house constructed. When it was completed, about 4 p.m., he returned. In order to avoid being surprised by the enemy the Honorable President, Señores Villa and Barcelona will sleep in the house every night.

About 3 p.m. Captain Magsarile arrived with two of his brothers, the other four having disappeared in the mountains, perhaps on account of their losing their way.

About 5 o'clock there came a report from Sergeant Olimpio Cortes informing the Honorable President that the lost soldiers of Captain Magsarile had already arrived at a ranch in search of us. He also says that the Americans have entirely quit the town, having passed through the last ranch on their retreat the 26th instant — this being all due to the singular conduct of the inhabitants of Palanan, all of whom left their houses and took refuge in the mountains. Suspecting that the Americans had hidden in the woods in order to surprise the people on their return to the town, the Honorable President sent out several persons to make sure of the truth of this news. The report as to the retirement of the Americans was confirmed.

November 29. — Nothing new.

November 30. — At 11:30 a.m. the Honorable President with Señor Villa and two soldiers started for the place called Salpic, toward the east from the town, having arrived there at 5 p.m.

The return mail was sent off.

DECEMBER, 1900

December 1. — During the morning the excursionists (sic) visited the mountain ridges near Salpic, but found nothing offering a favorable condition for a defense.

At 11:30 a.m. they set out on return to the woods where they were residing, arriving there at 3 p.m. On the road they met several of the headmen from the town, who told them that there were several corpses of the enemy at the place where the fight occurred on the 23rd of November.

December 3. — We abandoned the woods at 9 a.m. and started for the town. As all the houses were destroyed, we had to halt at the ranch nearest to the town where we were formerly, in order to send on ahead to have our houses repaired. We got to the ranch at 12 o'clock noon. After eating luncheon we visited the town itself, where we saw the barbarities which the Americans had committed.

We returned to the ranch at 4 p.m.

December 4. — This morning, by order of the Honorable President, all the officers and soldiers, except one of the former and five of the latter, went to the town to repair our houses.

December 7. — This morning about 9 o'clock Captain Dayao informed the Honorable President that our houses in the town were completed. About 10 o'clock we arrived in the town.

About 1 o'clock the vice-president came to report, and said according to the statements of a Dumagas man the latter met several people yesterday coming from Casiguran whom he supposed to be Americans. Several individuals were at once sent to the Casiguran road as guards or sentinels, so as to give us notice if enemies came. We supposed the people coming were either Americans in combination with those who came to attack us a few days ago, or else native residents of Casiguran sent here by the *presidente local* of their town. As the Palanan people had already returned to their houses, orders were given them to hide their animals and food supplies in the mountain ridges. Scarcely do we think of resting when here comes bad news.

December 8. — The day dawned in sadness with a cloudy sky. Everybody was ready for marching. We were waiting for a report from our sentinels. About 6 a.m. the Honorable President ordered a concealed trench to be constructed among the trees at the convent, in order that our forces might ambush the enemy when these arrived. The people of the ranches had already taken refuge in the mountains.

About 10 a.m. the *presidente local* arrived, bringing a letter from the sentries, which proved to be a report from the people who were coming from Casiguran. The report was from Major Nasario Alhambra, informing the Honorable President that he and all his forces had arrived from Casiguran. Then our tranquility returned.

About 5 p.m. Major Alhambra and four soldiers arrived, bringing with them $3,200 dollars as war contributions collected in Echague, Isabela province, while his forces remained in Casiguran.

December 12. — This morning a resident of Palanan, receiving his information from a Dumagas native, notified the

Honorable President that the Americans who had attacked us on the 23rd of last month had lost their way on their retirement, and at present were in a mountainous place called Disaplat, without any burden bearers, and that they only numbered some 10 men.

December 13. — In view of the news received yesterday, the Honorable President commissioned two residents here to go to the place to see the Americans who were lost in the mountains.

By order of the Honorable President, on this date Colonel Villa, of the staff, dispatched a letter to Señor Agustin Oros, head of the "Tabacalera Company" in Isabela province, intimating to him that he should supply us with powder and everything necessary for an arsenal. In the name of the Filipino government Señor Villa promised him that if he rendered us this valuable service, all the interests of the "Tabacalera Company" would be respected throughout the Philippine Islands.

December 16. — The officers composing the Honorable President's escort gave a ball in the convent in honor of the Palanan young ladies.

December 17. — The Honorable President, with his chief of staff, Villa, and some other officers, went out to superintend the construction of trenches on the mountain ridge called Dinagapilan. They left at 9:10 a.m., accompanied by many residents of Palanan, who are the ones who are going to do the work.

At 12 o'clock they arrived at the farthest ranch, which is at the foot of the mountain ridge. On account of Señor Villa being attacked with malarial fever, the party had to halt here until night, but Lieutenant Reyes and four soldiers kept on.

December 18. — At 6 a.m. we resumed the march, ascending to the top of the mountain ridge, and at 10 a.m. we reached its foot on the other side. The ground was immediately reconnoitered and the orders were given for the construction of trenches at the strategical points.

December 19. — Construction of trenches continued.

December 20. — Construction of the trenches continued.

December 22. — The construction of the trenches continued; but there was want of provisions for the laborers, many of them having eaten nothing.

December 24. — Only two batteries remained unfinished; but it was impossible to continue the work, as there had been nothing to eat since the day before. Therefore the Honorable President ordered that 12 o'clock of this day we should return to the town. So at that hour we left Dinagapilan, and after a rapid march we arrived in Palanan at 3:30 p.m., being met by band of music.

December 25.— Today being Christmas, the Honorable President distributed gifts to all the boys and girls in the town, as well as to all the officers and soldiers of his escort. After the distribution of money was finished the mothers of the boys and girls sang a hymn, the words of which referred very feelingly to our campaign in the mountains. An order was given for all the old men and old women to assemble at the convent on New Year's Day for the purpose of receiving presents.

December 27. — By order of the Honorable President, Lieutenants Medina and Paz and Señor Olimpio Cortes, the chief of police at Palanan, with 200 men of the town went out to Dinagapilan this morning to resume work on the trenches.

On awakening this morning the Honorable President found himself indisposed on account of indigestion and fulness of the stomach.

December 28 and 29. — The Honorable President is improving. On the afternoon of the last-mentioned date he moved into a larger house, which fronts the convent and was once the municipal schoolhouse.

December 30. — At 8 a.m. a solemn funeral ceremony in memory of the grand Rizal was celebrated in the church, all the field and line officers and soldiers who could be spared from duty having participated in the same, as well as the people of the town. Señor Barcelona delivered an oration touching upon the biography of the illustrious dead man.

December 31. — In order to take leave of the nineteenth century and the old year to welcome the new year and the new century, the Honorable President invited to his house all the leading men of Palanan and the officers of his escort, as well as the charming lady dancers of this town.

The entertainment commenced at 7 o'clock in the evening with dances and rigodons. About 11:30 all sat down at the table to eat supper, and when it struck 12 the band played the national air. After supper the Honorable President and all the officers proposed toasts. When all this was over, dances and rigodons commenced again and lasted till 4 o'clock in the morning, when the guests dispersed.

TWENTIETH CENTURY, YEAR OF 1901, JANUARY

January 1. — At 8 a.m. the Honorable President distributed presents, the sum amounting to 500 dollars.

At 10 a.m. there was another dance in the convent, it having been attended by all the young ladies of the town. The entertainment closed at 4 p.m.

January 2. — At noon the Honorable President and Señor Barcelona went out to examine the outposts at Dinagapilan.

January 5. — At 4:30 p.m. the Honorable President and his companions returned.

About 6 p.m. the mail arrived, containing very important packages from the Hongkong committee, from Manila, and from the chief of guerrillas, and especially important ones from Señor Mabini.

In the name of the Palanan people the local commander of the town gave a ball on this night in honor of the officers of the Honorable President's escort. It commenced at 8 o'clock in the evening and terminated at 7 o'clock the following morning.

January 6. — By the mail which arrived yesterday we learned that McKinley was reelected in the presidential election of America.

January 8. — Owing to the reelection of McKinley to the presidency of the United States, the Honorable President arranged to issue a manifesto to the Filipinos in arms inciting them to patriotism in order that they may not be discouraged.

Forty of Major Alhambra's soldiers have arrived from Casiguran.

January 10. — The post left for Manila this morning carrying the Honorable President's mail for foreign countries, for

the Filipino committees, for Señor Mabini, and for the Filipino generals.

January 14. — Just after luncheon today Second Lieutenant Leandro Paz went to take station at our outposts.

January 16. — At 9 a.m. an ordinary court-martial convened at headquarters to hear and determine the case of the soldier, Luis Novicio, charged with committing abuses under menace of armed force. The court was composed of the following persons: Colonel Villa, of the staff; Capt. Tomas Magsarile, prosecuting attorney: "Capt. Santos Baltazar," counsel for accused; Second Lieut. Medina (Calixto), judge-advocate, and the following voting members: Capt. Teodoro Dayao, Capt. Miguel Santos, Maj. Nasario Alhambra, Second Lieut. Basilio Palameg.

The trial resulted in the soldier, Luis Novicio, being convicted and sentenced to six year's imprisonment.

January 19. — A drumhead court-martial convened at headquarters for the trial of Norberto Julian, Florentino Nidia, and— (blank — J. C. H.) on the charge of being spies for the enemy. It was composed of Colonel Villa, of the staff as president and several field and line officers of the army. The three prisoners were condemned to death.

January 20. — The three spies of the enemy sentenced to death by court-martial yesterday were shot this morning at 9 o'clock.

January 22. — Tomorrow being the anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic at Malolos, the Honorable Dictator gave a ball and supper at his house this night in honor of the leading people of Palanan, the entertainment having lasted till 1 a.m.

January 23. — At 7 a.m. all the troops were reviewed in front of the house of the Honorable Dictator, who, from the window of his house, pronounced a brilliant discourse. Señor Barcelona also made a brilliant address.

The officers of the escort gave a ball in honor of the people of the town. It lasted from 9 a.m. until 11 p.m.

January 24. — About 6 p.m. the Honorable Dictator received a report from the outpost at Disusuan, informing him that our soldiers had been surprised by the enemy before daylight on the 20th instant, one of their rifles having been captured by the enemy. The report also states that very soon the 200 Americans at Maluno will come to attack us.

January 27. — In view of the foregoing news, at about 9 o'clock this morning the 60 soldiers of the Honorable Dictator's escort started for the mountain ridge of Dinagapilan under command of Colonel Villa, and arrived there at 3 p.m.

January 28. — With a view to avoiding misfortune to travelers, the colonel in command of the Dinagapilan line gave orders to Second Lieutenant Paz, who is at the outpost, not to permit travelers to pass at night.

January 29. — In the afternoon several persons came from Disusuan, and Second Lieutenant Paz sent a report stating that there are 200 Americans en route to this point.

January 30. — Several persons came from Disusuan, bringing the same news as that of yesterday.

On this night the "Red Cross" was organized at Palanan.

FEBRUARY, 1901

February 1. — In view of the great number of the enemy coming, the dictator asked the military commander of Isabela province for reenforcements.

February 6.—During the afternoon a courier arrived, bringing the news that the Americans had gone back.

February 7. — In view of the foregoing news, Colonel Villa returned to town.

February 9. — The troops were ordered to retire to Palanan.

February 10. — There was a dance in the convent.

February 11. — The mail left for Manila, with correspondence for the Hongkong committee, and for Lumpo and many others.

February 17. — There was a dance in the convent.

MARCH, 1901

March 3. — All the members of the municipal council of Palanan presented themselves to the Honorable Dictator, and stated that the town is running short of rice.

March 4. — The municipal council of Palanan communicated with the municipal council of Casiguran, asking for rice at the earliest moment.

March 7. — The Honorable Dictator received a letter from Señor Apolinario Mabini, dated the 22nd of November, 1900, transmitting messages from the American generals, MacArthur and Bell, to the effect that our independence can not be conceded, and that the Honorable Dictator may retire to Manila under conditions of his to live at the palace in Malacañang with MacArthur.

As to himself, Señor Mabini inquires of the Honorable Dictator whether he will have to advocate independence or autonomy, seeing that McKinley is already reelected.

March 8. — The Honorable Dictator answered Señor Mabini's letter, instructing him to thank General MacArthur, in his name, for the invitation, but to say that the Filipinos in arms desired nothing less than independence of the Philippine Islands.

March 16. — Having had news that the Americans will come by sea, the Honorable Dictator went out this morning to examine the place for a sentry station, which is situated on top of the mountain ridge and which commands a fine view of the sea.

He also visited the place called Sabang, in order to see the fish traps he had ordered constructed there.

March 22. — Today the Dictator celebrates his birthday, and on this account many people have come to congratulate him.

(*Translator's Note.* — At this point the diary abruptly ends, Emilio Aguinaldo and his staff officers, Santiago Barcelona and Simeon A. Villa, having been captured by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston at Palanan on March 23, 1901. — J. C. H.)

I certify that the foregoing translation, made by myself from the original Spanish, is correct.

J. C. HIXON
First Lieutenant, Thirty-second Infantry, U.S.V.,
Assistant to Officer in Charge Division of Military Information
Manila, P. I., June 5, 1901.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P.I., February 28, 1902

A true copy of the original translation.

R. H. VAN DEMAN
Captain, Twenty-first United States Infantry
In charge of Military Information.

The Betrayal of General Aguinaldo*

Antonio K. Abad

Translated by Armando J. Malay

JUST A FEW WORDS: I wrote this account, which is sad to recall and full of mystery, to offer to the motherland. The truth of the account is based on events actually witnessed by some of the companions and co-workers of General Frederick Funston of the American army, in the capture of the President of the Philippine Republic.

Many of the men who were brought by General Funston to Palanan are still alive and peacefully living in Nueva Ecija. These were the men who related and confessed to me the scheme by which they tricked and captured President Aguinaldo.

I must say that in writing this account I have no intention of dishonoring anyone mentioned herein, because my only purpose is to picture the true events and reveal the cunning displayed by one officer to obtain his dreamed of success.

And as my competence is limited in such delicate work as this, I am not afraid to say that it may suffer from defects which the intelligent readers may criticize, for which I place myself in their judgement.

ANTONIO K. ABAD

Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
August, 13, 1918.

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* *Ang Pagkanulo kay Heneral Aguinaldo* (Naging Presidente ng Republika Pilipina). Kasaysayang Tagalog. Sinulat ni Antonio K. Abad. Unang Pagkalimbag. Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. The Student Press. 1919. 76p.

CECILIO SEGISMUNDO'S APPEARANCE BEFORE AN AMERICAN LIEUTENANT IN PANTABANGAN, NUEVA ECIJA

One day in February 1901, after more than a month's trek over the mountains and cliffs between Isabela and Nueva Ecija, a band of Filipino revolutionists from Palanan carrying a letter by President Aguinaldo, reached the barrio of San Juan in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, about 70 kilometers from San Isidro, then the provincial capital.

When they were recognized as Katipuneros by a municipal councilor, Guillermo Huerta, the latter immediately went to the town and informed the municipal president Francisco Villajuan Sr., that the arrivals carried guns and other arms. The municipal president lost no time meeting the arrivals. These soldiers, from the time they left Palanan to carry an important order of the President of the Philippine Republic, had often missed meals, were all tired, and it was believed they would all die in the forest. And on a plain called Tuntunin, a few miles from Baler, they had encountered some American soldiers coming from the latter place. In their retreat, Cecilio Segismundo and some others, were cut off from the rest. Those who showed up before Villajuan were Ambrosio Sanz, of Caranglan; Pedro de Ocampo, Ciriaco Reyes, Julian Baltazar, Pedro Marcelo, Alvaro Mariano, and Angel Iniwan, all from Pantabangan. When the municipal president told the group that they would not be harmed if they would see Lt. James Davis Taylor of 24th Infantry of the American army stationed in Pantabangan, Pedro de Ocampo immediately surrendered his gun and some rounds of ammunition. The next day, Cecilio Segismundo, together with Pedro de Ocampo and Candido Uraga, also voluntarily appeared before the lieutenant. The valuable bundle of letters addressed to Generals Baldomero Aguinaldo, Jose Alejandrino, Urbano Lakuna, Pablo Tekson, and Teodoro Sandiko, and other defenders of the mother country, was given by Cecilio Segismundo to the lieutenant. Some of the letters were not so important, as they were from some officers and soldiers of Aguinaldo and addressed to their families and friends.

An envelope with the name of General Urbano Lakuna was opened by Lt. Taylor in the presence of Segismundo. As the lieutenant could not understand its contents because it was written in Tagalog he asked Municipal President Villajuan to translate the letter into Spanish. After Villajuan had translated the letter, Segismundo added, "It's true, sir."

In the letter, President Aguinaldo informed General Lakuna that his headquarters in Palanan was most secured and amply provided and that it would not fall easily to an enemy invasion, so that he ordered that all revolutionists should gather in Palanan. President Aguinaldo also invited them to his birthday celebration on March 22, 1901.

The same day, Lt. Taylor sent a rush wire to General Funston, informing him of the appearance and voluntary surrender of Cecilio Segismundo, and of the valuable letters which had fallen into his (Taylor's) hands. Funston replied that Segismundo be brought immediately to San Isidro, together with the letters. Lt. Taylor secretly ordered Municipal President Francisco Villajuan Sr. to have Segismundo closely guarded, but not to make it so evident so as not to scare him. A policeman was ordered to sleep with Segismundo in a house owned by Ciriaco Reyes. At midnight, Taylor called for Segismundo and brought him, with some soldiers, to Bongabong. From Bongabong, Segismundo was to be brought to San Isidro. In Bongabong, Lt. Taylor remained and then returned to Pantabangan.

Cecilio Segismundo was a native of the Ilocos and was not a true revolutionary soldier. The only reason he joined the revolutionary army was because he suffered much from the cruel "Iloko Volunteers." When the contingent of Major Nazario Alhambra passed by Dupax, Segismundo decided to go with it to Palanan. When President Aguinaldo saw that Segismundo was brave and loyal to his officers, the President came to trust him and named him courier or messenger to the various revolutionary officers in the field.

REVELATIONS OF SEGISMUNDO TO GENERAL FUNSTON. AGUINALDO, COL. VILLA AND DR. BARCELONA IN PALANAN, DISTRICT OF PRINCIPE

Cecilio Segismundo, escorted by a small contingent of American soldiers, arrived in San Isidro.

After resting for a few hours, Segismundo revealed to General Funston that the President of the Philippine Republic was in Palanan, a small town in Isabela nine kilometers from the coast. He also said that there was a contingent of Tagalog soldiers headed by the brave Major Nazario Alhambra, and that in the mountains surrounding the town was a small unit of the signal corps headed by Captain Pascual Velasco of the Tagalog army. Any attempt of the Americans, therefore, to trap Aguinaldo would be most difficult and doomed to failure, for the only trail from Cagayan leading to Palanan, or any other place, for that matter, was guarded closely by spies of the Philippine army. Besides, there was surveillance by the friendly Negritos and Ilongots who would immediately notify Palanan so that President Emilio Aguinaldo could flee immediately and hide in the mountains.

The letters surrendered by Cecilio Segismundo to Lt. Taylor came into the hands of General Funston and greatly aided in his plan to capture the commander-in-chief of the Filipino Army.

Some important letters gave the American officers difficulty as they were written in a code. Officers under General Funston tried to decipher the letters, without success; but due to the perseverance of the Spaniard Lazaro Segovia, the code was broken.[1] The President of the Philippine Republic was asking for 400 soldiers who were strong, select and all armed, to reinforce Palanan.[2] In addition, he ordered that General Baldomero Aguinaldo assume command all of the Central Luzon troops, because General Alejandrino was ill and could not carry out his duties in full.

Upon knowing through the letter that President Aguinaldo was awaiting a reinforcement of 400 soldiers to be sent either

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[1] Affirmed by General Funston in his *Memories of Two Wars,* (New York, 1911) p. 389.

[2] These troops were to be commanded by Col. Simeon A. Villa in a raid on Cagayan and Isabela.

by Baldomero Aguinaldo or Alejandrino or Lakuna, General Funston thought of organizing a group of Filipino or Macabebe soldiers who would pretend to be those of the Republic going to the aid of General Aguinaldo.

General Funston lost no time and he put his plan in writing and communicated it to Manila. Here is his letter:[3]

SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA
February 12, 1901

The ADJUTANT GENERAL
Department of East Luzon,
Manila, P.I.

SIR:

I have the honor to suggest the following plan for the capture of Aguinaldo, who, according to recent information, is in Palanan, province of Isabela.

Before I describe the plans, I call your attention to the translation of letters and others confiscated from Cecilio Segismundo, who carried the letters. Through these letters, Aguinaldo is asking for soldiers in the shortest time possible from Simon Tekson, Sandico and Baldomero Aguinaldo; Segismundo is a commander of one of the detachments. He also affirms that Aguinaldo has asked him to head the first troops asked for who would arrive in Palanan. For this reason, Aguinaldo is awaiting the soldiers he (Segismundo) would be bringing.

My plan is to bring a group of Macabebes to Manila, arm them with Mausers and Remingtons, disguise some of them in the uniforms of insurrectionists and the others in civilian clothes, get a gunboat and bring it at night to the eastern coast of Luzon, south of Casiguran. These soldiers would bring four or five officers, as if the latter were their prisoners, until the appropriate time. It will bring Natividad and other former insurrectionist officers, who will pose as officers of the contingent until the time when the truth will be revealed. We are going to sail to Casiguran and from here we will call the Municipal president (insurrectionist) so as to give us supplies. This person, who has been introduced by Segismundo, will be the one to send the letter signed by Natividad, and the letter will say that we are the reenforcements from Nueva Ecija, as he had ordered.

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[3] Page 123 of the Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901, — Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army.—in five parts.—Part 3.—Division of Insular Affairs, War Department."

I believe that we could decide him until we are in his presence, and the rest will be easy. Until that moment, the officers would appear as prisoners. Aguinaldo probably does not know yet that Natividad has surrendered, but still considers him in his service. Segismundo wishes to help to the utmost. All details can be worked out satisfactorily and plan ought to be successful, although undoubtedly great hardships will be encountered. This has got to be done before Aguinaldo learns that his courier had surrendered and given up the letters.

Should they carry out their orders well, it is necessary to pay handsomely the Tagalogs who will go as supposed officers. If this plan meets with your approval, may I be inform by wire, so that we could prepare?

Respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON
Brigadier General, U.S.V.

After a few days, General Funston was called to Manila and his valuable plan was approved by General Wheaton and the highest commander of the American army, General MacArthur. Funston was told that he would be provided with a boat to carry the men who were going with him on the trip, to carry out the capture of President Aguinaldo in Palanan.

The flamboyant general returned to San Isidro in great satisfaction. He immediately called to his headquarters Hilario Tal Placido, Gregorio Cadhit, Dionisio Bato, Cecilio Segismundo and the Spaniard Lazaro Segovia. General Funston invited them to go with him to Manila to arrest a man suspected to be involved in the revolution. The general also told them to leave their revolvers at the headquarters, as in Manila they would be given new and better guns.

These men possessed revolvers because some of them were loyal advisers of Funston and the others were employed in his headquarters. All of them had been threatened with being kidnaped[4] by some who were sympathetic to the holdouts, and the only reason they escaped with their lives was because they were escorted by American soldiers every time they ventured out of the town.

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[4] At that time there were many who were kidnaped by the "outsiders" on suspicion they were spies of the American government.

In Nueva Ecija there were many who were killed by "those on the outside," on suspicion that they were enemy spies. At that time there was no peace yet between Americans and Filipinos, and no Filipino who was friendly to the Americans could walk alone, either in town or out, because the "outsiders" hated greatly those suspected of being traitors to the mother land.

Once my father, Atanasio Abad, received a letter from an "outsider." The letter said my father was awaited between the towns of Aluwa and San Isidro. At dawn my father, who had not done anything to incur the ire of his compatriots, went outside the town with only myself for a companion. I was a small boy then. We found under a tree the "outsider" who had sent the letter to my father. He was alone. If he had companions, they were probably hiding behind the cogon bushes beyond. The man right away said that he had heard that my father was a spy of the American authorities. He also said efforts would be made to kidnap and kill the Spaniard Segovia, Gregorio Cadhit, Hilario Tal Placido, Dionisio Bato and others suspected of real collaboration with the enemy. After a few minutes, he let us go but warned that he and his companions would not stop pursuing those who would betray the mother land.

When my father and I were on our way home, we learned that the man who talked to us was one of the officers of General Lakuna, on reconnoisance around the town to find the whereabouts of the men named above.

PRISONERS-OF-WAR CONFINED IN SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA

Although the American officers tried to keep secret the plan to capture President Aguinaldo, the information somehow leaked out. Among the prisoners of war in San Isidro there were whisperings about the plot. When one of the unfortunate prisoners, who still did not want to swear allegiance and recognize the American flag, heard about the plot, he wrote a message on cigarette paper and had it sent to Palanan through one of his captains who was still at liberty. The message, originally in Spanish, reads:[5]

[5] Told by Crisanto de la Fuente to this author. Mr. De la Fuente is a lawyer residing in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.

My dear President:

I have definite information that Colonel Hilario Tal Placido and that officer Lazaro Segovia have met with the American army,[6] and there is a rumor, which is true, that these officers will go to your place, accompanied by soldiers.

CRISANTO DE LA FUENTE

The writer of this message, Crisanto de la Fuente, had been a major of a contingent of the Philippine army commanded by General Venancio Concepcion, and he was captured by the enemy in a battle somewhere between Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija.

Thinking that his first message might not reach the hands of the President of the Republic, Major de la Fuente wrote a second message, also on cigarette paper, as follows:

Colonel Villa:

According to reliable news, there are plans to capture Aguinaldo and his companions. Be on the alert!

CRISANTO DE LA FUENTE

Besides these two letters, there were others written by loyal prisoners-of-war in the prison in San Isidro, but none of those who had been asked to carry the messages reached Palanan, as all of eastern Nueva Ecija was well guarded by American soldiers.

A few days passed. Four Tagalogs and the Spaniards Lazaro Segovia boarded an ambulance wagon pulled by four big horses. The five men were trusted and obedient followers of General Funston.

They were escorted by a small group of cavalry men who went with them as far as Arayat.[7] From Arayat, other troops accompanied them to San Fernando. As they rested in a wooden house in San Fernando, Hilario Tal Placido was nervous and thought of nothing but escape, due to a rumor he had heard that he would be exiled to Guam and imprisoned for life.

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[6] Only Lazaro Segovia voluntarily surrendered to General Funston. Tal Placido was arrested in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.

[7] The reason for the American army escort was the danger on the road. General Lakuna's troops were waiting for the enemy.

Arriving in Manila, they stayed in the hotel "Cuatro Naciones" (Four Nations) in Intramuros. The Spaniard Segovia went his own way, probably to stay with a friend. They stayed three weeks in Manila, doing nothing except to eat and go to places of amusement. Their meals were paid for by General Funston, who also gave them plenty of money to spend as they amused themselves in Manila.

It should be known that except for Cecilio Segismundo and the Spaniard Lazaro Segovia,[8] none of them knew of the real plan of General Funston. Tal Placido, Cadhit and Bato were told they were to arrest a revolutionary officer in Manila. But after a long wait in the city, they themselves wondered why they were in Manila. Segismundo was a most discreet man, and although he knew that the trip to Manila was for the purpose of later going to Palanan to capture President Aguinaldo, he never revealed this to any one of his companions. Either Funston had warned him against revealing the nature of the mission or he (Segismundo) was ashamed of himself.

The aide of General Funston used to visit them in the hotel, but even this officer gave them no orders. He visited them merely to see how they were and to ask what they needed; beyond this, they could not discern any clue which would reveal to them what apparently was a secret.

Probably due to the delay in the arrival of the things they would need in their trip, the Tagalogs and Segovia were ordered to return to Pakturia or San Isidro, as if they had been brought to Manila merely to amuse themselves, like rich men from the province who spent much money in the city for pleasure.

ROMAN ROQUE'S FORGERY OF GENERAL URBANO LAKUNA'S SIGNATURE AND THE BOARDING OF THE SHIP "VICKSBURG" BY THE MACABEBES

General Funston, an intelligent, meticulous and secretive person, thought of having the signature of General Urbano Lakuna forged by his employe Roman Roque on two sheets of paper with the heading "Lakuna Brigade." Roque took several days

[8] According to Gregorio Cadhit and Hilario Tal Placido, Funston did not reveal to them their real destination.

to make a good imitation of the signature of the said officer of the Katipunan in Nueva Ecija. Roque was especially gifted with the ability to imitate any handwriting.[9]

Roman Roque was a former Philippine army officer but wishing to live a peaceful life or turn his back on the mother country, voluntarily surrendered to General Funston in San Isidro. Once his loyalty was proved, Roque was made clerk-interpreter in the office of General Funston. It is not known by this writer whether Roque had informed on the Katipuneros or betrayed some of his companions with whom he had shared the hardships of the field, but the truth is, Roque became a good subordinate of the said general.

The sheets with the heading "Lakuna Brigade" had been seized from a camp abandoned by Filipino soldiers after a bloody and fierce battle between American and Filipino troops sometime in October 1900. The Americans also captured Lakuna's seal and some letters of his, and it was Lakuna's signature in these letters which Roque used as model in the forgery. The sheets with the heading "Lakuna Brigade" were blank, and Roque forged the name Urbano Lakuna at the bottom of the sheets. Funston did not tell Roque what was going to be written above the signatures. Thus the loyal and obedient Roque was much surprised.

Everything prepared, General Funston went ahead to Manila to confer with Generals MacArthur and Wheaton.

February 1901 had just ended when a message arrived in San Isidro from General Funston. The men who were to accompany him to Palanan were called to Manila.

An incident painful to a young man occurred in connection with Funston's order. Dionisio Bato, one of those summoned to Manila, was being married in church when an ambulance wagon parked in the churchyard. The ceremony over, Dionisio was immediately put in the vehicle, without a chance to kiss the girl whom he had wooed for a long time. All he was able to tell her was: "Until my return . . ."

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[9] This man, a close friend of the father of this writer, confessed that he forged the signature of General Urbano Lakuna.

Their trip to Manila was similar to the first one; they were brought to the Four Nations Hotel in Intramuros. Funston saw them immediately and announced they were going to board a launch at the mouth of the Pasig river. Tal Placido and Cadhit were worried; they thought they were going to be exiled to Guam.

Next day, a group of Macabebes, without guns, joined them. A launch pulling a big casco brought them to the warship *Vicksburg,* which was moored in the middle of the bay and commanded by Captain E. B. Barry.

About to leave Manila, General Funston received from his superior the following message:

> Funston, this is a desperate undertaking. I fear that I shall never see you again.[10]

It was night on March 6, 1901 when the *Vicksburg* left the bay.

ON BOARD THE SHIP *VICKSBURG,* INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MACABEBES AND THE USE OF KATIPUNAN UNIFORMS.

The *Vicksburg* sailed on Philippine seas.

Eighty-one Macabebes, picked from a batallion of Philippine Scouts by their officer, Capt. R. T. Hazzard of the Cavalry Volunteers, were on the trip. The Macabebes were all well-built and could speak in Tagalog. Besides the brothers, Captain R. T. Hazzard and Lt. Hazzard, other officers were Lt. B. J. Mitchell and Captain Harry W. Newton of the 27th Infantry, Volunteer Corps. Captain Newton was taken along because he had been to Casiguran, where the *Vicskburg* was going to land.

These four Americans, besides General Funston himself, were to pretend to be prisoners of the Filipino troops. The Macabebes were to put on the uniforms of Tagalog soldiers and pose as revolutionists from Nueva Ecija. They were to be under Hilario Tal Placido, who would pretend to be a lieutenant-colonel of the Philippine army. Tal Placido had been a major and was probably known to Aguinaldo since Tal Placido was wounded while fighting with General Luna in the battle of Kalookan in

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[10] Frederick Funston, *Memories of Two Wars,* p. 398.

1899. He had been arrested by Capt. E. V. Smith in May 1900 in a house in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, together with his chief, General Pantaleon Garcia. Tal Placido had furnished Funston with information about this or that person. Funston came to trust him and thought he should head the Macabebes who would pose as revolutionary soldiers and allies of the defenders of the mother land. To assist Tal Placido in commanding the group, the Spaniard Lazaro Segovia was named, and was given the rank of captain. Segovia had been a sergeant of infantry and assigned for a long time in San Isidro; later he became a lieutenant of the Philippine army and an aide to General Mariano Llanera [11] of the Philippine army. However, when Segovia saw that the American army was going to defeat the Filipino soldiers, he surrendered to General Funston [12] in San Isidro in May 1900.

Besides Tal Placido and Segovia, Gregorio Cadhit was made first lieutenant and aide to Tal Placido. Cecilio Segismundo and Dionisio Bato were named second lieutenants.

Natividad, who was mentioned by Funston in his letter to the adjutant general as going with the expedition, was left behind in Nueva Ecija because, although he had surrendered to the American army, that fact was not known yet to Aguinaldo, who thought Natividad was still fighting in the field.

The Macabebes were armed with Mauser, Remington and Krag-Jorgensen rifles. As many of the Remingtons and Mausers were out of order and could not be fired, it took Gregorio Cadhit several days to repair the old and rusty guns. The supposed officers of the group were each given a revolver. The youngest, Gregorio Cadhit, was also given a signal gun.

Besides the guns, they were dressed in uniforms and hats commonly worn by revolutionists. Any one seeing them would conclude they were Filipino soldiers defending the country.

On the high seas, General Funston revealed to them their true mission: they were going to raid the camp of the President of the Philippine Republic and capture the Dictator.[13]

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[11] According to General Llanera in an interview with this writer. Segovia became his aide on request of the officer Torres Bugallon.

[12] Report of the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army, 1901, p. 124.

[13] The title of Dictator was usually used on President Aguinaldo, although this had been changed to "President of the Revolutionary Government" in accord-

Funston told them that after capturing President Aguinaldo they would received big rewards and all those who performed their duties well would be made officers of the Philippine Constabulary.[14] However, those who would betray their oath would receive severe punishment(?). They were advised that those who took an oath of allegiance to the American flag should be loyal to the very end. When Tal Placido and Gregorio Cadhit heard the American officer say that they were going to capture the President of the Philippine Republic, the two men became gloomy, as if they realized the curse that their former chief and former them for the coming betrayal of their former chief and former companion in the struggle for the independence of their country. Fear entered their hearts — fear of a bitter future for traitors, many of whom met ignominous death. But they could not disobey orders, so the two finally consented.

The Macabebes were asked next. The oldest sergeant in the group immediately answered, saying their loyalty should not be questioned as they were ready to fight until the end of their lives. This sergeant had grown old in the service of the Spanish army, earned many medals for his bravery in the Mindanao battles,[15] and upon the outbreak of Philippine-American hostilities had enlisted in the Scouts of the American army.

While the *Vicksburg* was sailing, the Macabebes practiced speaking in Tagalog. They were told that during the overland journey, if questioned, they were to answer that they were revolutionary soldiers from Nueva Ecija or troops of General Lakuna asked for by President Aguinaldo. They were also to say that one day in February, while they were crossing a forest in that province, they came upon ten Americans making maps; that in the skirmish, they killed two Americans, wounded three whom they sent to the American army stationed in Pantabangan; and captured five, the same ones they were now bringing to Palanan.

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ance with an order issued in Cavite on June 27, 1898.—Tipo-Litografia de Chofre y Comp. taon 1899."

[14] A Philippine Army was established, according to "Reports of the United States Philippine Commission.—Message from the President of the United States Year 1901,—Native troops and police, page 77."

[15] F. Funston, *Op. cit.*

Funston prohibited those Macabebes who could not speak in Tagalog from talking to any civilian, so as not to jeopardize their secret mission.

THE LETTER PREPARED FOR PRESIDENT AGUINALDO. ARRIVAL IN CASIGURAN BAY

When the *Vicksburg* reached the coast of Atimonan, Tayabas, General Funston's aide went ashore to look for big boats or cascos to be used in disembarking, for if the *Vicksburg* were to be sighted by people friendly to the Katipuneros off the coast of Casiguran, many would suspect the arrivals were troops of the American army. No suitable boat could be found in Atimonan, so they went to the island of Polillo, to the east of Infanta and in the Pacific Ocean. Here they found three boats of suitable size. The boats were towed by the *Vicksburg* and at midnight of March 13 they secretly entered Casiguran Bay. The lights on the ship were covered so no enemy would suspect and notice their movement.

During the voyage, the letters for President Aguinaldo had been prepared. General Funston wrote the rough drafts, Segovia carefully copied these on the sheets with the heading "Lakuna Brigade," over the signatures of General Lakuna which had been forged by Roman Roque in San Isidro.

One of the letters was dated Feb. 24, 1901, informing that he (Lakuna) had received the letter dated January 13 and 14, and expressing gratitude for President Aguinaldo's approval of his appointment as brigadier general. The second letter, dated Feb. 28, informed that he (Lakuna) had received the order of General Baldomero Aguinaldo, chief of the army in Central Luzon, to send a contingent of picked soldiers to President Aguinaldo. The letter mentioned the names of the officers who were coming: Lieutenant Colonel Hilario Tal Placido, highest officer of the contingent, although previously captured by the enemy, had escaped and had returned to battle on his (Lakuna's) order; the captain was the Spaniard Lazaro Segovia, and the lieutenants were Gregorio Cadhit and Dionisio Bato. Cadhit was the aide to the lieutenant colonel.

During the murky night, all the boats carried by the *Vicksburg* were lowered. After battling the big waves and the driving rain and braving many dangers, during which some of them nearly lost their lives, they reached the shore, soaked to the skin. They regrouped under a tree. No one had slept during the night and all were shivering.

After they had landed, the *Vicksburg,* so as not to be discovered by daylight, hurriedly sailed for Baler.

At 7 o'clock in the morning, they marched towards the town of Casiguran.

The food they carried was enough for only a day's march. The five fake prisoners were dressed in dark shirts, wore campaign hats and leggings, and carried across their shoulders thick woollen blankets. Inside their shirts, over their breasts, the American soldiers carried a small revolver each, which they carefully hid from the Filipino soldiers.

To avoid suspicion that they were enemies or so as not to arouse fear on the part of any one who would meet them in the forest, Gregorio Cadhit and Cecilio Segismundo, accompanied by four armed Macabebes, went ahead by banca. They carried a letter from Tal Placido to the municipal president of the town of Casiguran, announcing their arrival. When the people of Casiguran saw the advanced guard, even before disembarking, the people cheered in welcome and all of them shouted "Mga buto mo," ("Your bones!") a password supposed to mean "friends," but what was amusing was, as soon as the townspeople saw them all armed, the people ran away, in fear. Luckily they found the vice-president of Casiguran, who convinced the townspeople that they were friends. The people then quieted down.

As the municipal president of Casiguran was reportedly attending the fiesta in Palanan, Cadhit gave the letter to the vice-president, who believed that the awaited arrivals were revolutionists. He ordered the people to prepare food for them and also sent a man to meet the rest of the group of Tal Placido, which he thought were defenders of the mother land.

At 6 o'clock in the afternoon — of March 14, after a whole day's hike, the whole group headed by Tal Placido arrived. The

people enjoyed the sight of the five American prisoners; the soldiers who were guarding them made a show of strictness.

The Filipino soldiers were quartered in several unoccupied houses prepared by the vice-president. The five prisoners were locked up in a room, and provided with some guards. Macabebes who could not speak Tagalog were not allowed to roam the streets; they were strictly forbidden from speaking Capampangan.

Casiguran had a shortage of rice; the ordinary diet of the people consisted of ground corn, camote, dried carabao's meat, and fish caught in the nearby sea.

That night, they heard the news that Palanan would hold a big fiesta on March 22, to celebrate the birthday of the great President of the Philippine Republic. Word also passed around that General Manuel Tinio and Colonel Vicente J. Salazar had arrived in Palanan with 400 soldiers, all armed. Most of the Macabebes became nervous over this news, but they kept their nervousness to themselves. After a long while, however, they found out that the news was false and was made up by some pranksters, for the truth was, General Tinio was in northern Luzon or Ilocandia, in the thick of the fight against thousands of the enemy.

THE DELIVERY OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT AGUINALDO AND THE REPORT ON THE CAPTURE OF THE FIVE AMERICANS

Next morning, March 15, they sent a letter to the great President of the Philippine Republic. The letter, which was prepared by Gregorio Cadhit, the dashing young aide of the lieutenant colonel of the group, was signed by Hilario Tal Placido, their commanding officer.

The following is the rough draft of the letter sent to Palanan.[16]

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[16] This letter was given to the author by Gregorio Cadhit, one of Funston's companions in Palanan. Mr. Cadhit is at present municipal president of San Jose, Nueva Ecija.

CASIGURAN, *15 March 1901*

To the Honorable Emilio Aguinaldo,
President and General-in-Chief of the Filipino Army,
Palanan.

Great Sir:

In accordance with your letter to General Urbano Lakuna, and to Mayor-General Baldomero Aguinaldo which was brought by your representative, Cecilio Segismundo, a lieutenant of our army, I happily and respectfully inform your highness that we are here now in Casiguran, along with your said representative, some officers and about eighty soldiers, picked from the troops commanded by Mayor-General Baldomero Agui naldo and General Urbano Lakuna, together with five American prisoners, captured as follows: while we were passing over the mountain of Pantabangan, province of Nueva Ecija, we encountered ten American soldiers, one captain, two lieutenants, and seven soldiers, who were mapping the mountains; in the battle which followed the encounter with the American soldiers, we were able to repel their strength; two were killed, three were wounded (all enlisted men) whom we released and sent back to Pantabagan; and five who were able-bodied — three officers and two soldiers — are our prisoners and we have them with us.

I also wish to inform you that on the 17th of this month, we are going to resume our journey to your place; we are going to meet you and comply with your request so we could serve you and our country.

May God keep us for a long time.

Respectfully,

The Lt. Colonel:
HILARIO TAL PLACIDO

This letter and the other two prepared on board the *Vicksburg,* purportedly from Lakuna and written by the Spaniard Lazaro Segovia, were sent to President Aguinaldo through an Ilongot and two residents of Casiguran.

At 8 o'clock in the morning of March 17, they left Casiguran in order to reach Palanan quickly.

The patriotic vice-president and a few prominent people of Casiguran escorted them for a few kilometers out of the town. On this journey, they were not able to bring enough provisions, because the people of Casiguran depended mostly only on camote, ground corn and fish caught in the sea. In spite of this, had they stayed longer in Casiguran, the vice-president promised they

would be able to bring enough food to last them up to Palanan. However, they could not delay their trip because the warship *Vicksburg* was certain to show up in Palanan Bay to meet them as agreed upon after they had captured the President of the Philippine Republic.

The marchers encountered tremendous difficulties. They marched through thick forests, climbed steep cliffs, and negotiated muddy trails. A continuous heavy rain kept their clothes wet all the time.

They would start marching at dawn and at 10 o'clock in the morning would have their first meal.

On the trail, they found, hanging from a tree branch, the letter of March 15, but they could not determine the whereabouts of the three messengers they had dispatched. Fortunately, they met a Negrito whom they sent, after paying him well, to Palanan to carry the letter.

THEY NEARLY STARVED TO DEATH. THEY ASKED FOR FOOD IN PALANAN.

On March 22, a Friday, at six in the afternoon, the marchers reached a place called Dinudungan or Dibulo River, which had a trail leading to Palanan. They were hungry and dead tired. In the forest, they ate only snails, lichens and *pandan,* their provisions having been carried away by the Negritos in their escape. Treacherous carriers. It look as if the expedition was going to be starved by the wily mountain men.

At Dinudungan, they came across an old man reputed to be the chief of the Negritos and in charge of some huts. The old man showed a letter from Colonel Villa to Hilario Tal Placido, chief of the new arrivals. The letter was in answer to the one they sent to Palanan and dated March 15. According to Colonel Villa's letter, the Old Man (Aguinaldo) had received the letter informing him of the events of their journey, and President Aguinaldo had advised them to rest in Dinudungan until they receive new orders. This word from the revolutionary chiefs in Palanan caused great worry to the marchers, and they imagined for a moment the failure of their mission. They held a con-

ference. They could not keep calm, their hearts were assailed by doubt. They could not afford to stay for a few days in Dinudungan for most of the Macabebes were so tired and hungry they could hardly move. They needed food from Palanan.

It was decided to send a reply to Colonel Villa.

The reply [17] read:

DINUDUNGAN, *22 March 1901*

Hon. Colonel of the Chief of Staff
Mr. Simeon Villa,
Palanan.

Sir:

Referring to your letter that we received, advising us to rest and wait for new orders from the Old Man (Aguinaldo), I respectfully inform you that our soldiers are very weak from hunger, and in view of this, please send us food right away.

May God keep you for a long time.

The Lt. Coronel:
HILARIO TAL PLACIDO

Without hesitation and without reading its content, Tal Placido signed the letter.

The answer to this letter came the next day: early in the morning, a Saturday, March 23, much food came from Palanan, besides a letter from Colonel Villa ordering them to proceed to Palanan but to leave the prisoners at the Dibulo River, to be guarded by ten soldiers, and after a few days, to bring the prisoners to Isabela for release. This move of Villa's was in compliance with Aguinaldo's desire that no enemy should reach Palanan to be able to find out the size of the army defending the President of the Republic.

As the Macabebes were not friendly to the Katipuneros, the former did not heed the order from Palanan. At 8 in the morning, the Macabebes, headed by Tal Placido and Segovia, set out. The group was in two sections: the first under Cadhit and the second under Dionisio Bato. The five fake prisoners, purportedly guarded by ten picked Macabebes, followed a few hundred meters behind.

[17] This letter was given as a gift to the author by Gregorio Cadhit.

A few kilometers out of Palanan, they met 22 Katipunan soldiers from that town. All were smartly dressed and fully armed. These were to guard the five prisoners. Their big number was due to a desire to impress upon the Americans that in Palanan there were many troops amply provided with guns and bullets to fight until the last.

Sergeant Andres Reyes, who headed the 22 soldiers, carried a letter from Colonel Simeon Villa ordering the turn-over of the five prisoners in Dinudungan to this new contingent, so that the old guards might be able to enter Palanan with their companions, rest after the hardships of the trip, and enjoy the program being prepared in Palanan. The program was to consist of a *moro-moro* and the inauguration of the Red Cross.[18]

As the meeting of the two contingents was dangerous to their plot, Tal Placido's men distracted the revolutionary soldiers and told them to wait while they (Placido and his men) wrote a letter for the guards who were in Dinudungan. This gave the followers of Funston time to hold a secret meeting on what to do so that their enemy would not discover the plot.

Segovia wished to kidnap the small group from Palanan, but Tal Placido and Cadhit feared that if some of the Aguinaldo soldiers escaped, President Aguinaldo would leave Palanan or Aguinaldo's soldiers would wage battle until all the Macabebes were killed. Their minds were in turmoil, not knowing what to do. Finally, it was decided to send back some soldiers to Funston and advise him of the danger he would encounter. This

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[18] The Red Cross was organized to take care of the wounded in Palanan. At the program the following song was sung:

"In the east the sun has risen,
Side by side with three beautiful stars,
Special are these stars,
All shining brightly and richly.

"The rays of the sun number eight,
Made their way to the Philippines,
The chain, without much ado,
Was severed in Biak-na-Bato.

"Great flag born of the battle,
Homage to you is endless.
You and only you we are going to honor,
Oh, oh, Filipinas, our mother country."

(Who authored this?)

was done: secretly, a sergeant and a soldier were immediately dispatched.

Cadhit gave to the sergeant the following letter,[19] also signed by Tal Placido.

23 March 1901

Sergeant of Detachment
Dibulo.

Sir:

Upon your receipt of this letter, turn over the prisoners to the sergeant, who brings some troops, and you follow at once to Palanan to rest our tired bodies.

May God keep you for a long time.

The Lieutenant Colonel:
HILARIO TAL PLACIDO

Aguinaldo's soldiers proceeded to Dinudungan.

As stated before, Tal Placido had a letter supposedly from General Urbano Lakuna ordering Tal Placido to take with him some troops and giving other instructions. The letter follows:[20]

Commandant Tal Placido:

By virtue of a superior order received by the general commandant of Central Luzon, you are to march in the morning of tomorrow with the company of Captain Segovia, going north, making the trip through Baler, which is the safe route. You are to be guided by Cecilio Segismundo, who will conduct you to the place where our Honorable President is, and under whose orders you are to place yourselves. God grant you many years.

Bulac 26 February 1901.

The General Military Chief
of the Province
URBANO LAKUNA

THE LIGHTNING-LIKE EVENT IN PALANAN. PEOPLE RAN TO THE FOREST FOR FEAR OF THE ARRIVING MACABEBES.

The whole contingent under Tal Placido reached the Palanan River at three in the afternoon. They were delayed in crossing, because the small banca could accommodate only a few passengers

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[19] Gregorio Cadhit gave this as a gift to the writer. It was written in pencil.
[20] In Lazaro Segovia, *La Aventura de Palanan,* (Manila, 1902), p. 113.

at a time. The river was swollen and deep, about fifty feet across, and from the river's bank could be discerned the town to be raided.

At the river's landing, the arrivals were met by Captain Tomas Magsarile, nephew and representative of President Aguinaldo, as a sign of joy and welcome to the compatriots who had just arrived.

As they were negotiating the river, President Aguinaldo was at the window looking out at the river, and with binoculars was identifying each officer among the arrivals.

Major Alhambra, a brave officer of the revolution, now and then would pace the ground beneath the window, voicing his doubts about the soldiers then crossing the river. He asked the President for permission to order the presidential guard to fire a volley, to find out if the arrivals were enemies or friends. Not only did the President refuse but he almost got incensed over the suggestion of the major, in his belief that the arrivals, being brothers and allies, should not be harmed.

Aguinaldo was a very careful and calm man, although he was a hero who seemed to ignore death. More than once, his bravery had terrified the proud Spaniards; many thought he possessed an amulet or anting-anting on his body.

At last all the disguised Macabebes crossed the river and were able to enter the town without any mishap. They stopped at a short distance from the house of Aguinaldo; on one side, to the left, a guard of honor consisting of sixteen soldiers, most of them sick, were lined up. They had left their sick beds on order of the President that they welcome the arriving brothers.

It should be realized that in Palanan there were no able-bodied troops except those sent to Dinudungan to guard the five supposed American prisoners and twenty-five men attached to the signal corps under Captain Velasco, who had been guarding the mountain passes in the last few days and who were still away.

After the customary military courtesies, Lt. Col. Hilario Tal Placido and the Spanish Captain Lazaro Segovia very courteously entered the house of President Aguinaldo. The two lieutenants, Gregorio Cadhit and Dionisio Bato, were left outside with their

respective units, awaiting a signal or an order from Captain Segovia.

In the house, Tal Placido and Segovia found President Aguinaldo and some Katipunan officers seated around a writing table. Aguinaldo and his officers were happy over the arrival of the men they considered to be friends and allies. Each one was anxious to hear the story of the capture of the five Americans who were said to have been left in Dinudungan, guarded by a Filipino detachment, although the fact was, the five soldiers who composed the vanguard of President Aguinaldo outside the town had been captured and imprisoned by Tal Placido and his companions, before the latter entered the township of Palanan.

Captain Segovia said he had been an aide to General Llanera and had fought the Americans on several occasions. The President asked where they procured their guns and ammunition, and Segovia answered they had secretly procured the arms in Manila and other places in the Islands. It was evident that Segovia was the spokesman while Tal Placido simply affirmed all that Segovia said. Tal Placido seldom spoke and Funston had ordered him to keep as silent as possible.

After about fifteen minutes, President Aguinaldo advised that the two, as well as their troops. take a rest, in view of the hardships they had encountered on the march. Some of them could hardly walk. Segovia stood up, limping and scarcely able to lift his feet, whereupon Dr. Barcelona said Segovia's feet needed medical attention.

Segovia then went down in a hurry, not showing any sign of the treachery he was about to commit. On the street he met Francisco Vetus,[21] who asked who of the soldiers just arrived knew how to blow the bugle. Segovia ignored Vetus, and as he approached his soldiers, he shouted at the top of his voice:

"It's time, Macabebes..."

Almost simultaneously the guns fired... It was as if untamed lightning had befallen Palanan.

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[21] He was about fourteen years old then, and the son of one of the Three Martyrs of Nueva Ecija.

The townspeople were agog; young and old, men and women ran to the forest in fear . . . It looked like Judgement Day for the universe. There were shouts, cries . . . They did not know where to go . . .

Shots rang out everywhere . . . the bullets respected no one . . . the unfortunate ones fell.

Dr. Barcelona, who thought that the shots were fired in joy by the arrivals, looked out of the balcony and shouted.

"Don't waste bullets . . ."

But the firing continued, and even got worse.

President Aguinaldo, who also did not realize that the arrivals were enemies, ran to the balcony and ordered the stopping of the shots, which he thought were just a salute.

"Cease firing!" . . . shouted the President, "Cease firing!" . . .

But it did not cease. The new arrivals were like mad men. firing at anybody they could see. President Aguinaldo was amazed; he tapped Dr. Barcelona on the shoulder and in utter surprise said:

"Doctor, they are enemies! . . ."

Both withdrew from the balcony . . .

At that moment, the whole world appeared black to Aguinaldo; he never thought the arrivals were traitors. He grabbed a revolver, but when he was about to fire, Dr. Barcelona calmly stayed Aguinaldo's arm and almost tearfully said:

"Don't sacrifice your life, it's needed by our country."[22]

The two embraced . . . It seemed as if they were preparing themselves for death. To President Aguinaldo, it was the first time in his life that he felt such a fiery anger. His breast was almost rent by the resentment against the treacherous brothers.

Then they heard the crash of bullets through the house. The Macabebes saw that some of Aguinaldo's soldiers were jumping through a window in the rear, either to aid their comrades or to escape, so the Macabebes fired at the house, which they later surrounded and entered.

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[22] As written by General Emilio Aguinaldo and published in *The Independent*, (Manila, Sept. 29, 1917); See also Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, *Galeria de Filipinos Ilusters,* Vol. 1, p. 304.

President Aguinaldo's escape from death was like a miracle. It seemed as if bullets, too, sometimes respect the bodies of heroes.

Aguinaldo's troops stopped firing or ran away, and Tal Placido's contingent shouted:

"Long live the Macabebes!"

"Mabuhay!"

"Mabuhay!!!"

In front and behind Aguinaldo were cocked guns. And probably at that moment, he said to himself that the cost of his desire to obtain the freedom of his country was this: a most bitter treachery by his nameless countrymen.

A Macabebe grabbed Dr. Barcelona and ordered him to kneel. Barcelona refused and was about to be shot by the soldier when Cadhit approached and saved the life of the aged doctor.[23]

A few moments later, Segovia and Tal Placido[24] approached President Aguinaldo, their guns drawn, and the first announced, like a king:

"You are prisoners of the Americans."

Segovia then asked where the Republic's treasury was, which Dr. Barcelona quickly pointed at (at his feet).

The two brothers, Captain and Lieutenant Hazzards, went up and the captain asked:

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[23] To ascertain this, Basilio Aromin, counsel for the author, interviewed Dr. Santiago Barcelona on June 15, 1918, and Aromin reported: "After I told him my mission, I read him your letter, to get the information you desired. Barcelona shook his head and was trembling. He denied that Gregorio Cadhit saved him, and it was likewise not true that the Macabebe had tried to harm him. He was furious with Gregorio Cadhit, saying the latter was the one who ordered that our loyal troops be fired upon; that this was a big treachery as our troops were not ready for battle but were lined up as a guard of honore to welcome friendly troops. (Sgd.) BASILIO AROMIN. (Attorney, 131 A. Mabini, Manila).

[24] Hilario Tal Placido was asked by this author if he really pointed a gun at Aguinaldo. He denied this and in his letter said: "When Segovia and I entered the house of President Aguinaldo, it was Segovia who did the talking. Segovia went down and while I was talking with the Honorable President, we heard shots. It was Segovia who ordered the Macabebes to fire at the Katipuneros, not Cadhit nor myself. When the President asked me, 'What's that?' I answered, 'Macabebes, Sir.' And soon the Macabebes fired at the house. I lay on my stomach in the middle of the house . . ."

"Who of you is Aguinaldo?"

When the American recognized Aguinaldo, he respectfully added:

"Gentlemen, you are in the hands of General Funston."

Just then the general (Funston) appeared and said:

"Gentlemen, you are prisoners of the army of the United States."

"Yes, Sir, this is how Napoleon fell . . ." was the haughty reply of Dr. Barcelona who was still surrounded by the Macabebes.

In his great disappointment over their capture, President Aguinaldo boldly said that the treachery and betrayal was a despicable act and hardly could be considered a triumph of their enemy; Aguinaldo requested that they be released and allowed to rejoin the revolutionists and that both sides fight honorably and courageously, but the American officer refused and said that the United States wished the Philippines would return to peace and end the bloody war.

Two Macabebes were supporting the brave Colonel Villa, who was about to fall, and in such a bloody state that he was pitiful to look at. As he was brought before Funston, Villa was silent, as if the fire of hatred over the unspeakable treachery was still raging in his heart.

This noble hero, realizing that the presumed friends and allies were actually enemies, had rushed inside a room to get a revolver, but Segovia saw him and fired at him three times. Two of the shots hit him, and he lost consciousness.

So three heroes of the revolution fell into the hands of the general of the United States army: President Emilio Aguinaldo, Dr. Santiago Barcelona, and Col. Simeon A. Villa. Three souls of the race, like the three stars gracing the Philippine flag, whose brows darkened with sorrow when the flag of the revolution, which had waved for some time, was hauled down.

On the part of the revolutionists, two were killed. Those who, surprised by the unexpected foe, ran to the forest, managed to save their lives. They left behind eighteen guns and plenty

of ammunition, besides about ₱6,000 in gold and silver coins left in the convent where they were stationed.

Those killed were Valeriano Beile of Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, and Crispin Santiaguil, of Imus, Cavite. Their bodies were thrown into the river,[25] to be devoured by the crocodiles which abound there. Among the soldiers of Tal Placido, one was wounded, the shot, it was believed, being fired by the guard at the door of President Aguinaldo's residence. That guard fired and fought until his last breath. The Macabebes were not able to enter the President's residence at once precisely because of the fight put up by the guard, and it was only after the brave guard had been killed that Tal Placido's soldiers were able to enter the house. The name of this soldier was Valeriano Beile. According to Dionisio Bato, who felled him, Valeriano was extraordinarily brave and showed genuine heroism in his defense of President Aguinaldo of the Philippine Republic.

How many in these times can be as brave as Valeriano Beile?

A COUNTER-PLOT TO CAPTURE GENERAL FUNSTON AND HIS COMPANIONS

On the night of the same day, March 23, 1901, in the dark, the Macabebes erected fortifications around the house where the three heroes were imprisoned, for fear that the Katipuneros would return, attack them, and forcibly carry away President Aguinaldo.

On order of Funston, Cadhit fired his signal gun, to inform the officers of the ship *Vicksburg,* then in the bay, of the success of the mission. The shots from the signal gun were like tongues of flame piercing the dark and were of many colors.

The three prisoners were confined in a room, guarded by an American officer. A Macabebe, however, could go in and out of the room, to bring them food; it was this man who almost wrecked the success of General Funston. According to an account[26] kept by this author, this is what Colonel Simeon A. Villa says:

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[25] Dionisio Bato said he saw the bodies being thrown into the river.

[26] Written by Basilio Aromin, lawyer and representative of this author, based on an interview with Col. Simeon A. Villa, now called Dr. Villa, a specialist in eye diseases and residing at 134 P. Faura, Ermita.

But Funston and his four American companions also nearly suffered capture. One evening, the five Americans were inside a room and we three (Aguinaldo, Barcelona and myself) were in another. We were being served food by the Macabebe, and downstairs there were Macabebe guards. Very softly, President Aguinaldo talked to the Macabebe who was serving us, persuading him and his companions to change their minds and think of the future of their country; and that if they wished, the five Americans need not be killed but merely captured and imprisoned. Probably after reflection, the poor Macabebe — his heart touched — calmly answered that he was willing to carry out Aguinaldo's plan, but he had to convince the rest of his companions first. That night, we felt that the Macabebe did not sleep but was secretly trying to convince each one of his companions.

The next day, the Macabebe secretly told the President that he had convinced half of his companions, but requested that no action be taken until all or a majority of his companions had consented to take part in the counter-plot.

After about three days and when President Aguinaldo was about to order the Macabebes to capture and imprison the five Americans, the plot failed because the Macabebes were not united, and in the face of a feared disaster, those who had earlier consented, also withdrew.

The rest of the account of Attorney Basilio Aromin's interview with Colonel Villa follows:

Although President Aguinaldo's plan for the resistance of the Macabebes did not materialize, I asked Colonel Villa for the name of the Macabebe soldier who labored, in the face of great danger, to convince his companions to change their hearts, repent, and go to the defense of the revolutionary leaders then imprisoned — this is important, for it proves that no matter how bad the stories we hear about the Macabebes, not all of them were traitors to the native land, that they only needed a leader who was going to inspire and lead them — Colonel Villa could not give me his name, either due to forgetfulness or his failure to ask for such name.

After Palanan was taken, the ones who commanded the Macabebes were the brothers, Captain Hazzard and Lieutenant Hazzard. Hilario Tal Placido and Segovia, as well as Cadhit and Bato, were stripped of their authority to give orders to the troops; they appeared to have been merely invited to join the trip.

General Funston showed goodwill to his prisoners. To the Macabebes, he prohibited the picking up of any article left by the people who had fled the town.

WHO PLOTTED AGAINST AND BETRAYED PRESIDENT AGUINALDO?

At eight in the morning of the same month (March 25), under a clear sky, the whole contingent of General Funston left for the coast, with the three prisoners who were surrounded by many soldiers. They marched for several hours and sometimes lost their way to the coast.

A member of the musical band who was hit by a stray bullet when the Macabebes fired, was taken along; he was put in a banca rowed by two Macabebes, who were furnished passes by Colonel Villa so they would not be taken prisoners should they meet Katipuneros. Some of those who had carried provisions for the Macabebes pleaded they be taken also to Manila, for fear that the Katipuneros would suspect them for spies and harm them. But owing to an unexplained reason they were left behind.

They waited for the boats to be sent from the ship *Vicksburg*. Some of them gathered under a tree by the bank of a stream emptying into the sea. Gregorio Cadhit, a jolly bachelor who was fond of jokes, told a story without a beginning and an end. He said despite the beautiful conduct of Jesus towards his twelve apostles, one turned out to be a traitor, Judas, who plotted against and sold his Master. And . . .

"What?" Cecilio Segismundo interrupted, "is the point of your story?"

"Well . . . " Cadhit replied with a smile, "what I am relating has its parallel in the capture of the President of the Republic."

"What parallel?" Segismundo, who was seated on a big tree root, stood up."

"Well," Cadhit continued, "the twelve Apostles of Jesus were like us. Aguinaldo is the Christ and you are Judas!"

Segismundo was incensed and pulled out his revolver. Cadhit also pulled out his gun and faced the other. Were it not for the intervention of General Funston, blood would have flowed at that moment.

They themselves were annoyed to hear the name of Judas, the same Judas cursed by humanity and who met a most despicable death.

But, who really could be called Judas among them?

This author lodges no accusation against any one, for the events that happened were only the result of the obeying of ORDERS by a superior officer.

ALHAMBRA ATTEMPTED TO SNATCH PRESIDENT AGUINALDO

While Funston's party was waiting for the boats which would take them to the *Vicksburg,* outside the town the soldiers of Major Nazario Alhambra had gathered, joined by about five hundred civilians who wanted to attack the enemy believed to be still in Palanan.

Although his head wound was still fresh, the result of a bullet fired at him as he jumped from the house of President Aguinaldo, Alhambra was heading the planned attack. In his heart burned a fierce desire to snatch his loved President from the hands of the enemy. Alhambra was afraid that President Aguinaldo might be executed, for he had heard that the Macabebes were blood-thirsty and hated the President of the Philippine Republic.

Major Alhambra stood up in front of the throng and asked if they wanted to attack the town and snatch the President, and a majority shouted:

"Let's get the President . . ."

"Rescue him!"

"In that case," Alhambra said, "are you ready to die, to fight until the last moment?"

A loud shout of approval was heard from the throng.

Immediately they set out for the town, passing through cogon and talahib like mountain people running after wild beasts. Heading them was Alhambra, who seemed to possess an amulet and did not care for the shadow of death; his pants were rolled up to the knees and his feet were covered with mud.

As they marched, they frequently shouted:

"Long live the Philippines!..."

"Long live Major Alhambra!..."

"Long live!..."

Soon they were near the town. They divided into sections, then rushed to the station and the convent. But not a single Macabebe could be found. They rushed to the seashore, tracing the footprints of the enemy, their guns cocked in all directions... But their pursuit was too late: Funston's group were all aboard the *Vicksburg* by this time. The pursuers saw only thick smoke coming from the warship.

Alhambra suddendly felt tired; his eyes reddened; he shook his head and sat down on a tree root; he placed his right palm on his perspiration-soaked brow and slowly said:

"FORGIVENESS FOR THE TREACHEROUS COUNTRYMEN!"

The noisy conversation of the soldiers suddenly stopped and a silence, born of hurt and disappointment, reigned.

Before joining President Aguinaldo in Palanan, Alhambra had become a police lieutenant in Pantabangan, under the assumed name of Procopio Linsangan, posing as the younger brother of Serafin Linsangan, who was president of the town. He was able to escape when he asked Lt. Taylor for permission to go to Manila to buy some musical instruments. Several months passed before he surrendered.[27]

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[27] This is shown by the following letter:

Baler, Luzon, P.I.,
September 16*th*, 1901

To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that Nasario Alhambra. late a Major of the insurgent forces, surrendered to Captain G. A. Detachmendy, 22nd Infantry at Casiguran, Luzon, P.I., September 13th, 1901. With him surrendered two Captains, two Lieutenants and twenty eight men and these last turned in twenty eight (28) rifles. This is not to be considered in any respect a receipt for the said rifles and no payment will be made for them except to the individual soldiers who turned them in, when the money is available. The list of their names is on record at this post.

The five officers voluntarily took the oath of allegiance at the United States of America and were released.

Parker Hitt
2nd Lieutenant Infantry
Post Quartermaster.

THE SURPRISE CAUSED BY THE CAPTURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

The *Vicksburg* sailed at full speed, non-stop, along the eastern coast of Luzon. At dawn of March 28, the ship secretly entered Manila Bay. General Funston, with the three men captured in Palanan and four American army officers who served as guards, transferred to a motor launch. The launch entered the mouth of the Pasig River and proceeded to Malacañang Palace, the magnificent home of General MacArthur, commanding general of the United States army in the Philippines.

It was almost four o'clock when the rest of the party was allowed to land. At the same time, the sensational news spread in Manila that the President of the Philippine Republic had been captured and was being guarded by some American soldiers in Malacañang.

Numerous American officers went to Malacañang to see the great General Aguinaldo, who had suffered great pains and sleepless nights for a long time in defense of his RACE and his NATIVE LAND.

General Aguinaldo's family was given much freedom in visiting him at his chalet, which was just a few feet away from the palace.

Because of the capture of the President of the Philippine Republic, that great compatriot, Sixto Lopez, who had been residing for sometime in the United States and could not return to the Philippines, sent a cablegram to the Sublime Paralytic, Mabini, who was then exiled in the lonely island of Guam along with the revolutionary Generals Artemio Ricarte, Mariano Llanera, Pio del Pilar, Maximino Hizon, Francisco de los Santos; Colonel Alpio Tekson, Hermogenes Plata and other compatriots who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the enemy's government.

Lopez's cablegram reads:[28]

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[28] Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army.—Division of Insular Affairs, War Department, Part IV, p. 242.

BOSTON, MASS.
March 29, 1901

Mabini,
Care Military Governor, Guam

Aguinaldo captured. I telegraphed to him in order that he may solicit from the American authorities that he, together with you, be brought here to America. I desire that you recur to the American authority there.

SIXTO LOPEZ
Young's Hotel, Boston

On the first day of April, President Aguinaldo, realizing that if he did not enter into an understanding with the (American) government, thousands of Filipino prisoners would stay in jail indefinitely, signed an oath of allegiance in the presence of Military Governor MacArthur and Cayetano Arellano, as follows:

I, Emilio Aguinaldo, by this means reject help from all and from what is called the Philippine Revolutionary Government, and I recognize and accept the high authority of the United States of America; publicly swear loyalty and promise cooperation to this government; that I shall for all time be a loyal citizen of the Philippines, and that, either publicly or privately, I will not negotiate with or furnish news to the enemies of the United States; I will not induce, aid and contribute, and I voluntarily impose these duties upon myself without secrecy. So help me God.

After a few days, President Aguinaldo issued a proclamation to the Nation, in which he called on his brothers to lay down their arms and keep the peace, for the sake of the Mother Country. The proclamation was published in the English, Spanish and Tagalog newspapers.

The proclamation reads:

To the FILIPINO PEOPLE:

I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of the hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.

The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and

courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force — a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this manner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.

The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has clearly manifested its will.

So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.

By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago. as I now do without any reservations whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be thine!

Only when this proclamation reached Nueva Ecija did Colonel Teodoro Sandiko, then in a barrio in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, realize that the chief of the Philippine army had been betrayed, arrested, and had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The colonel, noted for his coolness, in the face of the sad event, felt as if the sky had fallen on him; nevertheless, he was not tempted to take revenge on those countrymen who betrayed the mother country. However, in his anger which he had to voice out, from his lips issued the following words:

ALL DEBTS, SOONER OR LATER, WOULD BE PAID FOR.

In the course of events, General Funston's companions in his Palanan exploits were amply rewarded. But after receiving their rewards *for their hardships*, they gambled in a house in Manila; in the end, the unfortunate Cecilio Segismundo lost all his money . . . and later he tearfully complained to an aide of General Funston that he was not only cheated but taunted by his companions, and called "Christ for Sale."

GENERAL FUNSTON

And since then, many days passed, a few years went by . . . The newspaper *Taliba* carried the following news report:

MAJOR GENERAL FUNSTON DIES

Washington, Feb. 20 (1917).) — Major General Frederick Funston, according to a dispatch received here from San Antonio is dead.

The dispatch did not state the cause of his death.

Major General Funston was born on November 9, 1865 in New Carhile, Ohio, and (at the time of his death) commanded the whole American army guarding the Mexican border.

He was very well known in the Philippines. It can be said that his rise to a high rank in the American army was due to his participation in the wars against Spain and the Philippines. He came to the Philippines as an infantry colonel and fought with his regiment in some battles in the Rio Grande of Pampanga against Filipino troops. Before coming to the Philippines, Funston was with the Cuban revolutionary army headed by Cuban Generals Garcia and Gomez. He was one of the officers of the artillery.

The dispatch carried by the same newspaper also said that the manner in which General Funston captured General Aguinaldo was ill received in the United States. For this reason, he was reverted to the reserve corps, and the only reason he was reactivated was the outbreak of the tension between the United States and Japan.

The Capture of Emilio Aguinaldo*

Frederick Funston

IT WAS THE 8TH DAY of February, 1901, and in the room that served as an office in the headquarters building at San Isidro, I was going over the morning's work with the adjutant-general of the district, Captain E. V. Smith, when there arrived a telegram that for the moment disturbed our equanimity — a brief message that was to have no small part in the making of the history of the Philippine insurrection. It was signed by Lieutenant J. D. Taylor, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding the company of that regiment that constituted the garrison of the town of Pantabangan, about sixty miles to the north-east, at the foot of the western slope of the massive mountain range that separates the great central plain of Luzon from the Pacific coast of the island, and was to the effect that a small band of insurgent soldiers had voluntarily presented themselves to him, and that the man in command had stated that he was the bearer of respatches from Emilio Aguinaldo to certain subordinates in central and southern Luzon. The letters addressed to Baldomero Aguinaldo, Alejandrino, Urbano Lacuna, Pablo Tecson, Simon Tecson, Teodoro Sandico, and other insurgent leaders were in cipher and so could not be read, and evidently signed fictitiously, though in a handwriting that seemed to resemble that of Aguinaldo.

For more than a year the exact whereabouts of the elusive chieftain of the insurgent Filipinos had been a mystery. Rumor located him in all sorts of impossible places, but those best qualified to judge thought that he was somewhere in the great valley of the Cagayan, in the northern part of the island, or in

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* Reprinted from Frederick Funston's *Memories of Two Wars* (New York, 1911), Chap. VII.

one of the extensive mountain ranges on either side of it. Probably few if any of those in high command among the insurgent forces knew where he was, as he was taking every precaution against treachery, or the disclosure of his hiding-place by the capture of correspondence, having gone so far as to forbid that the name of his temporary capital should be put on paper in any of the letters sent out by himself or staff. A few trusted men saw that letters to him reached their destination.

The period of guerrilla warfare that had succeeded the heavier fighting of the earlier days of the insurrection had now lasted more than a year and a half, and it must be confessed that from our standpoint the results had not been satisfactory. Scattered all over the Philippines we had more than seventy thousand troops, counting native auxiliaries, and these in detachments varying in size from a regiment to less than a company garrisoned every town of importance and many places that were mere villages. Through the country everywhere were the enemy's guerrilla bands, made up not only of the survivors of the forces that had fought us earlier in the war, but of men who had been recruited or conscripted since. We had almost worn outselves out chasing these marauders, and it was only occasionally by effecting a surprise or through some streak of good fortune that we were able to inflict any punishment on them, and such successes were only local and had little effect on general conditions. These guerillas persistently violated all the rules that are supposed to govern the conduct of civilized people engaged in war, while the fact that they passed rapidly from the status of peaceful non-combatants living in our garrisoned towns to that of men in arms against us made it especially difficult for us to deal with them. It was realized that Aguinaldo from his hiding-place, wherever it might be, exercised through their local chiefs a sort of general control over these guerrilla bands, and as he was insistent that the Filipinos should not accept American rule, and as he was still recognized as the head and front of the insurrection, many of us had long felt that the thing could not end until he was either out of the way or a prisoner in our hands.

Therefore it was but natural that the telegram from Lieutenant Taylor should have created no little excitement, though as I now recollect the circumstances I do not believe that it occurred to any one of us that we would be able to do more than transmit the information for what it might be worth to higher authority, the plan which afterward worked so successfully being evolved later. It was directed that the leader of the surrendered band, with the correspondence that he had given up, be sent to San Isidro with all possible speed. With an escort of soldiers he arrived in less than two days, and proved to be a very intelligent Ilocano, giving his name as Cecilio Segismundo. After being well fed he told me the story of his recent adventures. During this recital he looked me squarely in the eyes, answered all questions frankly and apparently without reserve, and seemed to be telling the truth and keeping back nothing. This conversation was carried on in Spanish, which the man spoke quite well.

According to his story he was one of the men attached to Aguinaldo's headquarters and had been with him many months, his principal duty being such errands as the one that he had now been sent out on, that is, carrying official mail between the insurgent chief and his subordinates. On the 14th of January, accompanied by a detachment of twelve armed men of Aguinaldo's escort, he had left with a package of letters to be delivered to Urbano Lacuna, the insurgent chief in Nueva Ecija province, who was to forward to their final destinations those that were not meant for him. After a terrible journey down the coast and through mountains he had in the vicinity of Baler encountered a small detachment of our troops out on a scouting expedition and had lost two of his men. It subsequently developed that this was a detachment of the company of the Twenty-second Infantry garrisoning the town of Baler, and was commanded by Lieutenant Parker Hitt. After this encounter Segismundo and his little band had made their way across the pass through the mountain range to the westward, and finally, twenty-six days after leaving Palanan, had reached the outskirts of the town of Pantabangan. Here, foot-weary and hungry, he communicated with the local *presidente*, or mayor, who had for-

merly acted in the same capacity for the insurgent government that he was now filling under American rule. Segismundo not unnaturally thought that this man, like practically all of the Filipinos who in those days took office under us, was a double dealer, but this one was true to his salt. He told Segismundo that he was in the service of the Americans, and strongly counseled him to present himself to the commander of the local garrison, give up the correspondence in his charge, and in fact attach himself to the chariot of progress and be an *Americanista.* I don't suppose the loyal *presidente* put it just that way, but that is what he meant. Segismundo was loath to take so radical a step, and with his band remained in hiding in the woods. It took much diplomacy on the part of Lieutenant Taylor, the *presidente* at first acting as go-between, to get him to surrender, but he finally did so. Lieutenant Taylor deserved the greatest credit for the excellent judgment he used in the whole matter. Of course, any attempt to capture the band would have spoiled everything, as the most of them would probably have escaped. Segismundo then went on to tell of conditions at Palanan. Aguinaldo, with several officers of his staff and an escort of about fifty uniformed and well-armed men, had been there for several months, and had been in constant communication with his various subordinates by means of messengers. The residents of the town and most of the soldiers of his escort were not aware of his identity. He passed as "Capitan Emilio," and by those who did not know him to be Aguinaldo was supposed to be merely a subordinate officer of the insurrection.

So far we had no evidence beyond the word of Segismundo that the man who had sent him on this long journey was really Aguinaldo, and it was not impossible that the man himself might be mistaken. Our attention was now given to the surrendered correspondence. All the letters were addressed to the persons for whom they were meant, but those not in cipher contained little of importance. What there was, however, tended to bear out Segismundo's story. All official communications were signed by what were evidently fictitious names. A number of personal letters from soldiers of Aguinaldo's escort to their friends and families helped us some, as two or three of them referred to

"Capitan Emilio," and one or two to the "Dictator," and stated that the writers were still with him. Not one of these referred in any way to the town of Palanan, so that we were entirely dependent on Segismundo's word so far as that place was concerned.

The cipher letters completely balked us for many hours. They seemed to be made up of a jumble of letters of the alphabet, making words in no particular language. Captain Smith, Lazaro Segovia, the versatile and courageous Spaniard who for nearly a year had done such excellent secret-service work for me, and I took off our coats and even other things, in fact, stripped for action, and with pencils and pads of paper seated ourselves around a table and racked our brains, while Patterson, our negro soldier cook, from time to time brought in copious libations of hot and strong coffee in order that we might be able to keep awake, for daylight became darkness, and dawn was at hand before the peerless Segovia, whose knowledge of both Spanish and Tagalog now stood us in such good stead, found the key word of the cipher, which was in the latter language, having done it by ransacking his brain for every word in that Malay dialect that he had ever heard of. Among us, we then slowly unwound the mess, and mess it was when there are taken into consideration the difficulties of reducing a cipher and of rendering it through two languages to get the letters in which it was written into English. When it was over, tired and sleepy as we were, we had left enough energy to be wildly enthusiastic over the result, for it was realized that there had been laid bare the plans of the one man who, for what seemed to be a long time, had been the head and front of the insurrection against the authority of the United States. Before we had finished it was nearly noon, and despite Patterson's administrations of hot coffee we were nearly done for. We had been without sleep or food for twenty hours. Some of the cipher letters were signed "Colon Magdalo" and others "Pastor," this apparently depending on to whom they were addressed, but from their context these communications could come only from one who was recognized as the leader of the insurrection, as they gave positive orders to officers of the highest military rank. But besides that I had

once heard that Aguinaldo had used "Colon Magdalo" as a *nom de plume.* The body of all of these letters had evidently been written by a secretary, but the handwriting of the signatures very much resembled several of Aguinaldo's that I had seen in captured correspondence.

Not one of the communications, either official or personal, intimated the name of the obscure town in which Aguinaldo had taken his refuge. Two, those to Lacuna and Baldomero Aguinaldo, stated that the trusted messenger knew the name of the town where he had his headquarters. The most important letter, and the one that was the final undoing of its writer, was to his cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, then in command of the insurgent bands operating in Cavite province just south of Manila.

This directed the person to whom it was addressed to proceed at once to the "Centre of Luzon," and, using this communication as authority, to supersede in command José Alejandrino, who evidently was not giving satisfaction to his chieftain. As soon as he had established himself in command, Baldomero was to direct his subordinates, that is, Lacuna, Mascardo, Simon, and Pablo Tecson, and possibly one or two others, to send him detachments of men until the aggregate should reach about four hundred.

These were to be made up of picked troops, and might be sent by whatever routes their respective commanders thought best. A letter to Lacuna contained nothing of importance, but was of interest for the reason that for more than a year the troops under my command had been trying to break up the guerilla bands that recognized him as chief.

After translating the letters we went to bed, but I had great difficulty in sleeping, as plans began to evolve themselves. About four o'clock I got up and sent for Segismundo. I thought the best way was to go at him boldly, now that he had apparently cast his lot with us, and told him that I was going to capture his chief and expected him to help in the operation. He had already told me that the trail leading eastward from the valley of the Cagayan was so carefully watched by outposts that any advance from that direction would be discovered days before it

could possibly reach Palanan. Some months before a company of our troops had, after a most trying march, entered Palanan from that direction, but Aguinaldo, his staff and escort, had leisurely retired to the mountains in the vicinity, taking with them all their archives and records, and compelling all the inhabitants to accompany them. As we learned afterward, this was a company of the Sixteenth Infantry, commanded by Captain Cochran. According to Segismundo, the trail along the coast to the south was so carefully watched by the Negritos and Ilongotes, primitive savages, that the same conditions existed. In reply to a question as to whether an expedition from the sea, landing at night on the beach about seven miles from Palanan, would have any chance of success, he stated that the presence of any vessel off the coast would to a certainty be reported, and that even if such an expedition succeeded in landing, it would be discovered before reaching Palanan. The prospects did not seem any too bright, and I went to bed to sleep it over. In the meantime I had taken into my confidence Captain Smith, Lieutenant Mitchell, my aide, and Segovia, and had discussed the matter with them. By morning I had thought out the general features of the plan which was eventually to succeed, and on asking Segismundo whether it was in his opinion practicable, he replied in the affirmative. There were now all sorts of details to work out, and in these matters I had much assistance from those who had been taken into my confidence. We knew exactly where Aguinaldo was, at the obscure and isolated village of Palanan, a few miles from the east coast of Luzon and very near the north end of the island. We know that he would be expecting reinforcements from the guerilla bands in central Luzon, he having sent orders to the effect. It was settled beyond the possibility of a doubt that no force the nature of which was known could get even within several days' march of him. So the only recourse was to work a stratagem, that is, to get to him under false colors. It would be so impossible to disguise our own troops that they were not even considered, and dependence would have to be placed on the Macabebes, those fine little fighters, taking their name from their home town, who had always been loyal to Spain and who had now transferred that loyalty to the United States. As it would be absolutely essential to have along some American officers to

direct matters and deal with such emergencies as might arise, they were to accompany the expedition as supposed prisoners who had been captured on the march, and were not to throw off that disguise until there was no longer necessity for concealment.

This plan was briefly outlined in writing and sent to the department commander, General Wheaton, who was stationed in Manila. This officer ordered me to Manila for immediate consultation, and approved the project, as also did the division commander, General MacArthur. The latter was to arrange with Admiral Remey, commanding the Asiatic Station, for a small naval vessel to transport the expedition to the east cosat of Luzon. After a few days in Manila I returned to San Isidro to complete the plans.

As mentioned in the last chapter,* when, during the preceding October, with a detachment of scouts and Troop A of the Fourth Cavalry, I had "jumped" Lacuna's camp, though that individual escaped we had found ourselves in possession of all his personal effects, besides much correspondence, records, and his official stationery. This last had been kept and now proved to be of the utmost value.

In order to pave the way for the bogus reinforcements, which were supposed to be those of Lacuna's command, it was considered essential to have them preceded by letters from that individual. In fact, had this not been done the expedition would without a particle of doubt have met a disastrous end. Aguinaldo himself afterward told me that it was the supposed letters from Lacuna that threw him entirely off his guard and caused him to welcome the supposed reinforcements. The stationery captured in Lacuna's camp had at the top of each sheet the words "Brigada Lacuna" — in English, Lacuna's Brigade — they having been put on with a rubber stamp. It would be necessary, if we were going to utilize supposed letters from Lacuna, to imitate his signature, which was without doubt known to Aguinaldo. In captured correspondence we found several examples to serve as models, and had at hand the man to do the work. Nearly a year

* Chap. VI of the author's *Memories of Two, Wars* — Ed.

before an insurgent officer by the name of Roman Roque had voluntarily presented himself to me, and since then had been employed at district headquarters as interpreter and clerk. He was an expert penman, and I set him to work practising on Lacuna's signature. I, of course, did not inform him as to the object of this work. The faithful Roque kept at it with such success that in a few days his work could not be distinguished from the original. After he had reached this degree of perfection, one of the bogus signatures was placed at the foot of each of two of the sheets of the stamped "Brigada Lacuna" writing-paper. The bodies of the two letters were not to be filled in until we were at sea.

It was now necessary to make up the personnel of the expedition. Captain Smith was exceedingly anxious to be taken along, but the nature of his duties was such that he could not be spared from San Isidro. I selected as one of the officers Captain Harry W. Newton, of the Thirty-fourth United States Volunteer Infantry, now a captain in the Coast Artillery Corps. Captain Newton had had some experience at sea, and, besides, while stationed at Baler about a year previously, had made a boat expedition from there to Casiguran, a town that we would necessarily have something to do with. Of course, I took along my efficient aide, Lieutenant Mitchell. Segovia and Segismundo would be very necessary, and in fact proved invaluable. But it would be necessary to have some Tagalogs, as Lacuna's force, from which this detachment was supposed to come, was made up entirely of men of that race. The selection of these men was a very delicate matter, as they would have it in their power to ruin us by disclosing our real character. As will be seen, they were absolutely faithful. But I would never again take such a risk, as I believe that we could have succeeded without them. None of them was informed as to what we were going to do, they merely being told I wanted them to accompany me on an expedition. One of the men was Hilario Tal Placido, who was to be the supposed chief of the expedition, he being personally known to Aguinaldo. He had been badly wounded in a fight with the Twentieth Kansas at Caloocan in 1899, had been captured with his chief, General Pantaleon Garcia, in the town of Jaen, by Captain Smith, in

May, 1900, and had been released after taking the oath of allegiance. He had on several occasions shown that he was friendly to the Americans by giving me information of value. The other two Tagalogs were young men, Dionisio Bato and Gregorio Cadhit, both former insurgent officers. The former had been captured and the latter had surrendered, both having voluntarily taken the oath of allegiance. All of us went to Manila ready to sail.

General Wheaton had selected as the main part of the expedition Company D of the First Battalion of Macabebe Scouts. This organization contained about one hundred men and had seen much service in the field. The two officers on duty with it were Captain R. T. Hazzard, of the Eleventh United States Volunteer Cavalry, and his brother Lieutenant O. P. M. Hazzard, of the same regiment, the latter now an officer of the regular army. A weeding out of the Macabebe company so that we would have in it only men who could speak Tagalog, and so pass themselves off as belonging to that race, and the leaving behind a few who it was thought might not be able to make the long march anticipated, brought the number actually embarked down to eighty-one. Of course, it was absolutely essential for them to discard everything in the way of their equipment as American soldiers, or any attempt to pass themselves off as insurgent troops would have been worse than futile. So before sailing we obtained a sufficient supply of the clothing of the country, the most of it being second-hand material, as it would not do for the men to look neat. Even if it had been thought advisable to do so, it was considered unnecessary to clothe the Macabebes in insurgent uniforms, as the time when the great body of insurgent troops wore uniforms had long gone by. There was also obtained from the Manila arsenal a sufficient number of Mauser and Remington rifles with the necessary quantity of cartridges, all of this being material that had been captured in the field. An insurgent company armed exclusively with Krags would indeed have been a most unusual sight. Admiral Remey had designated the gunboat *Vicksburg,* Commander E. B. Barry commanding, to carry the expedition, the object of which even he did not know. The clothing and arms that would enable the Macabebes to pass

off as insurgent troops were quietly placed on board at night. The greatest secrecy had been maintained, as, outside of Generals MacArthur and Wheaton, two or three officers of the district staff left behind at San Isidro, the officers who were to go on the expedition, Segovia and Segismundo, not a single man had been informed. I felt that it was incumbent on me to tell all to Mrs. Funston, who had accompanied me from San Isidro, and all through the long three weeks that we were absent from Manila the poor woman had to keep her council. During this time she was the guest of our old friends, Captain and Mrs. George P. Ahern.

At last everything was ready. No precaution had been omitted, and nothing was forgotten. On many occasions while in Manila I had been in consultation with Generals MacArthur and Wheaton, and when I made my last call on the former, just before sailing, he said: "Funston, this is a desperate undertaking. I fear that I shall never see you again." At the same interview he told me that some days before he had received from the War Department by cable an order to return me to the United States for muster-out of the service, but had cabled for and received permission to retain me for a short time for some special duty. Of course, as a volunteer officer, I was subject to muster-out at any time, but this, coming at the time that it did, filed my heart with bitterness, and nothing but a feeling of the loyalty that I owed to my division and department commanders made me willing to go on with the apparently thankless and all but hopeless task.

On the night of March 6 the *Vicksburg* slipped out of Manila Bay, and steered south in order to pass through the straits of San Bernardino.

There was no longer any occasion for secrecy and Commander Barry and the other officers of the vessel soon knew the object of the expedition that they were transporting. The next morning, having Segovia to assist me in order that everything would be well understood, I sent for Tal Placido, Bato, and Cadhit, the three ex-insurgent officers with us. and told them that we were going after their old chieftain, and that they would be expected to play their part, as they had all of them

without compulsion taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. If they were faithful they would be well rewarded, if not, there would be but one penalty and that would be inflicted, if it was the last thing done. They seemed thunderstruck but soon regained their composure, promised to do their part, and did it. They even showed no little interest and enthusiasm as we outlined to them the complicated plan which it was hoped might bring success. As they were to have important parts to play, it was necessary to confide in them fully and give them complete instructions as to what they were to do. Next came the Macabebes. No one who ever served with them would doubt their loyalty, even to the last extremity, but many of them were men of not a great deal of intelligence, and so they had to be instructed very carefully and thoroughly. This work was done mostly by Captain Hazzard, Lieutenant Hazzard, and Segovia. The little "Macs," as we called them, were quite enthusiastic over the whole proposition. Their first sergeant was Pedro Bustos, a little shrivelled old fellow who had spent his life since boyhood in the native regiments of the Spanish army, and had been decorated for gallantry in the wars with the Moros of Mindanao. He had not an atom of fear in his whole system, and when I asked him if they would stand by us until the end, he replied: "I cannot speak for the others, but I am a soldier of the United States." It was not necessary to make any further inquiries from him. Day after day the instruction of the Tagalogs and the Macabebes went on, and they were often tested to see how well they knew their parts. According to the elaborate yarn that they had been instructed in, they constituted one of the companies of Lacuna's force operating against the Americans in the province of Nueva Ecija. Some time in February they had started on the march to the northward. In the course of this they had crossed the mountains between Pantabangan and Baler, and on this part of their journey had encountered a party of ten American soldiers making maps of the country. They had succeeded in surprising these men, and after a brief fight had killed two and wounded three, all of whom they had left on the ground. The remaining five had surrendered, and they had brought them along as prisoners, as they could not detach men to take them back. They were drilled over and over again in the story of this fight and

march until all of them seemed to know it by heart. The Macabebes were further instructed that they must at once begin to communicate with each other in the Tagalog dialect, and not use their own under any circumstances until the job was finished. This would, of course, be absolutely necessary after we had landed and got into touch with people who were still insurgents, as they would know mighty well that there were no Macabebes on their side of the war. In the meantime every vestige of their equipment as American soldiers was taken from them and stored on the vessel, and they were rigged out in the lot of nondescript clothing obtained in Manila, and armed with the job lot of Mausers and Remingtons from the Manila arsenal. There were, however, ten Krag carbines, supposed to have been captured from the unfortunate mapmakers. In their new rig the Macabebes did not know whether to feel sheepish or to take a humorous view of the situation. When he saw them Hilario Tal Placido's fat sides shook with laughter, and he assured me that they would pass as real insurgents.

One of the things that Segismundo had impressed on me was that if any steamer approached the east coast of Luzon, even as far south of Palanan as a hundred miles, Aguinaldo would soon be informed of the fact by rumors, and would be on the lookout. For this reason it was determined to call at some port on the east coast of Luzon and obtain several large *bancas,* native sailing boats. We were to be loaded into these some thirty miles at sea and then cast adrift, the *Vicksburg* immediately getting out of the way, so that her smoke could not be seen from shore. We were to run in to the coast at night, land through the surf as best we could, and then begin the march northward. Even if the *bancas* should be seen they would not cause alarm. Accordingly, in a couple of days the *Vicksburg* called at the town of Atimonan, on the east coast of the province of Tayabas, and I sent Lieutenant Mitchel ashore with the necessary funds, but no *bancas* were to be had except a few that were too small for our purpose. So we sailed for the island of Polillo, and there were more successful, obtaining three that among them were large enough to hold all of us, each of them having two masts with the necessary sails. These boats were taken in tow of the *Vicksburg,* and on

the 12th of March, six days after leaving Manila, we headed to the northwest, bound for the mouth of Casiguran Bay. Two Macabebes were placed on each boat to steer them and to clear the towing lines in case they should become fouled. They had provisions and water for two days. The wind had been rising and soon began to blow a gale. The sea ran very high; the first of the two *bancas* was swamped, and went down, the two men on it crawling along the rope to the second. By four in the afternoon the sea had increased to such an extent that it was necessary to lower the ship's boats and rescue the six men, who were hanging on to the two remaining *bancas*. The *Vicksburg* was rolling and pitching fearfully, and it looked to the most of us like a hopeless job. But the gallant men of the navy went at it in fine style, and in two hours of gruelling and dangerous work had accomplished their task. Shortly after the rescue the last of the *bancas* went down, and the tow-ropes were cut. So that was one part of the game that did not work. It was now necessary for us to change our plans to the extent of landing in the ship's boats at night, trusting that before daylight the vessel would be far enough away from shore to prevent her being seen.

The time had now come when it was necessary to write the two bogus letters from Lacuna to Aguinaldo, these to be on the sheets of paper that bore at their head the stamp of the former and his imitated signature at the foot. I made out a rough draft of what I wanted said, but left the actual composition and writing to Segovia, as his knowledge of Spanish was much more comprehensive than my own. One of them was dated February 24, 1901, at Bulac, a locality in the mountains of eastern Nueva Ecija, and acknowledged receipt of Aguinaldo's two letters of January 13 and 14, and at the same time thanked him for his confirmation of his, Lacuna's, appointment as brigadier-general, made some time previously by Alejandrino. There was also some news as to how the campaign was progressing, and some "airy persiflage" about the things the writer was doing to the hated invader. The second letter, dated February 28, stated that the writer had received orders from Baldomero Aguinaldo, who had just assumed command of the "Centre of Luzon," to send one of

his best companies to report to the Dictator. It should be noticed that the first of these letters referred to the two communications received from Aguinaldo, giving their dates as well as making reference to their contents. The second was in the line of what Aguinaldo would expect as the natural result of his letter to his cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo. This latter letter said that the force was in command of Hilario Tal Placido, whom the Honorable Dictator doubtless recollected as one of his former officers. He had been some time previously compelled to take the oath of allegiance to the Americans, but on orders from Lacuna had returned to active service. (This was put in for fear that Aguinaldo might have heard that Tal Placido had taken the oath.) According to the same letter, the second in command was the gallant Spaniard, Lazaro Segovia, who had shown himself so much addicted to our cause. (Segovia chuckled as he wrote this.) The other two were Dionisio Bato and Gregorio Cadhit. And then there was some mere rubbish, just to fill in space down to the bogus signature. These letters were held until the opportunity should come to send them in advance of us.

Fortunately for us, the weather was thick and squally, and at one o'clock on the morning of the 14th, the *Vicksburg* having very carefully approached the coast, with all her lights screened, we were landed in the ship's boats. We were inside the entrance to Casiguran Bay, and so fairly well protected, with the consequence that we had no surf work. The darkness was intense, however, and it was raining, so that we did not feel particularly comfortable or cheerful. It would have been impossible to carry out the plan of deception if we had landed with a supply of the food ordinarily used by American soldiers, so that we brought ashore one day's ration of rice. All of us Americans were dressed as private soldiers of our army, that is, in campaign hats, blue shirts, khaki breeches, and leggings. As I looked our crowd over the next morning I thought that we were a pretty scrubby-looking lot of privates. There is a lot in clothes, after all. In going ashore one of the Macabebes accidentally cut himself so badly with his bolo that we had to send him back to the ship, and another got "cold feet," and hid himself in the hammock nettings. It is a safe guess that life was a burden to him after his exultant

comrades returned to their native village. So it happened that eighty-nine of us, counting Filipinos and white men, landed on that dreary coast. I do not recall that we had any particular emotions or sensations, as we were too busy trying to make ourselves comfortable. All realized the hazardous nature of the undertaking, and without any agreement having been entered into on the subject, it was thoroughly understood that we would never be taken alive. Loyalty to our Macabebe comrades, who could not expect quarter, marked but one course for any men who made even a pretence at being soldiers.

The several hours until dawn were passed in simply sitting about and trying to keep out of the rain as much as we could. With the first daylight we made a short march in order to find fresh water. Here, with no little difficulty, fires were built, and some rice was boiled in vessels that we had brought along for the purpose. At seven o'clock we began the march. For a while it was not half bad, despite the fact that we had not had a wink of sleep during the night. Our progress was slow owing to the nature of the beach, for it should be understood that we were following the west side of Casiguran Bay, and there were no trails through the woods. We had landed at about the same point that a force coming across-country from Nueva Ecija would have struck the beach, and this was a part of the game.

Everything was now in our favor, as we felt positive that our landing had not been discovered. I very much doubt whether a straight line drawn from the point of our landing to the town of Casiguran would show the distance to be greater than ten miles; but we could pay no attention to straight lines, as some of them would lead through water up to our necks or over considerable ridges. In other words, we had to follow the sinuosities of the coast. We waded about a dozen streams, none of them over hip deep, but the greatest nuisance was the fact that during the greater part of the march it was high tide, which, owing to the fact that the mangrove bushes came down to the water's edge in dense masses, compelled us to wade pretty well out in the bay. Our salt-water wading during the day aggregated certainly five miles, and naturally added greatly to our fatigue and discomfort. About noon we discovered a small *banca*, cap-

able of holding half a dozen men, in the mouth of a small creek. It was very desirable to send word of our coming to Casiguran, not only that the inhabitants of the village might not be alarmed by the approach of an armed force, but that supplies might be collected for us. It must be remembered that this was a town that recognized no authority except that of the insurgent government, and no Americans had ever been in it except the few who had been with Captain Newton on his coast expedition from Baler in a futile attempt to rescue a Spanish friar, held prisoner by the insurgent officials. As soon as we discovered the *banca* we concocted another letter. This was addressed to the *presidente* of Casiguran, and was written by Segovia. This communication stated that the writer was in command of a body of insurgent troops belonging to the command of Lacuna and on their way north to report to the "Dictator." It was requested that the recipient would immediately send a guide to meet the column, and have all arrangements made for the housing and provisioning of the force. After the letter had been got up I invited my corpulent friend Hilario to sign it. This he did without batting an eyelash. I doubt if he ever read it. We sent this missive by Segismundo, he being accompanied by Cadhit and two armed Macabebes. The last-named men had their instructions as to what they were to do in case of treachery. But Segismundo and Cadhit seemed to enter into the spirit of the thing, and took a lot of satisfaction out of fooling their former compatriots. The four men sailed straight across the head of the bay, delivered the letter to the *vice-presidente*, the *presidente* being absent, and then became the guests of the village. Really, there were some ridiculous features about the whole business. In the meantime the little column had resumed its march. At four o'clock the guide sent out by the *vice-presidente* of Casiguran met us, and we knew that so far all was well, or he would not be "among those present." We had to make a considerable detour around the head of the bay, and then entered a forest along a fairly good trail. Naturally, there was much excitement in the little town of Casiguran, and crowds of people came to meet us. Of course, they thought that they were greeting some of their own victorious soldiers bringing in prisoners that they had captured. The village band was pressed into service,

and we entered the town in great style. We had had a hard time in impressing on the Macabebes the fact that as soon as we came in contact with insurgents they must treat us as real prisoners. This was a terribly hard thing for these men to do, as from their long service in the Spanish army, as well as the few years they had spent in our service, they regarded a commissioned officer as a being almost sacred. By considerable cussing on the part of the officers of the company as well as by Segovia it was finally drilled into them that they were to obey orders regardless of their personal feelings. Among those who met us as we entered the town was the badly fooled *vice-presidente.* He was a man of good appearance and address, and seemed somewhat solicitous regarding the welfare and comfort of the supposed American prisoners. I am glad to be able to state that the general attitude of the people of the town toward us was not hostile. Of course, we were a great show, being the first Americans they had ever seen, for all of them had fled when Newton's boat expedition reached the town during the previous year. They crowded around us, and there were some black looks, and some remarks not of a complimentary nature, but in general there was nothing in their conduct to criticise. Finally, we entered the plaza, the local band exuding some lively, if not very inspiring, music. The whole situation was so ludicrous that it was with difficulty we could keep from laughing, despite the peril of our position. The *vice-presidente* had directed that a number of buildings be vacated in order that the recently arrived patriots and their prisoners might be properly sheltered. I had impressed it on Segovia that it would be necessary for him and me to be so situated that we could communicate without difficulty, and he accordingly informed the *vice-presidente* that, as he was personally responsible for the safe-keeping of the prisoners, he wished to be near them. This was arranged without difficulty. We were confined in a room in the municipal building, our guards being our own Macabebes, while Segovia, Segismundo, and the Tagalog officers were accommodated in a room across the hallway. In the meantime, Segovia and Tal Placido had been talking with the *vice-presidente.* This official informed them that the march to Palanan would have to be made under great difficulties unless we could wait several days until he could collect

a sufficient quantity of cracked corn to furnish us with food for the journey. We now learned to our surprise that rice is not raised to any extent in the vicinity of Palanan, but that the people subsisted almost entirely on cracked corn, fresh fish, and sweet-potatoes. For reasons that will occur to any person of reasonable intelligence, the last two named were out of the question for a long journey. The *vice-presidente* thought that in four or five days he might be able to collect enough corn to see us through the nearly a hundred miles of uninhabited wilderness that still lay between us and our goal. But it had already been arranged with Commander Barry of the *Vicksburg* that he was to reach Palanan Bay on the 25th and, if he did not find us awaiting him on the beach, land a force and march to the town to ascertain if possible what had become of us.

We Americans were lying on the hard floor, talking in low tones as to the possible outcome of the adventure that we were now now hopelessly committed of the adventure that we were now hopelessly committed to, when Segovia sneaked in, lay down by my side, and, speaking Spanish in whispers, made me acquainted with the situation. There was one comforting thing, and that was that our disguise was evidently perfect, as nobody seemed to suspect our real character. As to the question of food, we discussed the matter among ourselves, and it was unanimously agreed to push on after a stay of two days, trusting that our luck would not desert us.

In the meantime the Macabebes were being entertained by the people of the town. It can scarcely be imagined what uneasiness we felt lest one of them should have his tongue lossened by some of the *bino* that was being passed around, and ruin everything. But they simply filled up the yokels of Casiguran with wonderful yarns of their service under Lacuna in faraway Nueva Ecija, with the story of their great march across the mountains, the capture of the American soldiers now in their hands, and, in fact, most anything that would make the people proud to associate with them. The next day, the 15th, was spent in our prison, resting as well as the hard boards that we were lying on would permit. One most disquieting piece of news,

fortunately false, that we received here was to the effect that the well-known insurgent general, Tinio, had joined Aguinaldo with four hundred well-armed men. The story did not seem at all improbable, and we did not know that there was nothing to it until we were within eight miles of our goal. The Macabebes, who also heard the story from their Casiguran friends, who thought they were telling them something pleasant, were badly worried, as it looked as if we would be outnumbered five to one; but we succeeded in convincing them that by means of a surprise we could win. Everybody in Casiguran and the surrounding country came to see us, among them being some of the Ilongotes, the most treacherous and cruel of all the head-hunting savages of Luzon. The Macabebes, supposed to be rigidly guarding us, laid it on pretty thick in telling how they had captured us. Once I saw a sergeant, whose eye I had caught, start laugh, but he got a look and a shake of the head that brought him to his senses. It would be essential, in order that Aguinaldo and those with him might not be alarmed at the approach to Palanan of an armed body, to send word to him in advance. So Segovia and I concocted another letter, supposed to come from Tal Placido, stating that the writer, in accordance with orders from his chief, Lacuna, was on his way to join him with a company of troops under the command of Captain Lazaro Segovia; in crossing the mountains he had surprised a small detachment of American soldiers, had killed two, wounded three, and was bringing five prisoners, as he could not detach men to send them back. As the main body of the two bogus letters from Lacuna were in the handwriting of Segovia, we had Tal Placido copy as well as sign this missive. In the meantime, the *vice-presidente* obtained two of his townsmen and an Ilongote to carry this letter and the two supposed ones from Lacuna. They started on the morning of the 16th and beat us to Palanan by two days. The second day of our captivity passed without especial incident. The guileless *vice-presidente* had all of this time been working like a beaver to hustle enough cracked corn to at least start us on our journey, and succeeded in obtaining about four hundred pounds, which might be considered a rather short four days' ration for our force. There was also a small quantity of dried carabao meat and half a dozen live chickens. Of course, these last would have

to be eaten very soon. Early on the morning of the 17th, a gloomy and rainy day, we started on the last and longest leg of our fateful journey. We were told that the march was usually made in a week, and that but one white man, a Spanish friar, a generation before, had accomplished it. In order to carry our food supplies and cooking pots, twelve men of the town were obtained, with an Ilongote to act as guide. The *vice-presidente* and a number of the principal men of the town accompanied us for a couple of miles, finally saying *adios* and *buen viaje* to all, including the "prisoners." I wonder what this simple and really good-hearted fellow thought when he found how he had been tricked. Of the numerous ones that we made fools of, he was the only one that I ever had the slightest qualms about. I hope he is gifted with a sense of humor. The first half-day lay along a muddy trail through the woods to the sea-beach. Here the rascally Ilongote deserted us, but one of the Casiguran men said he felt confident he could act as guide. The presence of these men made it necessary for us to keep up the deception on the march and in camp, as the slightest word might send one of them scurrying ahead to Palanan, and the poor Macabebes were under the necessity of continuing to converse in the Tagalog dialect.

From here our course generally followed the beach, though we were occasionally compelled to make detours over mountains because of cliffs coming down to the sea. The most of the beach was soft and deep sand, though we had two days over bowlders of every size from a watermelon to a freight car. I do not believe it necessary to go too much into the details of that horrible march, as it is not pleasant reading. The rain never ceased pouring, and from the morning we left Casiguran we were drenched to the skin for a week. We waded more than sixty streams, some of them mere brooks, but others so deep and swift that we had to put our hands on each other's shoulders and go in up to our armpits. The food, soaked through and through, became a soggy and fermenting mass. The usual programme was to start at daybreak and march until ten o'clock, then stop for breakfast, resuming the march about one o'clock, and keep it up until darkness, when we would have the second and last meal of the day, exactly

a duplicate of the first. From the start we went on half rations, and in a few days were ravenous with hunger. Of sleep we could get very little, as our bed was the bare ground, and we were exposed without shelter to the never-ending torrents of rain. Of course, the building and maintaining of fires for cooking was a matter that taxed to the utmost the ingenuity of our Macabebes, used as they are to taking care of themselves under all sorts of conditions. To eke out our food supply, a few small fish were caught in their hands by the Macabebes, and they scraped limpets from the rocks and gathered snails. All of these things, however, could not help out much with the now one hundred and one of us including the Casiguran men. The snails, limpets, and small fish were stewed up with the corn, and made a revolting mess. One funny thing happened, and gave us all a much-needed laugh. It was a pitch-dark night and the Macabebes had just set before us on this occasion a stewpot containing this delectable mixture. Mitchell, who was ravenously hungry, drew a fish about three inches long, and had downed it before he realized it had not been dressed. Then and there his gorge rose and he became violently "sea-sick." We laughed at him so much that his temper rose perceptibly. On the night of the fifth day out of Casiguran we lay down supperless. Segovia had developed a terrible abscess in one of his feet, but the plucky Spaniard never faltered. (When we finally got on board the *Vicksburg,* the surgeon opened up his foot and gave him relief.) All day of the 22nd we stumbled along in a half-dazed condition, marching the entire day without food. Our men were scattered for a mile along the beach, some of them so weak that they reeled as they walked. It was plain that the end was at hand, but we were approaching our destination. It seemed impossible that the madcap enterprise could succeed, and I began to have regrets that I had led all these men to such a finish, for it must be remembered that we still expected to have to fight Tinio with his four hundred men, and it did not now seem that there was any fight left in the outfit. Every mile during this afternoon we expected the crackle of rifle fire from some cliff.

About five o'clock we saw a man ahead of us along the beach, evidently watching us. The crisis was at hand, and Segovia went

to meet him, while we made some attempt to close up the column. We breathlessly watched Segovia and the man while they were talking, and saw the latter hand the former a letter. Segovia came limping back down the column, and as he passed us Americans said in Spanish, "It is all right. We have them." What a load it lifted off our minds! We were now within ten miles of our quarry. The letter, which Segovia opened and read at once and then passed to me, was from Simeon Villa, Aguinaldo's chief of staff, and was addressed to "Lieutenant-Colonel Hilario Tal Placido." Although it showed that our ruse was working and that our real identity was not even suspected, there was in it one thing that disturbed us greatly, this being an order that the five prisoners would not be brought into Palanan, as they might find out that the "Dictator" was there, but would be left under a guard of ten men at the place known as Dinudungan. Just think of living in a place with such a name as that! We had in some way to circumvent this plan, and succeeded, though it brought us nearer to disaster than any other thing connected with the expedition. We march two miles farther up the beach and reached Dinudungan, which was not a town but merely the name of a locality, it being the point where a trail from Palanan, eight miles distant, reaches the beach. Here we found an Old Tagalog in charge of a few Negritos just completing a couple of small grass-roofed open sheds, one of which was for the prisoners and the other for their guard. It was already dark, and again we lay down supperless to bed, if one could call the water-soaked ground by such a name. In whispers we discussed the situation, and before going to sleep had worked out our little scheme. But we had to have food, or the march of eight miles would be out of the question, so Hilario wrote a note to Villa reporting his arrival at Dinudungan, and stated that in the morning he would resume the march to Palanan, but that food was necessary, as his men were so weak from hunger that they could go no farther. The orders directing that the prisoners be left where he then was had been received, and would be complied with. This letter was sent to Palanan by one of the Negritos, and by daylight a sufficient quantity of cracked corn to give us all a fairly satisfactory meal had arrived. This incident was the basis of the charge afterward made and harped upon by certain

people in the United States, that being in a starving condition we had begged Aguinaldo for food, and then violated his hospitality by using the strength thus given us to capture him. We had simply fooled him into supplying us, as he thought he was rationing his own troops. Had we, disclosing our identity, asked for quarter, and that food be furnished us, and had then turned on him, the case would have been entirely different. I would be very much interested in seeing the results of a surgical operation performed on the skull of a man who cannot readily see the radical difference between the two propositions. I do not think that even "sweetbreads" would be found.

At last, morning came on the great day, nine days after we had landed from the *Vicksburg*, and we set to work to pull the wool over the eyes of the old Tagalog who had constructed the sheds, and who knew that the prisoners were to be left with him. It was taken for granted that if we boldly disobeyed the instructions he would light out to Palanan with the news. An attempt to seize him was considered too risky, as some of the Negritos might get away and give the alarm. So we again had recourse to the pen, which certainly is sometimes mightier than the sword. We picked out one of the most intelligent of the Macabebe corporals as the man who was to be left in charge of us with a guard of nine men, and gave him his instructions. A letter to him from Segovia was then prepared informing him that a messenger from Palanan had been met on the trail with a letter from the chief of staff revoking previous instructions relative to the prisoners, and directing that he immediately follow with them. At eight o'clock the main column left on the trail to Palanan, leaving us with our guard. In about an hour two of the Macabebes came running down the trail and very ostentatiously handed to the corporal a note, which he showed the old Tagalog, who was able to read it, it being in his dialect. The old fellow merely remarked that he did not see why they had put him to so much trouble if they did not intend to use the shelters. This disposed of him, and with our guard we set out along the trail, the two Macabebes who had brought the bogus letter accompanying us.

Fortunately, we now had with us only our own people, and were relieved from the trying necessity of watching every action for fear it would arouse suspicion in the minds of the Casiguran men, who were with the main body. The trail led in a northwesterly direction and was very muddy, as the sunlight seldom reached the ground in those dense and gloomy woods. Despite our breakfast, we were very weak, and were six hours in covering the eight miles. Of the Americans, Mitchell and I were in the worst shape, the Hazzards and Newton standing it better. I had to lie down flat on the ground every few hundred yards to get a rest of a moment or two. We crossed and recrossed many times by wading a small branch of the Palanan River. About halfway to the town we were disturbed by meeting a Macabebe sergeant and one of the privates coming back along the trail as rapidly as they could. The two men were out of breath, and simply motioned frantically to us to get off the trail and hide in the woods. This we did, and they joined us. The sergeant quickly explained that some real insurgent soldiers were on the way to Dinudungan to take charge of us, in order that all the men of our party might be able to come to Palanan. Soon we heard the men come splashing along laughing and talking. They passed within thirty feet of us, as we lay close to the ground, almost fearing to breathe. If they had met us in the trail or discovered us in our hiding place it would have all been off then and there, as they would have insisted on taking charge of us and conducting us back to Dinundungan. A fight would have been the result; the firing would have been heard in Palanan, and the least that could happen was that the quarry would escape. For we now knew, having been so informed by the old Tagalog at Dinundungan, that the story of Tinio having reached Palanan with four hundred men was a myth, the only troops there being about fifty men of Aguinaldo's escort. Anyhow, this was the closest call the expedition had, and it owed its salvation to the quick-witted Segovia. The main body that he was with had met the detachment in the trail, and upon inquiry had learned from the non-commissioned officer in charge his instructions. Detaining the man in conversation for a moment, he managed to step aside and whisper to one of the sergeants to hurry back down the trail and warn us.

We resumed our march, having had a fine scare. It was not desirable to catch up with the main body, as we correctly presumed that some officers might come out from Palanan to meet it, and see that the orders regarding the prisoners were not being carried out, so that we kept some distance behind it until we realized that we were approaching the town, and then hurried on as much as possible.

The main interest now centres in the adventures of the main column, the one by which the actual capture was made. About a mile outside the town it was met by a couple of insurgent officers, who escorted them the remainder of the distance. About three o'clock they approached the Palanan River, here about a hundred yards wide and quite deep, and saw the town on the other side. The only way to cross this stream was by means of a rather good-sized *banca*. Hilario and Segovia crossed with the load, leaving instructions for the men to follow as rapidly as they could form on the opposite bank, and then march up to Aguinaldo's house, where they would find him. The boat was to be sent back to await our arrival. Segovia and Hilario now had a most trying half-hour. They called on Aguinaldo at his headquarters, and found him surrounded by seven insurgent officers, all of them armed with revolvers. Outside, the fifty men of the escort, neatly uniformed and armed with Mausers, were drawn up to do the honors for the reinforcements that had made such a wonderful march to join them. Segovia and Hilario entertained those present with stories of the march from Lacuna's headquarters, and were warmly congratulated on having made it successfully. Segovia took his position where he could look out of one of the open windows and see when the time had arrived. Finally, the Macabebes under Dionisio Bato and Gregorio Cadhit marched up, Segovia stepped to the head of the stairway outside the house, for they were in the second story, and signalled to Gregorio, who called out, "Now is the time, Macabebes. Give it to them." The poor little "Macs" were in such a nervous state from their excitement over the strange drama that they were playing a part in that they were pretty badly rattled. They had loaded their pipes and were standing at "order arms," as were the men of the escort facing them on the other side of the little square. They fired a ragged

volley, killing two men of the escort and severely wounding the leader of Aguinaldo's band, who happened to be passing between the lines when fire was opened. Aguinaldo, hearing the firing, and thinking that the men of his escort had broken loose to celebrate the arrival of the reinforcements, stepped to the window, and called out, "Stop that foolishness. Don't waste your ammunition." Before he could turn around Hilario had grasped him about the waist and thrown him under a table, where he literally sat on him, and Hilario was a fat man. I had given the most positive orders to the effect that under no circumstances should Aguinaldo be killed, and that no lives should be taken unless it was absolutely necessary. But as Segovia dashed back into the room several of the officers started to draw their revolvers, and he opened fire on them, hitting Villa three times, who was tugging to get a Mauser automatic pistol out of its holster, and also wounding Major Alhambra. Villa surrendered, as did Santiago Barcelona, treasurer of the so-called republic. Alhambra and the other officers leaped from one of the windows into the river, the house standing on the bank, and escaped by swimming. As Hilario grasped Aguinaldo, he had said, "You are a prisoner of the Americans," so that the fallen "Dictator," as he now called himself, had some sort of a vague idea of what had happened to him.

In the meantime we Americans with our supposed guard had reached the river, jumped into the *banca* waiting for us, and had paddled across in frantic haste. Running up the bank toward the house, we were met by Segovia, who came running out, his face aglow with exultation and his clothing spattered with the blood of the men he had wounded. He called out in Spanish, "It is all right. We have him." We hastened into the house, and I introduced myself to Aguinaldo, telling him that we were officers of the American army, that the men with us were our troops, and not his, and that he was a prisoner of war. He was given assurance that he need fear no bad treatment. He said in a dazed sort of way, "Is this not some joke?" I assured him that it was not, though, as a matter of fact, it was a pretty bad one on him. While naturally agitated, his bearing was dignified, and in this moment of his fall there was nothing of the craven. He

is a man of many excellent qualities, far and away the best Filipino I ever was brought in contact with. It was well known that he was a man of humane instincts, and had done all he could to prevent the horrible atrocities committed by some of the guerrilla bands that now made up his forces; but under the circumstances his control over them was limited. The wounded Villa was more inclined to stand aloof, but we dressed his wounds, thereby mollifying him somewhat. Barcelona was as mild as could be. There was some difficulty in getting under control the wildly excited Macabebes. A lot of them insisted in throwing their arms about us.

Aguinaldo's escort in their flight had dropped eighteen rifles and about a thousand rounds of ammunition, and these we now gathered up. It was regrettable that two of these men had been killed, but there was no help for it. The escort had to be surprised and quickly scattered. If we had sent our cards to them, told them who we were, and invited them to retire, as some lady-like persons in the United States afterward insisted that we should have done, it would merely have exposed our own men to a volley from them, and it scarcely could have been less fatal than the one that they received from us. The lives of these two men were of small moment counted against those that would have been lost had the insurrection continued. Few men have died to better purpose.

We supposed prisoners now took command. Aguinaldo, Villa, and Barcelona were confined in a room in the house and made as comfortable as possible. We posted guards all about the building and searched it thoroughly, finding great quantities of the correspondence of the insurgent government, showing that Aguinaldo had all of the time been in touch with his subordinates, even with those in the far-away Visayan Islands. We recaptured the two bogus letters from Lacuna and the one from Hilario at Casiguran. We had now no further suffering from lack of food, as we found cracked corn, rice, sweet-potatoes, and chickens. The inhabitants of the town had fled to the last man, woman, and child, so that we merely helped ourselves. There was no destruction of property and we left the town in as good shape as we found it. Lieutenant Mitchell had a small camera, carried on the march for him by one of the Macabebes, and took some interest-

ing photographs. Aguinaldo, whose gameness and general bearing won our hearts, wrote and handed to me a brief note congratulating me on the outcome of the perilous expedition. In fact, the pleasantest relations were soon established between captors and captured.

We had made careful estimates of the distance marched each day, estimating at the rate of a mile and a half per hour, certainly conservative enough, and found that since landing from the *Vicksburg* we had covered one hundred and ten miles: twenty from the point of disembarkation to Casiguran; eighty-two from there to Dinundungan, and eight from the latter place to Palanan. It could not be less and might be ten or more miles farther.

The *Vicksburg* was not to be in Palanan Bay to take us on board until the 25th, so that we were compelled to wait over one day, but owing to our condition, this was a godsend. We spent the day in resting, sleeping, and eating. One of us American officers remained in the room with the prisoners all the time, day and night, this being at their request because of a wholesome fear of their hereditary enemies, the Macabebes. Early on the morning of the 25th we set out for the beach at Palanan Bay to meet the *Vicksburg,* the direction being northeast. The distance was two miles less than that over the trail to Dinundungan, being only six miles. But there was such a multiplicity of trails leading in all directions that we lost much time, as we had no guide, and none of the prisoners knew the way. Many of the Macabebes suffered severely from their bruised feet, and Segovia had a hard time of it. But all things end some time, and at noon we again saw the Pacific, and far out on it a wisp of smoke, the *Vicksburg* coming in. We had brought from Palanan a bed sheet to be used in signalling, and when the vessel was two miles out Captain Newton wig-wagged the message, "We have him. Send boats for all." Soon came the reply, "Well done." Finally she anchored and we could see the boats being lowered.

It will be remembered that in the firing at Palanan the leader of Aguinaldo's band had been badly wounded. It was considered only right to take him to Manila for treatment, and he had been brought down the Palanan River in a canoe by two of the Maca-

bebes, they being furnished with a pass by Villa in order to protect them in case they should fall in with insurgents. They arrived about this time, the place where he had reached the beach being not far from the mouth of the river. The surf was very ugly, but the boats came bucking through it, Commander Barry being in the first one. One of them was upset and we had great difficulty in getting into them, and were all drenched, but that was nothing. The greatest difficulty was with the wounded man.

As we rowed alongside the crew cheered time and again. We were soon on board and en route for Manila, sailing around the north end of the island. The prisoners were treated with the greatest courtesy, being entertained in the officers messes, and sitting about on deck whenever they desired. On the morning of the 28th we entered Manila Bay with all our lights screened, as it was desired to keep the return of the expedition secret. At six o'clock I left the *Vicksburg* in her steam-launch, being accompanied by Lieutenant Glennon, executive officer of the vessel, by Lieutenant Mitchell, and the three prisoners. We steamed into the mouth of the Pasig River and up through the city to the Malacañan Palace, the home of the division commander, where we all went ashore. General MacArthur was just rising, and come out in a wrapper to meet me. He shook hands, looked at me in a quizzical way, but did not ask a question. I said, "Well, I have brought you Don Emilio." The general could scarcely believe it, and asked, "Where is he?" I replied, "Right in this house." As soon as he could dress the general came out and greeted cordially all of the three. We all sat down to breakfast, but Aguinaldo was not very talkative, being apparently somewhat overcome. But the general put him at his ease finally, and told him that he would immediately send for his family, whom he had not seen for a long time. The general got off his official despatch, and then the news was made public. To say that the city was wild with excitement mildly expresses the condition. It was now the opinion that the war that had wasted the country for so long a time was at its end. In the meantime I had hurried to tell the news of my return to the poor woman who for three long weeks had waited in an agony of suspense. A few days later General MacArthur sent for me, and as I entered his office said,

with a very serious look on his face, "Well, Funston, they do not seem to have thought much in Washington of your performance. I am afraid you have got into trouble." At the same time he handed me a cablegram announcing my appointment as a brigadier-general in the regular army. The other officers, all of whom had splendidly done their parts, were also given commission in the regular army, while Segovia, Segismundo, the three Tagalogs and the Macabebes were given appropriate rewards in various sum of money.

The Story of My Capture *

Emilio Aguinaldo

PALANAN IS A LITTLE VILLAGE OF HOUSES built of bamboo and thatched with nipa, situated on the banks of the river which bears the same name, and some six miles distant from the seashore. It is in one of the most isolated places in the province of Isabela, in northern Luzon. There are no ways of communication with the outside world except rough trails or footpaths that lead over the mountains to the west, to Ilagan, or south to Casiguran, and its peaceful population of some twelve hundred souls has heard very little of the tide of war which for four years has desolated our country. Nevertheless when I first went there with my companions and our little band of followers, in the month of September, 1900, I was received with enthusiasm by these simple, hospitable people, and everything that they had was placed at my disposal. I was accompanied by Dr. Santiago Barcelona and Colonel Simeon Villa, my chief of staff. We had some seventeen soldiers, who had followed us in all our wanderings over the mountains and through the forests of northern Luzon. Barracks were furnished for these soldiers, and a house was set apart for the residence of myself and my companions.

We lived here quietly for several weeks, enjoying the few diversions in the way of amusement that the village could offer. There was a fairly capable band of music, and on Saturday and Sunday afternoons it was accustomed to give concerts in the plaza in front of my house, followed sometimes by a dance in the parish house, next to the church, for the young people of the village.

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* As related to Fred C. Fisher, former justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, and published in the Philippine Education Magazine, May, 1927, Vol. 23, No. 12, pp. 718-719, 741-743.

This continued until the 23rd of November, when we received word that a force of about fifty Americans was in the mountains not far off, apparently coming to Palanan. We hastily concealed all documents and papers and other things which might reveal our presence in the town, and then left the village and went into the mountains near by, where we remained in hiding until the Americans went away, two or three days later. Then we returned to the village and resumed our tranquil existence. Not long after this occurrence our forces were augmented by the arrival of some forty men sent me by command of Major Nasario Alhambra.

During all this time we received the Manila newspapers with more or less regularity, although they were always considerably delayed in reaching us. I had the amusing experience of reading on several occasions the reports of my own death, and subsequently a detailed account of an imaginary adventure in Cavite last December, in which I was said to have narrowly escaped being captured.

In January of this year Colonel Villa, who was growing tired of our peaceful and uneventful life, asked me to give him command of forces in the field, in any province of Luzon, and it was decided between us and Dr. Barcelona to make requisition on the commanding officer of our forces in central Luzon for a reenforcement of four hundred men. It was my intention to put these men under the command of Colonel Villa, and to confer upon him the command of the military district of the valley of the Cagayan, which included the three provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. At the same time it was decided to send orders to Brigadier-General Teodoro Sandiko, directing him to come to Palanan to relieve Colonel Villa as chief of staff.

Accordingly, with this in view, I sent, on the 15th of January, Private Cecilio Segismundo, a man thoroughly acquainted with the country in central Luzon, to deliver several letters addressed to the officers who were in command of our guerrilla forces in that territory. Among these letters was one addressed to General Sandiko, and another addressed to General Baldomero Aguinaldo, to whom I gave orders to assume command of our forces in central Luzon, and also to send two hundred men, under command

of Colonel Lazaro Makapagal, to the province of Isabela. Colonel Villa also gave the messenger, Segismundo, a pass, directed to the local presidents of the towns through which he might travel, ordering them to render him every assistance possible, and to supply him with whatever he might need. Segismundo left for Nueva Vizcaya under directions to go by way of the towns of Casiguran and Baler.

We had no news whatever from our messenger until the 20th of March, upon which date I received two sealed packages, which were delivered to me by a man from Casiguran, a town about fifty miles south of Palanan. These packages contained two letters, one from General Urbano Lakuna, and the other from Lieutenant-Colonel Hilario Tal Placido. General Lakuna said in his letter which was addressed to me, that, in accordance with my orders of the 12th of January, he was sending me one of his best guerrilla companies under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hilario Tal Placido and Captain Lazaro Segovia, both whom he recommended for immediate promotion in recognition of the valiant and very valuable services which they had rendered.

The letter of Tal Placido was dated in Casiguran on the 17th of March. In it he said that while on the march, near the town of Pantabangan, he had encountered a party of ten Americans engaged in making maps, and that in view of the inferiority of the enemy's force he had attacked them, and had succeeded in killing and wounding five of them, taking the other five prisoners. The dead and wounded he had left on the field, but the prisoners were own with his force. The letter went on to say that they had exhausted their supplies, and he thought it would be necessary to allow the men to rest a few days in Casiguran and forage for more provisions.

Immediately upon the receipt of this letter I directed Colonel Villa to reply to it, and to say that in view of the circumstances it would not be wise to permit these American prisoners to come into Palanan, for the reason that in the event that they were set free, or contrived to escape, they would be able to serve as guides to bring their countrymen down on us. It seemed better, therefore, and Colonel Tal Placido was so directed, that the prisoners should be left in a placed called Dinudungan, which is about

five miles from Palanan, under a guard of eleven soldiers commanded by a sergeant, who should be instructed to take the prisoners to Ilagan, the capital of the province of Isabela, under cover of the darkness. Once in Ilagan, they were to be liberated.

On the evening of the 22nd of March another communication was received from Colonel Tal Placido, in which he informed Colonel Villa of his arrival with his forces at a place called Dibacal, distant about six miles from Palanan. He also said that his men were completely worn out with the fatigue and hardships of the march, and that they had not had so much as a grain of rice to eat in the last twenty-four hours. He begged me to send him a supply of rice at once, so that he could continue the march early in the morning of the next day. In accordance with this request I sent him a quantity of rice that same evening by a party of Negritos.

There had been a celebration in Palanan that day, March 22nd, on account of the anniversary of my birth, and the little village was in gala dress. Arches had been erected, and such other decorations were provided as the limited resources of the place could supply. A number of people had made the fifty-mile journey from Casiguran to congratulate me on the occasion, and we celebrated the day with horse races, dancing, serenades, and amateur theatricals. The near approach of our reinforcements furnished an added incentive to the festivity of the day.

The next morning, March 23rd, at six o'clock, I ordered Colonel Villa to send eleven soldiers of my personal guard to Dinundungan to take charge of the American prisoners in place of the men detailed by Colonel Tal Placido, who were worn out by their hard march, so that they might have a chance to rest and recuperate. Colonel Villa also superintended the evacuation of one of the barracks occupied by my troops, so that it might be made ready for the reenforcements which were about to arrive. At the same time Colonel Villa sent a letter to the Military Chief of Isabela de Luzon, informing him that within a week a company of reinforcements for his province would be sent to him, and directing him to get together at his camp at Tierra Virgen as large a quantity of rice as possible.

It was my intention to allow Hilario Tal Placido and his men to rest in the camp in Palanan for a week, and then to send them to Isabela. The men were to be attached to the guerrilla forces already operating in that province, and Colonel Tal Placido was to assume the military chieftainship of the province, relieving the officer then in command, who was to go to the province of Nueva Vizcaya.

The morning of March 23rd was passed in making preparations for the formation of a Red Cross league among the ladies who had come up from Casiguran for my birthday. With this object Dr. Barcelona had sent them an invitation to come to my house at three o'clock in the afternoon.

About two in the afternoon I saw Tal Placido's men crossing the Palanan River in small boats, and at once directed Colonel Villa to send Captain Tomas Magsarile to salute the newcomers and welcome them in my name. Colonel Villa also arranged that the soldiers of my personal guard who were not on duty should fire the proper military salutes.

It was not long before the new troops, some eighty-five in number. entered the village of Palanan and halted in the plaza in front of my house, where about twenty soldiers of my guard were drawn up waiting to receive them. It was about three o'clock. The newcomers were dressed in the regular uniform of the Filipino army, and were armed with Mausers, Remingtons, and one or two Kraggs. The officers, Colonel Tal Placido, and Captain Segovia — the latter a Peninsular Spaniard — then came into my house. After the usual salutations I asked them what sort of a journey they had had. To this Segovia replied that it had been exceedingly hard, and that they had not had twenty-four hours' rest since the 24th of February, the date of their departure from Nueva Ecija. Segovia then told me that he had been at one time the adjutant of the Spanish General Llanera, and had seen me then but I have no recollection of having seen him before this occasion.

After talking with Tal Placido and Segovia for fifteen or twenty minutes, I gave orders that the newly arrived men be allowed to fall out and go to rest in the quarters which had been prepared for them. Captain Segovia immediately left the house

and returned to the place where his men were drawn up waiting for him. As he came up to them Segovia shouted, in a loud voice, an order which we did not hear distinctly and did not understand. Instantly his men began to shoot at the soldiers of my guard, taking them completely by surprise.

When the firing began, not suspecting any plan against myself, I thought it was a salute with blank cartridges, and having this in mind, I ran to the window and cried out several times, "Cease firing." But seeing that the firing continued, and that the bullets from the rifles of the attacking party were directed against me as well as against the soldiers of my guard, I for the first time realized that the newcomers were enemies. I hurriedly left the window and ran into another room in the hope of finding some means of escape, but saw at once that the house was already surrounded. Then I seized a revolver, intending to defend myself, but Dr. Barcelona threw both arms around me, crying out, "Don't sacrifice yourself. The country needs your life." Thus I was prevented from carrying out my intention. Colonel Villa ran from the house in an attempt to break through the lines of the enemy and rally our men, but he was shot three times and finally taken prisoner.

When the firing commenced, Tal Placido threw himself on the floor to avoid the bullets, but now he got up and told us that we were prisoners of the Americans, who, he said, were on the other side of the river with four hundred American soldiers, and would soon be here. Just at this time several of Tal Placido's soldiers came into the house shouting, "Hurrah for the Macabebes!" and surrounded Barcelona and myself. A little later five Americans, all armed with carbines, came into the room where we were. They came up to us, and one of them asked, "Which of you is Aguinaldo?" As soon as I had been identified by the Americans I was placed, with Dr. Barcelona and Colonel Villa, in one of the rooms of the house, and guards were posted at all the windows and doors under command of one of the Americans. The other four Americans there began to search the house for whatever papers and documents might be there.

We were then informed that our captors were General Funston, Captains Newton and Hazzard and Mitchell. While the

search for documents was going on, Dr. Barcelona took advantage of the opportunity to dress the wounds of Colonel Villa and the others who had been hit. Fortunately the wounds of the colonel was not serious.

It is difficult to give a detailed account of what occurred outside the house during the confusion which arose after the beginning of the attack. The soldiers of my guard were completely surprised, and did not even have their rifles loaded. One was killed and two others were wounded, the rest making their escape; but whether there were any wounded among those who got away or not I do not know. When the firing began, all the inhabitants of the village fled precipitately in the endeavor to escape; and when the attack was over, there was not a living soul in the place except General Funston's men and ourselves, the prisoners of war. A few scattering shots were fired by my men in their retreat, but to no effect. They had been taken so entirely by surprise that they had no chance to resist.

The next morning, March 24th, I had a conference with General Funston, in which I was told by him that on the next day there would arrive in the bay of Palanan a warship which would take us to Manila. In the course of the day he informed me of the plan which had resulted in our capture — a fate which I had believed would never befall me. It appears that my messenger, Private Segismundo, fell into the hands of General Funston, and the letters which he carried suggested to the general the plan which was subsequently carried out so brilliantly. The letter which I had received on the 20th, and which I supposed had come from General Lakuna, was a forgery executed with the greatest cleverness. It was complete in all its details even bearing the seal of Lakuna, and there never occurred to me the least suspicion of its authenticity. I had not the slightest doubt from that time up to the instant of the commencement of the attack which ended in my capture. It was a bold plan, executed with skill and cleverness in the face of difficulties which, to most men, would have seemed insurmountable.

THE *VICKSBURG* TAKES AGUINALDO AND THE OTHER PRISONERS OF WAR TO MANILA

On the morning of the 25th of March General Funston gave orders to begin the march to the seashore, and we three prisoners, with one of my men, who had been wounded, left the little town which had been our place of refuge for so long a time. We reached the beach about noon, after a march of some six miles, and without loss of time the Americans made two signal fires and hoisted a white flag. A little later I made out, with the aid of my binoculars, a steamer on the horizon. Having seen, no doubt, the smoke of the signal fires, the ship steamed directly for the place where we were waiting. Within two hours the warship was anchored near the beach, and General Funston communicated, by means of the heliograph, to the officers on board the brilliant result of his expedition. By five o'clock in the afternoon we were all on board the *Vicksburg,* the anchor was hoisted, and we made for the open sea, bound for Manila.

At all times since our capture, as well in Palanan as on board the *Vicksburg,* we have been treated with the highest consideration by our captors, as well as by all the other American officers with whom we have come in contact.

At two o'clock on the morning of March 28th the *Vicksburg* anchored in the bay of Manila. At six o'clock that same morning General Funston and myself, accompanied by some officers, boarded one of the launches of the gunboat and left the *Vicksburg.* We went up the Pasig River to the residence of the Governor-General in Malacañang, where we disembarked. A little later I was presented to General MacArthur as a prisoner of war.

Such was my return to Manila after an absence of more than four years.

AGUINALDO'S CAMP IN BIAK-NA-BATO

True Account of the Philippine Revolution*

Emilio Aguinaldo

TO THE CIVILIZED NATIONS, and especially to the great North American Republic, is dedicated this humble work, to the end that they may know the international events which have occurred and continue to occur in the Philippines from three years ago up to the present time, and to the end that they may know and be convinced of the justice that is with the Philippine cause. The author offers also herein his homage of respect and admiration to the wisdom and the power of other nations, whom he salutes in the name of the Philippine nation with a full heart.

THE AUTHOR

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* A translation of Aguinaldo's *Reseña Veridica de la Revolucion Filipina,* first published in Tarlac, September 23, 1899. Reprinted from the *Philippine Social Science Review,* Vol. XIII (May 1941), pp. 181-233, where it is preceded by a Foreword by Leandro H Fernandez, then head of the history department of the University of the Philippines and editor of said publication. The Foreword is reproduced below to give the reader the background not only of the present translation but also of the original document.

"The *Reseña Veridica de la Revolucion Filipina* (True Account of the Philippine Revolution) is a pamphlet of forty-five pages released on September 23, 1899, in Tarlac, then the capital of the Philippine Republic. Although it carries the name of Don Emilio Aguinaldo as author, some scholars have expressed disagreement as to authorship probably because according to Captain John R. M. Taylor, 'portions of the original manuscript . . . filed in the insurgent records are in the handwriting of Felipe Buencamino, and not in that of Aguinaldo.' It is possible that the work was prepared in Tagalog at the instance and under the direction of General Aguinaldo and translated into Spanish by Felipe Buencamino, Secretary of Foreign Relations, for as the latter said in a letter to Dr. Galicano Apacible in Hongkong on September 10, 1899, the *Reseña* was 'a work written solely by Don Emilio and translated by me.' At all events, it is quite likely that the pamphlet was not only translated into Spanish but also revised by Don Felipe Buencamino.

'A careful perusal of the *Reseña* reveals that it was a piece of propaganda. Whoever the author or authors were, the main objective was to create abroad, especially in the United States, sympathy for the Philippine Revolution, and to

I. THE REVOLUTION OF 1896

Spain ruled the Philippines for more than three and a half centuries, during which time abuses of the friars and of administration exhausted the patience of the natives, forcing them from the 26th to the 31st of August, 1896, to throw off so heavy a yoke and begin the revolution in the provinces of Manila and Cavite.

In those glorious days rose Balintawak, Santa Mesa, Kalookan, Kawit, Noveleta, and San Francisco de Malabon, proclaiming the independence of the Philippines. They were followed in five days by all the other towns of the province of Cavite without the existence of any previous agreement to execute the movement, drawn, without doubt, by the noble example of the former.

As to the province of Cavite, there did indeed circulate there orders, in writing, for the uprising, signed by Don Agustin Rieta, Don Candido Tirona, and myself, lieutenants of the rev-

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secure the recognition of the revolutionary government." There was, in the pamphlet, an attempt to review the relations between the American and the Filipino officials most favorable, in a way, to the Filipinos. The legitimate aspirations of the revolutionists and the actuations of their government were justified, the veracity of the American professions of friendship towards the Filipinos was impugned and the methods sought to bolster up a rapidly declining organization in the expectation of an eventual Democratic victory in the presidential election of 1900 which, it was hoped, would result in the immediate reversal of American policy in this country and in the recognition of its independence.

"The monograph was printed twice in Spanish by order of the revolutionary government: First in Tarlac as already stated, and second in Nueva Caceres. The first edition was put out at the Imprenta Nacional, Tarlac, under the direction of Don Zacariaz Fajardo, and the second was printed at the Imprenta La Bicolana, Nueva Caceres, by order of A. Guevara, Acting Superior Military Chief. The original Spanish edition (Tarlac) is now very rare.

"There are four English translations known — two made from the original edition and two from the second edition. The first translation from the original edition came out in pamphlet form of fifty nine pages, without the translator's name and the place and date of publication. It is entitled *True Version of the Philippine Revolution* and has a number of errors. The second translation from the original edition was made by a certain Mr. Cairns, a resident of Manila, for General Thomas M Anderson, who published it in full in an article entitled "Aguinaldo's True Report of the Philippine Insurrection" in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, for May-June, 1915, and July-August, 1915. The remaining two English translations from the second edition — the "True Review of the Philippine Revolution", and the "True Story" — are found in the *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., 1902, vol. 35, pp. 439-450, and in J.R.M. Taylor's *Philippine Insurgent Records*, vol. 1, exhibit 71, and vol. 2, exhibit 2, respectively."

olutionary troops. Yet there was no assurance that they were attended to, or even received, as, in fact, one of these orders fell into the hands of the Spaniard, Don Fernando Parga, military and political governor of the province, who reported it to Captain General Don Ramon Blanco y Erenas, who immediately ordered the revolutionists to be attacked.

Providence, which had without doubt indicated the hour of Filipino emancipation, protected the revolutionists, because only thus can it be explained how men armed with only clubs and knives, without discipline and without organization, could conquer Spanish forces of regulars in the rude combats of Bakoor, Imus, and Noveleta, even to capturing numerous rifles. This obliged Captain General Blanco to suspend operations and try to supress the revolution by the policy of attraction under pretext that he did not like to be "slaughtering" Filipinos.

The government of Madrid, not approving this kind of policy on the part of General Blanco, sent Lieut. Gen. Don Camilo Polavieja to relieve him of this charge, and sent also at the same time regular troops of the Spanish peninsula forces. Polavieja, with 16,000 men armed with mausers and a battery of cannons, attacked the revolutionists with energy. He scarcely, however, reconquered half of the province of Cavite, and then fell sick and gave up his charge in April of 1897.

Don Camilo Polavieja having been relieved by Capt. Gen. Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, this old warrior in person pursued the revolutionists with as much firmness as humanity, succeeded in reconquering all of the province of Cavite, and drove the revolutionists into the mountains. Then I took up my headquarters in the steep and unknown mountain of Biak-na-bato, where I established the republican government of the Philippines in the end of May, 1897.

II. TREATY OF PEACE OF BIAK-NA-BATO

Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno was several times in Biak-na-bato to propose peace, which, after five months and long deliberations stood arranged and signed on the 14th of December, 1897, upon the following bases:

1. That I was free to live abroad with the companions who might wish to follow me, and, having fixed my residence in Hongkong, in this place was to be paid to me the 800,000 pesos indemnity in three payments, 400,000 upon the receipt of all the arms there were in Biak-na-bato, 200,000 when the number of arms surrendered should reach 800, and the last 200,000 when that number should be completed to 1,000 arms, and after the receipt of the cash the Te Deum to be sung in the cathedral of Manila by way of thanks. The second fortnight of February was fixed upon as the maximum limit for the delivery of the arms.

2. The money was all to be delivered to me in person, I being in full liberty with my companions and other revolutionists.

3. Before the evacuation of Biak-na-bato by the Filipino revolutionists, Captain General Primo de Rivera should send me two generals of the Spanish army, who should remain as hostages until I and my companions should reach Hongkong and the first payment of 400,000 pesos indemnity should be received.

4. It was also agreed to suppress the religious corporations of the islands and to establish autonomy in political order and administration, although at the request of Gen. Primo de Rivera, these extreme terms were not committed to writing, he alleging that it was very humiliating for the Spanish government to do so, whose fulfillment thereof, however, he guaranteed upon his honor as a gentleman and a soldier.

Gen. Primo de Rivera delivered the first payment of 400,000 pesos while the two generals yet remained as hostages.

We, the revolutionists, fulfilled our part with the surrender of arms, which exceeded 1,000, as is known to all the world from its having been published in the Manila papers. But the aforesaid captain general failed to comply with the other conditions—the suppression of the friars and executing the reforms agreed upon; however, the Te Deum was sung. This caused me and my companions profound sadness, a sadness which turned into desperation upon the receipt of a letter from Lieut. Col. Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, nephew and private secretary of the said general, advising me that my companions and I might yet return to Manila.

Was this a just proceeding upon the part of the representative of the government of Spain? Let honorable consciences answer.

III. NEGOTIATIONS

I had not long to remain with my companions in so critical a situation, because in March of 1898 there presented himself to me the name of commander of the North American vessel of war, *Petrel,* soliciting a conference by direction of Admiral Dewey.

Several were had with the said commander on the nights of the 16th of March to the 6th of April, he soliciting me to return to the Philippines to renew the war of independence against the Spaniards, and offering the aid of the United States in case this nation declared war against Spain. Then I asked the commander of the *Petrel* what the United States would concede to the Philippines, to which the commander answered that the United States were a great and rich nation, and did not need colonies.

I laid before the commander the propriety of putting the agreement in writing, to which he replied that he would lay it before Admiral Dewey.

These conferences were interrupted on the 5th of April by the receipt of letters from Isabelo Artacho and his attorney, demanding of me 200,000 pesos of the indemnity as the part which he ought to receive as secretary of the interior, which he had been in the Filipino government of Biak-na-bato, threatening to hale me before the tribunals of Hongkong if I did not yield to his demand.

Although it does not pertain strictly to the matter in hand, I will state here that Isabelo Artacho reached Biak-na-bato and entered the camp of the revolution the 21st of September, 1897, and was named secretary in the first part of November 4, when the peace proposed and worked out by Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno was almost agreed upon, as is proven by the fact that on the 14th of the following December it was signed. See, then, the unjust and unmeasured ambition of Artacho in claiming 200,000 pesos for the few days' service that he rendered the revolution.

Besides, it had been agreed between all of us revolutionists in Biak-na-bato that in case the Spaniards did not carry out their agreement the money proceeding from the indemnity should not be divided, but should be destined for the purchase of arms to renew the war.

Artacho then was working as a spy, an agent of Gen. Primo de Rivera, attempting to annihilate the revolution, stripping it of its most powerful element, money. And so the matter was considered by all the revolutionists, they agreeing together that I should leave Hongkong immediately, avoiding the demand of Artacho, in order that the rest might have an opportunity to meet this new danger against our holy ideals, and they obtained this opportunity in fact. Artacho agreed to withdraw his demand by means of a transaction.

In fulfillment of this agreement I secretly left Hongkong the 7th of April, embarking on the *Taisan,* and passing by Saigon I went and stopped in the greatest retiremen at Singapore, arriving at this port on the *Eridan* the 21st of the month. There I was entertained in the house of a countryman of ours. Such was the cause of the interruption of the most important conferences with Admiral Dewey, begun by the commander of the *Petrel.*

But "man proposes and God disposes," a proverb which on this occasion was fulfilled in all its parts, because notwithstanding the incognito which I preserved on the voyage, at 4 in the afternoon of the day of my arrival at Singapore there presented himself in the house where I was being entertained an Englishman, who, with great secrecy, said that the consul of the United States at that post, Mr. Pratt, desired to confer with Don Emilio Aguinaldo, to which reply was given that in that house no such Aguinaldo was known, for so it had been agreed to reply to everybody.

But the Englishman having repeatedly returned, declaring with insistence that it was no use to deny Aguinaldo's presence, because Consul Pratt had received notice from Admiral Dewey of my journey to Singapore, then I yielded to the interview with the said consul, which took place with the greatest secrecy, from 9 to 12, on the night of the 22nd of April, 1898, in a retired

part of the city, Mr. Pratt declaring to me as soon as he saw me that war between the United States and Spain had been officially declared the preceding day.

In the interview alluded to, Consul Pratt declared to me that the Spaniards not having fulfilled their part of the treaty of Biak-na-bato the Filipinos had the right to continue anew their interrupted revolution, persuading me to renew the war against Spain, and assuring me that America would give the greatest advantage to the Filipino.

Then I asked the consul what advantages the United States would concede to the Philippines, I indicating at that very time the propriety of putting the agreement in writing: to which the consul replied that he would by telegram lay that matter before Mr. Dewey, who was the commander of the expedition against the Philippines and had ample powers from President McKinley.

On the following day between 10 and 12 in the morning the conference was renewed, Consul Pratt declaring that Admiral Dewey had replied concerning my desires that the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippines under a naval protectorate, and that there was no necessity to put the agreement in writing, because the words of Admiral Dewey and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled, not being like those of the Spaniards; and he added, finally, that the government of North America was a most honorable, just, and powerful government.

I being as desirous as Admiral Dewey and the North American consul to reach the Philippines and renew the holy enterprise to reconquer our independence from the yoke of the Spaniards, I took advantage of the providential occasion which these representatives of the United States offered me, and giving complete credit to their honorable promises, I replied to the insistent solicitation of Mr. Pratt that he might immediately count on my return to arouse en masse the Filipino people against the Spaniards under the sacred ideals above mentioned, provided I could take with me arms to distribute to the patriots, offering him to do all that was possible to obtain the surrender of the Spaniards and the capture of Manila in a siege of two weeks if I could count upon a battery of 12 cannons.

The consul replied that he would aid me to send the expedition, with arms, as I had planned in Hongkong; then that he would telegraph immediately to Admiral Dewey the agreement, in order that on his part he might render aid to the said expedition.

On the 25th day of April the last conference closed in the American consulate, where I had been invited by Mr. Pratt, who, on seeing me, said that he had received telegrams from Admiral Dewey charging him to ask me to go immediately on the first steamer to Hongkong to join the Admiral, who was there with his squadron in Mirs Bay, a port of China, to which I replied affirmatively, ordering immediately my aids to go and engage passage and to prepare our journey under different names in order to maintain ourselves incognito on the journey, as we did coming from Hongkong to Singapore.

On the 26th I returned to take leave of Consul Pratt to embark on the steamer *Malaca.* The consul, after having said to me that before entering the port of Hongkong a launch of the Admiral would come out to take us secretly to the North American squadron — a secrecy which pleased me also in order to avoid publicity in my acts — suggested to me then that I should name him as representative of the Philippines in the United States in order to accomplish promptly the official recognition of our independence.

I answered that as soon as the Filipino government should be formed I would propose him for the charge which he desired, although I considered it an insignificant recompense for his assistance; then, in case of not having the fortune to secure independence, I would name him for a high post in the customhouse, besides giving also mercantile advantages, and sharing the expenses of war which the consul asked for his government at Washington, since to all that has been set forth the Filipinos beforehand agree as a just proof of gratitude.

Then I went away with my aids, Señors Pilar and Leyva, to Hongkong on the steamer *Malaca,* in which port we arrived at 2 on the morning of the 1st of May without any launch coming out to meet us. On the invitation of the consul of that colony, Mr. Wildman, I went to the consulate and from 9 to 11 of the

night of the same day of my arrival I conferred with him. He told me that Admiral Dewey had gone away to Manila without waiting for me, because he had received peremptory orders from his government to attack the Spanish squadron, leaving a message that he should send for me by a gunboat. In that conference I talked with the consul concerning the expedition of arms which I had in project and we agreed that the said consul and the Filipino, Señor Teodoro Sandico, should take charge of the expedition, I leaving on the same night, in the power of the gentlemen, 50,000 pesos on deposit.

A steam launch was obtainable for 15,000 pesos, and contract was made for the purchase of 2,000 guns at $7 a piece, and 200,000 cartridges at $33.50 per 1,000.

At the end of the week, the 7th of May, the American gunboat *McCulloch* arrived from Manila, bringing notice of the victory of Admiral Dewey over the Spanish squadron, but it brought no orders to take me to Manila, and at 9 at night I had a conference with the consul at his invitation.

The 15th of the same month the *McCulloch* returned again and brought the order to carry me to Manila with my companions. Having been immediately notified of the embarkation by Consul Wildman and at 10 o'clock at night of the 16th, at the city hall of Hongkong, being accompanied by the consul and the commander of the gunboat and by Mr. Barrett, ex-secretary of the American embassy of the Kingdom of Siam, we went in an American launch to the Chinese port of Kowloon, where lay that gunboat. Mr. Barrett, on taking leave, offered to visit me in the Philippines, and later kept his promise in Cavite and Malolos.

Consul Wildman charged me that as soon as I should arrive in the Philippines to establish the Filipino government under a dictatorial form and said that he would try by all means possible to end soon the expedition of arms, which in fact he did. (Note that after having received this consignment of arms, pleased and trusting more and more in the sincerity and good faith of Consul Wildman, I charged him to send another consignment, remitting to him $67,000 as a deposit for the expenses of the second consignment. But Mr. Wildman did not fulfill this last

charge, kept that sum which, according to my information, he refuses to return.)

The *McCulloch* leaving at 11 o'clock in the morning of the 7th of May for the Philippines, we came to anchor between 12 and 1 in the afternoon of May 19 in the waters of Cavite and immediately the launch of the Admiral with his adjutant and private secretary, came to take me to the *Olympia,* where I was received with my adjutant, Señor Leyva, with the honors of a general by a section of marines.

The Admiral received me in a saloon, and after salutes of courtesy I asked him if all the telegrams which he had sent to the consul of Singapore, Mr. Pratt, relative to me were true; he answering me affirmatively and adding that the United States had come to the Philippines to protect its natives and free them from the yoke of Spain.

He said, besides, that America was rich in lands and money and did not need colonies. He concluded by assuring me that I must have no doubt concerning the recognition of Philippine independence on the part of the United States. And immediately he asked me if I could raise the people against the Spaniards and make a rapid campaign.

I answered that events would prove it, but that until the arrival of the consignment of arms which had been intrusted to Consul Wildman in one of the ports of China I could do nothing, since without arms each victory would cost many lives of brave and daring Filipino revolutionists. The Admiral offered to send a steamer to hurry up the consignment of arms, apart from the orders which he had given Consul Wildman, and he placed immediately at my disposition all the cannons which were in the vessels of the Spanish squadron and 62 Mauser rifles with many cartridges, which were on the *Petrel* and came from Corregidor.

I then expressed to him my profound gratitude for the generous aid which the United States was giving to the Filipino people, as also my admiration for the greatness and goodness of the American people. I explained to him also that before I left Hongkong the Filipino colony had had a meeting, in which they had discussed the possibility that, after having conquered the

Spaniards, the Filipino might have a war with the Americans because of the latter's possible refusal to recognize our independence, and that the Americans would be sure to win, because they would find us tired, without munitions of war, and worn-out in the war against the Spaniards, and I asked him at the same time to pardon my frankness.

The Admiral replied that he was delighted with my sincerity and believed that Filipinos and Americans ought to treat among themselves, like allies and friends, expressing clearly all doubts for the most perfect understanding between both parties, adding that, as he had already declared, the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed by the honorable word of the Americans, of greater efficacy than documents that can be left unfulfilled when it is desired to do so, as happened with the written agreement with the Spaniards, and he advised me to make immediately a national Filipino flag, offering to do anything in his power to recognize and protect it before the other nations represented by the different squadrons lying in the bay; though he said that we ought to conquer the power of the Spaniards before unfurling [verb *hondear* here used probably should read *ondear*, to wave or unfurl]" that banner, in order that the act might be more honorable in the sight of all the world and, above all, of the United States; and in order that when Filipino vessels bearing their national flag should pass before foreign squadrons they might inspire respect and esteem. I thanked the Admiral anew for his good advice and generous offers, making him understand that if the sacrifice of my own life to honor the Admiral before the United States should be necessary I was ready to sacrifice it.

I added that with such conditions I could assure him that all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to shake off the yoke of Spain, though some few might fail for lack of arms or personal profits.

Thus ended the first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom I announced that I would take up my quarters in the office of the commander of marine in the arsenal at Cavite.

IV. THE REVOLUTION OF 1898

I returned to the *McCulloch* to order the discharge of the equipage and the materials of war which she brought, having had occasion to meet in the waters of Cavite various revolutionists of Bataan, to whom I gave two folders that contained orders of uprising for that province and Zambales.

Before landing at the arsenal I met also several boats full of revolutionists of Kawit, my native town, who told me that they had for two weeks been expecting my arrival, which had been announced by the American themselves. I felt no little joy at seeing my countrymen and relatives, old companions of the daring campaign of 1896 to 1897. I improved the opportunity to deliver to them the other orders of the uprising, scarcely stopping in the office of the commander of marines in the arsenal at 4 in the afternoon. I continued all that night with my companions writing more and more orders and circulars to the same end. Since, without explaining how or in what manner, there came pouring in from all parts messengers asking news of my arrival, at the same time the password for the uprising against the Spaniards.

God without doubt had designated that moment for the overthrow of the Spanish power in the Philippines, because my unexpected arrival could not have been saluted nor known with the rapidity and publicity that those facts demonstrated.

Seventy-two volunteers of San Roque and Caridad, armed with Remingtons and Mausers, organized by the Spaniards, presented themselves the following day and put themselves unconditionally under my orders. At first the American forces were alarmed by the arrival of these volunteers, and by precaution took positions to defend the entrance to the arsenal; but being informed of the matter I went down to see the volunteers, and gave them orders to guard the post of Dalahican to prevent the entrance of the Spanish troops, which, according to recent notice, were attempting it.

Learning what had occurred, the Americans became tranquil, and, giving the corresponding watchword to all the American force, the commander of the *Petrel* was ordered to deliver to me the 62 guns and ammunition of war offered by the Admiral,

which was done. Then, in a little while, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, the launches of the *Petrel* brought and disembarked in the dike of the arsenal the armament referred to. This was immediately distributed to those who had presented themselves, because by thousands they came, begging a place in the ranks of the revolution and a gun to go to the advanced posts.

On the night of that day — the 20th of May — the old revolutionary chief, Señor Luciano San Miguel, today brigadier general, presented himself to me to receive orders, which were given him, for the uprising of the provinces of Manila, Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Bulakan, Morong, Pampanga, Tarlak, Nueva Ecija, and others of the north of Luzon, and he went forth that very night to execute them.

The 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and rest of that month was continued the inpour of revolutionists who presented themselves to take part in the movement, so that I had to leave the arsenal and go to another house in Cavite in order to leave quiet the marines who garrisoned the arsenal.

V. THE DICTATORIAL GOVERNMENT

On the 24th the dictatorial government was establish by circulating a proclamation which I subscribed as chief of that government. Copies of this document were handed to Admiral Dewey and through him to the foreign consuls in Manila, although communication had been cut with the city. In a few days the dictatorial government was moved to the house where the old civil government of the Spaniards had been in Cavite, because the great crowd of persons who flowed hither from all parts overflowed the private house where we had formerly been. Here I received the pleasant notice of the arrival of the consignment of arms which were disembarked in the very dike of the arsenal under the gunboat *Petrel*, 1,999 rifles and 200,000 cartridges, with other munitions.

I immediately sent a committee to thank Admiral Dewey for the prompt arrival of the expedition, thanks to his action, informing him at the same time that the 31st of May had been fixed upon to commence the operation. The Admiral sent his secretary to congratulate me, as also my government, for the ani-

mation and activity that were noted in favor of the campaign, and he declared to me at the same time that he believed the day fixed upon too near to begin the uprising, and that I ought to put it off to a more distant day in order that the revolutionary troops might be better organized. I answered him by his secretary that the Admiral might feel easy, because everything was prepared and the Filipinos anxious to shake off and free themselves from the yoke of the Spaniards, and that this took the place of discipline, as time would prove. I thanked him, nevertheless, for his good counsel.

I immediately ordered the distribution to the various provinces of the arms received, sending some to the revolutionists of Kawit, which were introduced in the night of the 27th of May into the village of Alapang.

VI. THE FIRST TRIUMPHS

On the following day, the 28th of May, 1898, at the hour of the delivery of the arms to the people of Kawit in that town, a column of more than 270 Spanish marines presented themselves, having been sent by the Spanish general, Señor Peña, in pursuit of the said arms.

There was had the first combat of the Filipino revolution of 1898, which we may call a continuation of the campaign of 1896 to 1897. The combat lasted from 10 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, and through lack of ammunition the Spaniards surrendered with all their arms to the Filipino revolutionists, who entered Cavite with the prisoners. I seized upon this glorious occasion to bring out and unfurl the national flag, which was saluted by an immense multitude with acclamations of delirious joy and great hurrahs for Philippine independence and for the generosity of the United States, the act being witnessed by various officials and marines of the American squadron, who demonstrated clearly their sympathy with the cause of the Filipinos by taking part in their natural jubilee.

This glorious triumph was the prelude to continued victories; since, on the 31st day of May, the date fixed for the general uprising, the whole islands rose like one man to shake off the power of Spain.

The second triumph was in Binakayan, in a place called Polvorin, where a Spanish detachment composed of 250 men were attacked by revolutionists and surrendered in a few hours for lack of ammunition.

I again took occasion of this victory to display our national flag from the top of the barracks of Polvorin, which was in the seashore, in order that the only sign of our liberty and independence might be seen and looked upon by all the war vessels which, representing all the greatest and most civilized nations of the world, were lying congregated in the bay, observing the providential events taking place in the Philippines after more than three hundred and fifty years of Spanish domination.

Scarcely an hour had passed when another banner of ours was seen waving on the tower of the church of Bacoor, which was also upon the seashore. It was a sign of a new triumph of the revolutionists against the Spanish troops that garrisoned that town, composed of some 300 men, who likewise for lack of ammunition surrendered to the revolutionary army.

And so the revolution went on from triumph to triumph, the Filipino people proving thus their power and resolution to free themselves from every foreign yoke, to live independent, as I had already affirmed to Admiral Dewey. Upon these things this gentleman and his chiefs and the American officials warmly congratulated me and the Filipino army for these undeniable triumphs, attested, as they were, by a great number of prisoners arriving from all parts of Luzon in Cavite.

VII. THE FILIPINO FLAG

The 1st day of September I ordered that on all Filipino ships should be displayed our flag, which was complied with in the first place by the marines of our small fleet, composed of some eight Spanish steam launches and five other vessels of greater tonnage, called *Taaleño, Balayan, Taal, Bulusan,* and *Purissima Concepcion,* given to the Filipino government by their respective masters. These were immediately prepared in our arsenal to receive cannon, and we gave them 8 to 9 centimeter pieces, which were taken from the Spanish ships of the squadron.

Oh, how beautiful and gallant is our flag unfurled in the air from the masts of our ships upon the very waters of the bay of Manila, alternating with the ensigns of other great nations before whose ships ours came and went, bearing the recent sign of liberty and independence! How respected and admired as borne among the legitimate triumphant echoes of the proud Filipino army after it had received the surrenders of the regular forces of the Spanish government.

The heart dilates with joy, the soul swells with pride, and patriotism is cheered at so great a contemplation!

At the end of the month of June I visited Admiral Dewey, who, after having complimented me for the rapid triumphs of the Filipino revolution, declared to me that the German and French admirals had asked him why he had consented to the Filipinos using a flag not recognized upon their ships, and that to this question he had replied that with his knowledge and consent the Filipinos were using that flag; besides, by their valor and resolution in war against the Spaniards they deserved henceforth to use that right.

I then broke into demonstrations of lively gratitude before so valorous and decided protection on the part of the admiral, and I immediately ordered that the Filipino fleet should carry troops to the other provinces of Luzon and the isles of the south to carry on the war against the Spaniards that garrisoned them.

VIII. THE EXPEDITION TO THE VISAYAS

This expedition was made with much good luck, our steamers returning without accident after having left the troops at the points agreed upon. But the *Bulusan,* which went to Masbate to pick up the column of Colonel Mariano Riego de Dios and carry it to Samar, was sighted by the Spanish gunboats *Elcano* and *Uranus,* the first of which attacked the *Bulusan* and sunk it in those waters, not, however, without the Spanish ship having been made to suffer considerable damage by our troops. The crew of the *Bulusan* was fortunately saved by swimming to the shore.

FELIPE BUENCAMINO

APOLINARIO MABINI

IX. THE STEAMER *COMPANIA DE FILIPINAS*

In a short time the Spanish steamer *Compania de Filipinas* presented itself in Cavite, having been asked by the revolutionists in the waters of Aparri. Immediately it was provided with artillery and sent with troops to Olongapo, but it was necessary to order another of our gunboats to bring her back, by request of Admiral Dewey, in order to settle the claim made by the French consul for that vessel. The Admiral, having been informed that the *Compania de Filipinas* had been seized under the Spanish flag, abstained from entering further into the matter and returned the claim to the French consul, declaring that he and his forces had nothing to do with the matter.

Thus ended this incident, which demonstrates clearly the recognition and protection which Admiral Dewey gave to the Filipino revolution.

The *Filipinas,* for so the steamer in question was thenceforth called, continued her journey to Olongapo, and upon her return brought the troops to liberate from the power of Spain the provinces of the valley of Cagayan and the Batanes Islands. This vessel, which again changed name and is now called *Luzon,* went aground in the Cagayan from an accident to its machinery.

In all the expeditions our vessels before setting sail saluted the *Olympia* as the flagship, thereby fulfilling the duty of international courtesy, our salutes being answered with like demonstrations of friendship.

X. THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The dictatorial government prepared the proclamation of Filipino independence in the town of Kawit for the 12th of June. In fact I sent a commission to acquaint the Admiral with it, inviting him at the same time to be present at the act, which took place with all solemnity. The admiral sent his secretary to excuse me, [sic] alleging that it was mail day.

At the end of the month of June the Spanish gunboat *Leyte* fled for Manila from the rivers of Macabebe, where she had been besieged by the forces of General Torres. She carried a part of the troops and volunteers which the Filipino Colonel Don Eu-

genio Blanco commanded; but having been seen by an American cruiser, she voluntarily surrendered. Admiral Dewey delivered to me all the prisoners and all the arms except the steamer, but later claimed the return of the prisoners after the capitulation of Manila.

On the 4th of July the first military expedition of the United States arrived under command of General Anderson and was lodged in the arsenal of Cavite. This worthy general visited me in the office of the Filipino government in Cavite, a matter of etiquette which I returned immediately, and which is performed in all cases between two friendly and allied chiefs. In our conferences General Anderson solemnly ratified to me the promises of Admiral Dewey, affirming upon his word of honor that America has not come to the Philippines either to make war upon its natives or to conquer our territory, but indeed only to liberate the Filipino people from the oppressive government of Spain.

A little before the arrival of this military expedition and of those which afterwards came with General Merritt, Admiral Dewey sent his secretary to the dictatorial government asking my permission to put the American troops in Tambo and Maytubig, places of Parañaque and Pasay. To all of this the dictatorial government acceded, owing to the honorable promises of Admiral Dewey above set forth.

In the same month of July, the Admiral came to Cavite, accompanied by General Anderson, and after salutes of courtesy, said to me: "You have seen confirmed all that I have said to you and promised." "How beautiful your flag is. It has a triangle and resembles that of Cuba. Will you give me one as a memento when I return to America?"

I answered that I was convinced (or satisfied) by his honorable word, and there was no need to extend in writing the things agreed upon, and that as far as the flag was concerned he might count upon it as though it were already in his possession.

Dewey continued: "Writings are not fulfilled where there is no honor, which occurred with what you agreed upon with the Spaniards, who fell short in what had been written and signed.

Trust in my word, because I answer for it, that the United States will recognize the independence of the country. But I recommend to you to observe for the present much secrecy in all that we have spoken of and agreed upon. And, besides, I beg you to have patience if our soldiers trample upon some Filipino, since as volunteers they are as yet without discipline."

I answered the Admiral that I would remember his recommendation about reserve, and that as concerned the abuses of the soldiers proper orders had already been given in that matter, giving at the same time like notice to the Admiral with respect to our soldiers.

XI. THE SPANISH COMMISSION

The Admiral, changing suddenly the course of the conversation, asked me why the inhabitants of Manila do not rise as those of the provinces have done? Can it be true that they accept autonomy offered by General Augustin with the assembly of representatives? Can it be true as he had heard, that a commission of Filipinos had left Manila to propose the acceptance of that autonomy and to recognize you as general, as also your companions?

I answered that the people of Manila are not rising because they have no arms, and because, as merchants and proprietors which they are, they fear to rise lest the Spaniards should get possession of their riches and burn and destroy; in consequence of which they apparently accept autonomy for the purpose of deception. But I told him that I trusted that all the Filipinos of Manila were partisans in our independence, as would be proven the day Manila should be taken by our troops. Then I believed that the inhabitants of Manila will celebrate with us the independence of the Philippines, making new demonstrations of adherence to our government.

I told him also that it was true that there had come a mixed commission in the name of General Augustin and of Archbishop Nozaleda, which commission had declared to me that it was forced to come by the Spaniards, but that it had demonstrated their adherence to our cause. The individuals of the commission explained to me that the Spaniards had recommended to them to

say that they came of their own motion, without being sent and without being led thereto by the Spanish authorities, pretending to be faithful representatives of all the people of Manila, and that they should assure me that, provided autonomy should be accepted, General Augustin and Archbishop Nozaleda would recognize me and my companions as generals, giving me a million pesos, the indemnity not received from the treaty of Biak-na-bato, and besides, great gratifications and salaries in the assembly of representatives; that to these promises the commissioners themselves gave no credit, although some advised that the money be accepted to get it out of the Spanish government treasury and as a contribution of the Filipinos. The commissioners concluded by assuring me that they would rise in Manila if they were furnished arms, and that the best thing that I could do was to attack Manila at the places which they designated as the weak points defended by Spanish detachments easy to surround.

I thanked the commission for their sincerity and frankness and told them that they might withdraw in security, and that they should tell those who had sent them that they had not been received for the lack of credentials, and that although they should have had these credentials, according to what they had seen and heard from other revolutionists, Don Emilio Aguinaldo would not have accepted their propositions of autonomy because the Filipino people had sufficient intelligence to govern themselves and were tired of being martyred by the abuses of a foreign power; wherefore they desired no more than their independence, and so the Spaniards might prepare to defend their sovereignty, because the Filipino army would attack them hard and continuously until they took Manila.

I also charged the commissioners to say to Nozaleda that he was abusing much his high office, conduct contrary to the precepts of the high pontiff; that if he did not mend his ways he should see me the day he least expected, and see me prepared to bring to light things that would fill him with shame; and that he knew that, together with Augustin, he had commissioned four Germans and five Frenchmen who, in disguise, were to assassinate me, in the mistaken hope, without doubt, that I being

dead the Filipino people would submit tranquilly to the sovereignty of Spain — a most egregious error, because if I had been assassinated the Filipino people would have continued with greater warmth the revolution. Other men would have arisen like me to avenge my death.

And finally I recommended to the commissioners that they tell the inhabitants of Manila to go on about their business, to be tranquil concerning our government, whose line of conduct was rectitude and justice, since we had no friars to corrupt those civic virtues which the Filipino government is trying to show before the eyes of all nations. Then that they should go on with their business and not try to come out from Manila to this camp, where there were fewer resources, and because there were already too many people who were serving the government and in the Army. If we lacked anything, it was arms.

The commission asked me what conditions the United States would impose and what advantages they would give the Filipino people, to which I replied that it was difficult to answer this question in view of the promise I had made to keep silent concerning the terms of the agreement, and I limited myself to inviting their attention to the acts of sovereignty which our dictatorial government was exercising, especially in the waters of the bay.

These words made much impression on the Admiral, even to the extent of causing him to interrupt the translation of my words by the interpreter, Señor Leyva, and he interpolated me, saying, "Why have you revealed our secret? Do you mean to say that you are not fulfilling our agreement as to silence?" I answered him that no revelation had been made of the secret relating to him and the consul. The Admiral, thanking me for my reserve, took leave with General Anderson, not without requesting me to suspend for the time being the attack upon Manila, because they were studying a plan to take with his forces the walled city, leaving the taking of the suburbs to ours. He charged me, nevertheless, to study for my part the other plan to combine it with his, to all of which I agreed.

XII. NEW AMERICAN TROOPS

In a short time American troops arrived, and with them General Merritt. The secretary of the Admiral, with two chiefs, presented himself to the dictatorial government to ask permission to occupy our trenches at Maytubig from the seacoast to the high road, where they joined with the Filipino troops that occupied Pasay and Singalong. To this I acceded also, owing to the solemnly repeated promises of the Admiral and natural hopes born of them concerning the support and recognition of our independence.

Ten days after the occupation of Maytubig by the American forces the Spaniards, who were in front, fortified in the polvorin of San Antonio Abad, learning of it, during the night surprised the American outposts, which, being weak, had no more time than to leap out of bed and double back upon their center, abandoning their rifles and six cannons.

The uproar being heard by our troops, they immediately hastened to the aid of their friends and allies, putting the Spaniards to flight and recapturing the guns and cannons, which were returned to the Americans by the law of good friendship.

General Noriel opposed this return, alleging that the arms did not belong to the Americans now, since the Filipino forces took them from the Spaniards; but I did not listen to this reasoning of my general, but, in terms, ordered the return of the arms to the Americans, thereby clearly and evidently demonstrating the sincere friendship of the Filipinos.

These guns and cannons, with much ammunition, were thereupon returned to those who were then our allies, although General Noriel and his troops had captured them at the cost of the lives of many companions. A short time afterwards more American reenforcements arrived, and again Admiral Dewey, through his secretary, asked for more trenches for his army, alleging that those which had already been given were not sufficient, and I gave them the line of trenches up nearly to Pasay.

XIII. THE 13TH OF AUGUST

The 13th of August arrived, when I noted a general movement of attack against Manila on the part of the American squadron and of the land forces under command of General Anderson in Parañaque.

Immediately I ordered my troops to attack along the whole line. Gen. Pio del Pilar succeeded in entering by Sampalok and attacked the Spanish troops that were defending the suspension bridge. These fell back toward the bridge of Spain. The column of our Gen. Gregorio H. del Pilar took the suburb of Pretil, Tondo, Divisoria, and paseo de Azcarraga, to the north of Manila, and the column of General Noriel, in the direction of Pasay, took the suburbs of Singalong and Pako, following the American column and flanking the Spanish forces that defended the line of San Antonio Abad.

When this was seen by the Spanish chiefs, they ordered thier troops to retire toward the walled city, whereupon the American forces that occupied the trenches in front entered without firing a shot, through the suburbs of Malate and Ermita. But there they encountered the troops of General Noriel, who had taken possession of the suburbs named, and established his quarters in the convent of Malate and Ermita, in the buildings of the old exposition of the Philippines, in the normal school, and in the house of Señor Perez in Pako. In Santa Ana, eastern part of Manila, General Ricarte, aided by the troops of General Pio del Pilar, succeeded in cutting off five columns of Spaniards.

XIV. THE FIRST CLOUDS

Our men saw the American forces disembark upon the beach of the Luneta and the promenade of Santa Lucia, and the attention of all was attracted by the fact that the Spanish soldiers who were on the city wall did not fire upon these troops—a mystery which at nightfall was explained by the news of the capitulation of the town, made by General Señor Jaudenes to the American general, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which the American generals had kept secret in violation of the agreement with Admiral Dewey concerning the formation of plans to attack

and take Manila with the two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination.

This inexplicable conduct of the American leaders was made more evident by the telegrams which General Anderson on the aforesaid day, the 13th, directed to me from Maytubig, asking me to order our troops not to enter Manila. This request was denied, because it was contrary to the agreement and to the high limits of the revolutionary government, which, after undergoing the immense labor of besieging Manila two months and a half and sacrificing thousands of lives and tens of thousands of material interests, could not surely have done so with any other object than that of capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison that defended the town with firmness and tenacity.

But General Merritt, tenacious of his proposition, asked me now, not through the Admiral, but through Major Bell, to withdraw my troops from the suburbs to prevent danger of conflicts, which are ever to be feared in a double military occupation, and also thereby avoid for the American troops ridicule. And he offered in his three letters to negotiate after his plans had been carried out, to which I acceded, but not right away and all at once, but to withdraw our troops gradually to the blockhouses, that all the inhabitants of Manila might be witnesses of our military deeds and of such pregnant conduct with our American allies.

Up till then and up to the date when the Americans openly began hostilities against us I had entertained in my soul deeply founded hopes that the American chiefs would cause their agreements, orally had with the chiefs of the Filipino revolution, to stand with their own government, notwithstanding the signs to the contrary that were noted in their conduct, above all, in that of Admiral Dewey, who, without any reason whatever, one day in October, seized all our vessels and launches. When I was informed of this strange proceeding from the seat of government, which was then in Malolos, I sent a committee to General Otis to treat about the matter, who sent it on to the Admiral recommended. But they were not received by the Admiral, notwithstanding General Otis's recommendation.

Notwithstanding this conduct of the American leaders, so contrary to all agreements and arrangements above referred to, I continued observing toward them the same friendly attitude, sending a commission which went to take leave of General Merritt when he went away to Paris. After the General had given thanks for this act, he was kind enough to declare to our commissioners that he would defend the Filipinos in the United States. I also sent to Admiral Dewey a dagger, with its scabbard all of silver, and a cane of the finest wood, with a gold head worked by the best Filipino silversmith, remembrances of affection and old friendship, which the Admiral accepted, thus and to a certain extend consoling my afflicted spirits and the spirit of all those Filipinos composing the revolutionary government, and renewing in all our hearts the flattering and deceptive hopes of an arrangement with Admiral Dewey.

XV. FALSE HOPES

But such hopes disappeared when notice was received that Mr. Dewey had been working and was thus working against the revolutionary government by the order of His Excellency Mr. McKinley, who, controlled by the imperialist party, had decided to annex the Philippines, yielding, perhaps, to the ambition to exploit the immense natural riches that our virgin soil concealed.

This notice fell like a flash of lightning in the camp of the revolution. Some cursed the hour and the day that we had orally treated with the Americans; others censured the fact that we had yielded the suburbs. The greater part advised to send a commission to General Otis to draw out frank declarations upon the situation and to block out a treaty of friendship, if the United States would recognize our independence, or to break out into actual hostilities if this was refused.

In such a grave situation I advised moderation and prudence to all, as I still had hope in the justice and rectitude of the Congress of the United States, believing that it would not approve the tendencies of the imperialistic party, but would listen to the voice of Admiral Dewey, who, as the high representative of America in these islands, concerted and arranged with me and the Filipino people to recognize our independence.

In no other way in fact was so grave an affair to be looked upon, since if America intrusted to Admiral Dewey the honor of its arms in so foreign a land, well also might the Filipinos trust in the honorable promises of such a perfect gentleman and brave sailor, feeling sure that the great and noble American people would not abandon and expose to ridicule the illustrious conqueror of the Spanish squadron.

I was further induced to this judgment by the circumstance no less evident and notorious that the other American leaders who arrived after the celebrated victories of Admiral Dewey — Generals Merritt, Anderson, and Otis—proclaimed to the Filipino people that America came not to conquer territory, but to free their inhabitants from the oppression of Spanish sovereignty.

It would be, therefore, to expose also the honor of these chiefs to universal ridicule should the United States fail to stand by their official and public conduct, but annex the islands by conquest.

XVI. THE AMERICAN COMMISSION

With such wise and well-founded reflections I continued to calm the minds of my revolutionist companions until the official notice arrived that the government of Washington, on the motion of Admiral Dewey, had arranged for the coming of a civil commission to come to an understanding with the Filipinos in order to reach an agreement about the definite government of the islands.

Joy and satisfaction again sprang up in the minds of all Filipino revolutionists, and I then arranged to name a commission that should receive the American commissioners and at the same time gave strict orders to all to keep in the greatest harmony with the Americans, to tolerate and to pass over the abuses and aggressions of the soldiery, since it would be bad for the commission, which was expected, to find us at outs with the American forces.

But the abuses of the Americans were becoming in many cases intolerable. In the market of Arroceros, under pretense of being "only in play," they killed a woman and a child, causing

indignation on the part of all the multitude that filled the place.

My aids who had passes to enter Manila, armed and in uniform, were annoyed with repeated detentions by all guards that they passed, by which it was clearly seen that it was the intention to provoke them with public ridicule.

And while all these annoyances were being given our men the American leaders and officers who entered our camp were treated with deference and kindness.

In Lacoste street an American watchman shot a little child 7 years old because the latter had taken a banana from a Chinaman.

Searches of houses were as annoying as in the time of the Spaniards and the American outposts invaded our lines, provoking our sentinels. In short, it would be to make this writing too long should I relate one after another the abuses and aggressions committed by the American soldiery in those days of general anxiety.

Abuses seemed to have been ordered, or at least officially tolerated, with the evident intention of provoking us to a struggle. Our spirits were greatly provoked, but the Filipino government, which had assumed the responsibility of the acts of its people by prudent orders continually repeated, tried to preserve peace, advising all who suffered by aggression to bear with patience and forbearance until the arrival of the civil commission.

XVII. IMPOLITIC ACTS

In this wretched and critical situation, and before the arrival of the much-desired American civil commission, it occurred to General Otis, military governor of the American forces, to put in effect two most impolitic acts—one, the order to search our telegraph office in Sagunto street in Tondo, closing up the machinery, and detaining the official, Señor Reyna, in the fortress of Santiago under pretext that he was conspiring against the Americans.

How and why was Señor Reyna conspiring? Would it not have been sufficient for the Filipino government to have given

the order to attack for our whole 8,000 men to have entered into an immediate struggle with the forces of the United States? Was it necessary to conspire when this power was in our hands? And above all, was a telegraph operator to mix himself up in affairs of war when an army existed to whom that duty belonged?

The intention to annoy and directly ridicule the Filipino government in order to provoke it to a struggle is thus seen. It is to be noted that this act was not done by the soldiery but by General Otis himself, whose imperialistic policy was not pleased by the arrival of the civil commission and much less that that commission should find the Philippines in a state of peace, because it was evident to the General, as to all the world, that the Filipinos would have come to an understanding and friendly settlement with the commission had this commission arrived and found a stage of peace.

The Filipinos would have received this commission with demonstrations of true affection and complete adhesion as the honorable agents of great America. The commissioners could have gone through all of our provinces plainly seeing and observing order and tranquility in all our territory. It would have examined our constitution and public administration with perfect tranquility, and would have felt and enjoyed that ineffable enchantment of our oriental manner, a mixture of abandon and kindness of warmth and coldness, of confidence and suspicion, which marks our relations with strangers, with a thousand agreeable colors.

Ah! but neither General Otis nor the imperialists desired them to take such a journey. It was better for their criminal intentions that the American commissioners should find the desolation of war in the Philippines. and should, from the very moment of their arrival, smell the fetid odor of American and Filipino corpses blended. It was better for their plans that the gentleman, Mr. Schurman, president of the commission, should not be able to go out from Manila, but should be limited only to hearing the few Filipinos who, led by reasons of money, were partisans of the imperialists.

It was better that the commission should look at the Filipino problem through flames, through the whistling of balls, and through the shadows of all unchained passion in order that it might not form any exact judgment or idea of the proper and natural terms of the problem. Ah! it was better, in short, that the commission should return discouraged at not having obtained peace, and should blame me and the other Filipinos, when I and all the Filipino people desired that this peace should be made yesterday, before this, but worthy and honorable peace for the United States and the Filipino republic, to the end that it be sincere and perpetual.

The other impolitic act committed by General Otis was the publication of the proclamation of the 4th of January, establishing in the name of President McKinley American sovereignty in these islands, with threats of the ruin, death, and desolation to everyone who would not recognize it.

I, Emilio Aguinaldo, humble, servant of all, but president of the Filipino republic, charged, however, with watching over the liberties and the independence of the people who have chosen me for this elevated and thorny charge, distrusted for the first time the honor of the Americans, and understood from thenceforth that this proclamation of General Otis had passed all the limits of prudence, and that there was no remedy except to resist with arms such an unjust and unexpected proceeding on the part of the leader of the friendly army.

I protested then against this proclamation, threatening also to begin hostilities immediately, since the whole people were shouting "treason," declaring the foundation that the announced civil commission which had been asked for by Admiral Dewey was a farce, and that what General Otis had pretended was only to entertain us in order to bring reenforcements and more reenforcements from the United States, in order to crush at a single blow our new and ill-armed army.

But General Otis acted for one time with diplomacy, and wrote to me, by conduct of his secretary, Mr. Carmen, a letter inviting the Filipino government to send a commission to come to an understanding with another one, of Americans, about a

friendly arrangement between both parties. Although I did not trust in the sincerity of the friendly propositions of the General, whose decided intention to prevent the commission from finding a state of peace was already proven, I nevertheless yielded to his invitations, as much because I saw it officially confirmed, by order of the 9th of January, given by the General, as in order to demonstrate before the whole world my evident desires to preserve peace and friendship with the United States, solemnly agreed upon with Admiral Dewey.

XVIII. THE MIXED COMMISSION

The conferences of the commission composed of Americans and Filipinos were held in Manila from the 11th to the 31th of January. They showed with clearness the desires of our people to be recognized as an independent nation.

They set forth with frankness the complaints of the Filipino people against the abuses and aggressions of the soldiery, and they were heard attentively and kindly by the American commissioners.

The latter replied that they were without power to recognize the Filipino government, but that their mission was limited to hearing and gathering the wishes of our people, and transmitting them faithfully to the government at Washington, which alone could decide definitely the matter. These conferences were thus concluded in the greatest harmony, auguring better and more definite days of peace until the date when Mr. McKinley should answer General Otis's telegrams transmitting our desires with favorable recommendation, as was said by the American commissioners.

XIX. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

And when I, the governor, the congress, and the entire people were awaiting so desired a reply, yielding for the most part to the most flattering impressions, the fatal day, the 4th of February, came, on the night of which the American forces suddenly attacked all our lines. These lines were certainly almost abandoned, because, as it was Saturday, the eve of a feast day,

our generals and some other of our noted leaders had asked permission to go home to their respective families.

Gen. Don Pantaleon Garcia was the only one who at that critical moment was at his post of Maypajo, north of Manila, since Generals Noriel, Rizal, and Ricarte and Colonels San Miguel, Cailles, and others were out of camp enjoying their permissions to be absent.

General Otis, according to true information, telegraphed to Washington that the Filipinos had been the aggressors against the American army. President McKinley read the telegram before the Senate, which was discussing the ratification of the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, in so far as it related to the annexation of the Philippines, and he obtained by this criminal means the approval of the whole treaty only by 3 votes, which were given under protest in doing so in consideration of the state of war in the islands.

So singular a comedy could not last long, because we Filipinos never were the aggressors against the American forces, to whom we had sworn friendship, and in whose power we expected to find the production necessary to obtain from other nations the official recognition of our independence.

The doubt of the first few moments was great, but it soon yielded to the serene grave rays of the light of truth.

When sensible persons considered the acts of Mr. McKinley in sending troops and more troops to Manila after making the armistice and even after peace with Spain; when they reflected that he had gone on delaying to send the civil commission to arrange a treaty of friendship with the Filipinos; when they knew the facts that preceded my alliance with Admiral Dewey, prepared and arranged by Consuls Pratt and Wildman, of Singapore and Hongkong; when they fully understood the true state of things in the Philippines the 4th of February; when they knew that the Filipinos were expecting the reply of Mr. McKinley to General Otis's telegram communicating the peaceful desires of the Filipino people to live as an independent nation; when, finally, they fixed their attention on the terms of the treaty of Paris, whose approval in so far as related to the annexation of the

Philippines was greeted with shouts of jubilee and satisfaction by the imperialist party, directed by Mr. McKinley, when they opened their eyes to the light of truth and perceived clearly the low, *egotistic,* and inhuman policy which Mr. McKinley had followed with us Filipinos, pitilessly sacrificing to his immoderate ambition the honor of Admiral Dewey by exposing this worthy gentleman and illustrious conqueror of the Spanish squadron to universal ridicule, because no other deduction is possible from the fact that about the middle of May, 1898, the *McCulloch,* a war vessel of the United States, brought me with my revolutionary companions from Hongkong, by direction of the admiral, and is today devoted to bombarding the ports and cities of the revolution, whose principle is liberty and independence.

The facts related are recent and ought to be kept still fresh in the memory of all.

Those who in May of 1898 admired the valor of Admiral Dewey's marines and the humane sentiments of that illustrious leader, who lent visible support to an oppressed people in order that they might be free and independent, can surely never harmonize the present inhuman war with those elevated and honorable sentiments.

I will pass over the cruelties with which from the outbreak of hostilities General Otis treated the Filipinos, secretly shooting many who would not sign the writing begging autonomy. I will say nothing of the abuses of power which the American soldiers committed against the innocent and defenseless citizens of Manila, shooting children and women for looking out at the balconies, leveling houses at midnight, breaking open boxes and drawers and carrying away money, jewels. and whatever objects of value they found; breaking chairs, tables, and looking-glasses which they could not carry off, because, in brief, they are the consequences of war, though not of civilized war; but what I will not pass over is the inhuman conduct of General Otis toward the Filipino army, when, in order to arrange a treaty of peace with the civil commission presided over by Mr. Schurman, I three times sent a messenger asking the suspension of hostilities.

General Otis refused so just and prudent a request, and replied that he would not suspend hostilities until the Filipino army had laid down their arms.

What? Did that army deserve no consideration on the part of General Otis and the American forces? Had the important services rendered by the Filipino army to the American in the past war against the Spaniards been forgotten? Had General Otis forgotten the favor which the Filipino army showed him when it gave up to him and his forces the suburbs and the blockhouses which it had taken with so many sacrifices? Why did General Otis impose for peace so humiliating condition upon an army which, together with the American army, had poured out its blood, and whose bravery and heroism had been lauded by Admiral Dewey and other American leaders?

This inexplicable conduct on the part of General Otis, evidently contrary to all laws of international right and military honor, is proof most eloquent of his decided intention to render useless Mr. Schurman's pacific mission. What peace can be arranged to the thunder of cannon and the hiss of bullets? What kind of proceeding has General Brooke been carrying on and is now carrying on in Cuba? Do not the Cubans continue to bear their arms while at the same time they are treating of peace and the future of that island? And are we, peradventure, less worthy than those revolutionists of liberty and independence?

Oh, beloved Philippines! Blame your riches and your beauty for the great misfortune that is falling upon your faithful sons! You have awakened the ambition of the imperialists and expansionists of North America, and both have sunk their sharp claws into your entrails! Beloved mother, sweet mother. We are here to defend your liberty and independence to death! We do not want war; on the contrary, we desire peace; but peace that will not color your cheek nor stain with shame nor blush your brow; and we swear to you and promise that America, with all her power and riches, shall perhaps be able to annihilate us, killing us all, but enslave us, never!

No, no; it was not this humiliation which I arranged in Singapore with the American consul, Mr. Pratt. Such was not the

agreement which I stipulated with Mr. Wildman, consul at Hongkong. It is not, finally, the submission of my beloved country to a new foreign yoke which Admiral Dewey promised me.

Certain it is that the three have abandoned me and forgotten that I was sought by them and brought from my banishment and deportation; forgotten, also, that none of the three had solicited my services for American sovereignty, paying the expenses of the Filipino revolution, for which, evidently, they have sought and brought me to your beloved breast.

If there is, as I believe, a God, root and fountain of all justice, one an eternal judge of international contentions, He will not long delay, sweet mother, to save you from the claws of your unjust enemies. I believe it as I believe in the honor of Admiral Dewey. I expect it, as I rely upon the rectitude of the great people of the United States, where, if there are ambitious imperialists, there exist also valiant circles of defenders of the humane doctrine of the immortal Monroe, Franklin, and Washington, unless the race of virtuous citizens, glorious founders of the actual greatness of the North American Republic, has decreased so much that their beneficent and legitimate influence is overridden by the powerful ambitions of expansionists. In this unhappy case, is it not better to die than be slaves?

O reasonable American people, deep is the admiration produced in all the Filipino people and their new army by the valor of all your soldiers and leaders. Too weak are we before such Titans of the ambitious Cesarist policy of your present governor to resist their brave onset. Our means are scarce; but we will continue in this unjust struggle, bloody and unequal, not from love of war, because we hate it, but to defend our undeniable rights to liberty and independence, so dearly bought and our territory, threatened by the ambition of a party that is trying to subjugate us.

Pitiable is the war! Horrible its carnage! Unhappy Filipinos are perishing in the furor of its combats, leaving mothers, widows, and sons. North America may perhaps be able to shut her eyes upon the misfortunes she is heaping on us, but what her people will not undoubtedly consent to is the continued sacri-

fice of her sons, the weeping of mothers, widows, and sons for the mere caprice of sustaining a war contrary to her honorable traditions proclaimed by Washington and Jefferson.

Turn, then, O North American people, to your legendary liberties; raise your hands to your hearts and tell me, would it please you if, in the course of events, North America should find herself in the situation of a weak and oppressed people, and the Philippine nation, free and powerful, at war with your oppressors, should solicit your aid and promise to free you from so grievous a yoke and then, after conquering your enemy with your aid, should subjugate you and deny you that liberty?

Civilized people, honorable inhabitants of the United States, to whose high and right consideration I submit this unhappy paper, here you have the providential facts that brought forth the Filipino republic, whose existence has been unjustly denied, and a nation of whom, though unworthy, God has made me the principal agent.

The truth hereof rests in the word of the president of this republic and in the honor of a whole people of 8,000,000 souls, who for more than three years have borne the sacrifice of lives and property of their heroic sons to obtain the just recognition of her natural rights of liberty and independence.

If you will grant me the honor to receive and to read this writing, and judge it then impartially, declaring solemnly on which side are justice and right, then I shall remain eternally grateful.

Your respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO

Tarlac, September 23, 1899.

Sixty Years of Philippine History

Felipe Buencamino, Sr.

Translated by Alfonso Lecaros; with notes bv Mauro Garcia

IN NOVEMBER, 1859, my parents, Don Victor Buencamino and Doña Petrona Siojo, legally married in the parish of my native town, San Miguel de Mayumo, province of Bulacan, Philippine Islands, decided to take me and my two older brothers, Potenciano and Fortunato, to Manila, to study. It took us three and one half days from said town of San Miguel to Manila having partly made the trip on a carabao-drawn carreton from San Miguel to Bulacan and on a banca from this last town to Manila.

Today this trip is made in three and one half hours by train and in two hours by automobile. I know not how much our trip in November of said year 1859 cost us because I was only ten years old, but undoubtedly it must have cost us more than it costs now, which shows that the bad roads and the old means of communication cost more in money and time than the good roads and modern means of transportation of the present. The preceding account also shows that the more backward in the sciences and arts countries are the dearer community and personal living is and that the sciences and arts make human life more enjoyable by saving time and space. Consequently, present-day Filipinos are enthusiastically inclined to the study of the sciences and arts, as the sole means of making the Philippines an enjoyable place for all men of goodwill.

We stayed on Quiotan street, now Sales, in Sta. Cruz district, at the house of Doña Tomasa Tuason, widow of Don Magin Garcia, brother of Father Mariano Garcia, doctor of philosophy

and of theology, a dignitary of the ecclesiastical chapter of the Manila diocese, minister of the tribunal of the church court of Madrid, and rector of the then Royal College of San Jose. This learned Filipino priest was born in the island of Lubang, of the then military district of Mindoro, now province of Mindoro, had attained by competition all the high ecclesiastical positions he was occupying, and was notably known for his retentive memory. He knew from memory the entire breviary and the missal so much so that although blind he celebrated Mass. Doctor Don Mariano Garcia greatly influenced me in my dedication to study, as in the many instances I met him, he used to tell me the following:

> Felipe, bear in mind that much as you soap or rub your body you will never be as white as the Spaniards, but if you cultivate your mind and your heart, thinking highly and feeling deeply, then you will attain the level of the Europeans.

These words of Dr. Garcia constantly repeated to me every time I was asked by his sister-in-law to get her weekly allowance which he gave to help her in her widowhood and orphanhood, encouraged me to be assiduous in my studies of Latin, the only subject taught in all Manila colleges, including the university, as basis of primary and secondary education to pursue the two professions open to Filipinos: those of law and of priesthood.

Up to 1866 when the Jesuits were allowed to return to Spain and to the Philippines, the present program of primary and secondary education which includes Spanish as the main base of study had not been established. We students of that era have not learned Spanish language, because for those who have chosen the law course only three or four years of study of Latin, and Moral and Canon Law, also in Latin, were required.

Such a system resulted in Filipino priests or lawyers speaking or writing poorly in Spanish, a criminal result which, only now comes clearly to me, was aimed purposely by the Dominican friars who had the lawful monopoly of teaching in the Philippines during the Spanish regime. Naturally excepted from such Machiavelian aim were the Spaniards or their sons because naturally they spoke their native tongue. The aim was to show in public the native Filipino, despisingly called *Indio,* as a being

incapable of exercising higher professions because he could not speak and write Spanish well.

Looking for the reason as to how the friars were able to acquire a monopoly of education and to establish such a bad system for us Filipinos, I found the cause in the union of church and state by which the friars obtained all the desired government legislations to present the Filipino as a good Christian, a fair acolyte, a bad coadjutor, absolutely incapacable to be a good parish priest or to exercise any ecclesiastical dignity, or to present him as a good soldier, a fair corporal, a bad sergeant and incapable of being an officer.

Such were the most notable things that I witnessed from November 1859 until 1868.

THE SPANISH REVOLUTION OF 1868

The Filipino people, having been ruled more by the Church than by the State, were apparently completely resigned to their lot as unhappy colonials at the mercy of their capricious masters who reserved exclusively for themselves the privileges which the people hated most. But in 1868 the revolution of the Liberals occurred in Spain deposing Isabel II from her reactionary throne, and forming a provisional government under the presidency of General Francisco Serrano supreme leader of the revolutionists. He named as overseas minister Don Manuel Becerra, one of the greatest Spanish democrats, whose first orders were to remove every picture of the deposed Queen Doña Isabel II from all government buildings and to demolish all statues and monuments dedicated to her in plazas and gardens, not only in Manila but also in other parts of the Archipelago. He also ordered the archbishop and bishops of the Philippines to suppress the name of Isabel II as Queen of Spain in their prayers.

The civil government obeyed the order as to the removal of the pictures of Isabel II from the government buildings, but the friars did not suppress the name of Isabel II in their prayers. These events naturally excited the Filipinos, causing them to make comments bearing on politics, for they could not discern how the Spaniards of yesterday fought against the same Spaniards, with their own revolutionary countrymen, until there

came to sound in our ears the difference between the words liberty and despotism, tolerance and intolerance, privileged and under-privileged classes, slaves and masters, in other words, inviolable and natural human rights versus the rights of the master and despot.

THE FIRST FILIPINO LIBERAL PARTY

The first Filipinos whose eyes were opened by the light of these new truths were Father José Ma. Burgos, licenciate in philosophy and doctor of theology, parish priest and prebendary with part allowance of the ecclesiastical chapter of the Manila Diocese, by competition; Dr. Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, eminent lawyer and wealthy property owner, counsellor of the Administration, law professor of the University of Sto. Tomas of Manila; Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, also a lawyer, native of Biñan, province of Laguna; Don Martin de Alpa, also a lawyer of the town of Malabon, province of Rizal; Don Mauricio Sanchez and Mauricio de Leon, famous lawyers of Manila; and the proprietors, Don Maximo Paterno, Don Vicente Salgado, Don José Ma. Basa, Don Manuel Genato and many others more, with the parish priests Don Mariano Gomez, of Bacoor, province of Cavite, Jose Guevara, of Quiapo, Manila, Agustin Mendoza, of Sta. Cruz, Manila, and Father Jacinto Zamora, second parish priest of the Manila Cathedral, a native of Pandacan, who won by competition their respective parishes in accordance with ordinary canon law with the famous Father Vicente Garcia, of Rosario, Batangas. They consequently formed the first Liberal Party in the Philippines and settled the first question of political law respecting the capacity of the Filipino: the ecclesiastics to fill the ecclesiastical offices which were monopolized by the friars and the laymen also to fill the civil and military offices which were monopolized by the Peninsulars.

POLITICAL STATUS OF THE COUNTRY

During that time the Filipino political status officially created in the Philippines thru the influence of the friars rested on the two following themes:

(1) The Filipino is a good Christian, a fair acolyte, a bad coadjutor, and absolutely incapable of being a parish priest;

(2) The Filipino is a good soldier, a fair corporal, a bad sergeant, and absolutely incapable of being an officer.

These two themes held as well in civil affairs to consider the Filipino as a good tribute payer, a fair clerk, a bad lawyer, and absolutely incapable of filling higher positions. The efforts, therefore, of this Filipino Liberal Party were aimed at combating such lowly status, founding for the purpose in Madrid the first Filipino periodical entitled *El Eco Filipino,* through the effort of Dr. Don Antonio Ma. Regidor, who was then in Madrid, to counteract the friars' periodical entitled *La Verdad* which sustained these two themes.

To this first Liberal Party led by Father José Ma. Burgos and Don Joaquin Pardo de Tavera with the lawyers Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Don Martin de Alpa, Mauricio de Leon and Gervacio Sanchez, belonged as auxiliary soldiers, the undersigned; Gregorio Sanciangco, of Malabon, Rizal; Ariston Reyes, of Pasay, Rizal; Paciano Rizal Mercado, of Calamba, Laguna, older brother of Dr. Rizal; Florentino Torres, now justice of the Supreme Court; Mariano Alejandrino, of Arayat, Pampanga; the famous lawyer Don Mamerto Natividad, of San Mateo, Rizal; Mariano Parayno; Francisco Tizon, of San Luis, Pampanga; Ladislao Dayrit, of Mexico, Pampanga; the clerk of court de Leon, also of Pampanga; and many others, all property owners and coadjutors of all the towns of the principal provinces of the Islands. For this reason the said Liberal Party of the Philippines became vigorous and very enlightened because it was composed of the richest and wisest Filipinos, causing very serious worry among the peninsular Spanish officials especially among the friars.

FIRST SIGN OF LIFE

The first public act of this great party took place in 1869 when the first revolutionary governor general H. E. Sr. Don Carlos Maria de la Torre,[1] lieutenant general of the Spanish army and at the same time captain general of the Philippine Islands arrived. Father Burgos and Pardo de Tavera presented the Party with all solemnity, while everybody sung a hymn composed by the

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[1] Served as governor general from June 23, 1869, to April 4, 1871.

Filipino patriot and poet Don Angel Garchitorena, which ended with the following phrases: "Because the son of a lion is also a lion"; which meant to say that the Spaniards in the Philippines were the same as those in the peninsula, and should, therefore, have the same rights.

The friars and the Spanish politicians of their leanings were shocked at the impact of this first party which obtained as a first act of grace on the part of Governor General de la Torre the liberty of the undersigned who was at that time a prisoner in Bilibid, for the mere fact that as a student of Canon Law at that time he gave a lesson in Spanish instead of in Latin. I am telling this personal experience to show the hardship of the system of oppression which ruled then under the influence of the friars.

THE SOCIAL PICTURE OF THE ERA

Here is the social picture of that era: For the privileged classes, liberty and even license, and for the underprivileged, all the sufferings.

In fact, while the privileged classes enjoyed their privileges in the above-mentioned manner in the two houses of Captain Joaquin, without law or authority to restrain his acts and whims outside of those houses, the people were subjected to the oppressions of the *guardia civil*,[2] to the penalties of the tribute payer, and to the tribulations of the *cuadrillero*[3] and of the *cabeza de barangay*.

Notwithstanding my direct participation in those vices, the memories of my past sufferings in the cells of Bilibid in 1869 have not been erased from my heart, more so because Balbino Ventura who was also my companion in my youth, with Paciano Rizal, Gregorio Sanciangco, Ariston Reyes, and Engracio Gonzaga, who lived in Bacolor, an hour and a half (walking) distance from my residence in Sulipan, used to visit me and to remind me of our voluntary commitment to work for the political emancipa-

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[2] Created by a royal decree approved February 6, 1869, during the term of Jose de la Gandara, governor general from October 26, 1866, to June 7, 1869.

[3] A body of rural police which formed part of the Philippine police system during the Spanish regime. Its establishment dates back to a royal decree of January 8, 1836. It existed side by side with the *Guardia Civil* and the *Carabineros de Seguridad Publica.*

tion of our country, and, above all, of the oath we had taken a few days after the execution of Fathers Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora, to avenge their deaths so unjust and so base.

THE POWER OF THE CONFESSIONAL

One of the most significant facts of the governmental system which ruled the country at that time was revealed to me in the convent of Hagonoy in the dawn of July 26, 1881. My father-in-law, Don Joaquin,[4] and I used to be invited by the friars to the town fiestas, and on a 26th of July, St. Anne's day, tutelary patron of Hagonoy, we were invited by the famous Fray José Manzanares,[5] who belonged to the same type as Piernavieja.[6] While my father-in-law was enjoying a game of cards in a room, I passed the time with the others who either did not play or were resting in another. Among us were the captain of the *guardia civil* and Fray Manzanares who were discussing as to who were more powerful in the Philippines, the friars or the *guardia civil.* The captain of the *guardia civil* sustained that they were more powerful because they were the ones who could arrest and detain the *Indios,* since the friars had only the power to denounce them.

The captain told the friar: "If we do not mind your denunciations, your power over the *Indios* will be null because these will not fear you." Fray Manzanares burst out laughing, and answering the captain, said: "Captain, such is our power in the confessional that if we wished that your wife should not sleep with you, one or two nights, we could impose as penitence abstinence from the conjugal bed of two or more nights." The captain blushed, stood up and as sole argument gave the friar two strong fist blows, causing a scandal so much so that all those

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[4] Joaquin Arnedo from Sulipan, Pampanga, married to a certain Victoria; a daughter, Juanita, was the first wife of the author, his second wife being Guadalupe Abreu, daughter of Flaviano and Saturnina Salazar de Abreu.

[5] Should be Fr. Ignacio Manzanares who was a parish priest of Hagonoy, where he died April 23, 1881.

[6] Fr. Antonio Piernavieja who was curate of San Miguel de Mayumu, 1887-1891. Like Fr. Manzanares, he was an Augustinian. While serving in San Miguel, he is said to have committed two murders. His first victim was a young man, his second, a woman on the family way. In the turbulent days of the Philippine Revolution, held in captivity by the rebels, to save his life, he accepted an appointment as "Bishop" in a rebel diocese; but betrayed the confidence of his captors, collecting information concerning their activities which he passed to his Order. In expiation of his treason, he was bound to a post and left to die under the tropical sun.

playing cards went out of the room, including the alcalde mayor and the vicar, to pacify the combatants. Since then I remembered how dangerous was the confessional in the social life of the Filipinos who have continued and followed the practice of going to the confessional, and thus have been subject to the influence of two authorities: one, the husband and the other, the confessor.

THE INSURRECTION OF TAYUG

While I was enjoying a privileged life both with the law and the authorities, being in Sibul on the 10th of May, 1884, I was arrested by the commandant of the *guardia civil* as co-author of the insurrection of Andres Novicio which occurred in Santa Maria de Tayug, Pangasinan. The commandant brought me in a *carromata* to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija province, delivering me to the captain of the *guardia civil* who locked me up in the provincial jail of San Isidro where I slept on the floor without mat or pillow and without supper. At twelve o'clock the following morning, the door of the jail I was lodged in was opened and I saw entering my friend Gregorio Sanciangco who had, with a doctorate, returned three months ago from Spain where he had written his famous book *El Progreso de Filipinas.*[7]

The feeling I experienced on seeing Sanciangco a prisoner like myself was beyond words, because neither he nor I knew anything of the insurrection. Moreover, Dr. Sanciangco came to San Isidro, then the capital of Nueva Ecija, that morning of May 11, 1884, to visit the new alcalde mayor who was his schoolmate and friend in Madrid and who had graciously invited him to lunch; but while the two were conversing the alcalde received a telegram from the captain general ordering him to arrest Sanciangco. The alcalde became pale on reading the telegram and was at a loss as to know how to inform Sanciangco of its contents. His perplexity lasted several minutes and was solved only upon the arrival of the captain of the *guardia civil* who had also received an order to arrest Sanciangco, and having been informed that he was visiting the alcalde, came to comply with the order.

At three o'clock in the afternoon of the same day the door of the prison was opened and we saw entering the lawyer Anto-

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[7] Published, Madrid, 1881. Sancianco, not Sanciangco, died in 1892.

nio Constantino, also as a prisoner on account of Novicio's insurrection, and who, like us, did not have the least knowledge of the insurrection. At four o'clock in the morning of the following day the 12th, we were awakened by the captain of the *guardia civil* and after tying us elbow to elbow we were made to set forth on a trip that lasted nine days and nine nights from San Isidro to Lingayen, capital of Pangasinan province, where the military court which heard the case against the insurgents of Santa Maria de Tayug was. More than 1,700 of us prisoners were gathered in Lingayen, distributed in 15 houses aside from the public jail. Among them was the father of General Luna and his brother José Luna, the physician who, like us, were entirely unaware of the insurrection we were charged of.

HOW THE INSURRECTION WAS SIMULATED

What I knew about this affair is that General Jobellar,[8] the new governor and captain general of the Philippine Islands, arrived in these Islands in 1884 with the plan of secularizing the Pontifical University of Santo Tomas of Manila. His first step was to order the suppression of the adjective "Pontifical" thus reducing the name of said center of learning to "University of Santo Tomas of Manila."

Inasmuch as said University, by royal decrees of the Spanish Government, was under the Dominican friars who had the monopoly of private education in all the Islands, so that no one could open a college without the permission of the friar rector of the University of Santo Tomas of Manila, the friars were opposed to the secularization plan of General Jobellar, and as a consequence they simulated the insurrection of Santa Maria de Tayug, availing themselves of Andres Novicio, brother of the wife of Don Joaquin Luna, father of the painter Juan Luna and of General Antonio Luna.

About the months of December of the year 1883, and January of 1884, Novicio sent seditious letters to some Filipinos, who were found by the friars in their green list as their enemies, of the provinces of Cagayan, the two Ilocos, La Union, Panga-

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[8] General Joaquin Jovellar became governor April 7, 1883, and served till April 1, 1885. During his term the tribute was abolished and the *cedula personal* was substituted, 1884.

sinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan, informing the government at the proper time of a similar intent of such insurrection.

I had received one of these letters in my residence in Sulipan, altho my father-in-law Captain Joaquin had not, but I immediately sought the lieutenant of the *guardia civil* of Apalit, Ricardo Carnicero, and I gave him said letter signed by two friends. The content was an invitation to rise against the Spanish government and to proclaim the independence of the country, citing the example of Peru.[9]

About March of that year 1884, Don Ricardo Carnicero had been transferred to the detachment of the *guardia civil* in Asingan, province of Pangasinan, and was the first to douse Novicio's intent, so that when said officer learned of my imprisonment he presented himself before the military judge Major Puga, certifying to my innocence with respect to the case, a chivalric attitude, which united with the strong recommendations of my father-in-law, Captain Joaquin, worked in my favor in the treatment of the military judge towards the prisoners who were bound inhumanly to be whipped if they did not declare themselves guilty of the alleged insurrection.

A THRUST OF LAWYER SEBASTIAN

That was what happened to lawyer Joaquin Sebastian and another fellow called Bartolome Espiritu, if I remember his name right, both Ilocanos, who were hung and whipped to obtain a confession that they were insurgents. Joaquin Sebastian, however, in admitting his guilt, implicated not only Novicio, but also the Spanish lawyers, Dr. Manuel Marsano, and the licentiates Don José Palma, Don Rosendo Requesens y Requesens, Don José Ignacio Icaza, and many others, including Father Payo,[10] then Archbishop of Manila.

Major Puga wired the captain general requesting the arrest of those implicated by Joaquin Sebastian, and due to this circumstance the Manila authorities assumed jurisdiction of the

[9] Formerly the most important of the Spanish colonies in South America, Peru declared its independence in 1821, but it was not till 1824, after a protracted struggle, that it gained its actual freedom from Spain.

[10] Fr. Pedro Payo, a Dominican.

case from the military which, once done, subsequently named as special judge to the said case, the magistrate Don José Piqueras, who dismissed the case against most of the accused, limiting the prosecution against Novicio and the principal accused numbering about forty altogether. This case should in my opinion be compiled, just as the cases against Father Burgos and me, for serious study containing as they do politico-historical materials concerning that era of Spanish domination in these Islands.

A DANGEROUS MAN

When I arrived at Sulipan in October, 1884, I found myself completely isolated, because nobody wished to befriend me due to the fact that during my imprisonment in Pangasinan the friars and the *guardia civil* spread the talk that I was a dangerous man to the personal tranquility of anybody who wished to have a dealing with me, leading to my deprivation of my clientele as a lawyer and as a sugar merchant then.

Thus I went to my friend H. E. Don Joaquin Chinchilla, general intendant of finance of the Islands at the time, informing him of my unhappy situation, to which my good friend immediately responded obtaining for me the appointment of acting reporter of the Royal Audiencia of Manila, an appointment that required the unanimous approval by its twelve magistrates, for with one disapproval one could not be an acting reporter, because the position must enjoy the absolute confidence of the magistrates. Upon the publication of my appointment in the newspapers of Manila the first persons to congratulate me were the friars and the officers of the *guardia civil* of the province, thus ending my isolation which showed the reality of the system of privileged classes and underprivileged classes which the friars had created in the Philippines.

Thenceforth I endeavored to comply with my oath to avenge Father Burgos and worked incessantly in my position as acting reporter of the Royal Audiencia of Manila and in other positions that the Spanish government trusted me with later, which were successively, after that of reporter, those of attorney general of Binondo, judge of first instance of Batanes Islands, altho I never left Manila, and acting judge of first instance of the

province of Tayabas; this last appointment took place in August, 1887.

WEYLER'S REFUSAL

When I left my position as acting judge of first instance of the province of Tayabas in September, 1888, my friends Judge Don Antonio Mendo y Figueroa and His Majesty's Fiscal Sr. Belmonte proposed me as acting attorney general. But when my appointment was submitted to General Weyler [11] for his signature, this gentleman did not wish to sign it alleging that in the past few months the Filipinos had showed signs of insurrection and rebellion with the open declaration of the gobernadorcillos asking for the expulsion of the friars and of Archbishop Payo, the movement being due to masonic action of the then director of public administration Sr. Quiroga and of the then civil governor of Manila Sr. Centeno, and even spreading incendiary and seditious publications in the streets and plazas of Manila in which the Filipino people were asked to act to the extent of using "orsini" bombs against the Spaniards and aliens.

A PROTEST AGAINST INCENDIARY PUBLICATIONS

Having learned the motive why the governor general refused to sign my appointment, I presented myself to him protesting against such radical acts, to which the general answered that the publications having been written in Spanish they could not have been written by others who were ignorant and could not read Spanish, but by educated Filipinos who could speak and write in said language, and that he was surprised that none of the latter had made any public protest against such subversive acts.

Then in October, 1888, I published a public protest against said publications because I considered the publications as the inventions of the friars and could not have come from Filipinos even though they were regular and real rebels, because such acts in the case were improper for the end of those thinking of insurrections.

It has been proved beyond doubt that the friars had always simulated documents of insurrection and denounced their Filipino

[11] Valeriano Weyler, Marquis of Tenerife, was governor general, 1888-1891. He later became minister of war of Spain. Cf. Footnote 14, below.

enemies later as their authors. But as an act of gratitude towards my friends Messrs. Mendo and Belmonte, I told them not to bother anymore of giving me any appointment so that it might not be said that I protested for personal reason and not for the general concern to save all from any new trick of the friars. What I thought happened; Captain General Weyler, having been apprised of my published protest, was pleased and was about to sign my appointment as acting attorney general, when Messrs. Mendo and Belmonte told him that I was no longer inclined to accept the position.

Therefore, I dedicated myself to law, setting up an office on Marques de Comillas street of the city of Manila. There about the end of 1889, my friend, the rich proprietor, Don Telesforo Chuidian, turned over to me the defense of the parents, brother and sisters of Dr. Rizal who refused to pay the Dominican friars for the lease of lands in the estate of Calamba that they were cultivating. Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista was the first lawyer the parents of Rizal had against the Dominican fathers, but fearful of further persecution of which he had previously been a victim, having been twice imprisoned in Bilibid due to denunciations of the friars, said Rianzares Bautista abandoned the defense of Rizal's parents. In these circumstances, I accepted the case because I had the assurance of my friendship with all the magistrates of the Royal Audiencia of Manila and with the Marquis of Ahumada, *general segundo cabo*[12] of the Philippines at that time.

RIZAL'S FIRST IDEA OF UPRISING

To familiarize myself well with the case, I went to Calamba and there I learned that when Dr. Rizal was in the Philippines in 1887 he found out that the finance administrator in Laguna was Sr. Fox whom he befriended in Spain and who revealed to him that the tax declaration of the friars on their estate was declared very low in order to pay the least amount of land estate tax.

According to Spanish law the friar estates should pay the government ten percent of their products.

[12] The immediate head of the army and second in command to the captain general and governor of the Philippines.

Dr. Rizal then conceived the first noble political thought of open hostility to the clerical system of government that reigned in the country. He advised his own parents as tenants of the Calamba estate not to pay the friars' canon under the principle of their not being owners of the estate. Following this action of Rizal's parents refusing to pay canon, the friars sued them for ejectment. But what was behind Dr. Rizal's idea was that he thought that the action of his parents would be seconded by all or at least by the majority of the tenants not only of the Calamba estate, but also of the neighboring friars' estates in the towns of Santa Rosa, Biñan, San Pedro Tunasan, Muntinlupa, Imus, Tanza, and San Francisco de Malabon with their about 70,000 inhabitants. Dr. Rizal thought that the thousands of tenants sued by the friars would already constitute a grave danger to public order, and consequently, would call the attention of the government towards the friars' abuses of usury and despoliation on the pretext of saving souls from purgatory and hell for heaven and thus enabling them to usurp the natives.

In reality, following the default of Rizal's parents almost all the tenants of Calamba followed suit, and the great number of defendants already worried the government with reference to public order in the town of Calamba. This caused the voluntary separation of Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista from the cases of hundreds of defendants who came to confide their defense in my hands.

RIZAL WAS UNWILLING TO DEAL WITH THE FRIARS

Consulted by me on the case, the Marquis of Ahumada counseled me not to conduct any direct transaction with the friars. I acted accordingly and with the mediation and beneficial intervention of Don Francisco Iriarte and Don Vicente Reyes, of the judge and governor of the province, we were able to obtain from the Dominican fathers the following arrangement:

(1) The Dominican fathers as owners of the Calamba estate ceded the ownership of all lands comprising the area of the poblacion of Calamba which involved about 100 quiñones valued at ₱1,000.00 per *quiñon*:[13]

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[13] A quiñon is equivalent to two hectares, 79 ares, and 50 centiares .

(2) Accounts for rentals in arrears were all remitted;

(3) In exchange, the accused acknowledged the ownership by the Dominicans of the rest of the *quiñones* of the estate, and would pay only ten percent of the canon in succeeding years.

This arrangement was made in 1890, but Dr. Rizal on being consulted on it by his family, disapproved in a cablegram such arrangement, which led me to think that he had never considered the case from a private point of view, but from the political point of view. In other words, he was pushing the Filipino people to the brink of a revolution through the simple act of the tenants' refusing to pay the friars' canon for their supposed estate which, to Dr. Rizal, were all plundered in the manner he described the plunder of these estates in his famous politico-social book entitled *El Filibusterismo.*

I told therefore Dr. Rizal's family that I could not under any manner continue their defense because it would be useless for the object that Dr. Rizal proposed, and I advised them that the best thing they could do was to engage a Spanish lawyer. Consequently, they engaged the famous Spanish lawyer Don José Gutierrez who, at the same time he was defending the accused tenants, was insulting the friars in his writings, calling them hypocrites, robbers, and immoral.

PERSECUTION OF RIZAL AND HIS FAMILY

The friars, in view of the peculiar turn of the case, appealed to Captain General Weyler asking for protection, and according to rumor which reached my ears at that time, General Weyler gave the friars protection in that affair, sending artillery and military forces to Calamba which started to demolish the house of Rizal's parents, whom they arrested with his brothers-in-law, brother and sisters, exiling the men to different places of the Archipelago. In exchange for his act the Dominicans remitted to Spain the par value of ₱300,000 that said General Weyler was able to amass during his term of office in the Philippines; after that remittance, General Weyler arranged for, and immediately made, his departure for the Peninsula.[14]

[14] Weyler is said to have also received money from the religious orders for armed support against their tenants, and to have purchased office from the minister's wife in Spain.

By that time Dr. Rizal had moved from Madrid to Hongkong and began his plan to colonize a part of Borneo with Filipinos exiled by the Spanish government. This greatly worried the new Governor General Despujol,[15] and a plot was laid to bring Dr. Rizal to the Philippines and place him in custody. Consequently, after some correspondence with him, Dr. Rizal returned to the Philippines on July 1st, 1892;[16] but on the pretext of seditious propaganda sheets having been found in his baggage on that day of July, 1892, by order of Captain General Despujol, he was imprisoned and exiled to the island of Dapitan.[17]

From Sr. Timoteo Paez, a patriot of that era and who was a partisan of Dr. Rizal, I came to know in 1892 the following very interesting incidents:

(1) That he and some other Filipinos organized a party here in the Philippines called Partido Rizalino[18] whose first patriotic act was to hide Rizal's family in the house of the Chinese Martin Zomosa and effect their escape to Hongkong to be reunited with Dr. Rizal. (For that reason the Chinese Zomosa was also imprisoned during the Spanish time.)

(2) Sr. Timoteo Paez was commissioned by his party to welcome Dr. Rizal on the day of his arrival and offer him to head the party, but Dr. Rizal declined the honor saying that they had erred in founding a political party centered on his personality, because all men are mortals and political parties should be founded over the entity of the Filipino people and not over a single Filipino person. Dr. Rizal also advised the name Partido Rizalino should be changed to Liga Filipina. Following these, Dr. Rizal founded the Liga on the night of July 5, 1892, in the house now occupied by Dr. Arambulo on Ilaya Street, corner of Raxa Matanda, where the first monument was erected in honor of Dr. Rizal and the other Filipino martyrs and patriots in the suburb of Tondo, Manila.[19]

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[15] Eulogio Despujol was governor general, 1891-1893. He was popular with the Filipinos, but aroused the wrath of the religious orders who were said to have paid $100,000 for his dismissal.

[16] In reality, June 26, 1892.

[17] A town, not an island.

[18] Literally, the Rizalian Party.

[19] The monument was erected to Rizal and to other founders of the Liga by residents of Tondo on a site donated by Timoteo Paez, one of the members

(3) On the night of 6 July, 1892, the day of Dr. Rizal's imprisonment, the great Andres Bonifacio, later supreme head of the Katipunan, with Teodoro Plata, Emilio Jacinto and others constituted the revolutionary party against Spain called Kataastaasan, Kamahal-mahalan at Kagalang-galang Katipunan ng mgá Anak ng Bayan the objective of which, simultaneously with the proclamation of our independence by means of arms, was to obtain the freedom of Dr. Rizal, who had been deported to Dapitan by General Despujol. For this purpose the party sent Dr. Valenzuela [20] to Dapitan with the means to facilitate Dr. Rizal's escape, but the latter refused to escape in order not to stain the purity of his life by an act of cowardice. Rizal then returned to the Philippines to teach us to offer even one's whole life if the honor and dignity of the Motherland so required.

During all these incidences I was acting registrar of deeds in the province of Ilocos Sur, and consequently the above came to my knowledge through Sr. Timoteo Paez.

ORGANIZATIONS FOR LABORANTISM

However, on 1 August, 1896, the permanent registrar of deeds arrived in Vigan and I, therefore, ceased in my acting capacity, and I returned to Pampanga, Sulipan, place of my residence, where I came to know of the following events:

(1) On 26 August, 1896,[21] Andres Bonifacio proclaimed in Balintawak, barrio of Caloocan, the independence of the Philippines, opening hostilities against the Spanish forces;

(2) On the 28th of the same month of August, 1896, General Llanera with Captain Alipio Tecson rose in revolt in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, attacking the capital of said province, San Isidro,

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of the society, on December 30, 1903, with Rizal's mother, Doña Teodora Alonzo Rizal, unveiling it, assisted by relatives of other Philippine martyrs, the officers of Masonic lodges, the Samahan Nang May-Pag-Asa and the Club de Martires Filipinos. The inscription on the monument says that the Liga was inaugurated on the night of July 3, not 5.

20 Dr. Pio Valenzuela from Bulacan.

21 Altho August 26, 1896, is officially accepted, historians disagree on the correct date of the so-called "Cry of Balintawak." Teodoro A. Agoncillo, following Dr. Pio Valenzuela, a participant in the "Cry", asserts that it took place at Pugad Lawin on August 23, when the fateful decision to revolt against Spain was set for August 29, by tearing out their *cedulas,* raised their hands with bolos, and shouted "Long live Philippine independence, down with Spain."

but the attack was frustrated by Captain Arteaga who was sent from Manila along Calumpit River to aid the Spaniards;

(3) In Pampanga several masons and the rich proprietor Balbino Ventura, father of the incumbent Provincial Governor Hon. Honorio Ventura, were imprisoned.

Balbino Ventura had inherited from his parents the position of *camarero* [22] of the tutelar patron of the town of Bacolor, San Guillermo. The *camareros* of the tutelar saints had the obligation of dressing richly their corresponding images, placing these on *andas* [23] with silver sheet decorations, and sending the same to church on the day before the *fiesta.* Two years before his imprisonment, Balbino Ventura had sent the image of San Guillermo without clothes to the parish priest and without *andas.* This was the great crime of Balbino Ventura; the rest of the Pampanga prisoners were charged with the crime of being masons.

RIZAL'S MASONRY AND EXECUTION

From references and information obtained after I had entered Masonry, I learned that this benevolent institution had been brought into the Philippines from Madrid, as agreed upon by Dr. Rizal, Marcelo Hilario del Pilar, and Graciano Lopez Jaena, by one of the first Filipino masons, Sr. Pedro Serrano, who is now in the service of the Jesuits, who are the principal enemies of Masonry.

Masonry tends to make the countries of the world a home for all men with the object of paying homage to the great principles of liberty, equality and fraternity; and because of this, Masonry necessarily would be opposed to the friars who, as has already been stated, sustained in the Philippines, the contrary principles of privileges, fanaticism and intolerance.

To the propagation of the insurrection in the entire province of Cavite headed by Don Emilio Aguinaldo and followed by leaders like Trias, Riego de Dios, Belarmino and others, the Spanish government responded with executions, imprisonments and deportations. This caused a state of effervescent hos-

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22 Steward or keeper.
23 Platform borne either on the shoulders with horizontal poles or on wheels.

tility between the people and the government which rapidly extended almost throughout all the Tagalog provinces, after Dr. Rizal's execution on December 30, 1896.

In February 1897, Captain General Don Fernando Primo de Rivera arrived in the Philippines to relieve Captain General Polavieja.[24] Don Primo de Rivera whom I befriended when he first came to the Philippines in 1880, also as governor and captain general of the Philippine Islands,[25] called me immediately to a conference. In this conference, Governor General Primo de Rivera asked me what I knew with respect to the Filipino insurrection. I answered him that the Filipino insurrection was a fact because it had a moral basis in the loss of the Filipinos' faith in the Spaniards. I told Governor General Primo de Rivera that while the three elements representing Spain in the Philippines, the civil, the military and the ecclesiastic were united, the Filipino people believed in the virtue and power of Spain to guide their destiny happily; but the complete division of these three elements at that critical moment seriously scandalized the Filipinos in such a way that they had lost their faith in the power of Spain in the Philippines.

DISORGANIZATION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

To explain the division of the Spaniards, I cited the example of what was happening in the town of Calumpit, in the province of Bulacan, which, as a strategic town to the insurgents, had been chosen as headquarters of a company of *cazadores*[26] under the command of the famous Major Arteaga. Said town of Calumpit used to be visited at night by the insurgents, and Major Arteaga chose the church as the safest headquarters for his force and the convent, which was adjoining the church, as residence for himself and his officers, both being of strong materials, while the other buildings in the town were of wood, bamboo and nipa, and therefore, did not offer any safety against the

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[24] General Camilo Polavieja. He was governor, December 13, 1896, to April 15, 1897. Rizal was executed, December 30, 1896, during his term.

[25] Fernando Primo de Rivera, Marquis of Estella, served as governor twice: April 15, 1880-March 10, 1883, and April 23, 1897-April 11, 1898. During his first term, the cable between the Philippines and Spain was opened, 1880, and the tobacco monopoly was abolished, 1881. It was during his second term when the Pact of Biak-na-bato was signed, December 14, 1897.

[26] Literally, hunters. They formed part of the local police force.

attacks of the insurgents. The soldiers naturally disturbed the religious services which were the surest source of income for the friar who, as parish priest of Calumpit, grumbled against the military, and whose quiet and luxurious life in his convent was also disturbed by the officers because they consumed in only a day all his food supply, especially the wine, calculated to last a month.

Major Arteaga had to patrol the surroundings of Calumpit and especially the *pinac* [27] of Candaba where the insurgents often roamed, and for that reason, he asked the gobernadorcillo of Calumpit during his patrollings for cattle, sheep or goats, hens or roosters, rice, horses and carts for the use of his forces. The gobernadorcillo accommodated him at first, costing him money, but because Major Arteaga did not pay, the gobernadorcillo could not serve Major Arteaga the second time, for which the latter shouted at, kicked and insulted the gobernadorcillo, even threatening to place him in jail as an insurgent. The gobernadorcillo rushed to the capital to complain to the Spanish civil governor of his mistreatment by Major Arteaga. The civil governor who naturally wished to keep the friendship and loyalty of his gobernadorcillos as influential persons in their respective towns, was annoyed in turn and grumbled against the military. The Filipinos observed this great conflict among the very elements which composed Spain's representatives in the Islands, and consequently was losing the confidence of those elements for the defense of the Spanish society in these Islands. So I told General Don Fernando Primo de Rivera that in my opinion it would promote the cause of peace if all drastic measures imposed upon persons and properties of Filipinos by his predecessor, General Polavieja, be lifted at whatever cost; the said General found my advice to be correct, so that after visiting the camps of Cavite and upholding the honor of the Spanish forces, he issued a peace proclamation, pardoned the prisoners, and released their confiscated properties.

THE BIAK-NA-BATO PACT

Without my soliciting it, my said friend Captain General Don Primo de Rivera immediately entrusted me with the forma-

[27] Swamp.

tion of 200 volunteers at whose head he placed as officers a captain and two lieutenants, naming me also as an honorary lieutenant of said column of volunteers and assigning me to the general staff of the military commander of Pampanga, Brigadier General Monet. I congratulated myself for this unexpected confidence of the captain general in my person, because it freed me from the friars' denunciations which were filling the jails of Manila and the nearby provinces with prisoners, some for being masons and others for being antifriars.

In December, 1897, I received an order from General Primo de Rivera to prepare a table for 70 persons in Calumpit for General Aguinaldo and his companions who had to go to Hongkong in consequence of the Pact of Biak-na-bato, which took place towards the end of December, 1897,[28] between the Revolutionary General Emilio Aguinaldo and General Primo de Rivera thru the kind intervention of the illustrious Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, son of Maximo Paterno who had been deported to the Marianas as a result of the Cavite insurrection of 1872.

It was then for the first time I came to know Don Emilio Aguinaldo who, with his companions after lunching, boarded a special train which took them to Dagupan and thence proceeded to the port of Sual, to embark on the steamer which took them to Hongkong.

On April 1, 1898, I was summoned by General Augusti,[29] the new governor general who relieved Don Fernando Primo de Rivera who, after the Pact of Biak-na-bato, returned to Spain. General Augusti, the new governor and captain general of the Philippines in the presence of his *Segundo Cabo* Brigadier General Jaudenes,[30] confided to me the strained relations between Spain and America, assuring me that it was most probable the Spanish government would declare war against America. He asked me to organize a battalion of military volunteers conferring upon me the rank of lieutenant colonel to which I acceded. Accordingly, I organized a column of 600 men which I presented to the military commander General Monet, under whose orders

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28 The Pact was signed actually on December 14, 1897.

29 Basilio Augustin, not Augusti, became governor, April 11, 1898.

30 Fermin Jaudenes became governor *ad interim*, 1898, and negotiated the surrender of Manila to the American armed forces on August 13.

the column would be assigned; it was later called the column of Simon de Anda y Salazar.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

On April 21, 1898, I was called to Malacañang by Captain General Augusti to tell me that Spain had already declared war against America; and he asked me if he could count on the loyalty and valor of the Filipinos to repel the probable invasion by the Americans of these Islands. With the frankness that had always characterized my dealings with the authorities of the Archipelago, I told General Augusti that he could always count with the loyalty of the Filipinos, but with respect to their valor to repel the Americans, that would depend on the attitude of General Emilio Aguinaldo who was then in Hongkong. If General Emilio Aguinaldo would fight against the Americans, the Filipinos would undoubtedly side with the Spaniards; otherwise the contrary would be expected. General Augusti asked me as to the basis of my opinion, and with all frankness I answered him that the Spanish government had condemned to death, to imprisonment, and to deportation all Filipinos who were true lovers of their country and who could be relied upon to defend her against any foreign invasion and protect in turn all Filipinos who trusted in the power of Spain to defend the Philippines alone; and in the event of war between Spain and America the patriotic defense of Aguinaldo and his forces who escaped the death sentences, imprisonments and deportations above-mentioned could be hoped for.

In effect on May 1 of said year 1898, the American fleet under Admiral Dewey's command arrived in Manila bay and in less than four hours of fighting destroyed the Spanish fleet, capturing the port of Cavite which General Augusti immediately surrendered to Admiral Dewey in exchange for the postponement of the bombardment of Manila.

AGUINALDO'S ARRIVAL

At that time my battalion was occupying the defense line from San Antonio Abad up to Zapote and from this place to Muntinlupa, and here, joining my forces with those of Major Acevedo, I had my headquarters in Zapote proper. I remember

having been visited at my place by my friend Arsenio Cruz Herrera, now assemblyman from the first district of Rizal province, who told me cautiously that his brother-in-law, General José Alejandrino, had arrived with Dewey from Hongkong for the purpose of rousing the country to continue anew the insurrection of 1896. I answered my friend, Sr. Cruz Herrera, that Spain in the Philippines being as it was a sick man about to die, it would be better to serve her up to her last moments in exchange for arms and munitions the Spaniards would give the Filipinos to repel the American invasion which was to be expected after the defeat of the Spanish navy; and that after Spain's surrender to America, by means of a peace treaty, we could then declare ourselves independent with enough arms and with ammunitions; but Sr. Cruz Herrera did not see my point.

On the 19th of the month of 1898 referred to, the news had spread of the arrival of General Don Emilio Aguinaldo with his chief of staff to fight on the side of the Americans against Spain. I reported this at once to General Augusti who had summoned me, and on meeting my friend, Lieutenant General Don Antonio Dominguez Alfonso, he asked me what could be the consequences of General Aguinaldo's coming on the attitude of the Filipino people. I answered that if General Aguinaldo sided with the Americans, the loss of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands could be expected. Governor Augusti then asked me for some remedial measures to impede so disastrous a consequence, and I suggested that he issued a decree:

(1) Secularizing all the parishes to attract the Filipino priests in favor of Spain;

(2) Declaring all tenants of friars' haciendas as owners of their respective lots; and lastly,

(3) Appointing General Emilio Aguinaldo as brigadier general and chief of the Philippine armed forces, without prejudice of reporting to the government of Her Majesty such a decree for final approval.

With such a decree, I thought that we could have at our side the two most powerful elements of the insurrection against Spain, which were the Filipino clerics and the tenants of the friars' haciendas. Thus ended the conference in which my friend agreed

with me; but owing to the opposition of Archbishop Nozaleda,[31] and of the president of the Royal Audiencia and of his other advisers, the governor and captain general of the Philippines did not follow my suggestion.

PROPOSALS TO AGUINALDO

The following day the 21st, I was called by the Governor and Captain General Augusti to commission me to visit General Aguinaldo in Cavite and offer him the appointment of chief of the Philippine armed forces with the rank of brigadier general in the Spanish army, with a salary of ₱5,000 in exchange for his loyalty to Spain in the war against the Americans. On the morning of the 22nd I left Zapote accompanied by a friend from Cavite of Don Emilio Aguinaldo to whom, through his friend, my companion, I sent from Dalajican a letter requesting permission for an interview as an envoy of my general, H. E. Basilio Augusti, governor and captain general of the Philippines. In reply, I received a letter of Sr. Gregorio H. del Pilar, a Filipino colonel, granting me permission, in the name of General Don Emilio Aguinaldo, to enter, unaccompanied and unarmed, the port of Cavite which was already controlled by Admiral Dewey.

I arrived at Cavite at six o'clock in the afternoon of May 22, 1898, being received by Colonels Del Pilar and Mascardo who lodged me splendidly that night in the house of the Chinese Osorio. Up to the night of the 24th, Don Emilio Aguinaldo could not receive me. After having informed him of the purpose of my visit, he told me that he came to renew the war against Spain for our independence. Advising me as a Filipino who loved his country, he invited me to come to his side with all my volunteers. I called General Aguinaldo's attention regarding the purpose of my mission which was for a conference, but without being able to finish, the so-called *juez universal,*[32] Sr. Pedro Lipana who was present in the conference, said that I should answer categorically if I accepted or not General Aguinaldo's proposal. or I would be shot if I did not accept said proposal. General Aguinaldo admonished Sr. Lipana, and later stood up to enter a room, asking me to wait. When he came back he asked

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[31] Bernardino Nozaleda became archbishop, April 13, 1890.
[32] Literally, universal judge.

me for my credentials to attest my being a messenger of General Augusti, and after I have answered that my commission had only been made verbally, he ordered my arrest as a spy until I I could prove in writing my status as messenger. I learned later that inside the room Don Emilio Aguinaldo had come from were Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista and Don Felipe Calderon who advised Don Emilio Aguinaldo for my arrest in that same house of the Chinese Osorio and my imprisonment in its tower, where I was guarded by General Mascardo until June 6.

There I was royally treated as Don Emilio Aguinaldo brought from Hongkong a good supply of food and about 1,000 guns of "Amber" system. Every day there came to visit me Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, an old friend and almost a father to me because of his age and the experiences we had had during the time of Father Burgos, when upon the direction of the same Rianzares Bautista and Don Florentino Torres, now justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, I, Sanciangco, and Paciano Rizal, posing as *zacateros*[33] with bundles of grass on our heads, obtained in the house of H. E. Don José Esquivel y Esquivel copies of *El Eco Filipino* to be distributed to Filipino subscribers among whom I remember the most prominent gentlemen José Bonifacio Roxas, father of Don Pedro Roxas, the Filipino millionaire, Don Manuel Genato, Don Jose Salgado, Don José Maria Basa, and other rich proprietors and merchants of Santa Cruz, Don José Guevara of Quiapo, lawyers Don Mauricio de Leon, Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Don Martin de Alpa, and Don Gervasio Sanchez.

SPANISH SURRENDERS

From that prison of mine in the tower of the Chinese Osorio's house, I witnessed on May 28, 1898, the entrance of the first Spanish prisoners, numbering 200 soldiers of the marine infantry, captured in Alapang barrio, of Kawit town, Cavite province, by the small column of the Filipino Captain Pedro Castila[34] author of the assassination of General Luna;[35] I also

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[33] Grass cutters.

[34] Pedro Janolino, in reality. He headed the Kawit company which served as General Aguinaldo's bodyguards at his headquarters in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.

[35] He was assassinated at Cabanatuan, June 5, 1899, at the hands of Aguinaldo's bodyguards headed by Pedro Janolino. Since Buencamino was actually present

witnessed the entrance of the Spanish General Sr. Peña[36] with his 900 men surrendered to Generals Trias and Ricarte in San Francisco de Malabon, of the same province of Cavite. I sought General Aguinaldo's permission to confer with General Peña under whose orders my volunteer force had remained after my arrest in Cavite; and I asked Sr. Peña why he had surrendered without any fight. This Spanish general answered me that knowing the great might of America and the weakness of Spain he forsaw from the start the surrender of Spain to America within a few months; he also felt that the Philippines would always and forever be lost to Spain, and so much so, and because of it, he had decided to surrender without fighting for humanity's sake, and so that there be no more dead or wounded Spanish and Filipino soldiers when the day of our separation came. Then I told General Peña that if they, the Spaniards, were already unwilling to defend their cause in the Philippines, I considered myself relieved of my oath of loyalty and fidelity to Spain, and I could, therefore, join the forces of Don Emilio Aguinaldo to work for the independence of my country. General Peña told me I was free to act as would best suit me. I wrote immediately Don Emilio Aguinaldo a letter indicating my adherence to him after explaining what happened between General Peña and myself.

At the same time, I requested General Aguinaldo to please have a letter of mine sent to General Augusti wherein I related all that took place in my interview with General Aguinaldo and with General Peña, manifesting that in view thereof, I had decided to abandon the cause of Spain, as I should not be even more Spaniard than the Spaniards themselves, or as commonly expressed, more royalist than the King himself.

CONSTITUTION OF THE DICTATORSHIP

General Aguinaldo immediately ordered my liberty and invited me to witness the act of the second proclamation of the independence of the Philippines, which took place in the house of said General Aguinaldo in Kawit, Cavite province, in the

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at the scene of the assassination, he speaks with utmost reliability in stating that Janolino was the author of the dastard crime.

36 Nicolas de la Peña y Cuellar, auditor general of the army.

presence of more than 6,000 men all armed with guns, who then composed the Filipino army. At that time General Aguinaldo told me that on the day following his arrival, May 20, 1898, he asked Admiral Dewey for authorization to continue the war for our independence against Spain, an authorization which granted him with all the arms of the Spaniards found in Cavite. For this reason, Don Emilio, upon the advice of Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, issued the decree, dated May 24, 1898,[37] constituting the revolutionary government with dictatorial character, and on his secret orders he sent circulars to all towns and provinces of the Archipelago also directing that on the 31st of May of that year all Filipinos rise up against the Spaniards, proclaiming the independence of the Philippines, as it actually took place. Then I understood the need for an insurrection in the heart of the *poblacion*[38] itself, because an insurrection in the heart of the poblacion paralyses the enemy forces, cutting all means of communication, and furnishes the insurgents also with supplies of food and even of war materials; while an insurrection in the fields and mountains permits the enemy to have means of communications and, thus, ease to make decisions to chase and attack the insurgents, besides the fact that in the fields and mountains no supply of food and of war materials usually exist.

Now I think that the only effective insurrection would be what the Philippine Assembly through its deputies order all municipal presidents and provincial and sub-provincial governors of the entire Archipelago on a given day to pull down the American flag and in its place hoist the Philippine flag.

DISSENSIONS IN AGUINALDO'S GOVERNMENT

Don Emilio Aguinaldo placed me in contact with Mabini whom I found busy with his first revolutionary works entitled "The True Decalogue" and the "New Marriage Law" which conferred on the local town presidents the power to solemnize marriage without other requisites than the declaration of the contracting parties of their mutual desire to get married, which law was opposed by local Filipino priests and the lawyers Nazario Constantino and Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista. But Mabini

[37] Published elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

[38] I.e., the town proper.

at last won over his opponents, obtaining the approval of Don Emilio Aguinaldo. This was the first dissension I witnessed in the revolutionary government. The second dissension I witnessed was when he [39] had been named secretary of war by General Aguinaldo himself, and was later ousted from that position to give way to General Baldomero Aguinaldo, first cousin of General Aguinaldo.

With the discretion given me by the circumstances, I was able to observe the movement of that government and its dissensions, but I kept quiet knowing that I have come from the Spanish side, and the revolutionists, being Filipinos, could not have confidence in my judgment.

On the 26th of May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo transferred his government to Bacoor and assigned me as secretary to the military governor of Cavite, General Emiliano Riego de Dios. It happened that the day after I had assumed my position, the telegraph operator of the American General Mr. Anderson [40] who had arrived a few days ago from America with 4,000 men as a landing force for the occupation of Manila, cut our telegraphic wire to join with his. Called by General Riego de Dios to advise him on what we should do, I answered him that we should act as one mischievous fellow to another, which was to cut the American line and join it with our telegraphic station, preparing, of course, for any struggle that might arise. General Riego de Dios, who was truly brave, took my advice and ordered me and the chief telegraph operator General Valdes, that we proceed to cut the American telegraph line and join it with ours, which we did, showing ourselves immediately in the office of General Anderson, who was then in the Arsenal, to inform him of what happened. General Anderson called his telegraph operator and in our presence reprimanded him and cautioned him not to molest the Filipinos thereafter. News of this fortunate incident reached Don Emilio Aguinaldo, who wrote me a congratulatory letter and at the same time ordered General Riego de Dios to transfer me to Bacoor to serve under his immediate orders. It was not after I had been in Bacoor for ten days when General Aguinaldo received me. We had a conference for

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39 I.e., Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista.

40 Thomas M. Anderson, then brigadier general in the U.S. Army.

more than three hours in our first interview in this place, the following being the most salient points of our conference.

CONFERENCE WITH AGUINALDO

(1) General Aguinaldo asked me what I thought about the independence effort he was carrying on and I answered him: "General, there is a prior question I wish to submit to your consideration before answering your question: 'Who invited whom between you and Admiral Dewey? Did you invite Admiral Dewey to come to the Philippines or did he invite you?'" And I immediately added that I used such a metaphor to show that in a feast only the inviter should remain in the house and not the invited. So that, if General Aguinaldo invited the Americans, they should leave the Philippines after the feast; but if the case was the other way around, then the Americans should remain in the Philippines.

General Aguinaldo confided to me then all his conferences with the American consuls Messrs. Pratt[41] of Singapore and Wildman[42] of Hongkong, who invited him to come and cooperate with Admiral Dewey in the occupation of Manila, assuring him that the government of Washington would recognize our independence.

(2) Availing myself of the confidence General Aguinaldo reposed on me, I called his attention to the dissension between Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista and Don Ambrosio Flores, and I advised him to name the first as brigadier general auditor of the Filipino forces and the latter as governor general of the province of Manila, with the aim of satisfying these two revolutionists of very meritorious past records, for which advice he thanked me and which he adopted.

(3) I asked General Aguinaldo what position he was giving me within the revolutionary government of the Philippines offering to serve him in any level with full loyalty and devotion. General Aguinaldo told me that he wished to have me as his private secretary in charge of receiving consuls and other for-

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[41] E. Spencer Pratt.
[42] Rounseville Wildman.

eigners who came to call on him; as a result, I received the Belgian consul who brought a petition for the liberty of the friars as defenseless persons; the German consul who asked for exact information on the government decrees; and the French consul who claimed neutrality for the Compañia Tabacalera and its employees, whose assets belonged to French stockholders. I concurred with Mabini's opinion that the friars could not be considered as non-combatant persons inasmuch as they were captured with arms in the company of the enemy forces; and as to the petition of the German consul, compliance with his request would be made according to circumstances, as in fact orders were given that the properties of the Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas be respected as well as its employees, notwithstanding their being Spaniards, except when the latter committed some known acts of hostility.

This took place about July 16, 1898, when Mabini was busy writing his famous "Instructions of the Interior Government" of the country which were approved, signed and published by Don Emilio Aguinaldo on the 21st of the said month of June, if I remember correctly. These famous instructions of Mabini merited their insertion by the American commissioners in Paris to negotiate a peace treaty between America and Spain, in a book published in 1902 by the president of said commission, Mr. Hay, entitled *Peace Treaty of Paris* which was held on December 10, 1898, and ratified on July 11, 1899.

Meanwhile the government of Don Emilio Aguinaldo was extending itself following the successes of the revolutionary army led by Generals Trias, Ricarte, Riego de Dios, Cailles, Paciano Rizal, Pablo Tecson, Llanera, Mascardo, Tinio, Torres, Lacuna, Belarmino and others in the Visayas, and hardly a day passed without reports being received in Bacoor of battles of the Philippine army with the Spanish forces which were always followed with news of victory and surrender of the enemy. For this reason, the communications with the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Tayabas, Batangas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Bataan, Pangasinan, the two Ilocos, and Cagayan remained open throughout the year 1898 until February 4, 1899,[43] when said

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[43] Aguinaldo's proclamation declaring the outbreak of hostilities between the two forces is found elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

lines of communications were interrupted, owing to the outbreak of hostilities between the Filipino army and the American army.

Concerning this incident, I state with full sincerity that the first shot was not due to orders from the government of Malolos, followed by those from the American forces, as had been mentioned in the telegram of Major Grey whose vanguard was in contact with our company at the De las Damas bridge between Santa Ana and Manila which was the first encounter with all the American forces.

("Dear friend Kalaw: Here I close my work because the continuation had been given to you in previous information that you had asked me about Mabini, and therefore, I request that you please correlate those with these memoirs so that they may be complete, including my separation from the Spanish army and government and the death of General Luna, as it was explained in the stenographic notes of the stenographer Mr. Locsin, dictated by me also at your request.")[44]

I will, however, devote myself to other important facts which refer to the founding of the Federal Party; my testimony given to the committee on insular affairs of the House of Representatives of the United States in May and June, 1902; the formation of the Liga Popular Nacionalista; the establishment of the Presbyterian and Aglipayan churches; and lastly, all other participations I have had and have in the present politics of our country.

I should state here, that besides the post of private secretary to General Aguinaldo since June 1898, I owed him the appointment as *secretario de fomento* in the Malolos government which lasted until December 31, 1898; colonel of the general auditing office of the Philippine army at the outbreak of hostilities; special commissioner to inspect the army of the North and of all our provinces, a mission I fulfilled with lieutenant colonel of the military administration Joaquin Luna, going around Ilocos and Abra until the middle part of April, when I was recalled by General Aguinaldo himself, to be at his side in Baliwag as a special secretary and counselor of the captain general's office.

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[44] Note to Teodoro M. Kalaw at whose request the present memoirs of the author were prepared.

THE LUNA-MASCARDO INCIDENT

On April 18, 1899, the incident of misunderstanding between General Luna and General Mascardo occurred. General Mascardo had been appointed as politico-military commander of Pampanga and Bataan since July 1898, but at the outbreak of hostilities on February 4, 1899, General Luna was named chief commanding general of the fighting forces of Central Luzon which comprised Pampanga, Bulacan, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija and Bataan and, therefore, all the forces found within this area were subject to the command of General Luna. The secretary of war, Sr. Baldomero Aguinaldo, however, forgot to inform General Marcardo of General Luna's appointment. Here lies the origin of the tiff between the two generals.

On April 18, 1899, General Luna, who was residing, and had his general headquarters, in Calumpit, wired General Mascardo to send him Major Añano, if I remember his name correctly. General Mascardo whose residence and general headquarters were in Guagua, was taking a bath at the falls of Mount Arayat. He answered General Luna promising compliance with his order immediately upon his return to Guagua. To this reply, General Luna wired back, warning General Mascardo that thereafter he should not leave his official residence without the permission of General Luna as commander-in-chief of the fighting forces in Central Luzon. General Mascardo replied that he could not recognize the appointment of General Luna as such. General Luna again wired General Mascardo recommending that he read the Philippine army orders issued by said General Luna, and if he did not understand Spanish, he could get an interpreter for their translation. General Mascardo answered this last telegram that he stood by his previous reply and he considered himself honored in possessing only the language of his country.

General Luna forwarded all these facts to the captain general's office in Baliwag requesting General Mascardo's dismissal from the Philippine army through the formation of a council of war, and Don Emilio Aguinaldo charged me with the solution of the conflict. I solved the conflict giving General Mascardo's reason for not acknowledging General Luna's authority since he had not been informed by the secretary of war of General

Luna's appointment as general-in-chief of the fighting forces in Central Luzon. However, I also proposed that General Mascardo be penalized with arrest for a day in his own house having shown lack of respect in the manner of his answering a major general which was already General Luna's rank, while General Mascardo's was only a brigadier. Don Emilio approved my proposal and charged me to go personally to notify the two generals. At two o'clock in the afternoon of April 19, 1899, I crossed the Pinac [45] which lies between Baliwag and Apalit on horseback and sought General Luna in Calumpit. I brought him to my house in Sulipan to sup with me, apprising him at the same time of the resolution of the conflict between him and General Mascardo by the captain general's office, and informing him that the next morning I would take the train to San Fernando and go afterwards to Guagua to arrest Mascardo in his house. To assure General Luna, I showed him the letter of the secretary of war addressed to General Mascardo notifying him of the appointment of General Luna as commander-in-chief of the fighting forces in Central Luzon, directing him and his forces to submit under General Luna in case the latter needed their cooperation in the war.

THE INCIDENT CONTINUED

General Luna bade me good-bye satisfied, so that the same night I informed General Aguinaldo of my successful conference with General Luna. Don Emilio was in fact much affected by the controversy of his two dearest generals in the face of the enemy which was already in Malolos under the command of the American General MacArthur.[46] Very early the following morning, however, I was already about to take the train for San Fernando on my way to Guagua, when I received a letter from General Luna stating that his personal honor having been offended by Mascardo, he had challenged him and had named me as his second in their duel. I answered General Luna that in my capacity as emissary of the President of the Republic and Captain General of the Army, charged precisely with the official responsibilities to settle his tiff with General Mascardo, it did not strike me as proper to promote on that occasion the duel between them,

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[45] The Candaba swamp.

[46] Arthur MacArthur, then major general, U.S. Army.

nor to serve as his second, though great be the honor he was conferring on me. I proceeded on my trip to San Fernando, Pampanga, thence to Guagua where I found General Mascardo whom I informed of the resolution of the captain general's office which he respectfully obeyed, although he said he was ready to fight General Luna if the latter used force to arrest him.

I wired General Luna informing him of the compliance of the arrest order on General Mascardo, doing the same to Don Emilio Aguinaldo who thought that with the measures taken the conflict could amicably be settled. But on the following day when I returned to San Fernando on the way to Baliwag to report to General Emilio Aguinaldo the satisfactory accomplishment of my mission, I found out that General Luna had just left with 800 mausers and a cannon in company with General Hizon [47] and other commanders to effect the arrest of General Mascardo. I went to see General Luna and his guards, but these blocked my way. Then I sought his mother and his brother Joaquin imploring them to use their influence to prevent the struggle between the two Filipino generals in the face of the common enemy, the Americans, who were very near Malolos, but even for this General Luna did not wish to see me. I then took the train to go immediately to Apalit and later go to Baliwag to report the case to Don Emilio, but on reaching Apalit I already found General MacArthur's attack to advance to Calumpit, having learned undoubtedly of General Luna's absence, an absence that offered him the opportunity to advance.

ADVANCE OF THE AMERICAN FORCES

General Luna's plan approved by General Aguinaldo was a plausible one, because Malolos was situated in between Quingua [48] and Calumpit, with Quingua River and Bagbag separating them in half, so that if General MacArthur attacked through Quingua he would be met by General Luna directly via Bagbag; he could also be met by General Pantaleon [49] who was in Quingua and by General Gregorio H. del Pilar who was in Pulilan. General Mac-

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[47] General Maximino Hizon was a native of Mexico, Pampanga. He is credited for the Filipino's victory over the American forces in the battle of Caloocan, February 4, 1899.

[48] Now Plaridel.

[49] Pantaleon Garcia, from Cavite.

Arthur would, therefore, find himself in the midst of three fires, and that was why he did not advance for about one month and he did attack only on learning of General Luna's absence.

This action of General Luna to solve by himself his conflict with General Mascardo, withdrawing the Filipino forces from Bagbag, could not in any manner be approved, because he intervened in an affair already in the hands of the captain general's staff; besides he had no authority to withdraw the Bagbag forces without the knowledge and permission of the captain general. This action also gave an opportunity to the American forces to overwhelm the Filipino forces enabling them to take Quingua, Calumpit and Bagbag. While it is true that General Luna arrived the next day to take part in the battle with his 800 mausers, and that his acts of personal bravery on this occasion were so great as to encourage his aides to emulate him, costing the life of the newspaperman Villanueva, one of his aides, it was already late. General MacArthur, taking advantage of the demoralization in the Philippine army and its leaders, continued his advance in the days following and did not stop until he reached Apalit.

In October, 1899, on my initiative approved by Don Emilio Aguinaldo and the council of ministers, I drafted a petition to the Congress of the United States for the recognition of our independence. [50]

AGUINALDO'S RETREAT TO BAYOMBONG

On November 13, 1899, Don Emilio Aguinaldo apprised me of his plan to retreat to Bayombong, the capital of Nueva Vizcaya, as a place of refuge of the Philippine Government for which he had sent in advance the chief of engineers, Don Fernando Canon, to Bayombong for the purpose of building the corresponding defenses. He entrusted to me and Dr. Barcelona [51] the care of his family giving us an itinerary to proceed first to Tayug and from there to go up the Carballo mountains. But on November 14 our way was cut short by the Americans. Having learned

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[50] Cf. Buencamino's "Memorial to Congress", dated Tarlac, August 20, 1899, reproduced elsewhere in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

[51] Santiago Barcelona.

through General Canon[52] of Don Emilio Aguinaldo's plan, they have anticipated our movements cutting all our paths, so following Don Emilio's orders, we made a stop at Cabaruan, barrio of Manaoag, Pangasinan province, accompanied only by Colonel Leyva,[53] Don Emilio having taken Dr. Barcelona with him.

This barrio of Cabaruan, Pangasinan, is the place of the *guardias de honor,* an institution of superstitious and ignorant folks, purposely created by the Dominicans in the same way as the *colorum* had been created by the Franciscans in the provinces of Tayabas, Batangas, and Laguna. The object of the said friars in creating these societies of superstitious and ignorant folks, was to justify further their exalted mission to advance Catholicism in the Philippines.

But Father Aglipay who by that time was already a military chaplain of the Philippine Army, had been able to win the leaders of the *guardias de honor,* Antonio Valdes and a certain Patajo, now a captain in the Philippine Scouts. Because of the influence of Father Aglipay over these leaders, he suggested to Don Emilio Aguinaldo that Cabaruan would be the best place to retreat from the Americans, because, besides his influence, he had there a priest friend by the name of Pio Romeo, also an Ilocano. For that, Don Emilio Aguinaldo sent Mabini there, and ordered me that in case of a separation from each other, I should go to Cabaruan taking his mother and his son. Accordingly, I went with Colonel Leyva who came to aid us with 16 of Don Emilio's halberdiers in our flight as fugitives in November, 1899. Our caravan consisted of the undersigned, Don Emilio's mother, his son Miguel, Lieutenant Magsarile,[54] aide of the one in-charge of Don Emilio's horses named Nicolas, and Colonel Leyva.

INCIDENTS AND CAPTURE

We were received by the people of Cabaruan after an exhausting journey with an orchestra, but hardly had we sat on the floor to eat, when we heard shots followed by shouts of "Americanos! Americanos!" On my part, I pulled the old Lady[55]

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[52] Fernando Canon.

[53] Jose Leyva.

[54] Tomas Magsarile, a nephew of Aguinaldo.

[55] I. e., the mother of Aguinaldo.

Colonel Leyva and Aguinaldo's son, leaving the food and going down to hide in the forest until 7 o'clock that night, when informed that the Americans had already left. Later on it was known that it was a false alarm and a trick of the leaders of the *guardias de honor* made to rob us of all our baggage and of Colonel Leyva's and our halberdiers' arms, and more particularly of the money of the Red Cross amounting to ₱16,000.00.

The day following our arrival, the Americans really came guided by the deputy chief of the *guardias de honor*, Patajo, who sold us to the Americans for ₱6,000.00. The money paid him by Major Crowning which had been taken from us, really belonged to Don Emilio's mother, and consisted of ₱300.00 in Spanish gold. Lieutenant Magsarile was killed in the battle that took place in Palanan, when Don Emilio was captured. The American major separated me from General Aguinaldo's mother and son because the two were not considered prisoners. They were taken by train to Manila, while I was conducted to the town of Santo Tomas, La Union, and placed on board the *Brutus* for shipment as a prisoner to Manila. The captain of this ship, who was an excellent Spaniard, furnished me with clothing, for I was caught almost naked, and told me that I was a prisoner so dear to the Americans that they chartered his ship solely to transport me for ₱1,500.00.

THE *URANUS* FIRE

When we arrived at Manila, I was submitted to an investigation by General Otis [56] concerning the burning of the *Uranus* in the port of San Fernando, La Union. I told him that the act was most legal on the part of the Philippine army which held that port, because the entrance of all boats with the American flag into that port controlled by us being prohibited, and the captain of the *Uranus* having insisted, he was allowed to enter until he was in the midst of our fire resulting in the fire on board his ship. All the passengers and crew members were saved; the private properties not only of the passengers but also of the crew and the captain themselves were respected and delivered to me as secretary of state, receiving from the government

[56] Elwell S. Otis, then major general, U. S. Army.

an excellent treatment and transportation fare up to Angeles where General MacArthur's forces were, the general in turn furnishing them the means to make the trip to Manila. General Otis assigned as my prison a magnificent room in the house on Anda street, Intramuros, whose number I do not remember, but he told me that I was completely incommunicado and, therefore, I should take care not to send any news outside, because such an infraction would aggravate my imprisonment.

I was visited only by my daughter Soledad and my two sons, Felipe and Victor, who were boys of 13 and 14 years,[57] and thus I was from 25 November, 1899, until 25 April 1900, when I decided to pledge allegiance to the American sovereignty for the following reasons:[58]

RECOGNITION OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY

(1) I noticed our Army falling to pieces in a rapid manner—General Canon, General Venancio Concepcion, Colonel Sityar, Colonel Pablo Padilla, and numerous other chief officials and commanders were already prisoners, — all for lack of food and war supplies. Due to these circumstances, the war had to assume guerrilla tactics so as to prolong itself for ten or more years, which, in my opinion, meant a war that would render useless all the youths who would not be able to have the opportunity to continue their studies. Inasmuch as during that same period such few learned men and other intellectuals as we had might have died, either due to old age or to the war or to imprisonment, I forsaw the complete loss of the Filipino people, because with all our youths remaining in ignorance, we could become what the Aetas became after the invasion by the Malays.

(2) I had the chance to read General Order No. 68 of December 18, 1899,[59] which proclaimed the freedom of marriage and the separation of church and state. I had equally read Order No.

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[57] Dr. Victor Buencamino, in a verbal information given to the editor, stated that he and his brother were actually 11 and 10 years of age respectively at the time referred to by their father.

[58] According to a contemporary signed document by the author himself, he was liberated from prison by General Otis on April 15, 1899.

[59] Later amended by General Orders No. 70.

59 of May 25, 1900,[60] which contained the Rules of Procedure on Criminal Law wherein we were given the right to defend ourselves publicly and openly with "jeopardy", all highly democratic doctrines.

(3) Thinking of the geographical position of the Philippines, I found out that while we were 8,000,000 Christians, we were, surrounded by countries all Buddhists composed of 400,000,000 more or less, namely Japan and China, and that we would run a very great risk, alone without America's help, to be absorbed by those great and powerful neighbors. I conceived therefore the annexation of the Philippines by America with the object of gaining time under the protection of the American flag to promote our material and moral progress, without prejudice that in some future time we might be able to proclaim ourselves independent.

Here were the reasons that convinced me to submit to American sovereignty after five months of imprisonment and being incommunicado, taking into consideration that I was the only one of the ministers of Don Emilio who was held incommunicado.

I also felt that with the establishment of peace our youths would have the opportunities to study, since there were very few educated persons at that time. According to the census of 1903, in the Philippines with 1,200 towns, now converted into 800 municipalities, those with higher education did not exceed 75,000, when at least 100,000 were needed to run its government and public administration. Considering the foregoing, I addressed a letter to General Otis expressing my submission to American sovereignty under the condition that we would enjoy all the freedom that its citizens enjoy under the American constitution.

General Otis was greatly pleased and immediately offered me money and positions on condition that I cooperated in the pacification campaign. I answered him that I would cooperate in the pacification work without, however, accepting neither money nor position, inasmuch as I wished to work as I had always worked disinterestedly for my country.

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[60] The Code of Criminal Procedure, or General Orders No. 58, issued April 23, 1900, by General Otis, then U.S. Military Governor in the Philippines.

FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL PARTY

From then on I thought of lending my support to the Federal Party then just founded in the midst of our own people, because all the world appeared exhausted from the war, and the defeats of our army and surrenders of our generals and other leaders were further increasing each day. I believe that people in revolt are only instruments of Providence in manifesting its secret work and in the course of our political and social revolution, I have been chosen at the time with many others to achieve peace. I say so because my idea of annexation had not been widely accepted as that of pacification which produced beneficial results for our present youths who enjoy the chance to study.

In June, 1900, the Civil Commission [61] presided by Mr. William H. Taft arrived. He asked me to a conference, and told me to work for pacification. I replied that we could achieve pacification under certain conditions:

(1) On the basis of annexation.

(2) On the basis of a loan of $100,000.00, at 4 per cent interest by the American government to the Philippines. My reason for this, is that ruined as we the revolutionists were, the majority of whom were still in the field with arms, peace would mean adjustment in our mode of living and much work to recover war losses, and considering that not much money existed in the country to meet the inevitable demands of the people to be pacified, pacification would mean the spread of usury, an evil that may be fought only with said loan of $100,000.00.

I also asked for a general amnesty and the recognition of the ranks in the Filipino army, to which Mr. Taft replied that these will be taken care of by the government to be established after peace in the country was obtained.

All these conditions were indorsed to General McArthur, who was then still the governor general [62] of the Philippines. He re-

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[61] The second Philippine Commission, better known as Taft Commission, arrived in Manila on June 3, 1900. Constituted after the first Philippine Commission, headed by Jacob G. Schurman, completed its work in March 1900, it was composed of William H. Taft, Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses.

[62] I. e., military governor. Civil government was not established until July 4, 1901, and the title governor general under the American occupation was not used until 1905.

ferred the same to the United States furnishing me afterwards with a copy of the reply from the United States which reply I had registered with the notary public Sr. Heredia in the year 1900. This document must, therefore, be in the archives of public documents in the office of the executive secretary of these Islands.

THE FRIARS ONCE MORE

When peace was seen to be easily forthcoming, I noticed then that the friars, the enemies of the Filipino people, had started moving. They tried to win to their side the American commissioners who came with Mr. Taft, influencing them in determining the form of government to be established in the country. On the other hand, the Filipino commissioners, except Dr. Tavera, also sided with the friars, so that I noted immediately that Mr. Taft, with his commission, had gone to the side of the friars. This caused my separation from the Federal Party and from Mr. Taft's set in 1903.

In 1902, my friend Dr. Justo Lukban was already agitating for the formation of the Democratic Party, the Nacionalista of the Philippines. Notwithstanding the fact that I did not belong to it, I supported him in a quiet way within my social circles which were the Presbyterian Church of Tondo, the Philippine Independent Church, and Masonry, institutions which are the offsprings of the liberty of conscience and of religious freedom, in the excercise of which our people showed their great capacity to indulge in its blessings. Such institutions, which in some parts of Europe and even of America itself have been the cause of disturbances and even of war, here in the Philippines have been established, and continue to flourish, in the most peaceful manner in the world.

I am, however, neither an Aglipayan, nor a Presbyterian, nor a Roman Catholic in religion, for I believe as I should believe in only one true God, Who gives life and liberty, and neither kills nor enslaves; all forms of religion are completely tolerable so long as they are based on two great principles: "To love God above all things" and "To love your fellowman as you love yourself."

CAPACITY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE

Examining the social history of our country, one clearly sees that it is ruled and governed in its conscience by these two principles, because it renders cult to wisdom, to justice, to goodness, and to mercy, which are the attributes of God and which render due respect to the most prominent attributes of life, honor, liberty, family and property. Such constitute Filipino morality, so that this country appears as one with the fewest criminals and the fewest number of poor people, as can be gathered from the 1903 Census, Vol. IV, pages 444 and 445. In these pages the author of the 1903 Census, General Sanger, expresses admiration for the inherent virtues of the Filipino people with the few criminals and paupers which the Census shows in spite of the fact that it had been taken after various wars and revolutions, which naturally implied destruction of lives and property.

Our people, according to my social studies, because of their mores and industriousness, are capable of pursuing great careers and of occupying high positions, and their urgent need is education in the sciences and arts which are the only means to surmount the difficulties which naturally beset human life.

Our country is rich in agricultural, forest and mineral products and its people are so progressive that in learning new habits and customs, they constantly benefit industry and trade.

Our country, from what I have seen during the forty-seven years of political agitations that I had the good fortune to observe, is capable of sustaining major sacrifices to be able to enjoy its own independent government. However, the following great difficulties must first be overcome:

(1) Unity of the Moros and the non-Christians with the Christian natives.

(2) Political, social and economic discipline.

(3) A sincere, real and effective cooperation of Filipino with Filipino.

(4) A form of government simple and free from red tape that is most suitable to the characteristics of the Filipino people. Red

tape is often the means utilized by corrupt officials to take advantage of the citizens who come to them for their problems.

With these thoughts gathered during my forty-seven years of experience, I end this work, not without calling attention to possible errors in dates, places, and names which, with the help of the readers, would be corrected.[63]

FELIPE BUENCAMINO, SR.

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[63] The added notes are presented precisely to correct any such errors and to add to a better appreciation of the memoirs. As noted above (cf. note 44), the memoirs were prepared at the instance of Teodoro M. Kalaw, formerly director of the National Library (Nov. 18, 1916 — Jan. 1, 1917, and Feb. 14, 1929 — Dec. 4, 1940). After the author's death on February 6, 1929, the memoirs were published in *La Opinion*, a Manila afternoon daily is Spanish, where they appeared serially between February 9 and March 30, 1929. There is evidence showing copies of transcripts of the original memoirs were on file in the National Library, altho efforts to locate them there recently have proved in vain, having been probably lost during the last World War. Fortunately, a collection of clippings of the memoirs from *La Opinion* was traced by the Editor to Dr. Victor Buencamino, only surviving son of the author by his second wife, and it was from his collection that the present translation was made possible.

Report of a Tour Through the Island of Luzon*

MANILA, P. I., *November 23,* 1898

SIR: 1. In obedience to your order, we herewith submit a report of the tour of observation of the northern part of the island of Luzon undertaken by your authority during a leave of absence beginning October 5, 1898.

2. Paymaster W. B. Wilcox was detained by duty on board the U.S.S. *Monadnock* until October 6, Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent leaving on the 5th. Preparations for the journey were immediately begun, and were completed by the evening of October 7. From the experience of certain American officers we had learned that it was necessary, in order to pass through lines of the Philippine forces, to obtain permission from their leader, Señor Emilo Aguinaldo. To comply with this form, Naval Cadet Sargent visited Aguinaldo at his official residence in the town of Malolos. Leaving Manila by train at noon, October 7, he arrived at his destination shortly after 2 o'clock. Señor Aguinaldo at this time was attending a meeting of the Philippine cabinet, and our request for passports through his troops in the northern provinces was taken to him by his aid-de-camp, Señor C. C. Zealcita. In making this request we stated our rank as naval officers and the object of our proposed journey as a desire to acquire information with regard to this country, at present almost unknown to Americans. Señor Aguinaldo sent out word by his aid-de-camp that he was too busily engaged that day to provide the passes, and, furthermore, that a member of our party coming later to request them should be expected to have a letter from either Admiral Dewey, General Otis, or General MacArthur.

3. Naval Cadet Sargent returned to Manila by the evening train. The flagship *Olympia* being at Cavite, to have requested a letter from the commander-in-chief would have caused a delay of at least one day. Both members of our party being acquainted with General MacArthur, the circumstances were explained to him and a letter obtained on the evening of the 1st to Malolos. This letter was addressed "To whom it may concern," and was a mere statement that the officers presenting it wished to visit the northern provinces of the island and desired passports through

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the Philippine forces. It gave the itinerary of the proposed journey. The next morning, October 8, we also obtained from Consul-General Williams a personal letter to Señor Aguinaldo, requesting that passports be provided us.

4. At noon of this day, October 8, we left Manila by train with five servants, eight horses and between three and four hundred pounds of baggage, including a camp outfit, two rifles, and a shotgun, with ammunition. Paymaster Wilcox, in charge of the expedition, went on to Bayambang that night, while Naval Cadet Sargent left the train at Malolos to present our letters to Señor Aguinaldo. As on the day before, our request was taken in by Señor Zealcita. After a delay of about two hours Señor Aguinaldo's answer was brought out. It was to the effect that he declined to assume the responsibility of providing us with passports to travel in the provinces we wished to visit. Rumors had just been received of an insurrection, instigated by a Spanish bishop, in the northern provinces, on the western coast, and he could not tell how far an insurrection thus started might spread. While his authority was thus menaced he refused to provide us with papers that would make him responsible for our safety, while they might not protect us from illtreatment. He also refused a second request to furnish us passports specifically addressed to those soldiers only that were loyal to his command and stating that we traveled at our own risk. Thruogh his aid-de-camp, however, he gave us the repeated and positive assurance that we were free to prosecute our journey without passes from him, and that we should encounter no opposition from his forces. This oral promise was the only substitute that we were able to obtain for the formal passports that it has been the custom of the country heretofore to demand of every traveler.

5. Naval Cadet Sargent left Malolos by the first train next morning, October 9, and joined Paymaster Wilcox at Bayambang. At this town we remained at the house of Mr. Donald Clark, an Englishman, superintendent of a rice mill situated there. Here we made final preparations for an early morning start on horseback the next day. That evening two Americans came to Mr. Clark's house and requested shelter for the night. They had gone by train that morning to Dagupan, the northern terminus of the railway, intending to spend the night there. A squad of Philippine soldiers at the railway station, however, had demanded of them passes signed by Señor Aguinaldo. For want of them they were compelled to remain within the station until the departure of the next train south, which train they were required to board. This train remained for the

night at Bayambang. This evidence of the attitude of the Philippine troops toward travelers increased our fears that our progress would be opposed at the first town on our route. Through the influence of Mr. Clark we obtained from the "presidente local" of the town of Bayambang a letter to the "presidente local" of the town of Rosales, the first town of importance on our route. This letter merely requested that we be allowed to continue our journey through that town.

6. At daylight next morning, October 10, we left Bayambang and took the road for Rosales. We reached that town just before sundown and pitched our tent on the bank of the river Agno, outside the limits of the town. For the first 5 or 6 miles from Bayambang we found the roads in good condition and traveled with ease. Nearer to Rosales the roads were deep with mud and covered with water in places. We were forced to go on foot the greater part of the distance, men and horses having difficulty in making their way. About 11 o'clock in the morning we passed through the small town of Alcala. There were 12 soldiers stationed at this town in charge of a sergeant. They were armed with Remington rifles. We were met by the civil authorities and were surrounded by the people. Much curiosity was expressed in regard to our outfit, but it was of a harmless and friendly nature. No suspicion was excited and passports were not mentioned. The soldiers did not assert themselves in any way.

7. Between Alcala and Rosales we passed from the province of Pangasinan to that of Nueva Ecija. The province of Pangasinan is not touched upon in this report, since, except for the few miles traveled on the morning of October 10, we traversed it only by rail.

8. We were visited shortly after dark at our camp near Rosales by a messenger from the presidente local of that town with an invitation to pass the night at the government building or "presidencia." As we were already unpacked, we decided to remain in camp. We sent back to the presidente local by his messenger the letter we had obtained from the presidente local at Bayambang. We were visited during the evening by many natives from the town among them several civil officials. No soldiers came near the camp. The next morning, October 11, we continued our journey, reaching Rosales in a few minutes. We visited the "presidencia," where we were met by the presidente local and all other natives of consequence in the town. We were allowed to proceed without protest, although surprise was expressed that we had not obtained written pass-

ports from the Philippine government. There were about 20 soldiers in this town, armed, as before, with Remington rifles and commanded by a sergeant. We were detained at Rosales only a short time and then took the road for Humingan.

9. From Rosales to Humingan, and thence to San Jose, our experiences of travel were much the same as those already described. The road led through the low rice region of the province of Nueva Ecija. It rained almost constantly, and the roads were nearly impassable. We went on foot much of the distance. The pack horses were unable to carry their loads, and we were forced to engage natives to relieve them. Labor was cheap. Ten men could usually be engaged for a day for the sum of $2 in silver, or less than 10 cents in gold per man. We traveled slowly over this distance, the labor of walking through the mud, frequently over our knees, being excessive. The horses grew poor rapidly and we were forced to husband their strength. They were occasionally prostrated in the road and our progress was delayed until they could recover their strength. Moreover, we could seldom find proper food for them at night. As many as three at a time were unable to carry any weight for several days. One servant became ill and was left at a village. The rest of the party retained their health, with the exception of occasional cases of diarrhea and consequent sickness at the stomach, which did not prevent traveling. Our food during this period consisted of bacon and hardtack, which we had brought with us, and chickens and rice, which we obtained from the natives. The cooking was done by our own servant.

10. Through this part of the province of Nueva Ecija almost the only form of agriculture encouraged at present by the natives is rice growing. A little sugar is also raised. The land is very rich; we encountered no barren or unfertile spots. The fields at this season of the year are several inches deep with water. There is no timber of value along the direct line of our route, but in the hills along the river Agno forests could be seen. We passed through similar forests later, which will be treated in their turn. The forests in this district, however, are nearer to a market. There are very few horses and practically no cattle. There are great numbers of buffalo, and these are of extreme utility. The principal labor of the natives at this season is the threshing of rice. This is done very primitively, with implements that resemble on a large scale the pestle and mortar of a chemist. The mortar is replaced by a section of a log of hard wood hollowed out to receive the grain, the pestle by

a hard club from 4 to 5 feet long and about 6 inches in diameter at each end. This club is scraped down at the middle to the size of the hand. In threshing out the rice the native stands above the mortar and throws his club vertically into it with one hand, catching it up with the other hand and repeating the blow, always changing hands at the bottom of the stroke. Usually three or four natives beat into the same mortar and a certain cadence is always maintained. We have even seen them accompanied by a musical instrument. They pursue this occupation very industriously, and we seldom in this district got beyond the muffled sound of the rice beaters. A little cotton weaving is also done here. The cotton thread is brought from Manila and woven on crude bamboo looms into rough cloth, used by the natives.

11. In the villages of Humingan and Lupao there are a few Spanish prisoners — priests, soldiers, and civil officials. We have seen representatives of each of these three classes in these towns. We could detect no signs of previous ill treatment nor of undue restriction. On the contrary, they appeared to possess the freedom of the town in which they lived.

12. The towns in this section are neither large nor important. Humingan, the largest, has not over two or three thousand inhabitants. The church, with the convent attached, is the largest building in each town: it is built of planed wood, whitewashed. There are three or four houses of planed wood in each town, the rest of the village consisting of grass huts. The presidente local and other local officers are native Filipinos. Most of them have received a certain amount of education at religious schools in Manila. They are intelligent men and are extremely eager to learn news from the outside world. Their knowledge of modern history and geography, however, is extremely limited, and their ignorance of current events is surprising. We brought them their first definite information with regard to Cuba and to their own present status. One or two of them had heard of the Congress at Paris, but no one had any idea as to its object, nor as to its relation to themselves. They were well grounded on only three points—the destruction of the Spanish squadron in Manila Harbor, the surrender of Manila, and the declaration by the Philippine Government at Malolos of the independence of the islands and the establishment of a republican form of government, with Señor Aguinaldo as president. Even on these points the details they had recevied were very inaccurate. Between the towns of Rosales and Humingan there are two small villages, called barrios, varying in population from one to three

thousand inhabitants. We were thus enabled to sleep in a hut over night, and avoid camping in the wet fields by the roadside. These barrios are under the jurisdiction of the nearest town or "pueblo." There were soldiers in each town, but not more than twenty in any place, and there was no commissioned officer in the district. We were cordially received everywhere, not only by the heads of the town, but also by the laboring and farming people, who always saluted us in a friendly manner when we passed. On leaving each town our interpreter was presented by the presidente local with passes. These passes always included our native servants and packmen and sometimes ourselves as well. They were good only to the next town, and secured a comparatively prompt exchange of packmen. We were never allowed to take any men farther than to the next town without permanently attaching them to our party. It is the duty of the presidente local of each town to do his share in facilitating the journey of every properly accredited traveler. Usually the assistance brings him in a pecuniary return. The duty then becomes a privilege, and is very zealously guarded.

13. We arrived at the town of San Jose on the evening of October 14 and spent the night there. There was the usual guard here of between 12 and 20 soldiers, armed with Remington rifles and commanded by a noncommissioned officer. We had been warned by the official of the last town that San Jose must inevitably prove the end of our ourney. There is no road for 30 miles beyond this point, and in this season the natives consider the trail impassable to white men. Very few of the natives themselves attempt it in the months of rain. We found at San Jose, however, 10 men willing to accompany us as pack bearers, and with these we started out next moning. The trail proved to be little better than represented. Twenty-four hours more of rain would have made at least three mountain streams impassable. The trail is, moreover, extremely intricate. It leads for over half a mile along a shoal in a small river, and follows the beds of different mountain streams for many times that distance. Rushing water, frequently knee-deep on the horses, covered these stretches of the trail at the time we passed. On land grass and underbrush grow thickly over the trail and conceal it for considerable distances. Our guide had spent his life in this district and had traveled the trail very often. He deviated from it twice that day, however, and had much difficulty in regaining it. During the insurrection a company of Spanish soldiers had been sent over this trail. Our guide pointed out many spots where numbers of them had been ambushed and

slain. Huts that had been built for shelter at night could frequently be seen. According to the statement of our guide, very few of this Spanish force lived to reach the town of Carranglan. It is undoubtedly a trail that a few men could hold against heavy odds. It is the first of this nature we have seen. It is very hilly and the ascents are steep, crooked, and surrounded by heavy trees and underbrush. Numerous rapid streams were crossed during the day. The pack bearers at first refused to cross two streams that were deeper and more rapid than the others. They required both encouragement and example before they could be induced to make the attempt. It rained fiercely all day.

14. At dark we arrived at the town of Puncan. This town is the smallest and least pretentious that we visited during our entire journey. It has a population of about 300 inhabitants, only two or three of whom speak Spanish, and these imperfectly. The presidencia is a thatched hut with only one room. Next morning we continued our journey with the same pack men as before. The presidente local of the town could not provide a sufficient number and permitted this breach of etiquette.

15. The journey of this day was a repetition of our experience of the preceding day, with the exception that the rain was neither so continuous nor so violent. At 3 o'clock we reached the bank of the last river that separated us from the town of Carranglan. This river, the Rio Barat, was swollen to such an extent that our horses were carried off their feet before the bed of the stream was reached. Not being able to get our freight across the stream with the means at hand, we attracted the attention of a native on the other bank by discharging our firearms and sent him to the town of Carranglan to procure buffalo for our assistance. The buffalo did not arrive that evening, however, and we spent the night in camp on the bank of the river. Next morning we found that the river had gone down considerably. Buffalo arrived from the town, and with their help we crossed in safety with all our freight.

16. On the other bank we were met by a lieutenant of the Philippine army, the first military officer we had seen since leaving the railroad. We were escorted by him and his soldiers to the presidencia. The presidente local received us rather coolly and treated us in that manner while we were his guests. He asked us for passports from the central government, and expressed surprise and suspicion when he learned that we had none in writing. He was the only civil officer that we met until after we left Aparri that joined with the military power in opposing our progress. More-

over, he was the only one that seemed to have more power and influence in his own town than the military officers stationed there. The troops here consisted of 40 soldiers, armed with Remington rifles and commanded by the officer we had met at the river.

17. We spent the day at Carranglan, drying our baggage, which had been constantly wet for two days and had begun to mold. The officers here told us that there were still worse rivers to cross than those we had already encountered and other obstacles as well. This day was the 17th of October. At the rate we were traveling it was plainly impossible to accomplish the journey planned by November 5, and there appeared at this time no prospect of an improvement in the roads. We sent, therefore, letters addressed to the commanding officer U.S.S. *Monadnock,* requesting of the commander-in-chief an extension of leave of absence until November 26. These letters were given to the presidente local, who assured us that they would arrive safely at their destination.

18. We left Carranglan next morning. The presidente local insisted upon our taking a guard of 12 soldiers, with a sergeant, to protect us against the Igorrotes, or savages, that are said to infest the hills between this town and Aritao. We had but little difficulty making this trip, which lasted two days. The rain had ceased and the rivers had decreased so much in size that they were crossed with ease. At the end of the first day we camped at the foot of the Caraballo Sur Mountains, at an elevation of 200 meters above the sea level. The next day we crossed the mountains. The road is very steep and of a clayey formation. It ascends very quickly to a height of 1,050 meters, as recorded by our barometer, and then descends at about the same incline to an elevation of between 200 and 300 meters. The northern slope is covered with stones and pebbles. At the highest point of the road, a very well-defined summit, there is a stone barricade facing both sloped. This barricade was left here by the Spanish soldiers during the insurrection. They were driven from it by lack of water. It is an extremely strong position. At a level spot on the northern slope, about 500 feet below the summit, the Spanish troops have built a more elaborate fortification, consisting of a bamboo stockade inclosing a rectangular barricade of stones, with a small blockhouse at each end. There is a watchtower at each corner of the stockade. This fortification can be fired upon from above and approached from several directions at the same time.

19. We arrived at Aritao shortly before sundown. A broad branch of the Rio Magat separated us from this town. There was a "banca," or native dugout canoe, however, in which men and baggage were taken to the other side, while the horses were swum across at a point higher up the stream. These facilities for crossing streams were always available when necessary during the remainder of our journey. In the mountains and highlands through which we passed in the last two or three days there are extensive forests. The forests are not homogeneous, but contain many different classes of trees. the timber of which is in many cases valueless. Of the timber which we have seen the most valued on the island is the "mulawe," so called both in Spanish and Tagala. This is a tall straight tree with very few branches; the bark is very light in color, but the wood is very dark and close-grained and resists water and weather. It is much used for boats and for the floors and exposed uprights of houses. There is also much bamboo, some of which has been cut. The heavier trees are as yet unmolested. We saw no signs of savages nor of poisonous snakes against which we had been warned by the natives of the district. In going from Carranglan to Aritao we went from the province of Nueva Ecija to that of Nueva Vizcaya.

20. We were very cordially received by the presidente local of Aritao. On leaving next morning we were saluted by the music of a brass band and by the ringing of church bells. This precedent was followed by many of the towns which we visited in the next few days. There were about 30 soldiers at Aritao, but no commissioned officers. We were escorted on our journey by a squad of 6 mounted soldiers. At Dupax our escort was exchanged for a detail from that town. There, also, there were about 30 soldiers, commanded by a sergeant. Toward evening we arrived at the town of Bambang. These towns of Aritao, Dupax, and Bambang are much superior in size and appearance to those of Nueva Ecija. These towns and those to the northward of them lie in the valleys of the Rio Magat and the Rio Grande de Cagayan. They have been seats of Spanish authority for over a century. A telegraph line previously connected the towns in these valleys with Manila. This line, however, was torn down during the insurrection. The native officials have repaired it between Bayambang and Aparri, using barbed wire. They have been forced to leave many poles uninsulated, and short circuits frequently occur, especially in wet weather. The line between Bayombong and Carranglan is still down. There are many substantial wooden houses in each town. The church, with its convent, is usually built of brick, and is very elaborate. The

church at Aritao and many others date back over a hundred years. The native officials and leading men are better educated and better informed than those we had previously met. They possess, in addition, the same desire to improve their knowledge and the same receptivity that we had noticed in their country.

21. We spent the night at Bambang. The presidente local was absent, attending a fiesta or carnival at Ilagan. A military officer stationed here received us and entertained us. This officer, Lieutenant Aguinaldo, is a nephew of Don Emilio. He is the first military officer we have met since leaving Carranglan. He commands the usual force of 30 or 40 soldiers. Our treatment at this town was extremely friendly and cordial.

22. We spent the night at Bambang. We were accompanied by several soldiers and Lieutenant Aguinaldo. This was the first time that a commissioned officer had formed part of our escort. This town is the capital of the province, and has a population of about 12,000 inhabitants. At this place we met the first formidable opposition to our progress. A military officer of the rank of commandante, corresponding to the grade of major in our Army, is stationed at this town, and is in fact the governor of the province under the orders of the colonel commanding in this district. He was absent at the time of our arrival, attending the fiesta at Ilagan. His place was taken by the next military officer in rank, Lieutenant Gemenes. This officer received us very coldly and demanded passports. He refused to be satisfied with our statement of the promise we had received from Don Emilio Aguinaldo. He informed us that before permitting us to proceed he would require the authority of his colonel, who was then at Ilagan. He sent a telegram concerning us to the colonel and left us to await the decision of that officer.

23. We spent the afternoon and night at the house of a native lawyer, Señor Arriola. Our host was a very intelligent man, and we explained our position fully to him. We told him that passports are not required of travelers in the United States nor in any other free country. This information seemed to surprise him very much, but he readily accepted it as an argument against the attitude of the local lieutenant toward us. He left us for a short time to speak with other men of importance in the town and to use his influence in our favor. When he returned he assured us that we were at perfect liberty to travel without passes, and that the only question remaining was whether or not we were entitled to a military

escort. As we would have gladly dispensed with the escort, we accepted this information as a decision entirely in our favor.

24. Next morning Lieutenant Gemenes came very early to the house where we were entertained to tell us that a military escort was ready to accompany us on our journey at any hour. He hoped that we cherished no ill will against him for his action on the preceding day. We were not able to determine whether a favorable reply had been received from the colonel or whether this change of attitude was due to our arguments on the evening previous and to the influence of Señor Arriola. We left Bayombong with an escort consisting of a second lieutenant and 10 soldiers. The band was paraded and church bells rung. There was the greatest possible cordiality of feeling. At Bayombong there are stationed the commandante. First Lieutenant Gemenes, and a second lieutenant. There are 60 or 70 soldiers at Bayombong, armed, in this case, with both Remington and Mauser rifles.

25. We proceeded through the town of Solano to Bagabag. These towns are similar to Bambang and Dupax. They have the customary guard of about 30 soldiers. There are no commissioned officers in these towns, the soldiers being controlled by the officers at Bayombong. We were cordially received everywhere during this day and the next, and we were greeted unconditionally as friends. From Aritao to Bambang we had found very good roads. The weather had been clear since our departure from Carranglan, and the roads were consequently dry and the traveling easy. From Bagabag to the next town, Cordon (called Estella on the map), there is only a mountain trail. This trail is infested at certain seasons by Igorrotes, who waylay and murder persons traveling is small and unarmed parties. Several murders have occurred here recently. Three small parties of natives, with horses and buffaloes had been waiting at Bagabag for several days for an opportunity to travel with a military escort. They joined us next day.

26. We left Bagabag next morning with 12 soldiers. These, with the pack bearers and natives accompanying us, brought our number up to 47. The trail over these mountains is a good road, very easy of ascent. It winds up the slope, making the incline very gradual. The mountains are covered with forests similar to those on the Carballo and contain many small streams. There are two bamboo stockades between Bagabag and Cordon. One of these, Diadi, is indicated on the map; the other, Rosario, has been recently erected by the native government. It is situated

about halfway between Bagabag and Diadi. Each stockade has a garrison of 15 soldiers, in command of a sergeant. These stockades are merely outposts against the Igorrotes. They are very frail, and would offer no resistance to a rifle bullet. In passing over these mountains our escorts used their rifles very freely, firing into every thick bush that might conceal a savage and frequently into the air as well, in order, they said, that the Igorrotes might know that our party carried firearms. We spent the night at Cordon, where the feeling toward us proved to be very fiendly. There are 30 soldiers at Cordon, under command of a first lieutenant.

27. In passing from Diadi to Cordon we went from the province of Nueva Vizcaya into that of Isabella. Nueva Vizcaya is a rich province naturally, but it is surrounded by the mountains and has no outlet. The Rio Magat, which connects the province with Rio Grande de Cagayan, is not navigable, even for canoes of large size. The province produces principally rice, sugar, cocoa, and coffee. It is also rich in timber.

28. We left next morning — October 24 — for Carig, intending to reach Echague that night. We were escorted by 6 soldiers and the lieutenant. We found the road to Carig in good condition, and reached that town about 10 o'clock. This town is small and poor. It has a guard of only 15 soldiers, with no officers. The garrison had been reduced to a minimum on account of an illness prevalent in the immediate locality, which had affected the soldiers. We left Carig after a short stay for breakfast with a squad of 5 soldiers. One of them introduced himself as Señor Villa, commandante of the military forces of the province of Isabella. His companion was Lieutenant Guzman, an officer acting as his aid. Señor Villa informed us that he received orders from his colonel to leave his headquarters at Ilagan and to make all possible speed toward Bayombong, where we had last been heard from. His orders were to demand passports from us signed by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. If we were traveling without them, he was to examine into the object of our journey and to consult by wire with his colonel before permitting us to proceed. As there was no telegraph station at Echague, we were forced to turn back to Carig. Here we were informed that the line was down somewhere, between the station and Ilagan. Men were sent out to repair it, and we were forced to wait until it should be opened. We were taken by the commandante to the convent of the town and installed there. Our delay in this town lasted seven days — from noon October 24 to noon October 31.

29. The first two days were occupied in repairing the lines. On October 27 Señor Villa was able to communicate with his colonel. He brought back the answer that the officer had already sent a messenger to the central government asking for instructions. We were required to await the answer of the message, which had been, according to the information we received, three days on the road. Señor Villa assured us that an answer would arrive in three days. This appeared impossible to us, but we were obliged to accept his statement. After the expiration of three days we gave to Señor Villa, and requested him to send to Colonel Tirona, a telegram signed by ourselves. It was a mere statement that our accommodations were poor in Carig, and that if a longer delay was necessary we desired to proceed to Ilagan. This telegram was sent to Aparri. The colonel, however, at that time was on his way from Ilagan to Aparri. That night it rained and there was a violent wind. Next morning the line was down in several places. While we were waiting for the line to be repaired we composed a long telegram to Colonel Tirona, stating our position, explaining that we were required to return to Manila by the 26th of November, and requesting him to decide from his own authority whether we should proceed or turn back. On the morning of October 31 we gave the telegram to Señor Villa. Señor Villa himself wrote a telegram to accompany ours, stating that in his opinion we had not come into the country to draw plans or for any other military purpose. This was a statement which he had given us to understand at the time had formed part of his original telegram to Colonel Tirona a few days before. The line from Carig to Ilagan was still closed, but that from Ilagan to Aparri was supposed to be open. The two telegram were given to a mounted courier, with orders to take them with all speed to Ilagan, to send them from there by wire, and to return with the answer. This journey would have occupied at least three days. Fortunately the line to Ilagan was reported open just as the courier was about to start. His orders were accordingly counterminded. Colonel Tirona's answer to our first telegram came during the morning. It was favorable. He saluted us affectionately, and authorized Señor Villa to accompany us to Ilagan.

30. During our detention at Carig we were not treated as prisoners. We were informed that if we wished to return to Manila by the same road we had followed in leaving it we were at liberty to do so. Within the village itself we had, of course, entire liberty. We asked Señor Villa if the Philippine Republic intended to demand passports of travelers, and used the same argument that had proved so efficient at Bayombong. He

replied that it would be the custom only in time of war. He classed this period as a time of war and the congress at Paris as a mere suspension of hostilities, at the end of which their nation might again be enveloped in war. Our relations with Señor Villa were mainly official. His manner toward us was brusque and at times discourteous. He was extremely suspicious of us, particularly of the diary that we kept from day to day and of a camera that formed part of our equipment. He became slowly convinced, however, that we were not seeking for military information. After he had assured himself of this, he told us that the colonel had feared that we were making maps of the country. During the rest of our journey we were entirely free from the taint of this suspicion. According to Señor Villa's statement, the charge had first been made by the Spanish prisoners, who have never ceased to warn the natives that American troops would come into the province to conquer them, when they would find themselves in worse hands than before they rebelled against Spain.

31. A redeeming feature of our detention at Carig was the companionship of two lieutenants of the Philippine army that were quartered with us. These officers, Lieutenant Guzman and Lieutenant Clarabal, were very pleasant and gentlemanly.

32. We left Carig on the afternoon of October 31, accompanied by Commandante Villa, Lieutenant Guzman, Lieutenant Clarabal, and the five soldiers that had arrived with the commandante. It had rained almost constantly during the last week, and the two rivers between Carig and Echague were greatly swollen. We lost a horse in the river Carig, but crossed without other accident. In these streams, and particularly in the river Magat and the Rio Grande de Cagayan, there are many alligators, of which the natives are in great fear. No native will venture into the water or into the grass along the bank until he has first thrown stones in front of him to frighten away any alligators which may be in the neighborhood.

33. Echague is somewhat larger and more pretentious than Carig. It has a guard of 20 soldiers. From this town we went by boat to Ilagan, sending the servants with the horses by the road. The boat was a dugout, 25 feet long and 3 feet wide, with a grass canopy amidship 8 feet long. It was rowed by six natives. There are many eddies and whirlpools in the river, rendering it for some distance below Echague almost unnavigable, even for bancas. We shipped water repeatedly and were twice nearly

swamped. Farther down, particularly below the mouth of the Rio Magat, the stream is deeper and quieter, and cascoes and pangas come up to this point with freight received from the steamers at Aparri.

34. We arrived at Ilagan that evening — November 1. This town is the capital city of the province of Isabella. It has a population of between ten and fifteen thousand inhabitants, and has many large wooden houses roofed with corrugated iron, giving it rather a European appearance. It is well situated for defense, being at the junction of the Rio Pinacanauan with the Rio Grande. It is protected by these wide streams from all points except the south. To attack the city by land from the south it would be necessary to bring troops up the eastern side of the Rio Grande, where there are no roads. The site of the city is raised, moreover, about 40 feet above the level of the river. At this city there are stationed the commandante, Señor Villa, 2 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 surgeons, and about 100 soldiers. Besides the officers named above there is a "commandante interno," or civil officer, who takes charge in the absence of the commandante.

35. We remained at Ilagan two days, and were treated with great friendliness. The commandante interno, who is the highest civil officer in the province, was particularly cordial. This gentleman, Señor Guzman, father of the lieutenant who was with us at Carig, is a member of one of the most influential families in the province, and his friendship was of great advantage to us. In this town we were entertained at the house of a wealthy citizen. The first night after our arrival a ball was given in our honor, at which there were over 40 young ladies and an equal number of well-dressed and gentlemanly men. The ball was well conducted. The dances were Spanish. The next evening we were invited to the theater to see two one-act Spanish comedies, presented by the society of young people of the town. They were both excellently given, and spoke well for the intelligence of the players.

36. We desired to continue our journey from Ilagan to Tuguegarao, and from that point across the mountains to the western coast. This request was wired by Señor Villa to Colonel Tirona at Aparri. That officer replied that it would not be possible to make the propose trip at this season of the year. He invited us to proceed to Aparri, saying that he would send a steam launch up the river to take us to that city. We replied by another telegram, repeating our request and saying that the trip across the mountains would be made at our own risk. The reply

was a courteously worded but positive refusal. The colonel had sent out messengers to examine the roads and they reported them impassable. Moreover, there was danger from Igorrotes. He said that he felt himself responsible for our safety in the district over which he held command. He feared that any accident happening to our party might be misconstrued by our Government and create a wrong and injurious impression of the good faith of the Philippines and the tranquility of the country. He repeated his invitation to visit Aparri, take a steamer from that port, disembark at a northern point on the western coast, and continue our journey south by land. This arrangement was accepted as the most satisfactory one left open to us.

37. There are many Spanish prisoners in this town—civil officers, priests, soldiers. Eighty-four priests were paraded in the street for our inspection. The greater number of them were dressed in civilian garb, only four or five of them wearing the robes of their office. Nearly all of them wore long hair and beards. They appeared in good health, and we could detect no evidence of maltreatment. These priests had been assembled from different parts of the province. They are kept under stricter guard than either of the other two classes of prisoners for the reason that the native officials fear that if permitted to go among the people they will use the influence they possess through their position in the church to incite them against the Philippine government. We also met Don Jose Perez, a Spaniard, who had previously been governor of the island. He was well dressed and appeared to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts.

38. Our horses arrived at Ilagan November 2 and were sent on to Aparri next day. The steam launch mentioned by the colonel not arriving on time, we expressed our desire to set out in a canoe without delay. A "panga" or large built-up canoe, rowed by twelve men, was accordingly prepared. Friday morning, November 4, we embarked for Aparri. We were accompanied on the journey by Commandante Villa and Lieutenant Guzman. All the officers, civil and military, of the town accompanied us to the boat and wished us a pleasant journey.

39. The trip from Ilagan to Aparri lasted three days. We stopped at only one town on the way. This was Cabagan Viejo, which we visited while waiting for the moon to rise on the evening of the third day. At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the second day we were met, about

18 miles above Aparri, by the steam launch sent by Colonel Tirona. We were taken in tow and arrived at Aparri that night, November 5.

40. In these two days we passed out of the province of Isabella and entirely through the province of Cagayan. These are the leading tobacco provinces in the island. An idea of their wealth can be obtained from the fact that before the Philippine insurrection $3,000,000 in tobacco alone came yearly from the one province of Isabella. The tobacco of this province is preferred for exportation to that of Cagayan. Both provinces raise also sugar, rice, cocoa, and coffee. Cattle also are shipped from Aparri. The Rio Grande through these provinces is the great artery of trade. Tobacco is sent down the river in cascos and pangas, and imports from Aparri are taken back by the same means. The current is very swift, and it is slow and difficult work to ascend the river in these boats. Poling is the method resorted to. The banks of the river are about 20 feet above the stream over most of the distance and are regular throughout. The width of the river varies from 100 to 500 yards. Much fishing with nets is done in the river.

41. At Aparri we went alongside the *Philippina* and reached the wharf by crossing this vessel. We were met on board by Commandante Leyba, military commander in the province of Cagayan. We were taken to a private house, where we were quartered during our stay at Aparri. Here we met Colonel Tirona, commander of the military district, including the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabella, and Cagayan. He welcomed us cordially and continued from that time to treat us in a very friendly manner. We remained at Aparri three days, until the departure of the steamer *Oslo,* November 9.

42. The steamer *Saturnas,* which had left the harbor the day before our arrival, brought news from Hongkong papers that the Senators from the United States at the congress at Paris favored the independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel Tirona considered the information of sufficient reliability to justify him in regarding the Philippine independence as assured and warfare in the island at an end. For this reason he proceeded to relinquish the military command he held over the provinces and to place this power in the hands of a civil officer elected by the people. On the day following our arrival in Aparri the ceremony occurred which solemnized this transfer of authority in the province of Cagayan. The presidentes locales of all the towns in the province were present at the ceremony, conducted by a native priest. After the

priest had retired Colonel Tirona made a short speech, stating that, since in all probability permanent peace was at hand, it became his duty to relinquish the authority he had previously held over the province and to place it in the hands of a civil officer elected by the people. He then handed the staff of office to the man who had been elected "jefe-provincial." This officer also made a speech, in which he thanked the disciplined military forces and their colonel for the service they had rendered the province and assured them that the work they had begun would be perpetuated by the people of the province, where every man, woman, and child stood ready to take up arms to defend their newly won liberty and to resist with the last drop of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever to bring them back to their former state of dependence. His speech was very impassioned. He then knelt, placed his hand on an open Bible, and took the oath of office. He was followed by the three other officers who constitute the provincial government, the heads of the three departments — justice, police, and internal revenue. Every town in this province has this same organization. At the time of our departure Colonel Tirona planned to go within a few days to Ilagan and from there to Bayombong, repeating this ceremony in the capital city of each province.

43. We were hospitably entertained at Aparri; two balls were given in our honor. The town has a population of 20,000 inhabitants. It has many handsome houses and several well-defined streets. The military force stationed here consists of 300 soldiers; in addition to which the harbor has the protection of the gunboat *Philippina,* which carries two guns of a caliber of about 3 inches. There are several officers here, three captains and five or six lieutenants. The colonel goes from town to town in his district, and Commandante Leyba spends part of his time at Tuguegarao. There are no Spaniards here, with the exception of two or three merchants; one of these, representing the company of the steamer *Saturnas,* we have met. He is pursuing his business entirely unmolested. All the priests, soldiers, and civil officers have been sent to Tuguegarao and other towns up the river. Colonel Tirona does not consider them secure in a port town.

44. We left Aparri November 9 on the steamer *Oslo*. Before leaving Colonel Tirona provided us with a letter directed to Colonel Tino, at Vigan, in the province of Ilocos Sur, or, in the event of his absence from that town, to the commandante. This letter was sealed. The steamer

left port at 12:30 p.m., drawing 14 feet 9 inches; Captain Pederson, commanding the *Oslo,* was not acquainted with the port of Currimao, in the province of Ilocos Norte, the port at which we wished to disembark, but took us to Salomague, a few miles farther south, in the province of Ilocos Sur. The natives assert that the former harbor is much more secure and easy to enter than the latter. The *Oslo* remained outside the breakers, while we were put ashore in a ship's boat. We passed several native canoes going out to the ship, the leading one having on board a sergeant with a squad of soldiers. We landed on the beach and immediately sent the boat back to the ship. A few minutes later two officials from the town of Cabugao rode up. Our arrival had been reported to them, and they had come immediately to refuse us permission to disembark. The *Oslo* was already under way, however, and they were not able to carry out their intention. On the shore at Salomague there is a fortification about 5 feet high and 150 feet long. This barricade is built of sticks arranged in two rows and filled in between with sand and coral stones.

45. Its walls are about 4 feet thick, and it is built in the form of a crescent, with the concave part toward the sea. The formation of the reefs here and for some distance south along the coast is coral. The officers who met us were both dressed in military uniform. One of them wore the insignia of a first lieutenant, the other none whatever. Horses were provided for us, and we accompanied the officers to Cabugao. The officer without insignia of rank proved to be a native priest, the curé of the village. He put on his robe over his uniform as soon as he reached the convent. It is a fact worthy of note that in every town we visited in the province on the western coast we were met by a curé, who appeared to have great influence in civil matters. In the four provinces we had previously visited, on the contrary, we saw only one native priest. He was in a church performing service. At Cabugao our letter to Colonel Tino was not sufficient to gain permission to proceed. We were detained here all day, while the lieutenant sent a messenger to Vigan to obtain instruction from the commandante. The telegraph line was down and we could not wire. We were treated very cooly at this town and were regarded with suspicion. Next morning, an answer not having been received from Vigan, we asserted our right to proceed to that town to present our letter to the commandante. The lieutenant finally withdrew his objections. There were no transportation accommodations. We succeeded

at length in buying one horse and a broken-down kilis, in which only one could ride. We proceeded to the town of Lapo, where we changed vehicles. We left that town in a kilis drawn by a steer. We were half-way between Lapo and Magsingal when we were met by three miltiary officers — two captains and a lieutenant — in a carriage drawn by two horses. The senior captain informed us that they had been sent down from Vigan by the commandante, with orders to require us to turn back and reembark on our ship, the report having reached Vigan that we had disembarked from an American man-of-war, which was still waiting for us at Salomague. When we explained our position and showed them the letter of Colonel Tino, or, in case of his absence, to the commandante at Vigan, they permitted us to proceed to Magsingal, where they could communicate with their superior. They very politely insisted on our taking their carriage, while they followed in our cart. We were delayed at Magsingal until the early evening, waiting for an answer from the commandante. He brought the answer himself, in a handsome carriage drawn by four horses. He had with him a copy of the order he had just received from the Philippine secretary of war. This order granted liberty to persons of any nation, except Spain, to travel at will through the islands, under certain restrictions, viz, that they could not carry arms, nor approach within 200 meters of a fortification, nor make any plans, or take photographs of them. In compliance with this order, we were allowed to proceed, but were requested to give up all our arms, including our revolvers. We went on to Vigan that night, accompanied by the commandante and five other officers who had assembled at Magsingal. We rode in carriages, none of them drawn by fewer than three horses, and arrived at Vigan about 8 o'clock. Vigan is a town of about 27,000 inhabitants. Its streets are well laid out, and all the houses near the center of the town are built of wood, usually whitewashed. It has much more the appearance of a city than any other town we have visited. We were entertained at the palacio. This building before the insurrection had been the residence of the governor of the province, but it is now used as the headquarters of Colonel Tino. It is by far the handsomest house we have seen outside of Manila, and is perhaps the equal of any there. There is another house in the town even more elegant; this was formerly the residence of the archbishop. At the palacio there are quartered over eighteen military officers; they are all very young, as is usual in the Philippine army. The oldest one among them was a man of 29 years, with the grade of captain.

46. We remained at Vigan all next day, November 12. It had rained during the night, rendering impassable a part of the road to the next town. We walked through the town and visited the houses of several tradespeople. At one of these houses we heard the first and only definite complaint which came to our ears during the entire journey on the part of the natives against the present government. These people complained of the taxes imposed upon them and even went so far as to state that they preferred the Spanish Government. This statement was made in the presence of a party of six natives and was acquiesced in by all; they were all, however, of the same family.

47. Next morning we left Vigan and proceeded to Santa Maria, passing through the towns of Santa and Narvacan. Between Santa and Narvacan we came to the pass of Pidig. The road here goes between a bold rocky point and the sea. Today the sea line was 70 or 80 feet from the bluff, but in windy weather the waves cover the road and dash against the bluff. During the insurrection the Spaniards attempted to defend this pass; their barricades are still standing. We were escorted out of Vigan by the commandante and eight of his officers, all in carriages. These turned back, one at a time, until we were left with one lieutenant, who had been detailed to accompany us to San Fernando, and by two captains, who were going home on leave of absence. We also had a guard of four soldiers, who rode ahead with penants and cleared the road. At each town we were joined by the senior officer stationed there, who accompanied us on horseback to the next town. From Narvacan we were accompanied to Santa Maria by Captain Natividad, an officer of 18 years of age, who commands the military forces in the three neighboring towns. Captain Natividad remained with us at Santa Maria, where we spent the night in a convent. We intended to leave this town by trail for the mountains, passing through the provinces of Lepanto and Benguet and returning to the main road in the province of Union. When we wished to start next morning, Captain Natividad opposed our going, saying that he was under orders to take that action. It rained very hard all night and all morning, and the captain gave as his first reason that the roads were not passable. It was only when we continued to insist that he told us positively that he could not permit us to go, as there was danger from Igorrotes and Colonel Tino felt himself responsible for our safety. He told us that Colonel Tino had invited us to visit him at San Fernando. We left Santa Maria that afternoon

and reached Candon before night, passing through the towns of San Esteban and Santiago. We were escorted by the lieutenant and Captain Natividad. We found Candon a handsome town systematically laid out. After Vigan, it is the handsomest town we visited. There are two captains here and several lieutenants. We were received here with unusual cordiality and were accompanied out of town next morning by the presidente local and by a captain stationed at the town. Our journey this day took us to Namagpacan, passing through the towns of Santa Lucia, Santa Cruz, and Tagudin. Fresh horses were procured at each town and the officers accompanying us were changed.

48. In going from Tagudin to Bangar we passed from the province of Ilocos Sur into that of Union. The province of Ilocos Sur raises principally rice, tobacco, sugar, cattle, and sheep. The tobacco is of an inferior quality, being coarser and stronger than that raised in Isabella and Cagayan. The cultivation of coconuts is profitable and is increasing. Goats and pigs are raised in great numbers. Many of the people are engaged in the weaving of cotton, from which they make cloth, towels, etc. The cloth is coarse, but very strong. The natives realize the inferiority of the cloth and the discrepancy between its commercial value and the labor expended on it. Some of the cotton comes from Ilocos Norte and from Abra; much of it, however, comes as thread from Manila. The only part of the province that is cultivated or settled is a narrow strip between the province and the sea. This strip is very thickly settled. In the mountains there are mines of copper, sulphur, and gold; but these we have not seen. The Spaniards have spent much time and labor on these coast provinces, relatively speaking. Probably the best road in the islands is the one on which we traveled through Ilocos Sur and Union. It is raised above the level of the fields, and has a foundation of stone and lime. Bridges were built when the road was constructed, over a hundred years ago, but they are down now. Some of these were passable at the beginning of the insurrection, but were burned during that struggle. At the beginning of the dry season every year bamboo bridges were put across these streams. They usually last from December to June. Several of them have already been built this year, but the recent rains had caused them to be washed away. During the rainy months other methods are adopted for crossing these streams. The streams are numerous, but many of them have very little current. They are crossed by a ferry — a bamboo raft hauled across by means of a bamboo rope which spans the stream.

Traveling on this road in the rainy season is rather difficult. Carriages are usually used, but they are frequently mired and the passengers are compelled to walk. The carriages are drawn by either horses, steers, or buffaloes, according to the state of the road. The towns along this road have usually many wooden houses, and invariably a very handsome church and convent, usually of brick. There are more barrios here than in the eastern provinces; each town has two or three. Spanish soldiers laid waste this region during the insurrection of 1896. The principal buildings in many towns have been burnt, particularly in the province of Union. On the other hand, during the last insurrection the Spaniards took refuge in the large buildings, and these are consequently riddled with rifle shots.

49. We spent the night in the small town of Namagpacan and went on to San Fernando next morning. Carriages were prepared for us at every village, and we traveled with the customary escort. At San Fernando we met Colonel Tino, commander of the military district embracing the provinces of North and South Ilocos, Union, Abra, Lepanto, Bontoc, and Benguet. This officer had received his commission as brigadier-general three days before our arrival. He is 21 years old. We were received politely by this officer, but not cordially. He expressed several times his suspicion with regard to the object of our journey. He asked several times if we knew how to make maps and plans; also why we were not in uniform. We had sent word to this officer that we desired to visit the province of Benguet, taking the trail from San Fernando. He showed us an unsigned telegram purporting to be from the central government instructing him not to permit the American officers to reconnoiter any further in the district. For this reason he said he could not permit us to visit Benguet. We sent, through him, a telegram to the central government repeating our request and calling attention to their war department's order of October 20 regarding travelers. We were informed next morning by General Tino that our request had been refused. The reason given was that there were dangers on the trail. We accordingly left the town next morning, taking the road directly for Dagupan.

50. San Fernando is the capital city of the province of Union. It is a town of only 3,000 or 4,000 inhabitants and is very limited in area, lying between the mountains and the sea. It is the port for the province of Union. We have seen trains of buffalo carts taking tobacco there for exportation. There were about twenty military officers in the

town when we were there. Many of them are in General Tino's staff and are not regularly stationed in the town.

51. From San Fernando to Dagupan there were few significant or instructive incidents. We were never without a guard of soldiers. At the town of Baoang we met a German, Mr. Otto Scheerer, who had lived three years in the province of Benguet and who was about to return there with his family. He said the trail was safe and could be traveled by horses. The Igorrotes of the province, according to his statement, are a very gentle people. These are the civilized Igorrotes, or Tinguianes. At noon November 18 we arrived at Santa Tomas. The land between here and Dagupan is very low; the roads are heavy. We accordingly took a native sailboat for Parao; from that town to Dagupan. The natives fearing to take their boat across the bar at Dagupan, we crossed that at San Fabian and proceeded to our destination through a protected inlet of the sea. Along our route there were great beds of nipa. This plant is of great value to the natives. Wines are made from the sap, and the leaves are used for thatching houses. We arrived at Dagupan that night, and at Manila November 20. We reported to the commanding officer of the *Monadnock* and next morning to the commander in chief.

52. The foregoing narrative of our journey is designed to give a general description of the country we passed through and of the methods of travel, and to illustrate by its incidents the character and grade of intelligence of its people and their attitude toward Americans, especially toward ourselves as military officers. The information we have acquired on certain points is summed up in the following paragraphs:

INTELLIGENCE AND EDUCATION OF THE NATIVES

53. The Philippine officers, both military and civil, that we have met in all the provinces we have visited have, with very few exceptions, been men of intelligent appearance and conversation. The same is true of all those men who form the upper class in each town. The education of most of them is limited, but they appear to seize every opportunity to improve it. They had great respect and admiration for learning. Very many of them desire to send their children to schools in the United States or Europe. Many men of importance in different towns have told us that the first use to be made of the revenues of their government, after there is no more danger of war, will be to start good schools in

every village. The poorer classes are exremely ignorant on most subjects, but a large percentage of them can read and write.

RELATION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR

54. There is a very marked line between these two classes, and this has been broadened by the insurrection, for the reason that military officers must equip themselves without pay, and that civil officers have numerous expenses for which they receive no return. All officers, civil and military, have therefore been chosen from the richer class; and the political and military power of the provinces is in the hands of that class. The private soldiers are fed and clothed by the government and allowed a very small amount of spending money — in the western provinces 30 cents in silver per week.

ATTITUDE OF THE MILITARY TOWARD THE CIVIL CLASS

55. In the provinces of the east that we have visited there appears to be little or no friction between the civil and military classes. Officers and privates, as far as we could observe, treat civilians with consideration. In the provinces of Ilocos Sur and Union there is a marked dfference. The officers are more domineering. In traveling in these provinces we had many opportunities to observe this attitude. When accidents happened to our carriage, the officer commanding our escort called to our assistance every native in sight. When they did not answer his call promptly we have seen him strike them with his riding whip. One man had a serious wound on his face where an officer had struck him with his pistol butt. He came to us for redress, after having appealed in vain to the military officer in command of the town. An order from Don Emilio Aguinaldo, dated October 18, 1898, calls the attention of his officers to the evils of this practice and orders them to correct it in themselves and instruct all sergeants, corporals, and privates on the attitude they should maintain toward civilians.

DOMINION OF THE CHURCH

56. In the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabella, and Cagayan the native priests have no voice whatever in civil matters.

The Catholic Church itself seems to have very little hold on the people of these provinces. Many men have expressed to us their preference for the Protestant Church. In Ilocos Sur and Union there are

many more priests than in the other provinces mentioned. Every pueblo and barrio has its cura, and there are higher officers of the church in the larger towns. They appear to have an important influence in all civil matters.

POPULAR SENTIMENT REGARDING INDEPENDENCE

57. Of the larger number of officers, civil and military, and of leading townspeople we have met, nearly every man has expressed in our presence his sentiment on this question. It is universally the same. They all declare they will accept nothing short of independence. They desire the protection of the United States at sea, but fear any interference on land. The question of the remuneration of our Government for the expense of establishing a protectorate is never touched upon. On the subject of independence there is, again, a marked difference between four provinces first visited and those of Ilocos Sur and Union. In the former there is more enthusiasm — the sentiment is more of the people; in the latter it is more of the higher class and of the army. In these provinces we have seen signs of actual discontent with the existing state of things.

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

58. There is much variety of feeling among the Philippines with regard to the debt of gratitude they owe to the United States. In every town we found men said that our nation had saved them from slavery, and others who claimed that without our interference their independence would have been recognized before this time. On one point they are united, however, viz, that whatever our Government may have done for them it has not gained the right to annex them. They have been prejudiced against us by the Spaniards. The charges made have been so numerous and so severe that what the natives have since learned has not sufficed to disillusion them. With regard to the record of our policy toward a subject people, they have received remarkable information on two points—that we have mercilessly slain and finally exterminated the race of Indians that were native to our soil, and that we went to war in 1861 to suppress an insurrection of negro slaves, whom we also ended by exterminating. Intelligent and well-informed men have believed these charges. They were rehearsed to us in many towns in different provinces, beginning at Malolos. The Spanish version of our Indian problem is particularly well known.

PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

59. The Philippine government has an organized military force in every province we have visited. They claim it extends also into Ilocos Norte, Abra, Lepanto, Bontoc, and Benguet. With regard to its existence in Ilocos and Benguet, we can speak with assurance. We have met two officers with the rank of captain who are regularly stationed at Laoag, the capital city of Ilocos Norte, and also the commandante of the province of Benguet. The latter officer had come to San Fernando to obtain instructions from General Tino, and was about to return to Trinidad, the capital of that province. The number of troops under arms can only be given approximately. There are comparatively few in Nueva Ecija; an estimated number of not over 300. In the military district embracing the province of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabella, and Cagayan, Colonel Tirona, Commandante Leyba, and Commandante Villa agreed in giving the number of soldiers under arms actually as 2,000. An estimate, founded on the size of the garrisons in the towns we visited would bring the number nearly up to that figure. In the western military districts the number of forces is about double that number, leaving out those stationed in the interior provinces of Abra, Lepanto, Bontoc, and Benguet, of which we know nothing positively. In the coast provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, and Union a conservative estimate of the forces is 3,500. In most of the pueblos the garrison is but little larger than those in the towns of the western districts; but there are many barrios, each one of which has its guard of soldiers, never less than 12. In the eastern military district we met not more than 25 officers and in the western district over 60. There are rifles enough for all, principally Remington, but many Mausers. In every cuartel there were at least as many rifles as there were soldiers in the garrison. The arms are more numerous in the eastern than in the western provinces. It is safe to estimate the number of rifles in the eastern district as at least twice the number of soldiers. Commandante Villa and other officers made the statement that 40,000 rifles were being distributed among the people of that district. We have seen no proof of this statement. Ammunition is said to be plentiful, and it appears so from the fact that the soldiers use it freely in hunting for deer. With regard to the total force of the Philippine army, actual and reserve, we can not speak from our own knowledge.

Colonel Tirona claimed that 200,000 men from all the islands could be put in the field well armed; and several other officers have in-

dependently given the same figure. Every officer that we have seen carried a Spanish sword and revolver. They wear these weapons constantly, but regard them with contempt, preferring the bolo at close quarters. The *Philippina,* which was at Aparri during our visit, carries two guns of a caliber of about 3 inches. These are the only guns we have seen, with the exception of two revolving cannons in the palacio at Malolos. We saw no fortifications. The Spaniards have left numerous stockades in the wilder regions, and the natives have built a few others. There are also numerous barricades, thrown up during the insurrection. In the towns the Spaniards defended themselves in the houses for want of other protection. The military spirit pervades the eastern district, where every town and barrio has organized companies of its children, which are drilled every day. In the western districts we did not see any children under arms. The officers have had no military education except that which they gained during the insurrection. Spanish drill tactics are used, and most of the officers are still studying the elementary text-book.

Respectfully submitted,

W. B. WILCOCK
Paymaster, U.S.N.
LEONARD R. SARGENT
Naval Cadet, U.S.N.

[Indorsement]

FLAGSHIP OLYMPIA
Cavite, P.I., December 1, 1898.

Approved and respectfully forwarded for the information of the Navy Department.

Especial attention is invited to this interesting and carefully prepared report, which, in my opinion, contains the most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon Island.

GEORGE DEWEY
Rear-Admiral, U.S.N., Commanding Asiatic Station.

Report for the Purpose of Capturing General Aguinaldo*

HDQR. FOURTH DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN LUZON
San Isidro, Province of Nueva Ecija, May 6, 1901

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL
Department of Northern Luzon

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the recent expedition under my command to Palanan, province of Isabela.

On January 8 of the present year a native, who gave his name as Cecilio Segismundo, presented himself to First Lieut. J. D. Taylor, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding the station of Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, and said he had been sent by Emilio Aguinaldo to deliver important dispatches to Baldomero Aguinaldo, Urbano Lacuna, Pablo Tecson, Simon Tecson, Teodoro Sandico, and other insurgent chiefs.

This man stated that he had left Aguinaldo and a number of his officers with an escort of soldiers at Palanan, province of Isabela, January 14, and, accompanied by 12 armed men, had traveled by way of Casiguran and San Jose de Casignan, a small town in the vicinity of Baler. When near the latter place he had encountered a detachment of American troops belonging to that station, and 2 of his detachment had been either killed or captured. Upon arrival at Pantabangan he reported to the local presidente, or alcalde, who had formerly acted in that capacity for the insurgents, in order that he might be facilitated on his journey. This man told him that he was now acting with the Americans and advised him to present himself to Lieutenant Taylor, giving up his correspondence. This the man did at once. Lieutenant Taylor, after hearing the man's story and looking over the correspondence, telegraphed the adjutant-general of the district a brief account of the man's story and the nature of the correspondence. In reply he was instructed to send the man and captured letters with all possible haste to these headquarters.

Upon arrival I questioned the man thoroughly, and he did not vary from his original story.

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* From Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army. In Annual Reports of the War Department, Part 5 (Wash., 1901), App. D, p. 122-130.

Among the correspondence given up by this man were about 20 letters from Aguinaldo, or some of the officers with him, to insurgents in various parts of Luzon. There was also a considerable number of letters from soldiers of Aguinaldo's escort to their friends.

A letter to Baldomero Aguinaldo was in cipher and was worked out with much difficulty, as we did not have the key. This letter instructed Baldomero Aguinaldo, then presumably in the province of Cavite, to take command of the central provinces of Luzon, and as soon as possible to select 400 armed men from various bands and send them to the writer, Emilio Aguinaldo. The bearer of the dispatches, the man Cecilio Segismundo, was to tell him the exact whereabouts of Emilio Aguinaldo and was to serve as guide for the first detachment of the expected reenforcements. This man, in reply to a question, stated that he had received instructions from Aguinaldo to conduct to Palanan any insurgent soldiers who might be sent there.

The fact that Aguinaldo would be expecting reenforcements guided by this man suggested to me the plan for his capture, which was afterwards successfully carried out.

Segismundo stated that Aguinaldo, with his staff and an armed escort under Comandante Alhambra, was living in the small town of Palanan, Isabela, about due east of the town of Ilagan, and only 2 leagues from the coast. He stated that the only trail leading from Palanan to the valley of Cagayan was very carefully watched by outposts, and that any attempt to capture Aguinaldo by ordinary methods would surely fail, as he would receive warning of the approach of a hostile force in sufficient time to retire to the heavily wooded mountains which surrounded the town. The man also stated that a surprise by a party landing in boats on the coast near the town could not be effected for the reason that the Balugas, savages living along the beach, would quickly warn the insurgents.

My plan for the expedition to attempt the capture of Aguinaldo is shown by the following letter to your headquarters:

San Isidro, Province of Nueva Ecija,
February 12, 1901.

The Adjutant-General,
Department of Northern Luzon, Manila, P.I.

Sir: I have the honor to suggest the following plan for the capture of Aguinaldo, who, from recent development, is known to certainly be at Palanan, province of Isabela.

Before stating the plan I wish to call attention to the following facts, gleaned partly from the captured letters and partly from the native, Cecilio Segismundo, who brought through the correspondence. Aguinaldo has in these letters ordered Simon Tecson, Sandico, and Baldomero Aguinaldo to send him troops as soon as possible, this man to act as guide for one of the detachments. The man himself corroborates this by stating that Aguinaldo gave him verbal instructions to guide back to Palanan the first one of the columns to come through. Aguinaldo will consequently be expecting the column guided by this man.

My plan is to take a company of Macabebes to Manila, arm them with Mausers and Remingtons, dress them partly in insurgent uniform and partly in the clothing of the country, take one of the Navy light-draft gunboats, and be landed at night on the east coast of Luzon, south of Casiguran. Four or five officers would be with them, carried along as supposed prisoners, until the time came for action. I would take Natividad and several other ex-insurgent officers, who would act as officers of the column until time came to throw off the disguise. Upon arrival at Casiguran, which we would do by marching along the beach, we would call on the presidente (an insurgent) to supply us with necessaries. This man facilitated Segismundo, and would send forward a letter signed by Natividad that we were reenforcements from Nueva Ecija coming in obedience to his orders.

I believe that we could deceive him until we were in his presence, and the rest would be easy. Up to this time the American officers would be prisoners nominally. It is not likely that Aguinaldo knows that Natividad had presented himself, but still considers himself in his service. The native, Segismundo, is more than willing to play his part. All details can be worked out satisfactorily, and plan ought to succeed, though there is no doubt that great hardships will be endured. It should be done before Aguinaldo learns that his courier has presented himself and given up the letters. It would be necessary to pay the Tagalos who go as supposed officers pretty liberally, of course contingent on success. If the plan is approved, may I be notified by wire, in order to make preparations?

Respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON
Brigadier-General, U.S.V.

Upon receipt of the above communication the department commander ordered me to Manila for consultation and approved the plan, as did also the division commander, who arranged with the admiral commanding the Asiatic Station to secure the services of a naval vessel to transport the expedition. The necessity for me to return to San Isidro for several days caused a delay in the departure of the expedition, and

it was not until March 6 that we embarked on the *U.S.S. Vicksburg,* Commander E. B. Barry commanding.

Before going on the *Vicksburg,* all necessary preliminaries had been arranged. From Company D, First Battalion Macabebe Scouts, 81 men had been selected by the company commander, Capt. R. T. Hazzard, Eleventh Cavalry, U.S.V. These men were chosen because of their superior physique and intelligence and their ability to speak Tagalog. Captain Hazzard went in command of the company, assisted by his brother, First Lieut. O. P. M. Hazzard, of the Eleventh Cavalry, U.S.V. The Macabebes were clothed partly in insurgent uniforms and partly in the clothing of the country. All except 10, who carried Krag-Jorgensens, were armed with Mauser and Remington rifles. All articles of their equipment as American scouts were discarded, and they could in no way be distinguished from a band of insurgent soldiers. The question of finding several Tagalogs of undoubted reliability, to be passed off as the officers of this supposed insurgent force, was one of great difficulty. It was found necessary to abandon the original intention to use Joaquin Natividad.

The men chosen were all well known to me personally. They were all ex-insurgent officers who had since their capture or surrender served us in various ways. Hilario Placido, who was the nominal chief of the force with rank of lieutenant-colonel, was an ex-insurgent major who had been captured at Jaen, Nueva Ecija, with Gen. Pantaleon Garcia, by my adjutant-general, Capt. E.V. Smith, Fourth U.S. Infantry. He had been released after several months' confinement, after taking the oath of allegiance. Lazaro Segovia, palmed off as a captain, was a full-blooded Spaniard, formerly a first sergeant in the Spanish army, and later a lieutenant with the insurgents. He had presented himself to me at San Isidro in May, 1900, and had since done excellent service as a guide. Dionisio Bato and Gregorio Cadhit were ex-insurgent lieutenants who had been with us about three months. The former had been captured and the latter had surrendered. Cecilio Segismundo also accompanied the expedition. None of the above-mentioned natives, except Segovia and Segismundo, knew our object until after the *Vicksburg* had sailed.

In addition to Captain Hazzard and Lieutenant Hazzard, the two officers of the Macabebe company, I selected Capt. Harry W. Newton, Thirty-fourth Infantry, U.S.V., and First Lieut. B.J. Mitchell, Fortieth

Infantry, U.S.V., to accompany me. Captain Newton was chosen because of his having once visited Casiguran Bay, where we expected to land.

Lieutenant Mitchell was my personal aid. The *Vicksburg,* with the expedition on board, sailed from Manila for the east coast of Luzon, on March 6, by way of straits of San Bernardino.

The original plan was to land the expedition near Casiguran in native boats or bancas which could be abandoned, in order that it would not be necessary to bring the *Vicksburg* so near the shore as would have to be done in case the landing was made in the ship's boats, as they would have to return to the ship. With this object in view the *Vicksburg* called at Atimonan, east coast of the Province of Tayabas, and I sent Lieutenant Mitchell ashore to ascertain if large bancas or small cascos were to be had. There were none suitable in the port, and we sailed for the town of Polillo, on the island of the same name. Here we were more successful and succeeded in purchasing three large sailing bancas, each having two masts. The *Vicksburg,* with these bancas in tow, sailed for the entrance of Casiguran Bay shortly after daybreak of March 12. Two Macabebe soldiers were placed in each of the three bancas to steer and to clear the lines in case they became foul. The wind, which had been rising, increased almost to a gale, and by noon the smallest of the bancas had been swamped, the men in it getting on board one of the others.

By 4 p.m. it was evident that the remaining two could not endure the pounding much longer, and a lifeboat was lowered for the purpose of taking off the men. This dangerous task required nearly two hours. During the night the remaining bancas went down, and our plans were consequently changed to the extent that we would have to disembark at night in the ship's boats. During the voyage from Manila the natives, both Tagalogs and Macabebes, were carefully instructed in the part that they were to play. It was impressed upon them that they were to represent a band of insurgents of Lacuna's command on their way to join Aguinaldo in Isabela. The story that en route they had fallen in with a small detachment of Americans and had taken 5 prisoners, which they were carrying with them, was gone over with time and again, so that they would be able to repeat it. They were warned that any treachery or disobedience of orders would be punished by the summary execution of the offenders.

On October 24, 1900, while scouting in the vicinity of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, I had surprised the insurgent chief Lacuna in his camp, and had captured, among other things, some writing paper which already bore his headquarters seal. On this paper two letters were written to Aguinaldo over the carefully forged signature of Lacuna.

One of these letters was dated February 24, 1901, at Bulac, a place in the mountains east of Peñaranda. In it Lacuna acknowledged the receipt of Aguinaldo's letters of January 13 and 14, and thanked him for the confirmation of his (Lacuna's) appointment as brigadier-general, made sometime previously by Alejandrino.

It will be remembered that the letters of Aguinaldo referred to had fallen into our hands and had never been seen by Lacuna.

This letter also indulged in the usual rhetoric employed by the insurgent chiefs in their correspondence and gave a glowing account of the progress of the campaign from the standpoint of Lacuna.

Another letter, supposedly from the same place, but dated February 28, was prepared, stating that the writer had just received a communication from Baldomero Aguinaldo, ordering him to send one of his best companies under a reliable chief to Emilio Aguinaldo in Isabela.

In accordance with these orders he was sending this force under Lieut. Col. Hilario Placido. The latter, he stated, had been captured by the Americans a year ago, and after his release had lived in Jaen, but had recently taken to the field again when ordered to do so by Lacuna. This was included in the letter for fear that Aguinaldo might have heard that Placido had been captured by the Americans and had taken the oath of allegiance. The letter also stated that Aguinaldo's courier, Cecilio Segismundo, was with Lacuna and would accompany the column. These two letters were dictated by me, but written by Segovia. We were in possession of a number of samples of Lacuna's signature and had previously succeeded in executing a very neat forgery of his autograph at the end of each one of the two sheets.

The *Vicksburg*, with all lights screened and under low head of steam, passed Cape San Ildefonso, at the entrance of Casiguran Bay, at 9 p.m. of the 13th, and at 1 a.m. anchored near the west shore about 10 miles farther up. Boats were lowered and the expedition put on the beach rapidly and quietly. The disembarkation was completed by 2 a.m. One of the Macabebes accidentally injured himself in disem-

barking and had to be left on the ship. Another hid himself in the hammock netting and was overlooked. Each one of the American officers carried on his person in the form of a roll a half blanket containing a towel, comb, and extra pair of socks.

The Macabebes carried no blankets, lest suspicion would be aroused, the insurgents not using them. Each one had on his person a day's ration of rice. The American were dressed as private soldiers, in campaign hat, blue shirt, khaki trousers and leggings, and wore no insignia of rank. The night was dark, with occasional rain squalls. The *Vicksburg* steamed out to sea as soon as the disembarkation had been completed, and sailed for Baler. I had arranged with Commander Barry that he was to visit the town of Casiguran four days later with the pretext that he was searching for some American prisoners who had been carried off by insurgents.

This was not only for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the deception, but to take us on board in case our identity had been discovered at Casiguran, as in that event any further effort would be useless. The vessel was to meet us finally at Palanan Bay on the 25th.

We remained quietly on the beach until daylight, when we marched a short distance to find fresh water, and prepared breakfast.

At 7 a.m. we resumed the march in a northerly direction up the west side of Casiguran Bay. The coast line was extremely irregular, being indented by numerous bays, and while it is doubtful if it is more than 10 miles in an air line from the place of our disembarkation to the town of Casiguran, it took certainly 20 miles of marching, at a very conservative estimate. At its head Casiguran Bay broadens out into a fine circular basin, 4 miles in diameter.

We waded about a dozen streams, and owing to the fact that for a portion of the distance at high tide there was no space between the water and the mangrove jungles, we did some 5 miles of wading in salt water. At noon we found concealed in the bushes a small canoe or "banca." In order to send a courier ahead so that the inhabitants of the town would not be frightened away by the approach of a body of armed men, we made use of this. Hilario Placido wrote a note to the presidente of the town, stating that he was in command of a column of Filipino troops bound north and would reach Casiguran in the evening. He instructed the presidente to arrange for quarters and food for the command and to send a guide out of town to meet us.

Gregorio Cadhit and Cecilio Segismundo, accompanied by two armed Macabebes, left us at noon, in the canoe, and, as they were able to go straight across the head of the bay, reached the town in two hours.

They delivered Placido's note to the vice-presidente, the presidente himself being absent with Aguinaldo at Palanan. That individual was completely deceived, and bestirred himself to carry out his orders. At 4 p.m. we met the guide sent out from the town, and an hour later, having reach the head of the bay, entered the forest. At half past 6 o'clock, after an extremely hard all-day march, we reached the town. Many people came to see the American prisoners. In order that nothing might be suspected, the Macabebes made a great show of guarding us closely. The vice-presidente met the column and conducted us to several buildings which he had ordered vacated. We five Americans were kept in a room in one of the houses, under guard, and during the three nights passed in Casiguran slept on the floor. The supposed officers of the detachment occupied another room in the same house. But little rice is raised at Casiguran, so that the people, acting under orders of the vice-presidente, brought us cracked corn, sweet potatoes, and a few chickens. We learned here that there was a feast planned at Palanan on the 22d. Also, the very disquieting information that Tinio, with 400 armed men, had just joined Aguinaldo. This created something of a panic among the Macabebes, but during the night we saw some of them privately and made them believe that we could win anyhow by means of a surprise. As developed afterwards, there was no truth in this story about Tinio. Although Placido was the supposed commanding officer of the detachment, the man on whom I most depended to hoodwink the vice-presidente and other people of Casiguran was the energetic and versatile Spaniard, Segovia.

From time to time I sent for him and surreptitiously gave him instructions regarding what I wished done. He was a man of courage and resource, and his knowledge of the Filipinos and of the Tagalog dialect made his services indispensable. While Placido was absolutely loyal to us, he did not have the ingenuity and resource of Segovia.

It will be remembered that before landing we had prepared two letters to Aguinaldo over the forged signature of Lacuna. We now carefully prepared a letter to Aguinaldo for the signature of Placido. This communication stated that the writer, in accordance with orders received from his chief, Gen. Urbano Lacuna, had left the latter's camp

near Bulac, mountains of Peñaranda, to report to Aguinaldo with a company under Captain Lazaro Segovia. En route, while crossing the main range and on the trail between Pantabangan and Baler, he had surprised a detachment of 10 American soldiers who were making maps, and had killed 2 and wounded 3, which latter he had ordered sent to the American commander at Pantabangan.

The remaining five had been taken prisoners and were en route with him. As it was evident that the unannounced approach would alarm Aguinaldo and cause him to get out of the way for the time being, I instructed Placido and Segovia to obtain messengers to carry the three letters to Aguinaldo at Palanan, 90 miles up the coast.

These men, two Tagalogs and a Baluga, left Casiguran at daybreak of the 16th and reached Palanan two days ahead of us. The letters taken through by these men threw Aguinaldo completely off his guard, and, as he told me afterwards, were the most potent factor in his undoing.

The question of obtaining quickly a sufficiently large supply of portable food for our seven days' march to Palanan was a serious one. The people of Casiguran live mostly on fresh fish and sweet potatoes. The former could not be carried for any distance for obvious reasons, and the latter were too heavy and bulky.

The vice-presidente told Placido that by sending up the valley he could in four or five days get a sufficient quantity of cracked corn for the march. Delay was out of the question, as the *Vicksburg* was to be in Palanan Bay to meet us on the 25th. Accordingly, with what cracked corn that could be obtained on short notice (about 400 pounds) and a small quantity of dried carabao (buffalo) meat, we left Casiguran at 8 a.m., March 17, the vice-presidente and principal men of the town accompanying us for a couple of miles. Our food, which was about four days' short ration, was carried by 12 natives of Casiguran. On account of the difficulties of the trail their loads were necessarily light. These pack bearers also served as guides, as Segismundo's knowledge of the trail was not sufficiently definite. The presence of the 12 pack bearers in the column made it incumbent on us during the whole of the march to continue to carry out the fiction that we were insurgent soldiers with American prisoners.

The Macabebes played their part well and made a pretense of closely guarding the Americans, and, when in hearing of the pack bearers,

often spoke to them harshly. It was evident that if anyone of those men suspected a trick he would hasten on to Palanan and give warning, after which there could be but little hope that any of us would ever get out of the country.

Our route after leaving Casiguran was first east and then northeast for five hours along a muddy trail through dense woods until we reached the sea and thence along the beach in a general northerly direction. This portion of the coast appears on maps to be comparatively unbroken, but this is merely because it has never been surveyed.

It is, as a matter of fact, very much indented, which greatly increases the distance to be traveled between any two points on the coast. The country is extremely mountainous and everywhere heavily wooded. In places the cliffs come down sheer to the sea, necessitating a detour through the mountains to reach the beach again.

The beach is generally of soft, fine sand, though we had two days over bowlders of various sizes, most tiresome and painful marching.

Our programme for each day was to leave camp at daybreak, without breakfast, and march until 10 a.m., when we would stop for the first meal of the day, resuming the march at 1 p.m. and continuing until darkness, when we would go into camp and prepare supper. Because of the fearful nature of some portions of the trail we could not make an average of more than a mile and a half an hour. Rivers were numerous and had to be waded. Several times we narrowly escaped disaster in these swift mountain streams. It rained almost continuously day and night. All were soaked to the skin during the entire march and were compelled to sleep on the ground in their wet clothing.

Every effort was made to have the food hold out as long as possible, but the Macabebes, in spite of all precautions, managed to eat up all the dried meat in the first two days. We helped out our rations on small fish caught by the men in their hands, and with shell fish and snails. The country is uninhabited except by a few savages, who kept out of our way. At 6 p.m. of the 22d, after six days' hard marching, we reached the spot called Dinudungan, where the trail for Palanan leaves the sea and starts inland. Here we found an old Tagalog in charge of several Balugas, building a couple of small sheds, which he told us were for the American prisoners and their guard. He also had a letter for Placido from Col. Simeon Villa, Aguinaldo's chief of staff, instructing

him to proceed to Palanan, leaving the prisoners of Dinudungan under a guard of a noncommissioned officer and 10 soldiers. The prisoners were under no circumstances to be brought to Palanan, lest they learn of Aguinaldo's whereabouts. This brought about a most difficult complication which it was absolutely necessary to overcome, but we were encouraged to know that our ruse was succeeding, and that there was apparently no suspicion as to our identity.

Since leaving Casiguran we had been living on short rations, and but two meals a day. During all of the 22d we had no food. This privation was telling on many, some 20 of the Macabebes being so weak that without food they would be unable to continue the march to Palanan, a distance of only 8 miles. I discussed the situation with Segovia, and had the latter prepare a letter to forward to Aguinaldo, acknowledging receipt of his orders to leave the prisoners with a guard at this point. The letter stated that the instructions would be complied with, and continued by requesting that food be at once sent to us in order that the march could be resumed. This message was sent to Palanan by a Baluga. During the night we American officers held a secret conference and arranged a plan to avoid compliance with the orders that we be left behind and not brought to Palanan. So fearful were we of doing something that would arouse suspicion that we thought it best not to march with the column when it left camp in the morning, lest this apparent disregard of orders by Placido alarm Aguinaldo and his officers. The old Tagalog who was constructing the two sheds knew that the prisoners were to be left with him, and accordingly it was necessary to deceive him for fear that he would send a courier to Palanan with the news that the Americans had not been left behind. In the morning several Balugas arrived from Palanan with enough cracked corn to give all a sufficient meal.

The main part of the column, under Placido and Segovia, took up the march for Palanan at 8 a.m., leaving the Americans behind with a very intelligent Macabebe corporal and 10 privates. In accordance with arrangements previously made by us, in about an hour two of the Macabebes who had gone on up the Palanan trail came running back with a note in Tagalog from Segovia to the corporal of the guard stating that orders had just been received from Palanan changing his previous instructions regarding the prisoners and that they were to follow the column to the town. The Macabebe corporal on receiving this written

order showed it to the man in charge of the house building, and thus completely allayed his suspicions. We were then ordered to fall in and started out on the trail toward Palanan.

The general direction was northwesterly. The trail was narrow and muddy and through dense woods the entire distance. A branch of the Palanan River was crossed and recrossed many times by wading.

We had no guide, but were merely following in the trail of the main body of the command. About half way to Palanan we met a Macabebe sergeant and a private coming hastily back on the trail with the startling information that a detachment of 10 armed insurgent soldiers had been met coming out from Palanan to take charge of the prisoners in order that the guard over them might go to Palanan.

Segovia, with great presence of mind, had detained these men in conversation and has sent back the two men to warm us of the danger.

It was by all means necessary to avoid these men, as an encounter would have been almost inevitable, and there was danger that the sound of firing would be heard in Palanan. Upon receiving the warning we hastened to conceal ourselves in the jungle near the trail.

The 10 insurgents soon passed down the trail going to the coast, but apparently did not suspect our presence. A few moments after they had passed we slipped into the trail behind them and continued on the way to Palanan. We purposely did not attempt to gain on the main column, as we knew that the river was broad and deep and had to be crossed in one boat capable of holding but 10 men. It was important that we should not reach the river until most of the column had already crossed, lest some insurgent officer sent out from Palanan would see the Americans and warn Aguinaldo that his orders were being disobeyed. Our progress, as well as that of the main body, was extremely slow because of the weakened condition of all, which made it necessary to halt every half hour.

At a few moments of 3 p.m., we cautiously approached the Palanan River, here about 100 yards wide, and saw the town on the other side. The last boat load had crossed, and the Macabebes were forming on the other bank and, in accordance with a previous arrangement, were sending the boat back for us. The Macabebes started

up into the town, and we heard a few shots followed by a scattered firing. We hastily crossed the river, and running up into the town, found that the Macabebes were somewhat demoralized and firing wildly in every direction. They were gotten under control with some difficulty. Aguinaldo's guard of about 50 armed and neatly uniformed men had been drawn up to received the re-enforcements, and, on being fired into, broke and ran, a few of them returning the fire as they retreated. Aguinaldo, with his officers, had awaited in his quarters. Placido and Segovia entered the house to report their arrival, and, after a short conversation, Segovia stepped outside the house and ordered the Macabebes who had just come up from the river bank to open fire on the insurgents, who were standing in line at a distance of about 50 yards. The Macabebes were so excited and nervous that their fire was very ineffective. But two of the insurgents were killed, the remainder in their flight throwing away 18 rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition.

As soon as Segovia had given the order he ran back into the house and opened fire on the officers surrounding Aguinaldo. He wounded Villa and Alhambra. The latter jumped out of the house into the river and was not seen again. Villa, on being wounded, surrendered, as did also Santiago Barcelona, Aguinaldo's treasurer.

The five remaining officers escaped from the house and swam the river. Placido seized Aguinaldo and told him that he was a prisoner of the Americans. At this juncture the Americans arrived on the scene and gave their attention to getting the Macabebes under control and protecting the prisoners from them. One Macabebe was slightly wounded by a gunshot wound on the forehead.

No attempt was made to pursue the fleeing insurgent soldiers, as such an effort could have no result, they having scattered in all directions through the jungle. We at once dressed Villa's wounds and made him as comfortable as possible. The three captured officers were confined in one of the rooms of the house, while we American officers, with Segovia and the Tagalogs occupied the other two rooms. The prisoners were treated with every possible consideration, although very closely watched. There was constantly in the room with them an officer and three guards, while there was a sentry outside of the house under each window. The Macabebes were quartered in the building where the insurgent troops had been.

There was found in the town a sufficient quantity of cracked corn, rice, and sweet potatoes for the needs of all, and from the time of our arrival at Palanan there was no suffering from hunger. All the inhabitants of the town fled immediately after the firing began, and not one was seen during the remainder of our stay.

The town was found to consist of about eighty small houses, a portion of them of hard wood but the most of bamboo. All had grass roofs. The town was compact and the streets well laid out, crossing each other at right angles. There was on the south side of the town an open place, or plaza, bounded on the south side by the Palanan River. On this square, separated from all other buildings and standing within 10 feet of the river bank, was the building in which lived Aguinaldo, Barcelona, and Villa. It was a hardwood house of the general type to be found in the smaller towns of the Philippines, being on upright timbers 6 feet from the ground and having a grass roof. There were 3 rooms, not including kitchen. On the opposite side of the plaza was the church, a building in very bad repair, and next to it the convento, a two-story frame building, used as quarters for the officers and soldiers constituting Aguinaldo's personal escort.

The 22d, the day before our arrival, was Aguinaldo's birthday, and the town had been decorated with flowers and ornaments of bamboo in honor of the occasion. These decorations were still in place when the town was entered by us.

The night of the 23d passed without event, and all day of the 24th was spent in recovering from the hardships and fatigues of the march. The feet of many of the Macabebes were so worn and bruised that they could scarcely walk, and Segovia was suffering greatly from an abscess in his left foot. As stated in another part of this report, I had arranged with Commander Barry that the *Vicksburg* meet us on the 25th at Palanan Bay 6 miles northeast of the town.

Accordingly, on the morning of that day we started, marching down the Palanan River to the sea in a northeasterly direction. There was a multiplicity of trails leading in every direction. Houses with small fields and gardens were seen here and there, but all the occupants had fled. Our prisoners knew but little of the route to be followed, and we lost considerable time by taking wrong trails.

Shortly after noon we reached the coast and sighted the *Vicksburg* coming in. Signals were exchanged, and the ship came to anchor about 2 miles from the shore. Boats were lowered, and after two hours of hard and dangerous work we were taken off from the beach.

The distance marched by the expedition since it had disembarked at the entrance of Casiguran Bay had been 116 miles, divided as follows: From point of disembarkation to Casiguran, one day, 20 miles; from Casiguran to Palanan, seven days, 90 miles; Palanan to Palanan Bay, one-half day, 6 miles.

On board the *Vicksburg* Aguinaldo was assigned to the captain's table with myself, while Villa and Barcelona were accommodated with the wardroom officers. The *Vicksburg* sailed at once for Manila and, passing around the north end of Luzon, arrived in Manila Bay before daybreak of March 28. In order that she might not attract attention the vessel went in with her lights out and anchored well to the north of the city. At 6 a.m. I left the ship in the steam launch with the prisoners, being accompanied by Lieutenant Glennon, executive officer of the *Vicksburg,* and my aid, Lieutenant Mitchell.

The prisoners were taken at once to Malacañan Palace and delivered to the division commander. The correspondence captured at Palanan was also delivered to the division commander, while the money, 1,065 pesos Mexican, was turned into the insular treasury.

Later in the day the *Vicksburg* came in and achored near the breakwater, and at 4 p.m. the remainder of the expedition was disembarked

Where all did their duties so exceptionally well it is a difficult task to give to every member of the expedition his just dues of commendation. Captain Hazzard, Captain Newton, Lieutenant Hazzard, and Lieutenant Mitchel bore the hardships and faced the dangers of the march with exceptional fortitude and courage. They fully realized that every day took us farther and farther into the enemy's country, and that if there should be one traitor among us or our identity should be discovered there could be no doubt as to the fate of all. They were resourceful in assisting to plan and carry out the many deceptions that the nature of the expedition made necessary.

Too much praise can not be given the officers and men of the *Vicksburg* for the invaluable services rendered the expedition by that vessel.

Every suggestion or request that I made to Commander Barry was complied with fully. He navigated his vessel fearlessly along the dangerous and inaccurately charted east coast of Luzon, running up the narrow Casiguran Bay on a dark and squally night and disembarking the expedition so quickly and so quietly that its presence was not suspected by the natives. The task of reembarking the expedition at Palanan Bay through a heavy surf was of the same high order. My fellow-officers and myself are indebted to Commander Barry and the other officers of the *Vicksburg* for innumerable courtesies. Nothing was left undone which would contribute to our well-being and comfort.

First Lieut. Joseph D. Taylor, Twenty-fourth Infantry, commanding at Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, is entitled to great credit for the discretion and excellent judgment shown by him in obtaining possession of the correspondence which made known the whereabouts of Aguinaldo.

Lieutenant Taylor was confronted with a delicate situation, and had any mistakes been made in handling this situation the bearer of the dispatches would never have presented the letters. I commend Lieutenant Taylor's action to the favorable notice of his superiors.

Of the members of the expedition, in addition to the officers already referred to, the man who especially distinguished himself was the Spaniard, Lazaro Segovia. It is no exaggeration to say that without this man the expedition would probably have been a failure. His ingenuity in deceiving the natives, and his assistance in planning, were invaluable. His courage and endurance were phenomenal. Halfway between Casiguran and Palanan he developed an abscess on one foot, and during the remainder of the march every step was torture. He never hinted at giving up, but after we were on board the *Vicksburg* he was not able to stand for several days. He is a capable and intelligent man, and was formerly a first sergeant in the Spanish army. In case native troops are organized in these islands I recommend that he be given a commission as second lieutenant.

Hilario Placido, the ex insurgent major, did not have the resource and courage of Segovia, but did his part well and was faithful to the last, notwithstanding his previous connection with the insurgents. He is the man who in the critical moment seized and held Aguinaldo.

Cecilio Segismundo, Gregorio Cadhit, and Dionisio Bato acted well their subordinate parts; and though all three of them had been but a short time out of the insurgent ranks, served with unquestioned loyalty.

The Macabebes, as would be inferred from the contents of this reports, served with their accustomed loyalty and courage. As might be expected, some did better than others. There were a few indiscretions and minors breaches of discipline committed by some of the younger men. First Sergt. Pedro Bustos is deserving of special mention because of his courage and the intelligent discharge of his duties.

Very respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON
Brigadier General, U.S.A., Commanding

Buencamino's Memorial to Congress*

To the honorable the members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

GENTLEMEN: The government of the Philippine republic being informed that it is the intention of the President of the United States to convene a meeting of the honorable members of Congress at a comparatively early date for the purpose of discussing and passing a resolution having for its object a just decision as to the policy to be pursued in reference to the present situation in the Philippines, I believe it to be consistent with the dictates of courtesy, as well as a duty to humanity, that in view of the fact that I have been intrusted with the portfolio of foreign affairs I should respectfully submit this document to you, setting forth the aspirations of the Filipino people and their reasons and justification for wishing to be recognized by your influential Government as an independent state.

Allow me, gentlemen, to lay before you, for your distinguished consideration, the facts and rights that form the grounds upon which the claim for recognition is made and sustained.

First. It is generally accepted as an axiom that, as regards international affairs, the larger and more powerful a state the greater is the obligation, morally, to support and maintain lesser states in the independence, the welfare, and the happiness with which God, in His bountiful goodness, has designed should be theirs and of which the greater states are guardians.

For instance, it appears evident that the powerful and wealthy nation which you, gentlemen, represent in Congress has been deputed by God to assist the weak Filipinos in the arduous and difficult task of restoration of their independence.

Eloquent proof of this is to be found in the cooperation offered and rendered to Don Emilio Aguinaldo in May, 1898, by the United States consuls at Hongkong and Singapore (Mr. Rounsevelle Wildman and Mr. E. Spencer Pratt) in order that our illustrious leader might

* Reprinted from U.S. 56th Congress, 1st sess. Senate Doc. 66, p. 45-52.

continue the revolutionary war waged against Spain in 1896 and 1897, hostilities in connection with which were suspended under the provisions of the compact of Biac-na-bato.

The cooperation referred to consisted of the facts that the United States dispatch boat *McCulloch* (attached to Admiral Dewey's squadron) conveyed Don Emilio Aguinaldo from Hongkong to Cavite, where he arrived on May 19, 1898; that Admiral Dewey received Don Emilio Aguinaldo with the ceremony and honors due to a general, in the presence of the whole of the officers and men of the flagship *Olympia*, and, besides, gave him 60 Spanish Mauser rifles to aid in a renewal of the revolution against Spain; that Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo was allowed to establish in Cavite, which was then held by the United States naval forces, the headquarters of the Filipino government, which commenced to exercise the functions of government on May 24, 1898, issuing therefrom a proclamation declaring war against Spain to wrest from her our independence. (Proclamation attached hereto.)

The letters of the aforesaid consuls, which are attached hereto for the information of the free and enlightened citizens of the United States, confirm the above statements.

Mr. Pratt, in one of his letters, says he congratulates himself on the rapid triumphs of Don Emilio Aguinaldo over the Spaniards, as it proves the wisdom of his judgment in recommending him to Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey and the Government at Washington, and he added that he hoped to receive, when General Aguinaldo captured Manila, some historic memento of the place and of the incident, such as the flag or keys of the city or principal fortress.

Consul-General Wildman, of Hongkong, instructed Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, in a letter attached hereto, respecting the treatment of Spanish prisoners, advising General Aguinaldo to give them only rice and water and treat the Spaniards "as they would treat you," advice which our humane leader declined to accept and act upon.

Thus in this wholly unexpected and unforeseen way bonds of good will and friendship were formed between Americans and Filipinos, resulting, as is well known, in the heroic and triumphant campaign of the Filipino army against the Spaniards, though it must be admitted, with due regard for the truth, that after the above-mentioned assistance and cordial cooperation our army received no more aid from the high officers of the United States, the Filipino army thereafter prosecuting the war

against the Spanish land forces independently of any authority other than that exercised by our successful and brave leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who, while directing the military operations with well-nigh miraculous skill and startling result, was also engaged in the task of organizing the Filipino national government on the model of Western nations, which are, admittedly, founders and leaders of modern civilization.

This it is plain that it was through providential agencies that the Filipino State came into being on the 24th day of May, 1898, and has existed to this day, replacing the alien Spanish Government, which fell definitely on the 13th day of August, 1898, on which day our troops, which, in fact and as set forth in Consul-General Pratt's letters, had closely invested Manila for more than two months, captured the suburbs of Manila, driving the Spaniards from their defenses, while the United States forces peacefully occupied the walled city in accordance with the terms of capitulation signed by the Spanish general.

It would seem, therefore, that there can be no doubt that God, in his infinite goodness, wisdom, and mercy, intrusted to the honor of the United States the liberation and independence of the Filipino; but notwithstanding the evidence that the hand of Providence has guided the course of events, the United States are now endeavoring to prevent the consummation of the glorious and just purposes of the Creator. By whom, by what agency, were the two peoples united in the bonds of sympathy and friendship? Who could have prevented it?

Who is it that has caused these two friends and brethren to wage war upon one another? Alas! esteemed citizens of the great American Republic, you know well who is the cause of such reckless perturbation. It is the President of your Republic, Mr. William McKinley, who, using as a pretext alleged rights obtained through the purchase of the more than doubtful sovereignty of Spain, gives evidence of his intention to ignore the bonds of friendship and guardianship which should unite the two nations by imposing on us, by force of arms, the sovereignty of the United States. Is this line of conduct of Mr. McKinley in harmony with the canons of morality simply because the American nation is greater, more opulent, and more powerful than the Filipinos? Surely it is not, for if moral obligations, which bind parties to respect the generally accepted codes of morality, are applicable in international affairs, it is beyond question that there should be no evasion of obligation on the part of the great American nation to stand by and protect the small Filipino nation until the great work of securing the recognition of our existence

as an independent nation is recognized and thereby firmly established—a great work to which your consuls (above mentioned) and commanders unquestionably and providentially applied themselves.

In the name, therefore, of Almighty God, of humanity, and of national honor, I now appeal to the great and influential citizens of the United States to fulfill these obligations by passing, as a matter of paramount importance, a just resolution in your national Congress officially recognizing our independence, thereby bringing to an end this inhuman and wicked war and restoring the reign of peace and harmony between Americans and Filipinos, who, in accordance with the infinite will of God, should live under the happy conditions of brotherhood.

Second. Accomplished facts are accepted in dealing with things political as rights unless the facts are at variance with the doctrines laid down international law or the eternal principles of justice. Strictly in accordance with these incontrovertible principles the independence of the United States was realized and recognized in the last century.

In the same manner and in more recent times the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire have come into existence, the ruling principle being, and the reason of it, that all men are born equal and possess inalienable rights of life, liberty, independence, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness.

Now, it is indisputable that we, the Filipinos, defeated the Spaniards, capturing 9,000 prisoners, and set up a republican government in the place of the one which had been vanquished. It is also beyond question that these accomplished facts have been recognized in a practical manner by the high officers who at that time and since then represented the United States in this archipelago, which is proved by the correspondence of our leader with Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey and Generals Anderson, Merritt, and Otis, copies of which are attached hereto for the information of the citizens of the United States.

It is to be observed, in the first place, that in his first letter to Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo Admiral Dewey states that he has received with pleasure the documents forwarded to him by our distinguished leader, promising to transmit them to their respective destinations. The documents referred to are the first proclamation issued by Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo announcing his arrival and the establishment of the dictatorial government at Cavite; also the proclamation of Philippine independence, issued in the town of Cavite, in the province of the same name — some to be

forwarded to the United States Government in Washington and others to be forwarded to the representatives of the powers in Manila.

Secondly, it is to be noted that the admiral in another letter asks General Aguinaldo for passports for several gentlemen recommended by the British consul, who was also acting consul for the United States of America in Manila, to enable them to travel freely and safely through our territory.

And, finally, it is noteworthy that Generals Anderson, Merritt, and Otis, in their correspondence, styled, as was only right and proper that they should, our leader "General Commanding the Philippine Revolutionary Army," while General Anderson asked Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo for quarters and camping ground for the forces under his command, as well as other assistance and cooperation in the campaign against the Spaniards — our "common enemy." It is also a well-known fact that the American commanders applied to us for positions and trenches for their troops in Maytubig, so as to place their forces side by side with our troops in the siege of Manila. In fact, the records prove that everything was done in a manner that indicated full recognition of our triumphant revolution and the noble ends kept constantly in view, namely, our liberty and independence, and owing to which (the righteousness of our cause) the new Filipino State, by its just and irreproachable procedure, unquestionably merited the consideration and respect of the American commanders.

This explains how Admiral Dewey submitted for the disposition of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo a protest lodged by the French consul in respect of the capture of the steamer *Compania de Filipinas,* which had been seized by us, the Admiral stating positively that he and his forces had nothing to do with the affair; held no jurisdiction in the premises.

In the light of the correspondence it is readily understood how Generals Anderson and Merritt came to address telegrams to Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo on the 13th August, 1898 (the day on which our troops captured the whole of the suburbs of Manila and the Spaniards in the walled city capitulated to the forces of the United States), requesting General Aguinaldo to give instructions for his troops to evacuate the suburbs in order to avoid the dangers inseparable from a dual military occupation, and offering to negotiate with General Aguinaldo afterwards.

Lastly, it is quite comprehensible how General Otis came to appeal to General Aguinaldo in the name of the United States Government for

the release of the friars held by us as prisoners—acts which show in an eloquent manner distinct recognition of the sovereign power and authority of the Philippine people, which had been recovered from the Spaniards since then and reassumed in the exalted and worthy personality of our leader, Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo.

Viewed from another standpoint, the above-mentioned incidents might be held to indicate that they were clear evidence that it was the bounden duty of the American commanders to harass, and, if possible, quell the Philippine revolution, not convey our illustrious leader to Cavite, to begin with, and thereby afford him very favorable opportunity (in view of the mode of conveyance, his reception by the Admiral, and the permission granted him to establish his headquarters in Cavite, whence he issued, without protest of any kind by Admiral Dewey or anyone else, a proclamation calling on the people to rally round his standard and wage war upon Spain to wrest from her the sovereignty of the archipelago) to revive the revolution against Spain, using his prestige and exercising his authority and genius to that end. But far from being indiscreet or ill-considered action, the recognition of General Aguinaldo's power and prestige, the arrangement to bring him back to the Philippines, the courtesy extended to him by Admiral Dewey, and the conduct of your consuls and generals was, on the contrary, rightful recognition of our revolution, in that our sovereign rights and independent authority in the archipelago were practically conceded and accepted as accomplished facts. It is therefore evident that we have a perfect right, and are not straining any points, in demanding from the Government of Washington official recognition of our independence, basing the demand on the above-mentioned reason that accomplished facts in affairs political constitute right.

This is altogether apart from and does not clash with the victories of your troops over the Spaniards, nor the cession of sovereignty by Spain in the treaty of Paris of the 10th December last in favor of the United States.

As regards your victories, there are the proclamations of General Merritt and the letters of General Anderson clearly setting forth that America did not come to the Philippines to make conquests, much less to wage war against the natives, but to free the people from the galling yoke of Spain. "We came not as enemies, but as liberators." Such were

the solemn pledges of your Generals Merritt and Anderson to the Filipinos when they arrived in these islands.

Therefore it is plain that it can not be claimed that by reason of your victories over the Spaniards rights of conquest accrue to you as being due from the Filipinos for the all-sufficient reason that you were not engaged in war with us between the 1st May, 1898, and the 4th February, 1899, during the night of which latter date your forces, in accordance with the orders of President William McKinley, commenced hostilities against our forces for the purpose of establishing American sovereignty in our archipelago by force of arms.

As for the cession of sovereignty, I have to say it is a null and void agreement in every respect, for it has been celebrated in contravention of all rules of international law and in opposition to the eternal principles of justice.

For example: It is not moral nor could it be just, and much less is it in accord with international right to say to a nation: "I will help you to sweep away Spanish sovereignty and make you independent, and after helping you to sweep away and destroy the said sovereignty I come and buy the sovereignty from Spain by title of cession and impose it by force of arms upon the protected people."

Such a proceeding is self-condemnatory, for its accomplishment rests only with arbitrary power and in the power of anyone exercising such power and carrying it to the extent of injuring an ally or a friend to whom protection is offered. Fiore, Blunstschli, and Hallet, authorities on international right, established as a rule to be universally applied the following: "It is not just under the pretext of assumed laws of nations to amalgamate or segregate a people against their obvious will spontaneously and voluntarily acclaimed."

Therefore the cession in question is an act completely null and void, being neither moral nor just; nor is it even licit according to international law.

On the other hand, in respect of cessions, the essential conditions include the possession of what is ceded, and when it concerns inhabited territories the concordance and express consent of the inhabitants is necessary. Neither of these conditions have been fulfilled in respect of the cession of the Philippines by the treaty of Paris of the 10th December, 1898. First, because at that date, and long before it, Spain exercised

no sovereignty whatever over any Philippine territory, which was reconquered by us and governed by us since June, 1898, which facts were well known to the Governments of Washington and Madrid. Second, because the Philippine people had publicly and loyally manifested to the Government of Washington and to the whole world that it was their desire to live independently of all alien sovereignty; and perhaps on this account our wishes were not consulted when the cession was made. An act without doubt of bad faith on the part of the two contracting parties, who were perforce obliged to make the terms null and void by reason of this false step.

Consequently the treaty of Paris of 10th December, 1898, does not convey any sovereign rights whatever in favor of the United States over any of the Philippine Islands or its inhabitants. Nor are the United States in any way entitled by it to impose upon the Philippine people an alien sovereignty by force of arms.

The United States, therefore, can not be excused from recognizing our independence either on account of their victories over the Spaniards or by reason of the provisions of the treaty of Paris. We, however, readily admit that our gratitude and full recognition are due to the great North American nation for the generous assistance proffered us by their consular representatives and commanders in bringing from Hongkong to Cavite our illustrious leader to continue the rebellion against Spain, and then, by respecting that revolution, recognizing it as the sovereign power which replaced that which Spain had lost; but, from the fact of oppressing us and endeavoring to filch from us our liberties, subjecting our independence, so dearly won, to the influence of a new foreign yoke, there is a wide gulf fixed, which is as limitless as the distance to another world, and the only possible way to accomplish your object is to destroy the lives of 8,000,000 Filipinos — an act which would leave on the hitherto spotless pages of your glorious history and traditional liberality an everlasting and indelible stain.

Third. The Filipinos can justly boast of a social status on a par with cultured peoples and are fit to commingle and live on an equality with civilized nations, forming in common with them part of the magna civitas.

We are a community of 8,000,000 people politically organized on well-defined territory, with our own government, which is competent to and sufficient for the protection of the rights of our citizens and capable

of assuming full responsibility for our acts in the conduct of relations with other States. We have an official language — Spanish. We have accepted an enlightened religion — the Roman Catholic faith. Strict morality which emanates from christianizing influences governs our manners and customs. Our laws are on a par with statutes of other civilized States, being identical with those in operation in these islands during the last few years, which have been generally accepted as meeting the requirements of civilized communities. And, lastly, we live in families, in towns, and in cities, affording permanent evidence of a status of cultured and civilized society; it being universally conceded that the Philippines, unlike other far eastern States, have invariably extended hospitality to all foreigners and enjoy the reputation of exceptional faultlessness and the strongest aversion to anything in the nature of barbarous conduct.

We, the Filipinos, respect life, honor, and rights in property, and punish with severe penalties all violations of these governing principles of humanity. We also have laws encouraging the knowledge of science and arts, protecting industries, commerce, and agriculture, and we profess, finally our acquaintance with all the most noble sentiments of friendship, gratitude, and honesty.

We possess, therefore, all the conditions requisite for existence as an independent State according to article 37 of the International Code of the famous jurisconsult Fiore, and that being so, we are perfectly justified in demanding from all the great civilized States official recognition of our independence in conformity with articles 44, 48, and 49 of the said standard work, which provides, moreover, that such recognition can not, under the circumstances, be denied us, nor should it be unduly delayed. It is clearly set forth in articles 55 and 56 of Fiore's work that any course of procedure in contravention of the foregoing articles is opposed to the principle of high policy.

To better prove to the people of the United States our culture and state of civilization there are annexed to this document copies of our fundamental laws and various decrees relating to the establishment of our executive and judicial administration, our educational establishments, and our army regulations. In this way, perhaps, the people of the States will be better able to grasp the truth respecting our advancement along the high road of modern civilization, and be thereby convinced of our ability to rule and govern ourselves in an independent manner.

These are the reasons why we appeal for official recognition of our independence — reasons which we confidently submit to the deep con-

scientiousness of the enlightened people of the United States — a people destined by God to decide the fate of our unfortunate country — a fate which would be better if, heeding the dictates of justice and humanity, your President, Mr. McKinley, had not chosen to wage this cruel, devastating war against us with your powerful land and sea forces.

It is sometimes said that we are to blame for the outbreak of hostilities during the night of the 4th February last, but this is not an established fact.

In the first place, because we, the Filipinos, were expecting at that very time (the beginning of February) official recognition of our independence from the Government of Washington, an expectation which was justified by the annexed letter of Gen. E. S. Otis, dated 25th January; also on account of what took place at the conferences of the mixed commissions of Americans and Filipinos which sat in Manila during the latter part of the said month of January to discuss matters and arrange for a basis of friendly relations between the two parties, which, it was hoped, would be permanent. Moreover, there was another reason, namely, the Filipinos were fully aware of the superior strength of your forces, against whom it would have been criminal folly to pit our inexperienced and undisciplined army.

Accordingly, it is unquestionable that we were not the aggressors, for we knew full well that were we to act on the offensive we could look for neither military nor political gain of any kind. On the contrary, we regarded such action as bordering on suicidal folly and well-nigh sure to bring down on us the hatred and contempt of the American people. We had, in fact, nothing to gain and very much to lose by aggression.

Esteemed citizens of the United States, if with the foregoing reasoning there be borne in mind the fact that we were living in peace and harmony with your forces since June, without the smallest intention or inclination to commence hostilities, at a period when your forces were smaller and therefore more easy to cope with than subsequently, I verily believe that the enlightened people of the United States will not be slow to realize that it is not in the least degree probable, nor is it reasonable to assume, that we were the aggressors, seeing that we stood in need of their good will and were anxious to court and maintain a favorable impression with the American electorate in the interest of our cause. Peace and goodwill were essential to the success of our cause — a cause which would at once be jeopardized by any overt act of aggression.

We are neither celebrated warriors nor great fighters; nor are we as quixotic as the Spaniards. We took up arms to obtain our independence, and it is self-evident that we did not develop our little armed force for the purpose of making an enemy of such a great and mighty people as the citizens of the United States in order that thereby our noble cause might the more easily triumph.

If we call to mind the fact that your President, Mr. McKinley, caused reinforcements to be sent to Manila after the capitulation by Spain on the 30th August, 1898, if we remember his refusal to listen to our humble petition to him, praying for recognition of our independence through our representative, Don Felipe Agonçillo, whom he refused to receive, or whether we recall the fact that he refused to give ear unto our appeal through the good offices of General Otis, as is proved by a letter from the General and the [omission in copy] to; and if we take into consideration that, lastly and finally, the treaty of Paris was so framed as to involve the cession of the sovereignty of Spain to the United States, I am of opinion that the most natural sequence of these incontestable moves of Mr. McKinley is to be found in the outbreak of hostilities, namely, an order from your President to General Otis to commence with acts of aggression and impose on us that odious sovereignty by force of arms, notwithstanding the fact that we had demonstrated and made it evident in every possible way from the first that we would accept no solution other than our independence.

You, honorable representatives of the people of the United States, having in view the providential bonds which bind the fate of the Philippines to your supreme decision, surely you will not be unmindful at such a momentous epoch of the sublime principles of right and justice proclaimed by the illustrious founders of your independence on 4th June, 1776. Endowed with those magnificent principles, your nation advanced rapidly along the paths of progress till it became great and powerful, admired and respected by all the aged States of Europe.

Trusting, therefore, in your glorious traditions of humanity and liberality, the Filipinos look forward with confidence to obtaining from your acknowledged rectitude a just resolution officially recognizing the independence of our beloved country.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, yours very respectfully,

FELIPE BUENCAMINO

TARLAC, P. I., *August 20, 1899*

GEN. WESLEY MERRITT

GEN. ARTHUR MACARTHUR

GEN. ELWELL S. OTIS

GEN. THOMAS ANDERSON

Documents Relating to the Philippine-American War, 1898-1901, and to the Philippine Republic

I. Correspondences between General Emilio Aguinaldo and the American Military Authorities

CAVITE, *June 10, 1898.*

To the President of the Republic of the
Great North American Nation

DEAR AND HONORED SIR: I come to greet you with the most tender effusion of my soul, and to express to you my deep and sincere gratitude, in the name of the unfortunate Philippine people, for the efficient and disinterested protection which you have decided to give it, to shake off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba, which Spain wishes to see annihilated rather than free and independent, giving her, to quiet her and to cicatrize the deep wounds made in her heart by the iniquities committed upon her children, a false autonomy, of which one bold blow of the Governor-General may deprive her immediately, as she has no colonial army to serve as a counterpoise to the almost sovereign powers of that supreme authority.

At the same time, as I am always frank and open, I must express to you the great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading in the Times, a newspaper of the greatest circulation and reputation in the whole world, in its issue of the 5th of last month, the astounding statement that you, sir, will retain these islands until the end of the war, and, if Spain fails to pay the indemnity, will sell them to a European power, preferably Great Britain; but we found a palliative to our sorrow in the improbality and suddenness of that statement, as common sense refuses to believe that so sensible a public man as you would venture to make an assertion so contrary to common sense, before events are

entirely consummated, as you well know that if God favors the triumph of your arms to-day, to-morrow He may defeat them and give the victory to Spain, and because such an assertion is not consistent with the protection of which you make a boast toward this unfortunate people, which has been groaming for more than three centuries in the clutches of a nation which has for its shield (emblem) the lion, one of the ferocious animals, although she displays it as a symbol of nobility, which she certainly does not possess, besides the fact that it is opposed to your noble and generous sentiments to wish to sell these islands to a European power such as England, thereby making us pass under the domination of that nation, which, although it has a truly liberal government, partakes none the less of the nature of a tyranny as it is monarchial.

Oh, sir, you are greatly injured by this statement, which ought to be regarded merely as a diplomatic trick invented by the friends of Spain to induce us to help her by using this vile slander which has been hurled against you to arouse our hostilities to that powerful nation over whose destinies you happily preside.

The Philippine people, however, have not given credit to that awkwardly invented fable, and have seen in your nation, ever since your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish fleet which was here, in spite of its being assisted by the guns of their two forts, the angel who is the harbinger of their liberty; and they rose like a single wave when, as soon as I trod these shores, I addressed them to gain them over; and they captured, within the period of ten days, nearly the whole garrison of this Province of Cavite, in whose port I have my government---by the consent of the admiral of your triumphant fleet—as well as the garrison of the adjoining Province of Bataan, together with the governors and officials of both provinces; and my valiant hosts are now besieging Manila, the capital, on the south and east, while my forces in the Province of Bulacan, which adjoins this province on the north, and the chief town of which is likewise being besieged by them, nearly surround Manila on the north.

Such is the astonishing triumph which this suffering people has gained in a few days over the conquering race whose traditional valor, of which it is continually bragging, has been humbled on these battlefields and has been succeeded by a great terror; and a people of such warlike qualities, which is, moreover, thoroughly civilized, as nearly two-thirds of them can read and write, and as they have in their midst many men of high

attainments in the sciences and arts, should not be sold as if it were a lamb to be sacrificed and exploited for the greed of another nation.

I close by protesting once and a thousand times, in the name of this people, which knows how to fight for its honor by means of its improvised warriors and artillery men, against the statement published by the Times, mainly for the purpose of casting a blot in history upon its glorious name; a people which trusts blindly in you not to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain, and I offer fervent prayers for the ever-increasing prosperity of your powerful nation, to which and to you I shall show unbounded gratitude, and shall repay with interest that great obligation.

Your humble servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 62, II:360-361

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 4, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon

GENERAL; I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces.

In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this, I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule.

I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to

maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness.

I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without permission.

Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiment and distinguished consideration, I am, with all respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208,I:4

Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Commanding the United States Volunteers

GENERAL: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your excellency.

I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satisfaction whenever occasion represents.

I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes.

I beg of your excellency to accept in return the assurance of my most respectable consideration.

I remain, respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:5

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 6, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY
Commanding Philippine Forces

GENERAL: I am encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both.

Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country.

It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy; but for a short time we must organize and land supplies and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports.

I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place.

I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precautions. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine and fear epidemic disease, if the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?

I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration.

I am, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:5

CAVITE, *July 7, 1898*

To General THOMAS ANDERSON
Commanding First Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Troops

GENERAL: In order to respond to the sentiments of amity and concord expressed in your courteous note of the 6th instant, I am going to

give proper orders and instructions in order that when your re-enforcements arrive they may have ample place for accommodation and care of provisions.

You may feel assured that for my part I will resolutely avoid conflict of any kind, even if only to demonstrate the unalterable confidence of the Filipinos in the generosity and the grandeur of the designs of the Great American people, and I shall adopt the measures necessary to prevent any epidemic disease.

Thanking you for your courtesy, I am etc.

"Signed by Sr. Aguinaldo," (as per note on margin).

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 14, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Forces

GENERAL: Wishing to get complete information of the approaches to Manila in every direction, I therefore have the honor to request, that you give my officers all possible assistance in making reconnoissance to the lines and approaches, and that you favor them with your advice. Officers coming from me will have a note to that effect.

With great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:6

BACOOR, *July (15), 1898*

To His Excellency, the Admiral Commanding the
Asiatic Squadron of the U.S.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: As the revolution is occupying several provinces of the Archipelago, this Government has found itself under the necessity of adopting the form and organization best adapted to the popular will.

Therefore I have the honor and pleasure of placing in your hand the enclosed decrees which set forth the organization referred to, praying

you to signify to your government the desire of this Government of being always in friendly and harmonious relations with the just North American nation to which it is under great obligations.

I also pray your Excellency to have the goodness to direct the delivery of the enclosed packages to the British consul, requesting him on my behalf to have the same delivered to their respective destinations.

For which favor the Filipino people will be highly grateful to Your Excellency, as will also you, etc. etc.

"Signed by Sr. Aguinaldo," (as stated on the margin).

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
Cavite, Philippine Islands, July 17, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO
Addressed.

SIR: General Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Parañaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, it will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices.

We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for horses with each individual man.

I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible.

I will await your reply.

SAM R. JONES,

Major and Quartermaster, U.S. Volunteers, Chief Quartermaster.

SD 208, I:7

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P.I., July 18, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY.

GENERAL: Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active hostility to Spain.

The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.

We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us.

I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila.

The city is strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season. If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering ability here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:8

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITORY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding General, Philippine Forces

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant. Your offer of assistance is appreciated and your assurances of good will are most gratifying.

The difficulty of collecting supplies, referred to by you. is apprehended, and will be considered in fixing compensation.

As a medium of communication with your people, we will be pleased to have you assure them that there will be no confiscation of their property, that our requisitions will be reasonable, and that a fair compensation will always be given.

I remain, General, with all respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:9

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 19, 1898.

Señor DON EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding General, Philippine Forces

GENERAL: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, U.S.A. was sent by Maj. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT, U.S.A., to collect for him, by the time of his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country surrounding Manila.

I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps and place at his disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also give him a letter or pass addressed to your subordinates which will authorize them to furnish him any information they can on these subjects, and to facilitate his passage along the lines upon a reconnoissance around Manila on which I propose to send him.

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:8

[Extract]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY
Washington, D. C.

Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As to this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader.

It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship.

These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:12-13

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding General, Philippine Forces

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that passes and such other assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan, and party, who are making a reconnoissance of the surrounding country.

Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions,

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 62, II: 393

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, July 22, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding General, Philippine Forces

GENERAL: Replying to your excellency's letter in relation to the property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to state that if he transferred the property to you personally, before the capture of Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the property in question to you. If, however, the property was not transferred to your excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the property would appear to have been public Spanish property or contraband of war and subject to capture.

This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of the American army.

I observed that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my Government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign power. Your

fine intellect must perceive that, happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority.

I remain, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:9:10

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 23, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Forces

GENERAL: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American army, as it was to fight in the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.

As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts.

If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people.

I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

I remain, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:11

BACOOR, *July 24, 1898.*

Señor Don THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding
Expeditionary Forces of the United States.

GENERAL: In answer to the letter of your excellency, dated the 22nd of the current month, I have the honor to manifest to you the following.

That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of

Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the plaza (town) of Kavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything I might find in the same, including the arms which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But I was aware that the said effects belonged to the personal property of a Filipino, who treated in them by virtue of the payment of a contribution to the Spanish Government. I would not have touched them if the owner had not placed them at my disposition for the purposes of the war.

I came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal discord, because, [Being] a judge of their desires, I had the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires.

Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the provinces] might be justly represented, and administered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude.

Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and (being) more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship.

I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people]; and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed for the North American people, in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty.

With the greatest respect and consideration,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:10-11

BACOOR, *July 24, 1898.*

Señor Don THOMAS M. ANDERSON
Brigadier-General, Commander of the
Expeditionary Forces of the United States

GENERAL: Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of the number of these with due anticipation (notice).

I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I can not assure your excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last.

Whenever we have them united (or collected), I shall have the pleasure to advise your excellency.

I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever necessary, always (premising) that you afford me a previous advice of four days in anticipation.

Remaining, with great respect,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:11-12

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 24, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Forces

GENERAL: Your favor of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory. I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of caromatas, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part.

We are not so unreasonable as to suppose that all we want can be supplied at once or from one place. We may even have to send to other islands. Our quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp, where he will receive and pay for supplies, and from which he will send out parties to whatever places your excellency will indicate to transact business with your people.

With great regard, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:12

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
UNITED STATES EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 27, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Forces

GENERAL: Referring to your letter of the 24th instant, relative to the alleged property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to inform

you that it has been forwarded to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, commanding United States Expeditionary Forces, for his action.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SD 208, I:14

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite, P.I., July 30, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps
S. S. Newport, Manila Bay, P. I.

SIR: Referring to verbal instructions in relation to an issue of rations to Spanish prisoners, I have the honor to state that I have just received a verbal message from General Aguinaldo, conveyed by Capt. Marti Burges, aide-de-camp, to this effect: That he, Aguinaldo, appreciates the kindness that prompts the offer, but fears that if this should become known in Manila the Spaniards would regard it as an indication that resources were exhausted and would consequently take heart and make renewed resistance.

He will therefore endeavor to increase their rations, but reminds us that prisoners always complain. I made answer verbally that if their prisoners were kept here they would have to be well fed, but that he could of course remove them if he saw fit to do so.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U.S.V., Commanding.

SD 208, I:15

AUGUST *1, 1898.*

MR. WILLIAMS.

DEAR SIR AND DISTINGUISHED FRIEND: Impressed by the note of July 8 past, I can only confess that the people of North America have excited, and now excite, the universal admiration not only for the grade of progress and culture to which they have arrived in a very short time, but also for their political constitution, so admirable and inimitable, and

for the generosity, honesty, and industry of the men of the Government who have so far ruled the destinies of that great people without an equal in history.

Above all, I thank you sincerely for the kind words which you express in your note quoted above, and I congratulate you with all sincerity on the acuteness and ingenuity which you have displayed in it in painting in an admirable manner the benefits which, especially for me and my leaders, and, in general, for all my compatriots, would be secured by the union of these islands with the United States of America. Ah! that picture, so happy and so finished, is capable of fascinating not only the dreamy imagination of the impressionable Oriental, but also the cold and calculating thoughts of the sons of the North.

This is not saying that I am not of your opinion. I am fully persuaded that the Filipinos will arrive at the height of happiness and glory if in future they can show with raised heads the rights which to-day are shown by the free citizens of North America. These islands will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest countries of the globe if the capital and industry of North Americans come to develop the soil.

You say all this and yet more will result from annexing ourselves to your people, and I also believe the same since you are my friend and the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But why should we say it? Will my people believe it?

I, with true knowledge of the character and habits of these people, do not dare assure you of it, since I have only wished to establish a government in order that none of those powers which you call ambitious should be able to take advantage of our good faith, as has been done in the past by the Spaniards. I have done what they desire, establishing a government in order that nothing important may be done without consulting fully their sovereign will, not only because it was my duty, but also because acting in any other manner they would fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more careful of his own honor and dignity.

I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are now receiving, but however great those favors may be it is not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots.

These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these islands, why not recognize the government established in them in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation?

Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive?

Is is intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship?

It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present the American forces have shown not an active, only a passive cooperation, from which they suppose that the intention of these forces are not for the best. They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, fatigue; blood, and treasure that a war with Spain would cost.

But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history of the privileged people of the United States, and for that reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly, as also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat the Government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power with my people that the United States shall not repent their sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed people.

Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people abominate savagery, that in the midst of their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their own wishes when their future lot and history are under discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to our unfortunate country, that we know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism

of the grand men of America, among whom stands preeminent the immortal General Washington.

You and I both love the Filipinos; both see their progress, their prosperity, and their greatness. For this we should avoid any conflict which would be fatal to the interests of both peoples, who should always be brothers. In this you will acquire a name in the history of humanity and an ineradicable affection in the hearts of the Filipino people. (From General Aguinaldo to Mr. Williams, United States consul.)

SD 208, I:17

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Cavite Arsenal, P.I., August 5, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC, ETC.:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that General Aguinaldo, through a staff officer, complains that the Signal Corps, U.S.A., in putting up wires has interrupted his communications; that he was promised that this interruption would not last more than one day, but that it has now been out of working order for three days; that he is very glad to have the army use his telegraph poles, but it is so important to keep his communication that he earnestly requests prompt action in the matter.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON
Brigadier-General, U.S.V., Commanding.

SD 208, I:14

[Telegram]
CAMP DEWEY, *near Manila, 8—10—'98*

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Filipino Forces, Bacoor

Will your excellency consent to my occupation of the entrenchment facing Blockhouse No. 14, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon? Our object is to place artillery to destroy the blockhouse. If you consent, please issue necessary orders to-night. I shall highly appreciate a prompt reply.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON
Brigadier-General, U.S.V., Commanding.

SD 208, I:17

BACOOR, *August 10, 1898*

Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U.S.V.

Camp Dewey

SIR: Replying to your note of this date, in which you ask me the occupation by your troops of the intrenchments facing Blockhouse No. 14 only, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon, I have the pleasure to tell you that I [am] giving the necessary orders so that your troops may occupy the mentioned intrenchments, and my troops will pass to the immediate intrenchment or to any other place where they think convenient to intrench themselves.

I remain, most respectfully, yours,

E. AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:17

WAR DEPARTMENT, U. S. VOL. SIGNAL CORPS
Telegram Received

R. Ry. S. 26 Words. Received at 8:00 a.m. August 13, 1898.
Dated Camp Dewey 13.
To General Aguinaldo
Commanding Philippine Forces
Bacoor

Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission of the American Commander. On this side of Pasig river you will be under our fire.

ANDERSON
Brigadier-General.

[Telegram]

MANILA, P. I., *August 13, 1898*

General AGUINALDO
General in Chief, Filipino Forces

Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves in the city until we have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you.

ANDERSON.

SD 208, I:17

[Most urgent.]

PINEDA (received from Bacoor 10:50 a.m. 13th).

President of revolutionary government to General Anderson, Ermita

General ANDERSON, *Ermita:*

I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite; in consequence of this I have not answered till now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary, to avoid conflicts, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila.

I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked by a common enemy. I do not doubt that the good relations and friendship which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond to the conduct imposed upon mine. (Communication received by General Anderson from Aguinaldo the day of the attack on Manila.)

SD 208, I:17-18

[Telegram]

BACOOR, *August 14, 1898*

General ANDERSON:

My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and can not deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will alow the troops to enter because we have given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Parañaque, Pasay, Cingalon, and Maytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe Buen Camino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe during the conference.

E. A. AGUINALDO [*sic.*]

SD 208, I:18

[Telegram]

BACOOR, *August 14, 1898*

General ANDERSON, *Manila*

Dear General: Not being able to leave government, have conferred special powers to Buencamino, Araneta, and others, who left here for you at 8 o'clock this morning.

E. AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:18

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., August 15, 1898.

Brig. Gen. T. M. ANDERSON, U.S.V.
Commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps

SIR: The commanding general directs that in any arrangement made with the insurgents in regard to retiring from the vicinity of the city care will be taken to make them understand that they must not hold a line encircling the city. The commanding general will not tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our troops were hemmed in by a besieging force. The insurgents may billet their commands in villages in the vicinity, but under no circumstances will they be allowed to hold a line as above indicated.

Very respectfully,

J. B. BABCOCK
Adjutant-General.

SD208, I: 19

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, Philippine Islands, August 20, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES

SIR: The commanding general of American forces has received a memorandum addressed to General Anderson, which purports to contain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. As most

of them seem to be reasonable, it give him much pleasure to say that he agrees to the following:

The forces of the Filipinos are to withdraw entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits, or walled city, and its suburbs — Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando Dilao. The Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed, in order that the water may be turned on to the city, and the expenses of the repairs and the current expenses of the works will be paid by the city. The commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and security at the pumping station.

Permission for the free navigation of the *Patria* to entrance and exit of the port and river Pasig, and that country products for sale be admitted free of duty is granted.

Free entrance and departure from the city for all Filipinos without arms is granted. Chiefs and officers of the Filipino army may, as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated as possibly leading to the disturbance of the quiet of the city. No pistols should be carried.

The major-general having taken, for his own use, the palace at Malacañan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos can not be granted, and the convents at Malate, Ermita, and Paco can not be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila are being filled as rapidly as possible by Americans, and the commanding general will be glad to receive recommendations for appointments to offices of such Filipinos as may be considered fitted for the duties of subordinate offices.

American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through the Filipinos' positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos without arms are permitted to enter the city.

The return of the arms of the hundred and fifty men will be granted by the general in immediate command.

The opening of the waterworks at once and the retirement of your soldiers from the positions now occupied within the municipal jurisdiction will be sufficient notice on your part that everything is satisfactorily ar-

ranged on the terms of this letter. With the sincere hope that it may be speedily accomplished.

I am, very respectfully,

WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General Commanding.

SD 208, I: 20-21

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR BELL.

1. In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:

(1) That if a meeting between himself and the commanding general here could be arranged, I would be very glad to meet him and have a talk with him upon the general situation.

(2) That it is of the most importance to us that the water supply of the city be at once turned on, as, the rainy season having suspended, it is important that the sewers be flushed and the city gotten in fair sanitary condition.

(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him *in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government.*

(4) That I agree with Mr. Williams, the consul, in thinking that it would be well for him and some of his leaders to visit Washington and represent the case to the American authorities. I feel sure that good would result from this course. However, it is not considered necessary.

(5) It is my intention to depose the Spanish officials from all important positions hitherto held by them, and this already has been done to a considerable extent. I will be very clad to receive recommendations from him for Filipinos who are especially trustworthy, though I can not agree to make any appointments in the immediate future. The American officers and men will be employed as far as is practicable in conducting the affairs of the municipality.

(6) I expect daily a considerable accession to the forces which I now have here, and it is my design to lodge them in Cavite, provided room can there be found. In conclusion, I sincerely trust that there will be no friction in the future between our commands and that the good feeling that we have made every attempt to foster will be encouraged by Aguinaldo and his chiefs. For myself and the officers and men under my command I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the ability and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect.

WESLEY MERRITT, *Major-General.*

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—Aguinaldo told me to thank General M. for his kind offer and to say that just as soon as his health would permit of such a thing (he had been sick) he would send a staff officer to meet him. He had not sent the staff officer, as far as I know, when General M. left. Soon after General M.'s arrival he sent a staff officer on board the *Newport* to arrange for an interview with him, but the General sent back word that he was exceedingly pressed by business just then, but as soon as he could he would send him word when he could see him.

I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored [italicized] portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me and I preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject.

SD 208, I: 22-23

Without losing a moment you will proceed to open (start) the machinery of the waterworks, being sorry that up to the present my orders have not been completed (fulfilled) for said object, and I expect that the present will be immediately completed (fulfilled).

I inform you that this order will be carried to you by Majors Bement (engineer) and Bell, accompanied by an assistant, Mr. Infante, wtih the object of examining said machinery.

E. AGUINALDO.

BACOOR, *April 21, 1898.*

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—Aguinaldo and his associates seemed much gratified when I made known to them the contents of the preceding memorandum. I asked for a written order to the officer in charge of the forces holding the reservoir and pumping station, to be delivered by myself. The above was prepared and handed me. Captain Infante, one of Aguinaldo's adjutants, was also sent with me to make sure his object (the immediate opening of the works) was accomplished. On arriving at the pumping station next day I found that the delay had been due not to official obstruction, but to the inability of these mañana people people to overcome the inertia incident to starting up machinery which had lain idle for some months.

SD 208, I:23-24

BAKOOR, *August 21, 1898*

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES OF THE PACIFIC

SIR: The commanding general of the Philippine forces has been favored by a letter from your excellency, dated the 20th of the present month, which contains the conditions to be accepted by the Filipinos, namely, that they should evacuate the places which they now hold within the suburbs of Manila.

The before-mentioned letter speaks of the free navigation of the *Patria*, and as no boat of this name is counted by the Filipinos, he who subscribes would be pleased to have this point made more clear. It is understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of the American squadron, that they may have free navigation for all their boats, and free entrance to and departure from all ports which may be in possession of the same (squadron); but besides, in substitution of the proposed conditions, which the said letter does not mention, the Filipinos desire to continue in the occupation of that part of the suburbs of San Francisco de Dilao, or Paco, which is nearest the east of the bridge and stream of the same name, he who subscribes assuming responsibility for foreign interests which exist at said point. Equally they desire that in consequence of a treaty of peace which may be signed between the United States of America and Spain, the Philippines should continue in possession of the last named, that the American forces should turn over to the Filipinos all of the suburbs in consideration of the cooperation given by them in the taking of the Plaza of Manila. With these conditions and the others which are

accepted in said letter, he who subscribes promises, in the name of the Filipinos, to evacuate the places which they now hold in the suburb; and the acceptation of the same by your excellency will be a further proof that he holds in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed by the siege of Manila, and that he appreciates the newly arisen friendship which will be preserved at all cost.

Very respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:21-22

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM GEN. AGUINALDO TO MAJOR-GEN. MERRITT

August 24, 1898.

I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among themselves.

General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigation to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment.

Yours respectfully,

AGUINALDO.

SD 62, II:401

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, August 24, 1898.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO, *Bakoor, P. I.*

SIR: The commanding general of the American land forces has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 21, and in reply to inform you as follows:

The error which you speak of which needs clearing up as to the navigation of the *Patria* seems to have arisen from a request on your part that the Filipinos of the country should be permitted to trade freely and navigate without obstruction the streams and bays surrounding Manila.

So far as the products of the country are concerned this has been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the American land forces in the way of a free trade in the products of the country between the residents of this island and the city of Manila.

The protection which you ask from the American squadron rests with Rear-Admiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can be granted or not.

A commission of your appointment which had an interview with the undersigned about the 15th instant agreed that if a line were designated by a proper commission on my part that the armed Filipinos should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances it has been neglected in others, and it is now desired to call your attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila or any part of them can not be acceded to by the undersigned. It has already been pointed out to you that a dual occupation of Manila was impossible in the interests of either party; and as the troops of the United States are in possession of Manila I must insist upon the carrying out of the original agreement between your commission and myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent instructions from my home Government contemplate this course.

So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of the United States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.

This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of business which could not very well be neglected.

I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good feeling that now exists between us should be carefully fostered and maintained.

Very respectfully,

WESLEY MERRITT,
Major-General.

SD 208, I:24

[Telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5:13 a.m., August 25, 1898.]

General MERRITT

Concerning trouble between Philippine and American forces at Cavite, I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among themselves. General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigations to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment.

Very respectfully,

AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 25

[Reply to telegram received from Aguinaldo 5:13 a.m., August 25, 1898.]

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *August 25, 1898 — 8:05 a.m.*

General AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces, Bakoor

Thanks for your telegram. I am glad to learn of your intention to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should prevail, and request you always, in event of trouble, to communicate directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time.

MERRITT.

SD 208, I:25

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidencia, Bakoor, August 27, 1898.

General WESLEY MERRITT, *Manila*

My dear SIR: Knowing the content of your letter of the 24th instant, I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you have formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate.

I understood, and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation of my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city would take place when the proposed conditions were accepttd by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason, not having yet accepted some of the propositions made at the time, nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to now I have contracted said obligation.

If I have permitted the use of the water before the formalization of the treaty, it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend as well as yourself the inconvenience of a double occupation of the city and its suburbs, given the condition stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards; but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my force you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns.

I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people; I do not insist upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the city limits at the cost of much blood, of indescribable fatigues and much money; I promise to retire them to the following lines:

In Malate continuation of the Calzada of Singalong to the bridge that joins that road; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco; from this last bridge following the creek Paco and leaving outside that suburb of Tanque to the River Pasig; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge following the road (calzada) of th't same name, and that of Santa Mesa that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo.

But before I retire to this line I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships from free navigation, and permit me to insist, if you wish, upon the restitution of the position that we are now going to leave if the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of the above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to. I do

not believe that the acceptation of the conditions proposed will prejudice the smallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more than the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a friendly people.

I am now compelled to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and abandoned their interests during the siege of Manila. I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted government as that of the United States of America.

Very respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION. — No positions whatever, with a possible exception of Paco (San Fernando de Dilao), were conquered within the city limits by Aguinaldo's forces. Definite information can be procured of General MacArthur as to whether the insurgents or our forces forced the Spanish to retire from that place.

The Calzada Aviles merges at the crossroads (where there is really a round, open space, with a fountain in the center, and called the Plaza de Rotonda) into the road to Santa Mesa, marked on the map "A Marinquina", to which place it also goes. The First Colorado Regiment has a picket post on this road a half mile beyond the limit mentioned by Aguinaldo.

I gather from the statements of many naval officers that Aguinaldo was invited here and given much assistance and encouragements by Admiral Dewey, who, of course, did not anticipate any complication and probably never supposed Aguinaldo would at once assume an indtpendence of American control. He has been much concerned and displeased by Aguinaldo's course of conduct, and told me several days ago that he had ceased to recognize him in any way and had refused to any longer receive his representatives. This prayer to you to "reclaim" Admiral Dewey's protection is doubtless due to this change of attitude on the Admiral's part, who, if permitted to follow his own inclinations, will not only grant Aguinaldo no protection, but will seize his boats and launches at the first over act.

Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise (page —), made known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the

United States withdrawing from these islands, care should be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the general made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression "forces of the Government" to mean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation. At the time of the entry of the American forces into Manila, which was accomplished without assistance from the insurgents being either needed, requested, received, or desired, the insurgents held the following lines: Joining onto the American trenches facing Maytubig (the Indian name for the locality at the south end of Malate, in the vicinity of the old fort and bridge), their trenches extended a large circle around and outside of the Spanish line of blockhouses. The Spanish held Santa Ana, Concordia, Paco, Singalong, and Malate; then the line dropped back to blockhouse No. 8, to Macleod's house in Santa Mesa, and continued on around to the bay at Bancusay, including within it all the suburbs on the northern side of Manila. The lines are indicated in map accompanying my report of July 27. Parañaque, Pasay, San Pedro Macati, Mandaloyon, Pasig, Guadalupe, Partero Santalon (where is situated the pumping station), San Juan del Monte (where the reservoir is located), Cubao, Santol, San Francisco del Monte, Caloocan, and Malabon are the villages, towns, and places (immediately in rear of the insurgent trenches and positions) where the insurgent forces were generally located. After our entry to the city they all advanced their positions and encroached upon our outposts without anyone's authority or permission save their own, and in the face of repeated objections on the part of General Merritt. They can lay no just claim to having conquered from the Spanish the positions now held except those at the pumping station and reservoir. Prior to the 13th of August they had for weeks been straining every resource in an effort to capture Manila without the assistance of Americans, and before they got ready, without making the slightest progress. Of course, they could never have made the progress they did in investing the city had it not been for the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey; but they did do much hard fighting and did drive the Spanish from positions in the provinces immediately surrounding Manila into the confines of the city itself. This credit they are entitled to.

SD 208, I:25-27

[Telegram.]

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
Manila, P.I., August 31, 1898.

General AGUINALDO, *Bacoor, P. I.*

Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four day, I desire to state that General Merritt was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before replying, which I will do at earliest opportunity.

OTIS, *Commanding.*

SD 208, I:28

BACOOR, *Cavite, August 31, 1898*

General OTIS,
Commanding United States Forces, Manila

GENERAL: By your telegram of this date I understood that your excellency substitutes General Merritt in his absence, for which I beg you will kindly accept my cordial salutation and my most sincere congratulations.

I shall have much pleasure in continuing with your excellency the friendly relations which ought to exist between us.

The bearer is one of my aids, who will acquaint you of some reserved affairs.

Hoping you will give your attention as the welfare of both countries require,

Very respectfully yours,

EMILIO AGUINALDO

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 8, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 27th ultimo, addressed to General Merritt, my predecessor, and by him transferred to me on the eve of his departure

from Manila. By telegram on the 31st ultimo, I informed you of General Merritt's hurried departure, in obedience to orders of my Government; that his necessarily hurried preparations did not permit him to make reply to the communication and that such duty devolved upon me, which I would perform at the earliest opportunity and as soon as I could acquaint myself with the condition of affairs, of which (as I had but recently arrived) I had slight knowledge. To my telegram you made a most courteous response. Having now carefully considered the situation, I have the honor to make reply as follows:

And first, in your note of the 27th ultimo, you are pleased to manifest surprise that the late United States military governor should have reached an erroneous conclusion as to the result of a conference with your commissioners on August 15, as apparently manifested by his letter to you of August 24. I do not know the extent of any conversation which may have been indulged in at that conference and the nature of the impression which may have been conveyed. Referring to a written memorandum in my possession, which purports to contain the substance of propositions discussed at the time, I find that certain concessions were made by the commissioners in expected return for specific privileges to be conferred, and as there has not been a mutual agreement in these matters between the interested parties I do not understand that any obligations have arisen by reason of that conference.

Second. I note with pleasure your allusion to your very friendly disposition toward my Government, as manifested by your prompt attendance to our request for a supply of water; also your expression as to the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila, and I do not forget that the revolutionary forces under your command have made many sacrifices in the interest of civil liberty and for the welfare of your people, and to this I will be pleased to allude hereafter.

Third. In connection with your remark as to the injustice of the United States in not properly appreciating your assistance in the capture of Manila, I beg a full consideration on your part of the mandatory conditions which accompany the occupation, which I am sure you fully appreciate, but to which I will respectfully invite your attention in a subsequent portion of this reply.

Fourth. You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United

States Navy and the free navigation of your vessels within the water in United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named Government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines which you name shall retire within the same.

A discussion of your proposition to hold jointly with the United States Government the city of Manila involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although from remarks contained in former correspondence I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of the Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave to the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defenses of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents, United States authority over Manila and its defenses is full and supreme, and they can not escape the obligations which they have assumed.

By the able representatives who have charge of the interests of the Philippine revolutionary forces this conclusion will be admitted to be incontrovertible, and argument on the point is unnecessary. Can they who seek civil and religious liberty, and invite the approval and assistance of the civilized world, afford to enter upon a course of action which the law of nations must condemn?

But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and all of its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition of joint occupation upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known that they have made personal sacrifices, endured great

hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres, sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces recently embarked for your destruction and for the secure holding of its Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its Navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of considerations of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender and thereby preserve the lives and property of its inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

As between my Government and the revolutionary forces of the Philippines, I fail to discover on what principle of common justice a joint occupation of Manila can be maintained. Equity, in the legal acceptation of the term, would most assuredly condemn it. A sense of justice should, in my opinion, have prompted the revolutionary forces to aid those of my country in every way possible in return for the great assistance they have received. You remark in substance that had you not prevented the Spanish forces from retreating from the city the United States would have received naught but its ruined streets and buildings. Possibly, but had all Spanish subjects elsewhere and here been the contented subjects of Spain, war between it and my Government would not have been waged. It was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake, and not for their aggrandizement or for any national profit they expected to receive, and they have expended millions of treasure and hundreds of the lives of their citizens in the interest of Spanish suffering colonists.

Apart from all legal and equitable considerations and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations by careless or impertinent action might be the means of inciting gave disturbances, and in this connection I cite the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might

also arise conflict of authority between our respective officers. Even now within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquility, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

Again (reverting to a legal aspect of the subject), the affairs of the entire city corporation must be administered from a common center. The trust accepted by my Government from those who surrendered actual possession confers a discretionary power which can neither be shared nor delegated. The validity of this conclusion will be readily understood by yourself and associates as well-established legal proposition and does not require argument. And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the city on account of the hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, the conclusion, under the laws of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow. It has never recognized the existence of spoils of war denominated booty, as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed, or awarded to any of its officers and men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's surrendered territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops can not acquire booty nor any individual benefits by reason of capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment believing that

you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo. The first is:

Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels.-- Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas or in ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by a treaty of guaranty following international recognition of the belligerent rights of a Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the Bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed, nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike; no discrimination in this regard is intended or will be permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervisory jurisdiction over all navy matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces in case a treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered by her in the late capitulation articles, and the third, and last, is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and

stated in this communication concerning the nature of the obligations resting upon the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law nor morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honor, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to concede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila, and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates I must obey.

Thus have I endeavored, with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and, I doubt not, by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy it intends to pursue with regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your motives.

You and your associates could not regret more than I any conflict between our forces, which would tend to excite the citizens of my country, who are always a unit in action when its sovereignty is attacked or when its right to fulfill its international obligations is called in question. Then they never count cost, and, as you are fully aware, resources are abundant. Rather than see the ships of the Navy of the United States controlling the navigable waters of these islands and its armies devastating their territory, I would greatly prefer to advise my Government that there is no longer need to send more of its troops to this section of country, and that those whom it holds waiting on its Pacific slope can be remanded to their homes or employed elsewhere as it may determine.

It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to demand that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defenses, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short period of time should you decline to comply with my Government's demands, and I hereby serve notice upon you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the lines of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences that may ensue.

Permit me to believe that my confidence in the sound judgment and patriotism of yourself and associates is not misplaced.

You will please pardon me for my apparent unnecessary delay in replying to your communication of the 27th ultimo, but the press of duties connected with the administration of the affairs of the city is my excuse.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication, and am delegated by him to state that he fully approved of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as therein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis
Major-General, U.S.A.
and United States Military Governor in the Philippines

Note of Explanation. — On September 13 a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless they wihdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They

then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated — something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters — he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:

Office U. S. Military Governor
in the Philippine Islands
Manila, P.I., September 13, 1898.

The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces

Sir: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honor to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary government upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase while our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops, in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such; I am certain, is the desire of yourself and associates.

May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines

In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:

MALOLOS, BULACAN, *September 16, 1898.*

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES

MY DEAR SIR: Referring to your esteemed communication dated the 13th instant, I have the honor to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.

A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desire.

Your very respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I:28-34

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS,
Cavite Arsenal, P.I., October 10, 1898.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eight Army Corps,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, the 9th instant, while proceeding up the Pasig River, on the steam launch *Canacao,* with three officers of my staff, the American flag flying over the boat, I was stopped by an armed Filipino guard and informed that we could go no farther. Explaining that we were an unarmed party of American officers out upon an excursion, we were informed that, by orders given two days before, no Americans, armed or unarmed, were allowed to pass up the Pasig River without a special permit from President Aguinaldo.

I demanded to see the written order, and it was brought and shown me. It was an official letter signed by Pio del Pilar, division general, written in Tagalo and stamped with what appeared to be an official seal. It purported to be issued by the authority of the president of the revolu-

tionary government, and forbade Americans, either armed or unarmed, from passing up the Pasig River. It was signed by Pilar himself.

As this is a distinctly hostile act, I beg leave to ask how far we are to submit to this kind of interference.

It is respectfully submitted that whether this act of Pilar was authorized or not by the assumed insurgent government, it should, in any event, be resented.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Division.

SD 208, I:34

OFFICE OF THE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., October 14, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces,
Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 16th ultimo, and beg to apologize for the late official recognition of the same, presenting as a reason for my delay the necessity of obtaining certain information in order to arrive at conclusions in matters materially affecting the substance of our late correspondence, the securing of which has been attended with great difficulty.

I fully appreciate the friendly spirit manifested toward my Government in your expressions of regard, which your action in retiring your troops has confirmed, but I believe there has existed, and still exists, some misunderstanding as to the limits of territory which that Government is compelled to occupy and administer under its international obligations with Spain the responsibility for which it can not escape.

The articles of capitulation transferred the city of Manila, with suburbs and all defenses, as I had the honor to inform you in my letter of September 8. It was found impossible to determine definitely, on any existing map, either the limits of the city or the lines of its defenses. The latter had been variously placed, at some points retired and at others thrust out beyond the conceded city limits. I therefore directed my chief engineer, by a careful search of the municipal records and an actual survey, to ascertain the lines within which occupation by United

States troops was obligatory by reason of the terms of the surrender. He has finally concluded these directed labors, and has presented a map, of which the inclosed blue print is a copy, on which is traced in white the lines determined upon. By reference to this print and a comparison of the same with all former existing maps of the city and suburbs, it will be perceived that the latter vary materially from it, especially as to the trend of the Pasig River and the location of the Spanish defenses. The lines of circumvallation on the print begin at the Bocana de Vitas and thence they follow Maypajo Creek until they reach the line of the Lico road produced, thence proceed along said line and road to Lico, thence to the junction of the two roads in front of the Chinese hospital, thence along the road in front of said hospital to the north corner of the hospital wall, thence to Blockhouse No. 4, thence by Blockhouses Nos. 5, 6, and 7, to San Juan del Monte Creek at the aqueduct, thence down said creek and up the Rio Pasig to the mouth of Concordia Creek, thence by Concordia and Tripa de Gallinas creeks to a point opposite the place where the road from Cingalon to Pineda (Pasai) turns sharply to the right, thence by road to Maitubig, and thence to the mouth of the Malate Creek. This map is believed to be correct, as the surveying and platting were executed with the greatest care and with a desire for accuracy. The lines do not include all of the territory which the late Spanish chief engineer of this city has described as lying within its suburbs and a larger proportion of them are drawn within the lines of the city's defenses; but they are practical, and include all portions of the suburbs which my Government, under its promises to Spain, could be expected to hold possession of under any demands which Spain might present.

In your withdrawal of troops I note that to the north they retired to the line described on the map furnished by my predecessor, General Merritt, while to the east and south his request was not observed. As far as Paco is concerned, it was understood that the troops in that section would be withdrawn within a short period of time, and I have now the honor to represent that the retention of that mutually conceded suburb has been a source of great annoyance to the American authorities, and, as I fully believe, to yourself, while the revolutionary forces along the Cingalon and connecting roads have been the cause of complaint from the inhabitants of that section.

I am therefore compelled by reason of my instructions, which direct me to execute faithfully the articles of the Spanish capitulation, because

of the interest of my Government and, as I sincerely believe, the welfare of your own forces, to ask that you withdraw all your troops beyond the lines marked in the accompanying blue print, which are above described, and I must request such withdrawal on or before the 20th instant, else I shall be forced into some action looking to that end.

Permit me, in conclusion, General, to bring to your attention facts of which you are doubtless ignorant, and which all connected with the American authorities, especially that vast majority who have entertained a decided and pronounced friendly interest in the Philippine people, have viewed with more or less indignation. In a number of instances kidnapping and robbery have been committed recently within the city by parties who claimed to be connected with your forces, some of whom stated that they were acting under your instructions. This I can not believe; but the high-handed offenses committed by these persons show how important it is for the interests of all concerned to withdraw your troops as herein requested. In numerous instances my officers have submitted complaints to me that they have been arrested and compelled to turn back to the city, though journeying as unarmed and peaceful citizens merely with the intent to seek health and recreation; and on Sunday last a funeral party from the British ship *Powerful,* now lying within this harbor, was so delayed by the insurgent forces at Paco, when proceeding to its English cemetery, that it was obliged to return to its vessel and repeat the journey on the following day. I fail to see how such proceedings can be justified before enlightened public opinion, and it is a matter of profound surprise to me that people seeking relief from the control of a government by which, in the pronounced judgment of a large portion of the civilized world, it has been oppressed for centuries, should permit its armed authorities to so conduct themselves as to arouse the indignation of friendly and assistant nations. The indignities which my Government has suffered from the revolutionary forces still illegally maintained at Paco (a few of them are cited herein) cannot be tolerated in the future. Resistance to the high-handed proceedings here committed is not merely considered a duty from which there is no escape, but would be esteemed a virtue by any civilized government cognizant of the facts. I do not for a moment permit myself to entertain the impression that either you, or the able advisers by whom you

are surrounded, have authorized these insults to my Government, but I must bring them to the notice of the authorities which maintain these troops, and upon which rests the legal responsibility for their conduct.

There is another matter which I beg respectfully to present to your distinguished consideration. There are a great number of United States soldiers within this city and a large accession, primarily intended and equipped by my Government for use against the armed forces of Spain, is en route for this port. The continued unhealthfulness of the city, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts we are making for a thorough police of the same, may make it necessary to temporarily encamp such troops as are suffering from diseases contracted here on some point of land which promises favorable sanitary conditions for restoration to health.

Should the emergency become imminent, the dictates of humanity and the overwhelming demands of my Government would oblige me to establish a convalescent camp in this locality, to which troops could be sent for recuperation, and to relieve the congested situation which must attend the presence of so large a body of armed men within a thickly populated city. I have in mind for this possible camp the grounds on the shore of the bay formerly occupied by United States troops and designated Camp Dewey, or the high ground to the east of the city. It is my desire to place it at a locality which would not inconvenience any organizations connected with your forces or the surrounding inhabitants, and to the emergency of this anticipated proceeding I respectfully invite your consideration and ask your assistance should execution become necessary. Should action of this character be decided upon, I beg of you to rest firmly in my unqualified assurances that it will be undertaken in a spirit of the greatest friendliness and with the sincere desire to neither compromise nor affect in the slightest degree your interests and those of the people whom you represent, but, on the contrary, to enhance them.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

E. S. Otis,

Major-General, U.S.V.,

United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

SD 208, I: 34-37

MANILA, *October 18, 1898.*

His Excellency Major-General OTIS
Military Governor of the United States Forces in the Philippines.

GENERAL: I have the honor to place in your hands this note, which I bring personally, in which I make known the object of the mission confided to me by President Aguinaldo and which I will reiterate verbally. The letter dated the 14th of this month, which you directed to General Aguinaldo, reached his hands, and, desirous of complying with your desires, he called in council all of his generals and made known to them the desires which you expressed in your letter.

Highly appreciating the spirit of friendship and good feeling which is constantly noted in your honorable letters and which reflects the sentiments of Americans and of their policy toward us, the generals of Mr. Aguinaldo cheerfully accede to that which you ask.

But the idea of the possibility that Spain may return to this territory and occupy Manila as the result of the decision of the Americo-Spanish conference now in session in Paris has caused said generals to try and obtain a modification of the demands which you make in your letter of the 14th.

Having verbally explained, for your consideration, the reasons which influence the manner of thought of the Philippine generals, I shall make also the following propositions, made by President Aguinaldo:

First. The Filipinos will retire beyond the line of demarcation indicated in the blue print, as you desire.

Second. The Filipinos will retain Pandacan under their jurisdiction.

Third. The Filipinos consider it of the greatest importance to occupy the blockhouses, with their forces of the line, in view of the possible return of the Spanish, promising not to pass with arms.

Fourth. General Aguinaldo asks of you an extension of the time indicated for evacuation of his troops.

I repeat, sir, with the greatest consideration and respect,

T. H. PARDO DE TAVERA.

SD 208, I: 37

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Presidency, Malolos, October 22, 1898.

General E. S. OTIS
Commander in Chief of the American Forces
Manila, P.I.

GENERAL: In view of your favor of the 14th instant, I consulted the opinions of my generals and advisory council, and I have appointed Dr. Pardo de Tavera in order that he might place before you the wishes of all, as he did on the 18th. Said commissioners, upon giving me an account of your wishes, told me that you had consented to postpone the ultimatum for the withdrawal of our troops until the 25th and the retention by our forces of the blockhouses situated on the line shown on the blue map which you sent me with said letter, but had not acceded to the desires of the Philippine people that my forces continue to occupy Pandacan. Relative to the latter point, I take the liberty of telling you that your predecessor, General Merritt, understood that the American forces only ought to occupy, according to the terms of the capitulation of Manila, the city and its environs, i.e., Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando de Dilao, and thus he clearly puts it in his letter of August 20 last. The town of Pandacan has always been considered outside of the old municipal limits of Manila, which the general himself mentions in said letter, and I hope your high sense of judgment will see it thus.

Nevertheless, I understand that your forces are already occupying the Uli-Uli, Nactahan, and Santa Mesa districts, which, although belonging to the jurisdiction of Pandacan, they can continue to do, in order to prevent the continual encounters with mine which cause disagreeable incidents.

I take pleasure in manifesting to you that it is not lack of confidence, and much less animosity, that prompts me to write in this manner. To-day, more than ever, the Filipinos desire to live in peace and perfect harmony with the Americans, because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion.

When it is possible for a formal convention to pacify and harmonize the interests of the two peoples, then the suspicions of my people

— which I can not completely quiet with my prestige and authority, no matter what good desires move me — will disappear.

I beg of you not to consider as an insult to your flag a bad interpretation of my orders, which I will severely punish according to the gravity of the offenses. You, with your keen perception, will understand that a people agitated by a revolution return gradually, not suddenly to their normal life, no matter how educated they are supposed to be. It becomes necessary for me to act with much tact in order to give no cause for internal dissensions.

And this consideration is what obliges me to ask you about the form and conditions with which you wish to establish a sanitarium within my lines; because I wish, at all cost, to prevent the possibility of your complaint being renewed concerning acts emanating from the continual contact of our forces. I understand that you have considered it necessary to demand the withdrawal of our forces, notwithstanding the friendship which binds us, in order to prevent friction. On this account although, I highly appreciate the humane sentiments which prompt you, I do not dare allow it, without previous explanations, for the very reason that I wish to preserve the friendship that constitutes the welfare of both peoples.

I hope you will pardon me, as the necessity of consulting various advisers has obliged me to delay my answer.

I am, General, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I: 37-38

OFFICE U.S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

MANILA, P.I., *October 27, 1898.*

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P.I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22d instant, and have awaited the result of correspondence and conferences upon the subject of which you treat.

Concerning the conference of the 18th instant with your representative, Dr. Pardo de Tavera, it resulted in an honest misunderstanding between us in one slight particular only. The Doctor very ably, by

letter, submitted your wishes — one of which was the retention of the blockhouses on the designated line. In regard to this matter, I said I was powerless to make any concessions, and in the conversation which followed remarked, in substance, through the interpreter, that we did not wish to occupy them, as we did not consider them of any importance. The Doctor, I can conceive, very naturally misunderstood my meaning — in fact, the interpreter might have done so — and when, on the 24th instant, the Doctor again called and forcibly expressed his construction of my language, I was so impressed with his earnestness and honesty of purpose and convictions I remarked that, although the law would not permit a concession, I would not raise any objections, unless hereafter compelled to do so by my superior authority, if your forces continued to occupy the blockhouses to the north of the Pasig River.

I have referred to General Merritt's letter of August 20, which you mention, and find that it is as you state. Unfortunately, I am bound by the terms of capitulation, which recite "the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs." Pandacan is certainly far within the line of defense, and, from information obtained from two weighty sources, I have been led to believe that it has of late been considered one of the city's suburbs, although we have been unable to find any Spanish decree which fixes its status with definiteness.

In regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp for the restoration to health of members of my command, it was my intention to consult and arrive at an understanding in the matter before attempting anything of the kind. I knew you would not offer objections if it could be so placed as not to give your people annoyance, since it could not be in anywise a menace, but, on the contrary, would place our sick within your power and to a certain extent under your protection. I have that confidence in your humane sentiments and in the kindly impulses of your people as to believe that you would surely consent to a measure of this character, and I think the poorer classes of surrounding communities would be pecuniarily benefited by the small trade that it would give rise to, as hospitals make many purchases of edible products which your people would be glad to furnish. Should necessity arise under which I would be forced to take action, it will be my pleasure to confer with you before proceeding in the matter, and I am fully convinced that you will give assent and assistance.

Permit me, General, to assure you that I fully appreciate the difficulties under which you labor in your endeavors to carry out the desires and demands of your people. As I have already expressed myself in former communications, I am fully convinced of your wish to maintain harmonious relations with the United States forces and government of Manila, and that you deplore, with me, any proceeding which may disturb that harmony and friendly feeling. I have been fully aware that all unpleasant incidents which have occurred, and to which I alluded in my former letter, were due entirely to irresponsible and unwarranted action of subordinates, and I am constantly called upon to correct misconceptions entertained by my troops and to punish offenses which they have wantonly committed.

I am gratified with the success, both as concerns the interests of the Filipino people and the United States troops, which has attended our mutual efforts for the amicable adjustment of affairs, and sincerely hope that the manifested good will which now exists by and between our forces may be long continued.

I am, General, most sincerely, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis
Major-General, U.S.V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines

SD 208, I:39-40

Office U.S. Military Governor
in the Philippine Islands,
Manila, P.I., November 2, 1898.

Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P.I.

General: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to present for your distinguished consideration a subject which is causing much comment and a great deal of severe criticism of the Filipino people throughout Europe and among the very large class of Catholic citizens of my own country, and that is, the retention, as prisoners of war, of the Spanish Catholic clergy and nuns. I believe that a vast majority of the reports of great cruelty and barbarous treatment practiced by the Filipinos toward these individuals which have been put in general circulation are

untrue. Indeed, I have forbidden cablegrams prepared on this subject, which I had good reason to suppose could not be substantiated, to be sent to other countries, and I have informed the United States authorities that many rumors of this nature in circulation throughout the civilized world were greatly exaggerated. Still, however, the facts stand out prominently that these individuals have suffered privations and hardships and are still held in captivity, and fabrications charging most cruel and inhuman treatment, resulting in loss of life, will continue to be spread abroad, to the great detriment of the interest and welfare of the Filipino people. I do not consider that I sacrificed in any particular the confidence reposed in me by my Government in communicating to you that it has been requested by the Vatican at Rome and by many distinguished men high in the councils of nations to employ its good offices in efforts to secure the liberty of the Spanish clergy and of all individuals connected with religious orders now held in durance, among whom are especially mentioned the Bishop of New Segovia and the nuns in the northwestern part of the island of Luzon.

It is, of course, needless for me to present to you or the able counselors by whom you are surrounded, and, indeed, it may be considered a presumption on my part to invite your attention to the fact that this clergy, and, indeed, the civil functionaries of the Spanish Government, can not under a strict interpretation of the rules of international law be deemed prisoners of war except in certain very aggravated cases. It would require most decided action on the part of members of religious orders to place them in that category, and the seizure and retention of nuns or interference with them in the practice of what they consider their duties under their sacred religious vows is invariably looked upon upon with marked disfavor by all nations claiming to practice civilized warfare. All this is well known to you, and I only allude to it to account, in a measure, for the erroneous impressions which publicly prevail regarding the humage sentiments and good intentions cherished by the Filipinos, and which are so damaging to them in securing a position as a people which they seek to invoke. You will please pardon me for this allusion, but the matter is so important to the best interests of the Filipinos that I have taken the liberty, uninvited, to present it.

Confident that you seek the welfare of your people, may I in that confidence ask you to use your conceded influence to correct this condition of affairs and to act with me in efforts to place these prisoners in a

position which will put an end to the acrimonious criticisms which now so widely prevail? I would be pleased to receive them here at Manila and care for them while they make preparations to leave the country, as I am informed many of them desire to do, and more particularly does it appear to me as most essential that prompt action be taken with regard to the nuns. Any traveling expense or cost of food required to effect their removal to this point I would be glad to meet, should you desire it.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS
Major-General, U.S.A.
United States Military Governor in the Philippines

SD 208, I:41-42

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Presidency, Malolos, November 3, 1898

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
Comdr. in Chief of American Forces of Occupation in the Philippines.

GENERAL: I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your kind communication of yesterday's date, and I ought to tell you that your observations, far from displeasing me, are very useful to me, as they are dictated by the enlightment acquired in the atmosphere of a free country.

I ought also to inform you, especially, that we do not make prisoners of women and children, and much less of the nuns. If some woman or child is found among our prisoners, it is because they are part of the family of one from whom they do not wish to be separated, requiring us to support them at the expense of the Philippine treasury. This detail is not foreseen in international law, but the Filipinos observe this custom, prompted by humane sentiments.

I am glad to hear you say that the Spanish clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war according to international law. Before answering this point allow me to observe that we have only taken as prisoners the priests (sacerdotes religiosos) belonging to the Spanish clergy, and not those who live the life of monks; and permit me to make this point clear in order that the explanation which I have the pleasure

of giving you may be more intelligible, and so, also, that foreign public opinion may not be mistaken. It is true that international law declares in general that the clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war, but the spirit of these very laws exclude the Spanish priests (sacerdotes religiosos) and civil officials in the Philippines, because they (Spaniards) alone possess the certain class of persons known by that name.

Beginning with the Spanish civil officials, I take the liberty of pointing out to you that at the beginning of the declaration of war between the United States and Spain they were obliged by General Augustin to bear arms, without distinction as to class, and even before, during the first stages of the Philippine revolution. Spanish civil officials were already formed into armed volunteer corps who, if they did not frequently go into the field in company with the regular soldiers, shot and arrested defenseless and pacific inhabitants in order to imprison them and submit them to indescribable tortures. Besides, I ought also to say that in the Spanish penal prisons and penitentiaries groan even hundreds of prisoners and deported Filipinos who were torn away from their homes on account of the suspicions of the old Spanish Government, and thanks to the arts and malicious customs of the priests (sacerdotes religiosos) called ministers of peace.

Relative to the priests, or rather Spanish "sacerdotes religiosos", I take the liberty of laying before you the following points:

A. The religious corporations of the Philippines have acquired large agricultural colonies by means of fraud. In olden times the Filipinos, prompted by their religion, gave away a part of the products of their lands to the old priests (sacerdotes religiosos) for their support. But in the course of time that which was prompted by spiritual motive they made obligatory, taking possession of the lands, in order to better secure it, and making the proprietors dependents or colonists who could not refuse paying, because of the vengeance of the Spanish authorities, whom the said sacerdotes had in their favor, through bribery.

B. According to the canons of the Roman Church, these priests or religious sacerdotes can not claim the privilege of absolving, which is solely reserved to the secular clergy to which the Filipino priests belong. Nevertheless, the ecclesiastics, in order to be able to exercise the duties of parochial priests (cura parroco) in the Philippine towns, have been cheating the Vatican and foreign public opinion, picturing these towns as savage ranches, which require the care of Spanish religious

missionaries that the natives may not return to their ancient idolatry. The Filipino priests who have tried to rectify this false opinion of the Vatican relative to the religious state of the country, in order to be obedient to the canons of the church, died martyrs, accused by the ecclesiastics of being disturbers.

C. The same priests (sacerdotes religiosos) tried also to cheat the Spanish Government, making it believe that they were the only upholders of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, and although the Spanish authorities recognized the fraud, they did not want to admit anything, as they were influenced by the gold of the religious corporations. These priests, exercising the right of absolving in the Philippine towns, have been for a long time the absolute masters of the life, honor, and property of the Filipinos. For this reason, it is a widely known and notorious fact, recognized by all the foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations, which, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish Government, have robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty.

With these antecedents, General, you will understand that, owing to the influence and interests of the religious corporations in the Philippines, it is neither just nor politic to set at liberty the priests (sacerdotes religiosos). The archbishop, as well as the Spanish bishops in the Philippines, belong to the regular Spanish clergy, and it is not prudent to allow them to continue ruling in these islands, as they can incite a counter revolution, assisted by their gold and some fanatic Filipinos, who still obey their commands.

When the Filipino priests, unjustly spurned by the Vatican, have obtained the right to appointment to the duties of bishops and parochial priests, then there will be no danger to the public tranquility in setting at liberty the ecclesiastics. The Spanish Government and the Pope have proven themselves ignorant of law or justice when one deals with their interests. For that reason the Filipinos wish to hold the civil officials in order to obtain the liberty of the prisoners and deported Filipinos, and the priests in order to obtain from the Vatican the recognition of the Philippine clergy.

As a representative of the Government of the United States, I beg of you, General, with the greatest kindness, to notify it that neither vengeance nor hate influences the Filipinos when they hold the civil officials and Spanish ecclesiastics, but that public interests and the peace

of the Philippine people demand these measures. International law will have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress. My people exact these measures and I can not but comply with their will. If you, General, can interpret the sentiments of the people to your Government and foreign public opinion, and by this means correct the erroneous ideas emanating from the ignorance of the true condition of the country, you will make yourself a creditor to the gratitude of the Filipino people and the civilized world.

I am, with the greatest consideration, your most obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 42-44

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Presidency, Malolos, November 4, 1898

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS.

Commander in Chief of the American Forces of Occupation of Manila

GENERAL: In having the honor of answering your letter of the 27th of October last, I shall make no mention of the first paragraphs of the same, because I see, with pleasure, that the matter referred to in them has had a solution adjusted to your desires.

I shall limit myself only to the last paragraphs that speak of the establishment of a camp for convalescents. Concerning this paragraph, I ought to observe that from the moment when a concession is made of a part of the territory occupied by our forces and a hospital is built in it, you will have to place there a force in charge to look after the interests there created, unless it depends for security solely and exclusively upon the guaranty offered by the laws dictated by our government.

You, yourself, General, have always impressed me more than once with the fact of the impossibility of a dual occupation of Manila, because the continual contact of your forces and mine might give place to innumerable disagreeable incidents, if not serious and grave conflicts, which may disturb the harmony that exists between us. I am fully aware of the humanity you invoke in favor of the sick, but on the strength of this consideration it is my sacred duty to look after millions of souls

whose security and interests would be compromised if a conflict between us should ensue. The only solution possible is to completely cede you the use of this encampment, and this, as you will understand, requires some fixed basis of arrangement more concrete than can result from a verbal one made in a conference. Besides it is my duty to submit these conditions to the representatives of the people.

It is not lack of confidence which obliges me to proceed in this manner; it is necessity. These bases, if in the meanwhile a friendly convention between your Government and mine is not realized, will constitute the provisional rules that will serve as the form for the solution of the claims that might occur.

And, above all, these bases will contribute very much to perpetuate the friendship that exists between us, because my people will take great care not to break them.

I am, with the greatest consideration, your attentive and obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 40

OFFICE U.S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINES
Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I received with pleasure your note of the 4th instant, and have the honor to reply to the point you present in regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp beyond the present line of actual occupation by the United States troops, as follows:

I am not convinced that such establishment will be at all necessary, and, in fact, from present indications it would appear that we shall be able to care for our sick within the line and defenses of Manila.

With regard to right of occupancy of territory, so many international questions arise under the articles of capitulation with Spain, which the United States is in honor bound to strictly construe and obey in all matters affecting its action, that I do not intend to present them for determination if it can be consistently avoided, especially not those which might demand argument and decision, such, for instance, as might

arise regarding shore lines, which rightful occupation by the United States of the bay and harbor of Manila, with conceded rights of use for commercial purposes, might involve.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS
Major-General, U. S. V.
United States Military Governor in the Philippines

SD 208, I: 41

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your cordial communication of the 3d instant, for which permit me to thank you, and to which my manifold duties have denied me the pleasure of replying as promptly as I wished.

I highly appreciate your expressed desire to act for the public interests, the peace of the Filipinos, and in accordance with the dictates of humanity, but you will pardon my candid confession that I am unable to comprehend the force of your remark to the effect that international law must give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls because it is one of humanity. I fail to understand how the principles of that law can be antagonistic in any particular to the welfare of a people, founded, as they are, on the best interpretation of the law of nature which the acknowledged wisdom of ages of human progress has been able to bestow. Every independent nation claiming advanced enlightenment professes to be bound by these obligations of that law and certainly would be held responsible by the civilized world should it openly violate them.

My previous letter contained the request of my Government for the release of the clergy and members of religious orders, including nuns of a certain locality reported to be held by you as prisoners of war. Your reply informs me that you hold as such prisoners the Spanish priests and former civil officials, but not women and children, "much less nuns." In regard to the latter, I must have been misinformed, for I

received the impression that they sought return of their personal effects, of which they had been deprived, with permission to join their friends in this city. Your letter, however, assures me that they have not been despoiled and possess full liberty of action to journey wheresoever they please. This information I will gladly convey to my Government and to persons immediately interested in their welfare who have expressed concern for their safety as regards health, life, and individual property.

In respect to the Spanish officials whom you hold as prisoners of war, you are pleased to remark that during the first stages of the Filipino revolution they were formed into an armed volunteer corps, were subsequently obliged to bear arms without distinction as to class, and that if they did not frequently take the field with the army of the enemy, nevertheless shot and arrested peaceable and defenseless inhabitants. These you desire to retain until opportunity offers to exchange them for Filipino prisoners now in the hands of Spain. I am not conversant with the facts you narrate, and am not therefore competent to arrive at any conclusion. It is, however, a well-established principle of law that the chief officers of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who are of particular importance and use to it, become, upon capture, prisoners of war, but I do not think that its minor officials are classed in that category, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army for the purpose of rendering active aid.

As regards the members of the Spanish clergy, I understand you to state, in substance, that they are held as prisoners of war on account of the grave offenses committed by them while Luzon was under the practical domination of Spain; that they were the primary and principal cause of the revolution which has been in progress for the past two years; that it is not prudent to set them at liberty, as they are disposed, and might be able, if released, to incite a counter revolution in Spanish interests, and that they are retained in prison not only for such reasons, but also to compel the Vatican to recognize the conceded rights of the Filipino clergy, which has heretofore been denied it.

Accepting these as established facts (my knowledge is not to the contrary), the conclusion does not appear to follow that these members of the clergy con be considered prisoners of war, and I can not conceive how, under the laws of war or any international rights arising from the state of belligerency existing between the Filipinos and Spain, they can be so dominated. Nor do I understand your suggestion that

the spirit of these laws, if not their context, excludes these people from the protection which strict interpretation bestows, whatever may have been their previous crimes. Even if these priests belonged to religious corporations, against which the Filipinos had well-grounded complaint for past offenses, and indeed for cruelties received at their hands; even if they exhorted the communities in which they resided to resist the revolutionists, and might still do so if released; even if they persecuted the Spanish subjects among whom they lived, they could not be considered as prisoners of war in any sense of that term unles captured while making armed resistance or giving active armed aid to the enemy.

The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another, and concedes the right of revolution to a people greatly oppressed, but it does not admit a violation of the rules of regular warfare regarding the status of persons arrested or captured or in the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the forces of an unjust assailant or a formerly tyrannical master.

The expressed intention of holding these Spanish priests as prisoners of war in order to force the Vatican of Rome into certain acknowledgements with appropriate action I can not conceive to be well founded in law, custom, or precedent, and am convinced that such a position is untenable.

In this somewhat hasty letter, General, I have accepted all your facts for the sake of argument, and am unable to reach your conclusion, viz, that the members of the religious orders are rightfully kept imprisoned, and that the interests of the Filipino people demand their retention. I do not think that the views you advance would receive favorable general acceptance, and believe therefore, in all sincerity, that the good name, reputation, and welfare of that people would be greatly enhanced by relieving those men from the captivity which they have so long endured.

I can only ask in conclusion that the wishes of my Government may receive more favorable consideration than your most friendly letter indicates.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. Otis
Major-General, U. S. V.
United States Military Governor in the Philippines

SD 208, I: 44-46

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Malolos, November 18, 1898

To Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
General in Chief of the American forces of Occupation in Manila

GENERAL: Allow me to inform you that I have received your kind letter of the 10th instant; begging you to pardon the tardiness with which I answer, because of my many occupations.

I highly appreciate your desire to intercede for the liberty of the Spanish civil officials and the priests, and be assured that if well-founded reasons did not exist in order to retain them, always attentive to the laws of humanity and agreeing with the principles that regulate the relations of independent states, I would not have given you occasion to make in their favor the petition that elevates you so much.

In my last letter I have advanced the reasons which I have convinced myself justifies me in considering as prisoners of war said employees and ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, you attempt to depreciate the force of my arguments, relative to which I beg of you to kindly favor me by listening to my answer.

You say in your letter that, in virtue of the principles of a right well established, the chief employees of a hostile government, as well as diplomatic agents and those that render services of a particular importance, can be considered as prisoners of war; but that you do not think mere employees can be classified in said category unless they are armed or in some way attached to a hostile army for the purpose of lending their active aid. And in view of this assertion, coming from a person so competent, I can not do less than congratulate myself, for in that statement you recognize as justified the principal reasons that I uphold in retaining as prisoners the civil employees as well as the priests.

Admitting that principle, it must be confessed that it is strictly in conformity with my conduct if it is admitted (an undeniable fact) that the civil employees, as well as the regular priests (parrocos), not only supported in an active way those who combated against the Filipino revolutionists, but also personally took up arms in order to fights against them.

I have already said in my last letter that the decree of General Augustin of the 23d of last April obliged not only the employees of the

state and municipality to take up arms, but also the Spaniards born here, and that in the first epoch of the Filipino revolution they formed armed volunteer corps which, while guarding the towns, made arrests, tortured the prisoners, executed defenseless citizens, or joined the regular soldiers to fight against the revolutionists. General, read carefully the local papers from the time the revolution began and you will see there the proof of what I say. The pages of said papers are indisputable evidence of the military services rendered by the civil employees of the Spanish Government and the compensation received by them as a premium for their services. With these antecedents, is there room for the least argument that the Spanish civil employees should not be held as prisoners of war?

The same, if not worse, can be said of the priests. The latter, degrading their office, transformed from servants of the Lord to feudal lords and supported by the Spanish Government, were absolute masters of the lives, lands, and honor of the Filipinos.

At the beginning of the revolution they did not discharge the duties of ministers of peace, or preach gentleness or Christian charity, but, profaning their sacred mission, they made themselves the police of the Spanish Government, false denouncers of innocent citizens.

It seems incredible that those who should raise their prayers to stop so much cruelty and infamy committed by the Spanish Government, those who should give themselves over to reclusion and mortification and penance for so much crime, were precisely those who took part in the affairs, and with base insinuations, with infamous accusations and ideas of vengeance, increased more and more the pyre of the dead, and the defamatory charges through which were sacrified precious and innocent lives and the honor of many citizens.

Again, vengeance does not move me in treating these ecclesiastics as prisoners of war. I conform to the principles of international law advanced by yourself, for, apart from the abuses committed by the priests, to which I have referred in my last letter, and the facts that I add in my present one, you are informed that they have taken up arms against the revolution; as, for example, the priests (parrocos) of the town of Lipa, province of Batangas, who made themselves leaders of volunteer corps. In Manila, during the siege of the town by your forces, all the ecclesiastics, organized and uniformed, formed a part of the municipal armed

guard, and all of them you may be sure have lent their directive and effective cooperation to the forces that fought against the Filipinos, not only maintaining at their expense armed bodies, but accompanying them in their expeditions as well as inciting them to battle.

The convents have been the most impregnable defenses where the Spanish combatants, together with the priests, shielded themselves in order to attack the revolutionists, and this government preserves quite a number of muskets taken from the ecclesiastics. Therefore, the principle which you mention can be applied to them, and it follows in consequence that they should be treated as prisoners of war — the more so if all their civil attributes are taken into consideration. There is reason, therefore, to class them in the category of chief employees or those rendering service of special importance.

The principles of international law sustained by the most noted authors were taken into account by me when I treated as prisoners of war civil employees and the priests. Jiore, Martens, Bluntschli, and others, hold that all persons, though not forming a part of the army, but who follow it to perform their pacific functions, can be held as prisoners of war. I only exempt the hospital personnel, according to the Geneva convention, provided that they take no active part in the war; and the Spanish-American encyclopedia says: "All those who form part of the enemy's forces, whether they are regular troops or militia, all those who accompany armies on their expeditions, the newspaper correspondents, providers, even the civil officials, can be made prisoners."

Besides, retort (represalias) is a right admitted by the most cultured nations as a penal power to be exercised by one of the belligerents with respect to the other when the latter violates the rules or laws generally accepted; or as a sanction in the sense that by it the represalia can require the enemy to fulfill his duties.

In virtue of the right of retort, during the war of North American independence, the great Washington, to avenge the shooting of an American colonel, a prisoner in the hands of the English, deemed beyond the rules of war the English Colonel Argyll, a prisoner held by the Americans. Thanks to the intervention of the Queen of France, the order was not executed. In virtue of the same right, the German generals in the war of 1870 ordered the houses in which their soldiers had been treacherously attacked to be fired and destroyed.

If there were then no international rules to justify the retention of the civil officials and priests as prisoners of war, could not we Filipinos, not even considered belligerents by the other nations, invoke the right of retort in order to secure measures obliging the Spanish Government to grant the liberty of many Filipinos (prisoners for political reasons) and check their barbarous methods of torturing and shooting the lovers of liberty and independence of their country?

This is the reason why, in my last letter, I said that international law would have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress.

It is far from my intention, in making this assertion, to show you that in retaining as prisoners the persons in whose liberty you are interested I cite international law only when attending to the desires of my people, because I have well demonstrated that in taking this determination I have really been guided by those laws, at least when they do not greatly prejudice the welfare of my people. I have only wanted to say that in many cases the principles of international law, generally observed by the most cultured of nations, must conform to existing circumstances in the interest of a people who bewail the violation of those laws. For this reason it is understood that the most civilized nations recognize the right of retort. Thus also, General, when I tell you that the Filipino people desire to hold as prisoners the civil officials in order to obtain the release of the deported Filipinos and their priests, and in order to obtain from the Vatican the rights of the Philippine clergy, I have not wished to defend the measures adopted on that ground alone, when other well-founded principles justify my conduct. I have only wished to indicate that at the opportune moment, notwithstanding the motives previously advanced, liberty can be granted to these prisoners without the displeasure of the people.

I should like to see that moment arrived as soon as possible, to demonstrate to you my liveliest sympathy for the fulfillment of your desires, which today I am impeded from meeting for well-understood reasons.

The Philippine people, who aspire to a life of liberty and independence, have not deserved from the civilized nations, not even the United States, at least until the present time, the recognition of their rights in their war against Spain. They have the glory of having complied with

the rules required to be observed by belligerent powers, and nothing can be said to the contrary. I have no doubt, General, that having given your noble impulses and cultured judgment and sympathy to my country you will know how to interpret the sentiments of this letter before your Government and the civilized world and to justify my conduct in holding as prisoners of war the civil officials and the priests.

I close this letter, begging you to pardon the trouble that its perusal will cause you.

I remain, your most respectful servant.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION. — The last reply, and possibly the first, was drawn by Aguinaldo's attorney-general, a person of excellent legal attainments, who is now serving as one of the United States judges in the court of the audiencia, and was considered unanswerable by the Malolos government. It received newspaper publication at Malolos and here in Manila. An answer was drafted in part, but never delivered. It recited the fact that the discussion of the subject had reached proportions never contemplated; that I was not authorized to intercede for the release of the civil officials, and that my requests had been limited to priests or members of religious orders, and further remarked as follows:

A reference to the correspondence will show that my expressed desires are limited strictly to requests of that character, and in reference to them you have been good enough to inform me that of the classes of persons named you hold as prisoners of war only the Spanish clergy, permitting full freedom of action to all female members of religious institutions.

The announcement of that portion of your policy which affects nuns, or women who are devoting their service to the interest of church and benevolent societies, was received with satisfaction and has disarmed, to a certain extent, the hostile critics who have proclaimed that the revolutionary forces were imposing barbarous treatment on inhabitants in Luzon whom they retained in captivity. Appreciating this sentiment I was pleased to assure one of the good ladies of the church, Doña Sixta del Rosario of the Dominicans, who called for an expression of my opinion as to whether she could make a contemplated journey to the province of Cagayan for the relief of certain nuns, that she would not experience

any difficulty in so doing, as their movements were entirely optional with themselves, and would not be interfered with.

Returning now to the subject of my Government's request, viz, that which concerns priests. You are pleased to quote from my letter of November 10, not, however, the language employed, but as understood by you, doubtless, and to apply it in aid of your argument for their retention. The meaning of my language is very different from that which you believed it to convey. My remark referred strictly to civil officials, was only a passing brief attention given to one which your former letter contained, and had nothing whatever to do with any other class of individual. I said that it was "a well-established principle of law that the *chief officers* of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who were of *particular* importance and use to it, became, upon capture, prisoners of war", not its minor officials, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army, etc. I had not then, nor have I now, the impression that the priests could be classed as important civil officials of the Spanish Government, nor as minor civil officers armed as soldiers or attached to the Spanish hostile army warring against the insurgent forces in the field.

Formerly, as you are aware, a lawful prisoner of war was an active combatant secured by capture or through surrender. In these later times the class has been greatly enlarged, and ambraces members of the sovereign family, ministers and diplomatic agents of a government, and persons of importance at particular moments, though separate from the mass of combatants. This extension is due to the fact that no great hardships should now attend the lot of a prisoner of war, while his detention may help to defeat military operations of the enemy or assist those of the army making the arrest.

With an army in the field pursuing active hostilities, the laws of war permit civilians accompanying it to be taken and held as prisoners temporarily and while their services may be of benefit to that army. The termination of hostilities should put an end to the period of imprisonment. So with the priests. If their confinement as prisoners of war was ever lawful, further detention can hardly be justified on the ground that it will assist your revolutionary government, or that release will injure it, unless, possibly you apprehend determined hostility thereto, manifesting itself in dangerous demonstrations on the part of the people, who may be governed by their prejudices or spirit of revenge, for it is understood

to be the desire of the priests to return to Spain and not linger in these islands longer than is absolutely necessary; and it is conceded, I presume, that, removed from the country, they will be powerless to aid Spain in its further efforts to crush what it is pleased to denominate a formidable rebellion. The plea that you hold them to effect an exchange for priests of Philippine nativity and to compel certain recognition of principles by the Vatican at Rome is not well founded. The imprisoned native priests were probably state prisoners when Spain held acknowledged control of the islands and before rebellion had raised its front. The pacification, too, which terminated in the agreement or so-called treaty of Biac-na-bato may have set at rest all questions arising in the cases of prisoners captured during the rebellion of 1896. For an army to seize members of the clergy and hold them as prisoners of war for the purposes of effecting the release and return of certain civilians, placed in captivity long before that army or the government to which it belongs had an existence, must be considered a novel proceeding. To seize Spanish citizens, whatever their offenses, and hold them as prisoners of war to compel certain action by the Vatican of Rome is most assuredly indefensible under any circumstances.

The war doctrine of "retort" which you introduce in your argument can not be applied, and you certainly do not wish to be understood as contending that you would be justified in shooting friars, whom you hold as prisoners of war, simply because Spanish subjects tried and convicted under the forms of law were executed, etc.

As stated, this answer was not served, as I had been reliably informed that Aguinaldo contemplated or had promised influential Filipinos to release the minor civil officials, but that the temper of the people was such that he could not let go the members of the religious orders held in capitivity.

SD 208, I: 46-50

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE TROOPS AT ILOILO,
ISLAND OF PANAY, AND THE PEOPLE OF ILOILO
AND THE ISLAND OF PANAY:

The troops under my command appeared here under an order of the President of the United States of America, promulgated by Major-General Otis, commanding all of the troops of the United States in the Philippine Islands. It is accompanied by the United States naval ship *Baltimore,* sent by Admiral Dewey, commanding the United States squadron in these Asiatic waters.

When these orders were communicated to me it was supposed that the troops of Spain were still in possession of Iloilo, and that the transfer of possession and governmental authority would be by them to representatives of the Government of the United States, which has succeeded, by virtue of conquest, supplemented by treaty stipulations, to all the rights heretofore exercised by Spain in these islands. Upon arrival I find that the city of Iloilo is in the reported possession of native troops. The intention of this letter is to place myself in communication with those now exercising authority at Iloilo, with the view to the accomplishment of my mission to this place as above indicated.

This communication will be handed you by my aid, Lieut. M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, who is accompanied by four gentlemen, former residents of Iloilo, who will make known to you more in detail the purposes of the presence of my command at this place.

There accompanies my command on the steamship *Union* certain Spanish soldiers, natives of the island of Panay, whom it is my purpose, at a later date, to release with the privilege of returning to their homes, an act which it is hoped will be interpreted as an evidence of the good will of the major-general commanding in the Philippines, under whose orders I am acting.

I shall be pleased to receive a call from representatives of those to whom this communication is addressed on board the transport *Newport* at as early an hour as your convenience will allow.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eight Army Corps

SD 208, I: 50-51

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eight Army Corps

SIR: I want to report that a committee of people having civil control of the city of Iloilo, and claiming also control of the island, met me here yesterday at 6 p.m., and again claimed that they could not turn over the control of Iloilo to my command without consulting Aguinaldo. Should they agree to do it their lives and property would be in danger. After a long talk, setting forth the intention of our Government, explaining the kind of government, and reading to them extracts of your letter of instructions in reference to the same matter, I told them there was no time to consult Aguinaldo and my demand was that the President of the United States, as successor to the rights of Spain in these islands, required them to turn over the control of the city of Iloilo. I then asked them directly: "Should we land would you meet us with armed resistance?" They could not have their troops march out of the city and permit us, their friends, to move in without resistence to-morrow, the 31st instant. They requested time to consult with the committee that they represented, promising to return with a definite reply at noon, December 30 (to-day).

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, corps engineer, arrived here yesterday evening with a letter of instructions from you to me. It is my intention to land troops in twenty-four hours, after having served notice on the foreign consuls of the city and the people to that effect.

The estimate of armed native troops to-day is 3,500, who are said to be massed in the city and at Jaro and Molo, and six or seven thousand from the mountains, armed with bolos, who are massed at the same places.

I think I should have the Twentieth Kansas Regiment sent to me as soon as possible; 20,000 rounds of .45-caliber ammunition for Gatling guns should be supplied. Two field mortars (3.6 inches), with equipments and supply of ammunition, should be sent to me at once.

I forward this communication by the steamer *Union.*

.. M. P. MILLER
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding Brigade

SD 208, I: 51-52

HEADQUARTERS SEPARATE BRIGADE
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have just concluded second conference with commission representing the native government at Iloilo. They submitted a communication, copy inclosed herewith.

This communication was supplemented by verbal statements that if we insisted on landing our troops, but without arms and as friends, they could not answer for the attitude of the people, but that the army would endeavor to restrain the people. If we landed in force they would not answer for attitude of either army or people. This means, plainly, armed resistance to our landing.

A large number of native troops have been brought to the city within the past thirty-six hours. Best estimate 12,000, 2,500 of which are armed with rifles, the remainder being armed with bolos only. Their ammunition supply reported limited.

The situation is further complicated by petition of Iloilo merchants, representing the larger part of mercantile interests there, copy of which find herewith.

I understand, General, that it was at the request of many of the parties signing this petition for protection of life and property at Iloilo that this expedition was organized and dispatched to this point; that their request was largely its justification. Their present attitude contradicts their previous petition in a measure, and as the situation, if forced by me, by a landing of United States troops, promises great loss of life among noncombatants and destruction of private property at Iloilo, I have deemed it best to delay compliance with my orders for a sufficient time to communicate the above information to you and receive your instructions. I am further influenced to this delay because of the fact that before making the formidable attack upon Iloilo now necessary, it would be incumbent upon me to give the usual notice looking to the removal of noncombatants to points of safety.

I entertain no doubt of my ability to take and hold Iloilo with my present force, but in view of excitement prevailing among inhabitants of the city and island, as reported to me, and the large number of people

assembled in the city, it might be prudent to send an additional regiment to this point.

Two steam launches suitable for towing rowboats for use in landing troops are much needed.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER
Brigadier-General, Commanding

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[Translation of the letter from President Lopez, of the federal government of Bisayas, to General Miller.]

GENERAL: Upon the return of your commissioners last night we determined and discussed in a definite manner the situation and the attitude of this reason of Bisayas, in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government of Luzon, and in view of what these commissioners have manifested, I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and committee, we insist upon our pretension not to consent, in our present situation, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon, upon which we state one more that we depend, and with which we are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices.

Therefore, if you insist on your side upondisembarking your forces, this is our final attitude.

May God give you, etc.

Iloilo, December 30, 1898.

R. LOPEZ, *President*
——— ———, *Vice-President*

To General MILLER.

To which General Miller replied on same date.

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898

Mr. ROQUE LOPEZ,
President Estado Federal de Bisayas, Iloilo.

SIR: I have the honor to express my regret that your committee has concluded to offer armed resistance to the occupancy of Iloilo by the

United States forces at this time. I shall wait for the present in a spirit of friendship, hoping that your opinions may change after reconsideration. I will give you timely notice of my intentions.

Very respectfully,

M. P. Miller
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding

On the 31st of December the president, R. Lopex, wrote a second letter couched in the following language:

General Miller

General: I heartily concur in your wishes, which is also ours, to arrange matters in a spirit of good friendship, but not having the power to surrender the city and the port of Iloilo which having been taken by our forces in the name of the Filipino republic, whose central government resides in Malolos, I regret finding myself in the position of persisting in not consenting to the landing of your forces without the direct orders of the central government.

I trust that you will see the justice of our claim compacted by the will of the people explicitly declared last night at the great meeting called for the purpose.

May God give you ———.

The President

R. Lopez

President's House in the City of Jaro
December 31, 1898.

On January 1, General Miller transmitted to Señor Lopez the instructions of His Excellency the President of the United States of December 28, relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands. In transmitting this proclamation General Miller wrote as follows:

Hdqrs. First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps,
On Board Transport Newport
Iloilo Harbor, January 1, 1899

Mr. Roque Lopez, *President*

Sir: The within cablegram from the President of the United States to the United States military governor in the Philippines, transmitted by the latter to me yesterday, is inclosed herewith for the information

of your committee and of the people of Iloilo and Panay Island. Its more important statements are:

I. That the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to forces of the United States, followed by the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris on the 10th instant, operate to give the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands to the United States.

II. It authorizes and directs the military commander in the Philippines to extend, *with all possible dispatch,* the military government hereto fore maintained in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila to the whole of the Philippine group.

III. It directs that the military government to be established among you shall be exerted for the security of persons and property of the people of the island and for the conformation of their private rights and relations. It announces to you that the army does not come among you as invaders and conquerors, but as friends to establish and maintain a government which will accord to the people what is the heritage of all free peoples — the full measure of individual rights and liberty.

The forces here under my command have been sent to this point for the purpose of executing the above orders. Although fully conscious of my power to occupy the city at any moment, I have, nevertheless, waited, that you might have ample time to fully deliberate upon the questions presented. As indicated in the President's cablegram under existing conditions, the people of Panay Island owe obedience to the political authority of the United States, and grave responsibilities will be incurred if, after deliberation, it is decided to resist that authority. In obedience to my instructions, and in the belief that the highest interests of the people will be served by immediate occupation by the troops under my command and the establishment of the authority of the United States, I again express the desire that the native troops be withdrawn, thus assuring the entry of the forces under my command without unusual incident or menace to life and property interests in Iloilo.

I am, very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 53-54

MALOLOS, *January 9, 1899.*

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila

GENERAL: I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general, "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, I have considered it advisable to name, as "commanding general," a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Eufrasio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops.

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony among ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am, yours, General, with the highest consideration, your most respected servant.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 60

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS

Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,

Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day, and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to conduct its affairs under the limits which its Constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized to do so by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by a thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops, and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depend upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the whole world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a

desire to further the interests of the Filipino people and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it; and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS

Major-General, U.S.V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 60-61

General MILLER.

GENERAL: We have the high honor of having received your message, dated January 1, of this year, inclosing letter of President McKinley. We have deliberated about these points, and as a result of our deliberation we deduce an answer to one of its clauses. We are not able to enter discussion respecting the others, because it is not in the power of this council of state.

You say in one clause of your message: "As indicated in the President's cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants of the island of Panay ought to obey the political authority of the United States, and they will incur a grave responsibility if, after deliberating, they decide to resist said authority."

So the council of state of this region of Visayas are, at this present moment, between the authority of the United States, that you try to impose on us, and the authority of the central revolutionary government at Malolos. The supposed authority of the United States began with the treaty of Paris, on the 10th of December 1898. The authority of the central government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices, etc. It is also founded principally on our political constitution, which began with the insurrection, and has been manifested in all its doings, so that the authority of the government of Malolos over us began at a date long before the treaty of Paris.

Now, after consideration, please tell us with sincerity, General, what authority we should obey, whether the authority of the United States, which began with the treaty of Paris on the 10th of December, 1898,

of which we do not know officially, because the revolutionary government of Malolos has not been notified; which government is based on previous conquest, anterior to the said treaty, and the natural bonds created by politics and the constitution established since the first moment of the rebellion, on the 11th of August, 1896.

After all has been said we insist in not giving our consent to the disembarkation of your troops, without an express order from our central government of Malolos,

The President
JARO, *January 9, 1899*

R. LOPEZ

SD 208, I: 54-55

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 11, 1899.

MR. R. LOPEZ, *President Federal State of Bisayas*

SIR: I have the honor and pleasure to acknowledge receipt of your communication of January 9, and regret very much your final conclusion does not conform to the order of the President of the United States, which announces sovereignty over all these islands. You must rest assured in the end that the sovereignty will be maintained, whatever obstructions may temporarily intervene. The President is very desirious for the people of the Philippine Islands to accept the authority of the United States as friends and without compulsion. You asked me in your letter to tell you, in sincerity, why you people should acknowledge authority of the United States now, rather than the authority of your central government. The President's order tells why you should acknowledge the authority of the United States; that is because of the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. The United States, in naval and land battles in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila, compelled Spain to relinquish authority over the Philippine Islands to the United States. To this end she expended millions of dollars and thousands of lives, causing first the adoption of the protocol and finally the treaty. Every nation in the world recognizes the treaty as giving to the United States the same rights in the Philippine Islands as Spain formerly possessed. These rights of our Government were duly considered at Washington prior to the President issuing his order, and,

no doubt, on the best legal advice in accordance with international law. I might say that confederation of which you claim to be a part is not now acknowledged by any nation, and its existence is only accidental as a result of the war between Spain and the United States.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER
Major-General, U.S.V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 55-56

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT
Iloilo Harbor, P.I., January 11, 1899

Mr. R. LOPEZ, *President Federal State of Bisayas.*

SIR: I would be glad at any time to receive any of your people, and especially yourself, who wish to consult me, on board the *Newport.* They will be safe and can return at their pleasure. We are making no seizures of boats or property except that necessary to maintain our existence here on transports.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER
Major-General, U.S.V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 56

MANILA, *P. I., January 15, 1899*

My Dear GENERAL:

I am somewhat exercised, fearing that your correspondence with the Iloilo people may result in bringing about grave complications. I sent you the President's proclamation, not for publication, but for your information, simply. It came just before Colonel Potter sailed for Iloilo and I did not have time to consider its probable effect. As soon as I could do so I cabled Washington that it would not be published, as the time was not opportune. After some deliberation we put out one of our own which it was believed would suit the temper of the people. I also

fear that your conversations and letters to the Iloilo insurgent authorities on the intentions of the United States Government will also breed trouble.

I have concluded to send Major Mallory to you; he can represent my views and give you full information as to the policy which we have pursued here. He can give you a correct report of affairs in this section and show you how necessary it is to proceed with great caution.

The revolutionary government is very anxious for peaceful relations, and knows the value of United States protection; but unfortunately some of their radical representatives have raised a flood of excitement which they can not control and which they confess their inability to direct. We have had several conferences, and they plead with us to make some concession which they may published to their people in order that they can get out of the dilemma in which they have placed themselves. They have little idea of constitutional government and their people have none. They cry for "independence" and "protection," not knowing the true meaning of the terms, and grow enraged over the words "sovereignty," "United States control," etc. For several days we have been passing through, and are still in, a rather critical condition. Had you fired a gun at Iloilo the mob and insurgent troops were ready to make demonstration against the United States authorities. This would have been most disappointing to the President of the United States, who continually urges extreme caution and no conflict. Conditions are improving, the city is very quiet, the Malolos government slowly disintegrating, I think, and the Philippine people of the city and surrounding provinces having a better understanding of the United States' intentions.

Major Mallory will remain with you, and I desire that you consult him upon all matters affecting our relationship with the insurgent authorities. The policy to be pursued by the United States is to keep as quiet as possible, permitting the insurgent authorities to work out their own protection if possible. Please do not attempt any radical action without consulting us here.

Very respectfully,

E. S. Otis

Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller
Commanding First Separate Brigade
Eight Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay Island

SD 208, I:58-59

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Manila, P. I., January 25, 1899

Brigadier-General HUGHES,

Chairman of committee appointed to meet a committee appointed by General Aguinaldo to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States.

SIR: I am informed that the Filipino people do not place confidence in our good intentions which they are seeking from this conference. The fact that the President has appointed a commission seems to have confirmed them in their impressions. It might be well, therefore, to give you a brief history of events having relation to these commissioners. They are as follows:

Early in December Admiral Dewey and myself received instructions from Washington to report the condition of affairs and offer suggestions. Upon December 7 Admiral Dewey telegraphed as follows:

"It is strongly urged that the President issue a proclamation defining the policy of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands and showing the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Philippines as little as possible; that as they develop their capabilities of government their powers and privileges will be increased. That will allay the spirit of unrest. The Spanish soldiers should be expatriated as soon as possible; they are a source of discord and danger."

And the Admiral goes on to say that a force of several regiments raised from among the best insurgent troops and officered by the best of their leaders would do much to disarm opposition.

Upon this suggestion I think the proclamation was issued. Later Admiral Dewey cabled (I think sometime about the 1st of January, I am not aware of the date) that he thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be an excellent thing. On January 9 I was asked by the Washington authorities what I thought of the appointment of a commission to confer with the revolutionary authorities, and I replied that I thought it might do excellent work here. Before this date,

early in January, I had been requested by prominent Filipinos to appoint a committee from my own command to meet a like committee to be appointed by General Aguinaldo. This was done on January 9, one day before receiving the Washington dispatch asking if I thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be advantageous. Hence, what might be styled the two commissions have no relationship whatever. The one of which you are president, sitting to ascertain the desires of the Filipinos and having no authority to grant concessions except by permission of the Washington authorities; the other commission, appointed from Washington, comes with full instructions from the President of the United States and empowered to act for him.

On January 16 I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

Conditions improving; confidence of citizens returning; business active. Conference held Saturday; insurgents presented following statement, asking that it be cabled: "Undersigned commissioners commander in chief of revolutionary army of these islands state to commissioners of General Otis that aspiration Filipino people is independence, with restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree with American when latter agree to officially recognize the former." No conclusion reached; another conference to-morrow evening. I understand insurgents wish qualified independence under United States protection.

To this dispatch no reply has been received.

Upon another matter, viz, the sending of regular troops here, the purpose of which has been greatly misunderstood, you may communicate the following dispatch, received on December 7:

General Otis, Manila:

The Secretary of War directs you to send Astor Battery home on first returning transport. If you can spare volunteers to take first returning ships, send them in the order of their arrival. Six regular regiments are in course of preparation to report to you. It is probable that part of them will sail direct from this coast by way of canal — thus to give you good transports available for service from San Francisco.

The meaning and intent of this dispatch was to return the volunteer troops as soon as possible and to send part back by the transports then in the harbor, if practicable. The Astor Battery was sent home, but I

declined to send other volunteer troops at that time, as the revolutionary government had assumed a threatening attitude, notwithstanding our great desire for peace and harmony. The orders from Washington have not changed. I still have authority to return the volunteer troops, so that they can be discharged in the United States, by any returning vessels available, but I decline to return them as long as we are threatened with active hostilities. Under the articles of capitulation still prevailing with Spain, as there has been no ratification as yet of a treaty, I am obliged to hold Manila and its defenses, but no hostile act will be inaugurated by the United States troops.

Very sincerely, yours,

E. S. Otis
Major-General, U.S.A., United States Military Governor

Note of Explanation. — The commissioners held their final joint conference, I think, on January 25. With the insurgent representatives it was one continued plea for some concession which would satisfy the people. One of them was a man of excellent legal ability, who had occupied an important judicial position at Cebu under the Spanish Government for a number of years. He had recently arrived in Manila, and on the invitation of Aguinaldo had visited Malolos. He was animated with a desire to restore harmonious relations, or at least to effect a temporary peace until the existing excitement could be allayed, when the people might listen to reason. He secured the appointment of Aguinaldo's board and was named thereon as the most important member, but he was so circumscribed by specific instructions that he could not accomplish anything. I charged him with playing a false part, basing the charge on a knowledge of his legal requirements. He confessed that he was fully aware of the untenable position he occupied; and was powerless under the circumstances. He was an adept at legal fiction and could discover pregnants, both negative and positive, in every international postulate. The appointment of the President's commission had caused so much speculation, both as to membership and object, that I desired to correct mistaken impressions and to take away further opportunity for deliberate falsehood, and knowing that this gentleman still held friendly relations with the Malolos authorities and desired to know the truth in the matter, I sent him the following unofficial letter:

MANILA, *P. I., February 3, 1899*

Hon. FLORENTINO TORRES, *Manila, P. I.*

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of a Washington dispatch dated the 1st instant, which informs me that the gentlemen who expect to serve on the proposed commission on the part of the United States will reach Hongkong on the 21st of the month. They will probably arrive here about the 25th.

So many inaccuracies have been spread abroad concerning the identity of the gentlemen of the commission that I desire to make explanation. They are Messrs. Denby, Schurman, and Worcester. Respecting the first, he is doubtless well known as the late United States minister to China; the second is the president of Cornell University, one of the leading institutions of learning of the United States; the third is Professor Worcester, of the University of Michigan, also one of our leading educators and who has a personal acquaintance with the Philippines, he having spent some time here. He is a friend of Dr. Bourns, of our health board, who formerly made a tour of the Philippine Islands, in the interest of science.

I am sure the reputation of these gentlemen will commend them to the Filipino people as men of probity, ability, and most humane sentiments, having at heart the interest of that people. Admiral Dewey and myself have also been placed on this commission — the Government following the policy pursued with reference to Cuba and Porto Rico. My own inclinations and desire are not to serve thereon, being simply a soldier, but I must obey the commands of my Government.

It is quite important that friendly relations be maintained in every way among all of us, and I am doing my utmost to that end. A great deal of frictions has been caused by the action of troops, resulting, I am certain, from a misunderstanding of conditions. Our soldiers are frequently insulted and threatened within our own lines, but thus far have quietly submitted, obeying their instructions. If, however, these threatening demonstrations should proceed so far as to endanger life, I might not be able to hold them in check. I trust that the revolutionary authorities will exercise every endeavor to put a stop to demonstrations similar to those witnessed during the past two days.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS

NOTE OF EXPLANATION. — A few days before the above letter was written and on January 26, I was surprised by the receipt of a letter from Aguinaldo, because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness by the arbitrament of war. I cabled it in cipher to Washington in accordance with his request, as it contained such suggestive announcements of the course of conduct he was likely to pursue. The cablegram and my reply to the communication are as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
MANILA, *P.I., January 27, 1899*

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P.I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I received yesterday a communication dated the 23rd instant, signed by you and purporting to be issued from the office of the secretary of foreign affairs of the "Philippine national government."

I am pleased to further inform you that a translation of that communication into the English language, as shown in the accompanying paper, has been cabled in full to the United States authorities at Washington.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS
Major-General, U.S.V., Commanding

NOTE OF EXPLANATION: During the latter part of January the insurgents along their established lines and within the city exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming a defiant attitude, so much so that our troops were gathered well in hand to meet any demonstrations which might be attempted. Insurgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches. To arrest these preceedings, our officers, and citizens of Manila connected with the insurgent government, were sent to insurgent general officers at various places along their lines to request that they keep their men in check, which the latter invariably promised to do, paying, however, little heed to their promises. On February 1 a small detachment belonging to our engineer company

was arrested within our territory and sent to Malolos. This act brought on the following correspondence:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces, Malolos

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of engineers, consisting of a sergeant and four privates, who are engaged in making surveys for the completion of the map of Manila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting, has been missing for two or three days and is reported to be confined in Malolos. The detachment was sent out to do work within the city, with directions to confine itself to the city and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I do not understand, nor can I imagine for what reason they are held at Malolos. I am also informed that a citizen connected with Harper's Weekly, newspaper, of New York, engaged in talking views for that paper, has also been arrested and held as a prisoner. I know nothing of this except from report, nor do I know who the man is. I am also informed that a private soldier who went beyond the lines without authority, and for what motive I do not know, is also held as a prisoner.

I send my staff officer, Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to make inquiries and request your action in this matter.

I am doing everything possible to preserve the peace and avoid all friction until the Filipino people can be made fully acquainted with the sentiments and intentions of the American Government, when I am confident they will appreciate the endeavors of the United States and will again look upon that country as their friend and protector. I alsc fully believe that the present unrest is the result of the machinations of evil-disposed persons.

I am, General, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 66-67

MALOLOS, *February 4, 1899*

Major-General OTIS,

Chief of the Forces of Occupation of Manila and Cavite

GENERAL: In reply to your letter of February 2, I have the honor to state that the sergeant and four American soldiers of the Engineer Corps, to-day liberated, were detained within our territory, beyond our advanced lines on Solis street, examining our intrenchments and defenses at less than 200 meters.

The said individuals carried a revolver, knives, a compass, plans of Manila and its suburbs, a book with topographical notes, a measuring tape, a machete, two penknives, scales, etc.

I deeply regret that these soldiers have been taken within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers' witnesses of our detention, inasmuch as there exists a decree, dated October 20, which prohibits all foreigners from approaching our defensive works, taking photographic views of the same, drawing plans, or entering our territory with arms, although free transit is permitted all who are unarmed.

The correspondent of Harper's Weekly was arrested in San Juan del Monte taking photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Colonel Miguel he has been sent his camera and his horse.

I must state that in consideration of the friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the said soldiers have not been imprisoned, but detained in accordance with the spirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the Gobierno Militar and have been issued the daily rations of our officers. If they have been uncomfortable it is due to the excessive sobreity of our race and soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and sleep on the hard ground.

With these explanations I believe, General, you will understand the motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberated and who have been treated with all due consideration.

I therefore hope that your determination may be another motive on which to base our friendly relations with the great American Republic, and in consideration of this I also decree the liberty of the correspondent referred to.

I am, General, as ever, your obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 67

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
Commander in Chief of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila:

My government has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is to-day enthusiastically proclaimed by the people, because of its conviction that its duty is to interpret faithfully the aspirations of that people — a people making superhuman efforts to revindicate their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers.

To this end, of the governments to-day recognized and observed among cultured nations they have adopted the form of government most compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjust their actions to the dictates of reason and of right, in order to demonstrate their aptitude for civil life.

And, taking the liberty to notify your excellency, I confidently hope that, doing justice to the Philippine people, you will be pleased to inform the Government of your nation that the desire of mine, upon being accorded official recognition, is to contribute to the best of its scanty ability to the establishment of a general peace.

May God keep your excellency many years.

EMILIO AGUINALDO
A. MABINI

[Seal of the revolutionary government of the Philippines.]
MALOLOS, *January 23, 1899*
SD 208, I: 65-66

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899

COMMANDING GENERAL NATIVE FORCES, *Iloilo.*

SIR: In a communication from Gen. Roque Lopez, dated December 31, 1898, it was stated that armed resistance would be offered to the forces of the United States in case they attempted to occupy Iloilo with-

out the consent of General Aguinaldo. This communicaion was referred, for instructions, to Major-General Otis, commanding the United States forces in the Philippine Islands. After a long delay orders have arrived, and I am now directed by him to occupy Iloilo with my troops as soon as practicable. I therefore call on you to deliver up the city of Iloilo and adjacent territory, and to surrender the armed forces occupying the same before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant, or I shall proceed with my troops to occupy the city by force. It is requested that you give warning to all noncombatants in Iloilo, Jaro, and Molo that in case of resistance their city and villages will be exposed to bombardment. Any attempt on your part in the interim to close the Iloilo River, or to throw up or improve any defensive works, will at once be met by fire from the United States warships and my troops. Free ingress and egress to boats going to and coming from Iloilo will be permitted until sunset Saturday, the 11th instant. After this time all communications must be under flag of truce.

Official communication has been received by the *S.S. Butuan* of the complete defeat and scattering of the insurgent forces in the neighborhood of Manila.

Very respectfully,

M. P. Miller
Brigadier-General, U.S.V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 59-60

Hdqrs. First Division, Eight Army Corps
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 27, 1899

Adjutant-General,
Department of the Pacific and Eight Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the following is an epitome of the information elicited from a wounded insurgent officer whom I am sending in an ambulance to-day. This man was captured by Captain Eastwick's battalion of the Oregon during a reconnaissance made on the 26th instant across the river from Norzagaray:

General Pantaleon Garcia retired from Malabon with the Manila battalion, now composed of some 700 men, armed with Remingtons: ammunition faulty. This battalion is under complete command, composed

of old Spanish carabineros, and Seventy-third Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Pacheco in charge. Formerly occupied the towns of Norzagaray, Angat, Santa Maria, and Maruco, headquarters at Angat. This battalion keeps its complete organization and obeys all orders of their chief, Garcia. This latter is on good terms with Aguinaldo, with whom he corresponds frequently by messenger, taking four days to do so. Has asked Aguinaldo for instructions and reenforcements, but in the meantime retires toward San Miguel de Mayumo, where Aguinaldo is supposed to be.

If rebels knew treatment received from Americans many would surrender, as they are perfectly aware of the movements of the Americans. Officers do not desert, as they fear treatment from the Americans, and these men are in awe of their commanders.

Tulisanes, or robbers, are at foot of the mountains and frequently harass the insurgents.

The Novaliches and San Jose insurgents are under no recognized leaders and do not obey orders from Aguinaldo, but act separately.

The enemy are falling back toward San Miguel, where Aguinaldo is supposed to be, and when they are all retired there will be a force of more than 1,200 men.

This man seems to be very intelligent and very well satisfied of having the opportunity of returning to Manila, and perhaps would be a very interesting person to have examined by your own officers. His name is Tito David, and he says he is a son-in-law of an old employee of Smith, Bell & Co., Manila.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON

Major-General, U.S.V., Commanding

SD 208, I: 68

SAN ISIDRO, *April 29, 1899*

HONORABLE GENTLEMEN: The Philippine people, through its government, makes known to the commission that it has not yet lost its confidence in the friendship, justice, and magnanimity of the North American nation.

It feels itself weak before the advance of the American troops, whose valor it admires, and in view of the superiority of their organization,

discipline, fighting material, and other resources, does not feel humiliated in soliciting peace, invoking the generous sentiments of the Government of the North American people, worthily represented by the commission, and the sacred interests of humanity.

But the Philippine government, fully convinced that it has not provoked war, and that it has only employed its arms in defense of the integrity of its native land, asks for a suspension of hostilities and a general armistice in all the archipelago for the short time of three months, in order to enable it to consult the opinions of the people concerning the government which would be most advantageous, and the intervention in it which should be given to the North American Government, and to appoint an extraordinary commission with full powers to act in the name of the Philippine people.

The welfare of this unfortunate country and the triumph of the governing party in the United States of America depend upon the prompt establishment of peace. We confess ourselves weak, but we still possess resources — above all, the unfaltering resolution to prolong the war for an indefinite space of time if the undertaking to dominate us by force is persisted in.

In laying before the commission the preceding statements I believe that I interpret the sentiments of my president and his government and those of the Philippine people.

I salute the commission with the greatest respect.

Your most obedient servant,

A. MABINI

[SEAL]

SD 208, I: 69

The members of the Philippine government have commissioned Col. Manuel Arguelles to present and explain to the North American Commission to the Philippines the following points:

First. The Philippine government finds itself compelled to negotiate an armistice and a suspension of hostilities as an indispensable means of arriving at peace — in the first place, in order to justify itself before its people as having employed all the means in its power to avoid the ruin of the country, and, in the second place, to offer to the commission a

means of putting an end to the war in a manner most honorable to the American Army and most glorious to the Government of the United States.

Second. It does not solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which to reenforce itself, nor does it expect aid from Japan nor from any other nation, as no government up to the present time has recognized its belligerency, nor is disposed to injure its relations with powerful America, especially as there is nothing to be gained thereby. The Philippine government earnestly desiring the felicity of its people, while it is still in pursuit of independence, would not insist upon fighting for its ideal if the Philippine people through its accredited representative should ask for peace and accept autonomy.

Third. The interests of humanity are at present in harmony with those of the North American government, and both ask for a brief space of time, however short, in which the Philippine people may reflect upon their sad situation and may understand the bases of the autonomy which is offered to them.

Fourth. If, however, this last recourse is denied it, no one can blame the Philippine government for the tenacity which it may show. The honor of the army and the happiness of the country will then determine the only line of conduct for it to pursue, namely, to prolong the struggle until it reaches the end of its resources. This prolongation of the struggle would be fatal to both peoples.

Let the commission reflect, then, while there is time, that if the war is converted into a national war it would be very difficult to keep it within bounds.

In that case peace would mean the annihilation of the Philippine people or that of the imperialistic party of America.

San Isidro, May 1, 1899.

A. Mabini

(Lead pencil note) If this is refused, notify them that a move will be made for foreign intervention upon the grounds of commercial interests, which are seriously prejudiced by the prolongation of the war, and that a manifesto will be published making known to the world the reasons for the war.

SD 208, I: 69-70

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHT ARMY CORPS
Manila, P. I., May 13, 1899

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U.S.V.
Commanding United States Forces, Baliuag, Luzon

GENERAL: The commanding general of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands directs me to inform you that you will reply to the communication addressed to you by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, of the Philippine forces at your front, which communication was delivered to me by Captain Sewell, of your staff, and is herewith returned; that should General Aguinaldo desire to send representative men to confer with the United States commission, now in session in this city, you are at liberty and will pass such body through your lines, promising them safe conduct to and from Manila and ample protection during their stay there. Railway transportation between Malolos and Manila is freely accorded.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS BARRY
Assistant Adjutant-General

SD 208, I: 70

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 13, 1899

Brig. Gen. GREGORIO DEL PILAR
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Your messenger, Lieut. Perfecto Reyes, duly arrived at my headquarters about 8 o'clock last evening, he having been sent to me by Colonel Summers, commanding one of my brigades, then encamped at Maasin.

After due consideration I decided that it would be best to let your messenger, Lieutenant Reyes, proceed himself to Manila, and present in person to the general commanding the forces in the Philippine Islands your inquiry. Lieutenant Reyes was accompanied by an aid-de-camp of my staff, and they have just returned.

I inclose you a copy of the reply of the commanding general to me, from which you will observe that he freely accords to you and to the commission to whom you refer all that you and they desire on request,

and should they decide to honor me by passing through the lines under my command, it will afford me great pleasure to offer them every courtesy and assistance in my power to further their wishes.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. LAWTON

Major-General Commanding United States Forces

SD 208, I: 70-71

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS

In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899

General MACARTHUR, *San Fernando*:

Four commissioners, headed by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, will go under escort to-morrow, via Malolos, to see General Otis, and commission, from what I can understand, will not have definite results. From inquiry with one of its members, one of my staff officers reports that the former commission named by Aguinaldo to treat for peace has been dissolved by Luna. The latter arrested Buen Camino and Arguelles in Cabanatuan and has sent them to Talavera. Luna, it appears, desires to be dictator; has the greater part of the army (five or six thousand) under his influence. Aguinaldo fears Luna and is but nominally in power. Present commission bears no more powers than to request suspension of hostilities for short time to call congressional assembly for further action. This proposition from General Luna. Again, one of the commission reports that previous to the capture of Calumpit, Aguinaldo had given Pio del Pilar orders to move from Antipolo to the assistance of Gregorio del Pilar at Baliuag. Pio did not comply with the order, deeming it inadvisable. Now, it is said, Pio is on the road with 1,000 men to invade towns in the province of Bulacan.

This afternoon sent French with Twenty-second and North Dakotas down river to Cabiao. When reaching San Fernando, about 4 miles from here, met a force intrenched across the road estimated at 100. They were driven to the river. Our loss 4 wounded.

Have had very busy time last ten days. Insurgent government now at Tarlac.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers*

SD 208, I: 71

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899

Second Lieut. E. L. KING

Eight U.S. Cavalry, Aid-de-Camp

SIR: The commanding general directs that you accompany to Manila, and report to the corps commander, the following commissioners: General Gregorio del Pilar, Señors Gracio Gonzaga, Alberto Baretto, and Lorenzo L. Zialcita, of the insurgent forces, who were to-day admitted within our lines under a flag of truce.

You will start at 6 o'clock a.m. to-morrow, the 19th instant, or at such a time as the commissioners elect, for Malolos, from which point you will report by telegraph to the corps commander the probable time of your arrival in Manila, that transportation may meet your train.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS
Assistant Adjutant-General

SD 208, I: 71-72

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The commission, consisting of Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, Gracio Gonzaga, Alberto Barretto, and Lorenzo Zialcita, have arrived here and will start forward at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Has the general any instructions?

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers*

SD 208, I: 71-72

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 18, 1899*

General LAWTON:

Please furnish Señor Gracio Gonzaga and the commissioners proper escort to Malolos, thence to Manila. Direct officer in charge to notify

me of time of arrival of train in Manila, that transportation may be in readiness.

BARRY, *Adjutant-General*

SD 208, I: 71-72

[Telegram]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The Filipino party here consists of four commissioners and their assistants — seven in all. They have no transportation and I shall be obliged to send them in an ambulance. From what I can understand, their visit will come to very little, as their powers are limited. The following information, elicited from individuals of the party, is submitted: "Adjutant-General, First Division — Sir: I find that the former commission named by General Aguinaldo to treat for peace has been dissolved by General Luna. The latter arrested Buen Camino and Arguelles in Cabanatuan and has this afternoon sent them to Talavera. Luna evidently desires to be dictator, and has the greater part of the army (5,000 or 6,000 men) under his influence. Aguinaldo fears Luna, and is only nominally in power. The present commission bears no more power than a request for a suspension of hostilities for a short time to call an assembly of the congress for further action, and this proposition is from General Luna. The above information is derived from Dr. Albert and Señor Arsenio Cruz Herrera, members of the former commission, but in connection with this matter be kept secret. — J.F. Case."

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers*

SD 208, I: 71-72

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
Angeles, P. I., October 24, 1899

Brigadier-General SCHWAN,
Chief of Staff, Department of Pacific and Eight Army Corps

SIR: For the sake of reference I inclose herewith copies of the entire correspondence which began with the letter of October 18 instant, dated at Tarlac and signed by the general secretary of war, Ambrosio Flores.

These papers will be handed you by Lieutenant-Colonel Mallory of my staff.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding

TARLAC, *October 18, 1899*

To His Excellency the Commanding General of the American Forces in Angeles or San Fernando, Pampanga

RESPECTABLE GENERAL: In order to arrange with Major-General Otis difficulties connected with the delivery of sick Spanish civil and military prisoners my honorable president, General Aguinaldo, desires to send to Manila a military commission composed of five persons presided over by one general, who bears, moreover, other commissions of a pacific character.

I beg you to please inform me in reply whether General Otis will find no inconvenience in receiving the said commission, designating, in the affirmative case, a day and hour upon which the commission may enter your lines.

I am, respectable general, your very respectful and obliged comrade and servant,

The general secretary of war,

AMBROSIO FLORES

SD 208, I: 73

[Telegram]

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
Angeles, P. I., October 20, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL
Department Pacific and Eight Army Corps

A flag from the insurgent lines has just delivered a message directed to me signed by the secretary of war, Ambrosio Flores, in which he says that his honorable president, General Aguinaldo, desires to send a military commission to Manila composed of five persons, presided over by an insurgent general. The purpose of the commission, as stated by General Flores, is to arrange with General Otis difficulties connected with a delivery of sick Spanish civil and military prisoners. It is further stated by Flores in his letter that the commission is charged with other

matters of a pacific character. These matters, however, are not specified. I have directed the bearer of the flag to go back to his own lines, and return again to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock, at which time I would communicate to him the answer of the department commander.

MACARTHUR

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHT ARMY CORPS
Manila, P. I., October 27, 1899
SD 208, I: 74

[Telegram]

PALACE, MANILA, P. I., *October 20, 1899 — 12.45 p.m.*

General MACARTHUR, *Angeles*:

Reply to message received from insurgent lines on your front that General Otis is unable to recognize or receive any commission of gentlemen accredited by General Aguinaldo unless accredited by him solely in his character of general in chief of the insurgent forces.

SCHWAN, *Chief of Staff*

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHT ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., October 27, 1899
SD 208, I: 74

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHT ARMY CORPS
Angeles, P. I., October 21, 1899

Hon. AMBROSIO FLORES
Tarlak, Luzon

SIR: I take pleasure in acknowledging receipt of your note of October 18th instant, which was delivered yesterday, the 20th instant. The contents thereof were expeditiously communicated to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in Manila.

In reply thereto, the Commander in Chief desires me to say that he is unable to recognize or receive any commission of gentlemen accredited by General Aguinaldo unless accredited by him solely in his character of general in chief of the insurgent forces.

In this connection attention is invited to that part of the note of your excellency, wherein it is stated that "Mi Honorable Presidente General Aguinaldo desea," etc.

With warm personal esteem, I remain,

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR
Major-General, Commanding

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHT ARMY CORPS
Manila, P. I., October 27, 1899

SD 208, I: 74

TARLAK, *22nd of October, 1899*

To Major-General, Mr. MACARTHUR
Commander of the Forces of the United States in Angeles

RESPECTABLE SIR: I have the pleasure to receive this day the reply of your excellency dated the 21st instant, the contents of which have been read to my chief, General Aguinaldo.

And for the satisfaction of General Otis, I say in the name of my general that, in order to give evidence of our human sentiments and sincere proof of making friendship with the United States, the government (of the) Philippine republic desires to deliver to his excellency Mr. Otis, as representative of his nation, sick Spanish civil and military prisoners, already freed on our own initiative.

And with the object of overcoming the difficulties of assembling so large a number of prisoners, General Aguinaldo contemplates sending a military commission, composed of five persons, presided over by one of our generals, to confer with his excellency Mr. Otis.

And finally it is desired to know if General Otis is disposed to receive the said commission of humanity and pacific character.

In the affirmative case, it is requested that a day and hour be designated for the commission to enter your lines.

I beg you, general, to permit me again to impose upon your kindness by condescending to transmit, entire, this letter to his excellency General Otis, for which additional favor your most respectful servant remains greatly obliged.

The general secretary of war.

AMBROSIO FLORES

SD 208, I: 75

[Telegram]

MANILA, P. I., *October 23, 1899 — 9.10 p.m.*

COMMANDING GENERAL

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Angeles

Corps commander desires to see letter of General Flores, referred to in your telegram, before making any reply. Send letters to these headquarters by an officer to-morrow.

SCHWAN,

Chief of Staff, Department Pacifi·

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHT ARMY CORPS

Manila, P. I., October 27, 1899

SD 208, I: 75

[Telegram.]

ANGELES, LUZON, P. I., *Oct. 23, 1899*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC

Manila, P. I.

A note was delivered about 5.30 p.m. this afternoon, by flag, dated at Tarlac, 22d of October, signed by Ambrosio Flores, the general secretary of war, in which he acknowledges receipt of my note of the 21st, which contained the department commander's reply to the former note, the contents of which he informs me have been read by his chief, General Aguinaldo. General Flores then continues as follows:

And for the satisfaction of General Otis, I say, in the name of my general, that in order to give evidence of our humane sentiments and sincere proof of making friendship with the United States, the government of the Philippine republic desires to deliver to his excellency, Mr. Otis, as representative of his nation, sick Spanish civil and military prisoners already freed on our own initiative.

General Flores then states that in order to overcome the difficulties of assembling so large a number of prisoners General Aguinaldo contemplates sending a military commission, composed of five persons presided over by one of their generals, to confer with General Otis. An inquiry is made if General Otis is disposed to receive the said commission of humanity and pacific character.

The note concludes with a request that I will transmit the entire letter to General Otis, which I think perhaps is desirable, unless favorable

action is considered expedient upon this representation of its contents, in which event I will send it in tomorrow by an officer.

The insurgent flag will return at 9.30 in the morning. I would therefore like definite instructions before that time.

MACARTHUR

SD 208, I: 76

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHT ARMY CORPS

Manila, P. I., October 25, 1899

Maj. Gen. ARTHUR MACARTHUR
Commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps,
Angeles, Luzon, P. I.

SIR: I am directed by the commanding general to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 24th instant, with certain enclosures consisting:

First. Communication dated Tarlac, October 18, 1899, signed by "Ambrosio Flores," who styles himself "The general secretary of war."

Second. Official copy of telegram dated Angeles, October 20, 1899, addressed to "The Adjutant General, Department of the Pacific," signed "MacArthur."

Third. Official copy of telegram dated October 20, addressed to "General MacArthur," and signed "Schwan, chief of staff."

Fourth. Official copy of letter dated October 21, addressed to "Hon. Ambrosio Flores, Tarlac, Luzon," and signed "Arthur MacArthur, major-general commanding."

Fifth. Communication dated Tarlac, October 22, addressed to "Major-General MacArthur, commander of the forces of the United States in Angeles," and signed "El Gral Secretario de Guerra, Ambrosio Flores."

Sixth. Telegram dated Manila, October 23, addressed to the "Commanding General, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps," and signed "Schwan, chief of staff, Department of the Pacific," and

Seventh. Telegram of last-named date addressed to the "Adjutant-General Department of the Pacific," and signed "MacArthur."

This correspondence, in so far as the communications signed "Ambrosio Flores" (upon which all correspondence arose) are concerned,

sets but a desire of "My honorable president, General Aguinaldo," to arrange "with Major-General Otis difficulties connected with the delivery of sick Spanish civil and military prisoners" and to present other matters "of a pacific character" through "a military commission composed of five persons" to be sent to Manila; and "General Aguinaldo" desires to be informed — so the person who subscribes himself "Ambrosio Flores, the general secretary of war," asserts — if the proposed commission, claimed to be one of humanity, etc., will be officially received.

It is presumed that "the sick Spanish and civil and military prisoners" referred to are Spanish citizens, formerly civil officials and soldiers of Spain, made prisoners by the insurgent troops when in rebellion against the government, who have since been held in confinement by those troops, some of whom have performed service in the insurgent ranks against the United States.

I am instructed to inform you that with these prisoners or the armed forces by whom they are held in confinement the United States has no official relationship, but, moved by the dictates of humanity, would be glad to have them sent to our military lines, where they will be hospitably received and carefully tended, that they may be restored to a condition of health. Should these sick people present themselves or be presented at any point within your command, you will welcome their return from a prolonged, cruel, and unwarrantable captivity, look to their comfort and furnish them transportation as soon as practicable to the city of Manila.

There does not, therefore, seem to be any use which a commission of gentlemen sent from Tarlac could subserve in the interests of these so-called Spanish prisoners, and its journey to Manila would be purposeless and most significantly so to secure the expressed object.

I am further instructed to say that the commanding general has no official information or knowledge from his government of the parties styling themselves, or who are styled in the correspondence, as "my honorable president" or as the "general secretary of war" and hence is debarred from making official recognition of their communications which you have received.

You are therefore directed to make known these instructions to the persons by whom you have been addressed, and do whatever may be in

your power to ameliorate the condition of the prisoners whom they have referred to.

Very respectfully,

THEO. SCHWAN
Brigadier-General Volunteers, Chief of Staff.

SD 208, I: 76-77

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
Angeles, P. I., October 26, 1899

HON. AMBROSIO FLORES
[illegible] *Tarlak*

SIR: Referring to your note of October 22, 1899,, where you request me to transmit the entire contents thereof to General Otis, I take pleasure in informing you that not only that letter, but all other correspondence arising from your original note of October 18, was submitted to and personally considered by the commander in chief.

In reply to my letter transmitting these papers, I received carefully prepared instructions, of which, for the purpose of communicating exactly the views of the commander in chief, I respectfully enclose a full copy.

In pursuance of my instructions, which you will understand perfectly after having read the same, I shall be glad to receive such sick Spanish and military prisoners as it may be deemed expedient to send to my lines. For this purpose I will at any time, when not engaged in actual military operations, send an officer under a flag to confer with an officer from the Filipino army with a view to arranging all necessary details to secure the ease and comfort of such Spanish citizens as you may desire to transfer to my hospitality.

With assurances of high personal consideration, I beg to remain,

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR
Major-General Commanding

SD 208, I: 78

PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Tarlak, 28th of October, 1899

General MACARTHUR

Commander of the United States Forces in Angeles

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the esteemed letter of your excellency, dated the 26th instant, with the documents which accompany it as instructions of your general staff, General Otis.

In reply, I must inform your excellency that we can not send the prisoners through the lines, because, considering the distance of the different points where they are, it is, humanely speaking, impossible for them to survive (escape?) the great difficulties of arriving at the lines.

The said prisoners are scattered at various points in the island, for which reason you will see from the subjoined decree we have seen fit to liberate them in the seaports. Here is the reason for the necessity of conferring with his excellency, General Otis, who is aware of the true and pitiable situation of the prisoners, which certainly places the stamp of humanity upon this affair.

With respect to the treatment which we give, I have nothing more to say than it necessarily corresponds with our political condition, which your clear intellect will perfectly understand.

And apropos of the suspiciousness which might be entertained as to the character of the treatment, permit me, General, to declare that in the name of soldierly honor, common to you and to me, I protest against such suspicion, as we have never resorted to indirect means in order to wrest by artifice the recognition of our beloved independence.

This is very clear, because we seek by the light of day this right, which belongs to us by natural law, defending it openly and nobly by means of arms and diplomacy.

If in spite of these declarations General Otis does not admit the commission of General Aguinaldo, we will lament it on account of the unfortunate prisoners.

Thanking your excellency and General Otis once more for the courtesy and consideration which you have shown me on this occasion, I am always your warm admirer.

The general secretary of war,

AMBROSIO FLORES.

SD 208, I: 78-79

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
Angeles, P. I., October 30, 1899

Genl. THEO. SCHWAN
Chief of Staff, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I respectfully enclose herewith a copy of a letter written by myself to General Flores at Tarlak, immediately upon receipt of your letter of the 25th instant.

In continuation of the correspondence, General Flores transmitted by flag the communication herewith enclosed, which explains itself.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR
Major-General Commanding

SD 208, I: 79

[Cablegram — Received at War Department
November 9, 1899]

MANILA

AGWAR, *Washington*:

Spanish commission sent to Tarlac to make arrangements for release Spanish prisoners returned few days ago. Aguinaldo would not treat with them, as Spain had not formally recognized insurgent government. General MacArthur telegraphs to-day that he has just received at Mabalacat under flag of truce, communication from insurgent secretary war, dated 5th instant, asking that if I am powerless to formally receive Spanish prisoners from insurgent government I cable to Washington for permission to do this in interests of humanity. Letter states if insurgent application not granted, insurgent government will regard its humane offer withdrawn, and remarks that their national pride imposes duty of not delivering prisoners except to a nation; that Spain can not receive them, because Otis opposes, and Otis does not desire to receive them.

Communication concludes by stating that in view of difficulties this affair will have to be completely terminated to the prejudice of the unfortunate prisoners, much to the regret, and without any responsibility on the part of the insurgent government. In response to former insurgent applications I have informed Aguinaldo that we would be glad to receive and take care of all prisoners if he would simply send them in. The insurgents never intended to give prisoners up unless they could force money payments and recognition in exchange. They have not brought

them in from the mountains. Aguinaldo now reported to be in full retreat for Bayombong; his government believed to be much scattered.

OTIS

SD 208, I: 79

[Telegram]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 10, 1899*

OTIS, *Manila*:

Your course regarding prisoners held by insurgents is approved. Their location should be definitely ascertained and adequate force sent to recover them soon as possible. Insurgent secwar's letter implies a threat. Unless you see strong reasons to the contrary, notify Aguinaldo that he and his advisers will be held personally responsible for any injury done to Spanish or American prisoners in violation of the laws and usages of war among civilized nations.

CORBIN

[Sent in cipher]
SD 208 I: 80

Extracts and copies of certain cablegrams from General Otis relating to release of Spanish and American prisoners held by insurgents.

November 13, 1899.— x x x Wessels, with squadron Third Cavalry, hastened forward to Tayug, where insurgent supply depot captured, x x x also number insurgent officers and 69 Spanish and 2 American prisoners. x x x

November 25, 1899.—Voluminous correspondence between Spanish liquidation committees here and this office, on obligation United States to transport Spanish insurgent prisoners to Spain, under sixth article treaty. Until recently United States transported, but denied obligation; Spain now transporting and question of obligation to be referred to respective Governments this month. One hundred ten these prisoners have reached Manila; 80 sail to-day. Our troops have liberated some 300 recently. -------

December 8, 1899.—Hospital ship *Relief* just returned from Vigan bringing x x x 232 Spanish prisoners; reports several hundred Spanish prisoners at Vigan, for which we send transport this evening. x x x

December 11, 1899.—About 1,200 released Spanish prisoners here; steamship company contends can transport only on account of United States, as no contract with Spain; think sixth article treaty does not obligate United States to transport these prisoners, but we can send out the 1,200 by 16th instant if desired, as Spanish mail steamer here; ask instructions.

December 12, 1899. — Two thousand additional Spanish prisoners secured in northern Luzon, making over 3,000 released within month; 700 now en route from Vigan and transports will be sent for remainder.

December 14, 1899. — x x x Eighteen hundred Spanish prisoners received in Manila; over 2,000 more en route; 1,300 shipped to Spain 16th instant; these prisoners much better physical condition than Spanish troops surrendered when Manila capitulated.

December 18, 1899. — x x x Seven hundred thirty one Spanish prisoners arrived last evening; 500 more expected to-day; 1,400 leave for Spain this afternoon.

January 15, 1900.— x x x Schwan has liberated about 200 Spanish prisoners now en route to Manila. x x x

January 17, 1900. — *Alicante,* 88 officers, 1,039 enlisted men, Spanish prisoners, sailed 13th instant; 1,500 more now here awaiting shipment; probably 700 all told will be released in south; request answer to cable asking if United States ships Spanish civil prisoners.

January 26, 1900. — Released Spanish prisoners, 74 officers, 1,000 enlisted men, 22 civilian officials, 21 wives, 35 children, furnished transportation Spain yesterday.

SD 208, I: 80-81

G. H. DEL PILAR

ANTONIO LUNA

T. MASCARDO

AGUINALDO'S LEADING GENERALS

PIO DEL PILAR

P. GARCIA

A. RICARTE

II. Proclamations Issued by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo

DECREES ISSUED UPON ARRIVAL FROM EXILE IN HONG KONG

FILIPINOS:

The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty, and therefore the friend of our people, oppressed and enslave by the tyranny and despotism of its rulers, has come to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward our inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing for ourselves our unfortunate country. In order to maintain this high estimate granted us by the generous North American nation we should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion, which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to persons or property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflicts during the period of our campaign.

I decree as follows:

ARTICLE I. The lives and property of all foreigners, Chinese being included in this denomination, shall be respected, as well as that of all Spaniards who neither directly nor indirectly contributed to carry on war against us.

ARTICLE II. Enemies who lay down their arms must also be respected in like manner.

ARTICLE III. All hospitals and ambulances must likewise be respected, as well as all persons and goods found therein, including the staff on duty, unless they manifest hostility.

ARTICLE IV. Those who disobey what is prescribed in these preceding articles shall be tried by summary process and put to death if the said disobedience has resulted in murder, robbery, or rape.

Given in Cavite, the 24th of May, 1898.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 88

My Beloved Fellow-Countrymen:

I accepted the treaty proposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno, agreeing with the Captain-General of these islands under certain conditions, and laying down arms and dismissing the forces under my immediate control, because I believed it better for the country than to carry on the insurrection for which resources were lacking, but since the failure to fulifll any of the said conditions, certain bands were dissatisfied and remained under arms, and since a period of five months has elapsed without any step toward the reforms which we demand to advance our country to the rank of a civilized nation, like our neighbor Japan, which in little more than twenty years has advanced to a satisfactory position, and demonstrated her power and vigor in the late war with China, while the Spanish Government remains powerless to contend with certain obstacles which constantly arrest the progress of our country with a deadly influence which has been a principal factor in causing the uprising of the people. Now that the great and powerful North American Nation have come to offer disinterested protection for the effort to secure the liberation of this country, I return to assume command of all the forces for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, establishing a dictatorial government which will set forth decrees under my sole responsibility, assisted by the advice of eminent persons until these islands completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention, and to elect a president and a cabinet in whose favor I will duly resign the authority.

Given in Cavite, the 24th of May, 1898.

Emilio Aguinaldo

SD 208, I: 89

Filipinos:

This dictatorial government proposes to begin within a few days our military operations, and being informed that the Spaniard intends to send us a Parliamentary commission in order to open negotiations for restoring Spanish authority, and being resolved to admit no negotiations of that sort in view of the collapse of a former treaty by default of the same Spanish Government, and noting, moreover, the presence in this place of certain persons coming in the capacity of spies for the said Spanish Government, as general in chief of this region I decree as follows:

ARTICLE I. Civilians or soldiers who enter this territory with authority to negotiate, but with out presenting themselves under a flag of truce as provided for such cases by international law, and also those lacking credentials and documents for their due recognition of character and personality, shall be considered guilty of serving as spies and put to death.

ARTICLE II. Any Filipino who undertakes the aforesaid service shall be considered as a traitor to his country, and there shall be imposed upon him the penalty of hanging by the neck in a public place for the period of two hours with a label attached bearing the statement that he is a traitor to his country.

ARTICLE III. Any soldier or civilian found within our territories seeking to pass over to the enemy bearing secrets of war plans of fortifications shall also be reckoned as a traitor and put to death.

Given in Cavite, the 24th of May, 1898.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 89

PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING THE DICTATORIAL GOVERNMENT

To the Philippine Public:

Circumstances have providentially placed me in a position for which I can not fail to recognize that I am not properly qualified; but since I can not violate the laws of Providence nor decline the obligations which honor and patriotism impose upon me, I now salute you, Oh my Beloved People.

I have proclaimed in the face of the world that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my efforts and strength, is nothing else but your independence, for I am firmly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire, and that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining our liberty, and entrance into the concert of civilized nations.

I understand, on the other hand, that the first duty of every government is to interpret faithfully popular aspirations; with this motive, although the abnormal circumstances of the war have compelled me to institute this dictatorial government which assumes full powers both civil and military, my constant desire is to surround myself with the most

distinguished persons of each province, those that by their conduct deserve the confidence of their province, to the end that, the true necessities of each being known by them, measures may be adopted to meet those necessities and apply the remedies in accordance with the desires of all.

I understand, moreover, the urgent necessity of establishing in each town a solid and robust organization, the strongest bulwark of public security and the sole means of securing that union and discipline which are indispensable for the establishment of the Republic, that is, government of the people, for the people, and warding off the international conflicts which may arise.

Following out the foregoing considerations, I decree as follows:

ARTICLE I. The inhabitants of every town where the forces of the Spanish Government still remain will decide upon the most efficacious measures to combat and destroy them, according to the resources and means at their disposal, according to prisoners of war the treatment most conformable to humanitarian sentiments and to the customs observed by civilized nations.

ART. II. As soon as the town is freed from Spanish domination the inhabitants most distinguished for high character, social position, and honorable conduct, both in the center of the community and in the suburbs, will come together in a large meeting, in which they will proceed to elect by a majority of votes the chief of the town and a headman for each suburb, considering as suburbs not only those hitherto known as such, but also the center of the community.

All those inhabitants who fulfill the conditions above named will have the right to take part in this meeting and to be elected, provided always that they are friendly to the Philippine independence and are 20 years of age.

ART. III. In this meeting shall also be elected by a majority of votes three delegates, one of police and internal order, another of justice and civil registry, and another of taxes and property.

The delegate of justice and civil registry will aid the chief in the formation of courts and in keeping of books of registry of births, deaths, and marriage contracts and of the census.

The delegate of taxes and property will aid the chief in the collection of taxes and administration of public funds, the opening of books of

registry of cattle and real property, and in all work relating to encouragement of every class of industry.

Art. IV. The chief, as president, with the headman and the above-mentioned delegates will constitute the popular assemblies, who will supervise the exact fulfillment of the laws in force and the particular interests of each town.

The headman of the center of the community will be the vice-president of the assembly and the delegate of justice its secretary.

The headmen will be delegates of the chief within their respective boundaries.

Art. V. The chiefs of each town after consulting the opinion of their respective assemblies will meet and elect by majority of votes the chief of the province and three councilors for the three branches above-mentioned.

The chief of the province as president, the chief of the town which is the capital of the province as vice-president, and the above-named councilors will constitute the provincial council, which will supervise the carrying out of the instructions of this government in the territory of the province and for the general interest of the province, and will propose for this government the measures which should be adopted for the general welfare.

Art. VI. The above-named chiefs will also elect by a majority of votes three representatives for each one of the provinces of Manila and Cavite, two for each one of the provinces classified as terminal in Spanish legislation, and one for each one of the other provinces and politico-military commands of the Philippine Archipelago.

The above-named representatives will guard the general interests of the archipelago and the particular interests of their respective provinces, and will constitute the revolutionary congress which will propose to this Government the measures concerning the preservation of internal order and external security of these islands, and will be heard by this Government on all questions of grave importance, the decision of which will admit of delay or adjournment.

Art. VII. Persons elected to any office whatsoever in the form prescribed in the preceding article can not perform the same without the previous confirmation by this Government, which will give it in accordance with the certificates of election.

Representatives will establish their identity by exhibiting the above-named certificates.

ART. VIII. The military chiefs named by this government in each province will not intervene in the government and administration of the province, but will confine themselves to requesting of the chiefs of provinces and of the towns the aid which may be necessary, both in men and resources, which are not to be refused in case of actual necessity.

Nevertheless, when the province is threatened or occupied by the enemy, in whole or in part, the military chief of highest rank therein may assume the powers of the chief of the province until the danger has disappeared.

ART. IX. The government will name for each province a commissioner especially charged with establishing therein the organization prescribed in this degree in accordance with instructions which this government will communicate to him. Those military chiefs who liberate the towns from the Spanish domination are commissioners by virtue of their office.

The above-named commissioners will preside over the first meetings held in each town and in each province.

ART. X. As soon as the organization provided in the decree has been established all previous appointments to any civil office whatsoever, no matter what their origin or source, shall be null and void, and all instructions in conflict with the foregoing are hereby annulled.

Given at Cavite, the 18th day of June, 1898.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

SD 208, I: 92-94

PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, president of the revolutionary government of the Philippines and general in chief of its army.

This government desiring to demonstrate to the Philippine people that one of its ends is to combat with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish administration, substituting for personal luxury and that pompous ostentation which have made it a mere matter of routine, cumbrous and slow in its movements, another administration more modest, simple, and prompt in performing the public service, I decree as follows:

PROCLAMATION OF THE FIRST PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, MALOLOS, JANUARY 23, 1899

CHAPTER I. — *Of the revolutionary government*

ARTICLE I. The dictatorial government will be entitled hereafter the revolutionary government, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country so that a true republic may be established.

The dictator will be entitled hereafter president of the revolutionary government.

ART. II. Four secretaryships of government are created — one of foreign affairs, navy, and commerce; another of war and public works; another of police and internal order, justice, education, and hygiene; and another of finance, agriculture, and manufacturing industry.

The government may increase this number of secretaryships when it shall find in practice that this distribution is not sufficient for the multiplied and complicated necessities of the public service.

ART. III. Each secretaryship shall aid the president in the administration of questions concerning the different branches which it comprises.

At the head of each one shall be a secretary, who shall not be responsible for the decrees of the presidency, but shall sign them with the president to give them authority.

But if it shall appear that the decree has been promulgated on the proposition of the secretary of the department, the latter shall be responsible conjointly with the president.

ART. IV. The secretaryship of foreign affairs will be divided into three bureaus — one of diplomacy, another of navy, and another of commerce.

The first bureau will study and dispose of all questions pertaining to management of diplomatic negotiations with other powers and the correspondence of the government with them; the second will study all questions relating to the formation and organization of our navy, and the fitting out of such expeditions as the necessities of the revolution may require; and the third will have charge of everything relating to the internal and external commerce and the preliminary work which may be necessary for making treaties of commerce with other nations.

ART. V. The secretaryship of war will be divided into two bureaus; one of war, properly speaking, and the other of public works.

The first bureau will be subdivided into four sections — one of campaigns, another of military justice, another of military administration, and another of military health.

The section of campaigns will have charge of the appointment and formation of the certificates of enlistment and service of all who serve in the revolutionary militia; of the direction of campaigns; the preparation of plans, works of fortification, and preparing reports of battles; of the study of military tactics for the army and the organization of the general staff, artillery, and cavalry; and, finally, of the determination of all the other questions concerning the business of campaigns and military operations.

The section of military justice will have charge of everything relating to courts of war and military tribunals, the appointment of judges and counsel, and the determination of all questions of military justice. The section of military administration will be charged with the furnishing of food and other supplies necessary for the use of the army, and the section of military health will have charge of everything relating to the hygiene and healthfulness of the militia.

ART. VI. The other secretaryships will be divided into such bureaus as their branches may require, and each bureau will be subdivided into sections according to the nature and importance of the work it has to do.

ART. VII. The secretary will inspect and supervise all the work of his secretaryship and will determine all questions with the president of the government.

At the head of each bureau will be a director, and in each section an officer provided with such number of assistants and clerks as may be specified.

ART. VIII. The president will appoint the secretaries of his own free choice, and in concert with them will appoint all the subordinate officials of each secretaryship.

In order that in the choice of persons it may be possible to avoid favoritism it must be fully understood that the good name of the country and the triumph of the revolution required the services of persons truly capable.

Art. IX. The secretaries may be present at the revolutionary congress, in order that they may make any motion in the name of the president or may be interpolated publicly by any one of the repretatives; but when the question which is the object of the motion shall be put to vote, or after the interpolation is ended, they shall leave and shall not take part in the vote.

Art. X. The president of the government is the personification of the Philippine people, and in accordance with this idea it shall not be possible to hold him responsible while he fills the office.

His term of office shall last until the revolution triumphs, unless under extraordinary circumstances he shall feel obliged to offer his resignation to congress, in which case congress will elect whomsoever it considers most fit.

Chapter II. — *Of the revolutionary congress*

Art. XI. The revolutionary congress is the body of representatives of the province of the Philippine Archipelago elected in the manner prescribed in the decrees of the 18th of the present month.

Nevertheless, if any province shall not be able as yet to elect representatives, because the greater part of its towns shall have not yet been able to liberate themselves from Spanish domination, the government shall have power to appoint as provisional representatives for this province those persons who are most distinguished for high character and social position in such numbers as are prescribed by the above-named decree, provided always that they are natives of the province which they represent or have resided therein for a long time.

Art. XII. The representatives having met at the town which is the seat of the revolutionary government, and in the building which may be designated, will proceed to its preliminary labors, designating by plurality of votes a commission composed of five individuals charged with examining documents accrediting each representative, and another commission composed of three individuals, who will examine the documents which the five of the former commission exhibit.

Art. XIII. On the following day the above-named representatives will meet again, and the two commissions will read their respective reports concerning the legality of the said documents, deciding by an absolute majority of votes on the character of those which appear doubtful.

This business completed, it will proceed to designate, also by absolute majority, a president, a vice-president, and two secretaries, who shall be chosen from among the representatives, whereupon the congress shall be considered organized and shall notify the government of the result of the election.

ART. XIV. The place where congress deliberates is sacred and inviolable, and no armed force shall enter therein unless the president thereof shall ask therefor in order to establish internal order disturbed by those who can neither honor themselves nor its august functions.

ART. XV. The powers of congress are: To watch over the general interest of the Philippine people and the carrying out of the revolutionary laws; to discuss and vote upon said laws; to discuss and approve prior to their ratification treaties and loans; to examine and approve the accounts presented annually by the secretary of finance as well as extraordinary and other taxes which may hereafter be imposed.

ART. XVI. Congress shall also be consulted in grave and important questions the determination of which admit of delay or adjournment; but the president of the government shall have power to decide questions of urgent character, but in that case he shall give account by message to said body of the decision which he has adopted.

ART. XVII. Every representative shall have power to present to congress any project or a law, and every secretary on the order of the president of the government shall have similar power.

ART. XVIII. The sessions of congress shall be public, and only in cases which require reserve shall it have power to hold a secret session.

ART. XIX. In the order of its deliberations as well as in the internal government of the body congress itself shall be observed.

The president shall direct the deliberations and shall not vote except in case of a tie, when he shall have the casting vote.

ART. XX. The president of the government shall not have power to interrupt in any manner the meetings of congress nor embarrass its sessions.

ART. XXI. The congress shall designate a permanent commission of justice, which shall be presided over by the auxiliary vice-president or each of the secretaries, and shall be composed of those persons and seven members elected by plurality of votes from among the representatives.

This commission shall judge on appeal the criminal cases tried by the provincial courts, and shall take cognizance of and have original jurisdiction in all cases against the secretaries of the government, the chiefs of provinces and towns, and the provincial judges.

ART. XXII. In the office of the secretary of congress shall be kept a book of honor, wherein shall be recorded special services rendered the country and considered as such by said body. Every Filipino, whether in the military or civil service, may petition congress for notation in said book, presenting duly accredited documents describing the service rendered by him on behalf of the country since the beginning of the present revolution. For extraordinary services which may be rendered hereafter the government will propose said notation, accompaying the proposal with the necessary documents justifying it.

ART. XXIII. The congress will also grant on the proposal of the government rewards in money, which can be given only once, to the families of those who were victims of their duty and patriotism as a result of extraordinary acts of heroism.

ART. XXIV. The acts of congress shall not take effect until the president of the government orders their fulfillment and execution. Whenever the said president shall be of the opinion that any act is unsuitable or against public policy or pernicious, he shall explain to congress the reasons against its execution, and if the latter shall insist on its passage the president shall have power to oppose his veto under his most rigid responsibility.

CHAPTER III. — *Of military courts and justice*

ART. XXV. When the chiefs of military detachments have notice that any soldier has committed or has perpetrated any act of those commonly considered as military crimes, he shall bring it to the knowledge of the commandant of the Zone, who shall appoint a judge and a secretary who shall begin suit in the form prescribed in the instructions dated the 20th of the present month. If the accused shall be of the grade of lieutenant or higher, the said commandant shall himself be the judge, and if the latter shall be the accused the senior commandant of the Province shall name as judge an officer who holds a higher grade, unless the same senior commandant shall himself have brought the suit. The judge shall always belong to the class of chiefs.

ART. XXVI. On the conclusion of the preliminary hearing the senior commandant shall designate three officers of equal or higher

rank to the judge, and the military court shall consist of the said officers, the judge, the councilor, and the president. The latter shall be the commandant of the zone if the accused be of the grade of lieutenant or higher. This court shall conduct the trial in the form customary in the provincial courts, but the judgment shall be appealable to the higher courts of war.

ART. XXVII. The superior court shall be composed of six members, who shall hold rank not less than brigadier-generals, and the judge-advocate. If the number of generals present in the capital of the revolutionary government shall not be sufficient, the deficiency shall be supplied by representatives designated and commissioned by congress. The president of the court shall be the general having the highest rank of all, and should there be more than one having equal rank the president shall be elected from among them by absolute majority of votes.

ART. XXVIII. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting the higher commandants of zones and all officers of the rank of major and higher.

ART. XXIX. Commit military crimes: First, those who fail to grant the necessary protection to foreigners, both in their persons and property, and those who similarly fail to afford protection to hospital and ambulances, including persons and effects which may be found in possession of one or the other, and those engaged in the service of the same, provided always they commit no hostile act; second, those who fail in the respect due to the lives, money, and jewels of enemies who lay down their arms, and of prisoners of war; third, Filipinos who place themselves in the service of the enemy, acting as spies or disclosing to them secrets of war and the plans of the revolutionary positions and fortifications, and those who present themselves under a flag of truce without justifying properly their office and their personality; and fourth, those who fail to recognize a flag of truce duly accredited in the form prescribed by international law.

Will commit also military crimes: Those who conspire against the unity of the revolutionists, provoking rivalry between chiefs, and forming divisions and armed bands, second these who solicit contributions without authority of the government and misappropriate the public funds; third, those who desert to the enemy, or are guilty of cowardice in the presence of the enemy, being armed; and fourth, those who seize the property of any person who has done no harm to the revolution, violate

women, and assassinate or inflict serious wounds on unarmed persons, and who commit robberies and arson.

ART. XXX. Those who commit the crimes enumerated will be considered as declared enemies of the revolution, and will incur the penalties prescribed in the Spanish Penal Code, and in the highest grade.

If the crime shall not be found in the said code, the offender shall be imprisoned until the revolution triumphs, unless the result of this shall be an irreparable damage which, in the judgment of the tribunal, shall be a sufficient cause for imposing the penalty of death.

ADDITIONAL CLAUSES

The government will establish abroad a revolutionary committee composed of a number, not yet determined, of persons most competent in the Philippine Archipelago. This committee will be divided into three delegations: One of diplomacy, another of the navy, and another of the army.

The delegation of diplomacy will arrange and conduct negotiations with foreign cabinets with a view to the recognition of the belligerency and independence of the Philippines.

The delegation of the navy will be charged with the studying and organizing of the Philippine navy and preparing the expenditures which the necessities of the revolution may require.

The delegation of the army will study military tactics and the best form of organization for the general staff, artillery, and engineers, and whatever else may be necessary in order to fit out the Philippine army under the conditions required by modern progress.

ART. XXXII. The government will issue the necessary instructions for the proper execution of the present decree.

ART. XXXIII. All the decrees of the dictatorial government in conflict with the foregoing are hereby annulled.

Given at Cavite the 23rd of June, 1898.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 95-99

MESSAGE TO FOREIGN POWER

If it is true — and it is true — that a political revolution, well conceived, is the violent means which a people employs in order to recover the sovereignty which naturally belongs to it and which has been usurped and trampled upon by a tyrannical and arbitrary government, then the Philippine revolution could not have been more just, for the people have had recourse to it after exhausting all peaceful means counseled by reason and experience.

The former Kings of Castile bound themselves to regard the Philippines as a sister nation, associated with Spain in perfect unison of views and interests, and by the constitution of 1812, promulgated at Cadiz on the occasion of the war of Spanish independence, these islands were represented in the Spanish Cortes; but the interests of the monastic corporations, which have always met with unconditional support from the Spanish Government, have taken from them this sacred duty, and the Philippines have been excluded from the Spanish constitution and the people left to the mercy of the discretionary and arbitrary powers of the general government.

Under such circumstances the people clamored for justice, and asked of the mother country the recognition and restitution of their secular rights by means of reforms which would gradually assimilate them with Spain. But their voices were promptly drowned and the reward of their abnegation was exile, martyrdom, and death. The religious corporations, with whose interests — always opposed to those of the Philippine people — the Spanish Government has identified itself, jeered at these claims and answered, with the knowledge and consent of that same Government, that the liberty of Spain had cost blood.

What other recourse was there left to the people to recover their lost rights? They had no other means but force, and, covninced of this, they have had recourse to the revolution.

And now they no longer limit their claims to the assimilation with the political constitution of Spain, but ask for definite separation from her; they are fighting for their independence, firmly convinced that the time has come when they can and must govern themselves.

So they have constituted a revolutionary government, based upon wise and just laws, adapted to the abnormal conditions through which they are passing, and at the same time preparing them to become a true republic. Taking reason as the only guide for their actions, justice as

the only end, and honorable work as the only means, they call upon on all their Philippine sons, without distinction of class, to unite firmly together for the purpose of forming a society of nobility, not nobility of birth or pompous titles, but of work and personal merit of each one—a free society where there shall be no egotism and personal politics that crush and annihilate, no envy and favoritism that debase, no bragging and charlatanry that make ridiculous.

And it could not be otherwise; a people which has given proofs of valor and long suffering in time of trouble and danger, and of industry and diligence in time of peace, is not intended for slavery; such a people is called to be great, to be one of the strongest arms of Providence to direct the destinies of humanity; such a people has sufficient resources and energy to free itself from the ruin and annihilation into which the Spanish Government has plunged it, and to claim a modest but honorable seat in the concert of free nations.

Given at Cavite, June 23, 1898.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208. I: 94-95

MESSAGE REQUESTING SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN POWERS

To Foreign Governments:

The revolutionary government of the Philippines on its establishment explained through the message dated the 23rd of June last the true causes of the Philippine revolution, showing according to the evidence that this popular movement is the result of the laws which regulate the life of a people which aspire to progress and to perfection by the sole road of liberty.

The said revolution now rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Union, Infanta, and Zambales, and it hold besieged the capital of Manila.

In these provinces complete order and perfect tranquility reign, administered by the authorities elected by the provinces in accordance with the organic decrees dated 18th and 23d of June last.

The revolution holds moreover about 9,000 prisoners of war, who are treated in accordance with the customs of war between civilized

nations and humane sentiments, and at the end of the war it has more than 30,000 combatants organized in the form of a regular army.

In this situation the chiefs of the towns comprised in the above-mentioned provinces, interpreting the sentiments which animate those who have elected them, have proclaimed the independence of the Philippines, petitioning the revolutionary government that it will entreat and obtain from foreign governments recognition of its belligerency and its independence in the firm belief that the Philippine people have already arrived at that state in which they can and ought to govern themselves.

This is set forth in the accompanying documents subscribed by the above-named chiefs.

Wherefore the undersigned, by virtue of the powers which belong to him as president of the revolutionary government of the Philippines and in the name and representation of the Philippine people, asks the support of all the powers of the civilized world and earnestly entreats them to proceed to the formal recognition of the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Philippines, since they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the equilibrium between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong, to the end that by these means shall shine forth and be realized the most complete justice in the indefinite progress of humanity.

Given at Bacoor, in the province of Cavite, the 6th day of August, 1898.

The president of the revolutionary government.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

SD 208, I: 99

STATEMENT OF CHIEFS OF TOWNS REQUESTING RECOGNITION OF GEN. EMILIO AGUINALDO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

The undersigned chiefs of towns comprising the provinces hereinafter named, elected as such in the manner prescribed by the decree of the 18th and the instructions dated the 20th of June last, after having been confirmed in their respective offices by the president of the government and having taken the prescribed oath before him, have met in full assembly previously called for that purpose, for the purpose of discussing the solemn proclamation of Philippine independence.

The discussion took place with the prudence and at the length which so important a question demands, and after suitable deliberation the following declarations were unanimously adopted.

The Philippine revolution records, on the one hand, brilliant feats of arms, realized with singular courage by an improvised army almost without arms, and, on the other, the no less notable fact that the people after the combat have not entered upon great execesses nor pursued the enemy further, but have treated him on the contrary with generosity and humanity, returning at once to their ordinary and tranquil life.

Such deeds demonstrate in an indisputable manner that the Philippine people was not created, as all believed, for the sole purpose of dragging the chains of servitude, but that it has a perfect idea of order and justice, shuns a savage life, and loves a civilized life.

But what is most surprising in this people is that it goes on giving proofs that it knows how to frame laws commensurate with the progress of the age, to respect them and obey them, demonstrating that its national customs are not repugnant to this progress; that it is not ambitious for power, nor honors, nor riches, aside from the rational and just aspirations for a free and independent life and inspired by the most lofty idea of patriotism and national honor; and that in the service of this idea and for the realization of that aspiration it has not hesitated in the sacrifice of life and fortune.

These admirable — and more than admirable, these wonderful — deeds necessarily engender the most firm and ineradicable convictions of the necessity of leaving the Philippines free and independent, not only because they desire it, but because they are prepared to defend to the death their future and their history.

Filipinos are fully convinced that if individuals have need of material, moral, and intellectual perfection in order to contribute to the welfare of their fellows, peoples require to have fullness of life; they need liberty and independence in order to contribute to the indefinite progress of mankind. It has struggled and will struggle with decision and constance, without ever turning back or retrograding before the obstacles which may arise in its path, and with unshakable faith that it will obtain justice and fulfill the laws of Providence.

And neither will it be turned aside from the course it has hitherto followed by the unjustifiable imprisonment, tortures, assassinations, and the other vandal acts committed by the Spaniards against the persons of peaceful and defenseless Filipinos. The Spaniards believe themselves

released from every legal obligation toward the Filipinos for the sole reason that the belligerency of the revolution has not been recognized, taking no account of the fact that over and above every law, whether written or prescriptive, are placed with imprescriptible character culture, national honor, and humanity. No, the Filipinos have no need ever to make use of reprisals, because they seek independence with culture, liberty with unconditional respect for the law as the organ of justice, and a name purified in the crucible of human sentiment.

In virtue of the foregoing considerations the undersigned, giving voice to the unanimous aspiration of the people whom they represent and performing the offices received from them and the duties pertaining to the powers with which they are invested—

Proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence of the Philippines;

Recognize and respect Señor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as president of the revolutionary government organized in the manner prescribed by decree of the 23d and instructions of the 27th of June last, and beg the said president that he will ask and obtain from foreign governments the recognition of its belligerency and independence, not only because this act constitutes a duty of justice, but also because to no one is permitted to contravene natural laws nor stifle the legitimate aspiration of a people for its amelioration and dignification.

Given in the province of Cavite the 1st day of August of the year of our Lord 1898, and the first year of the Philippine independence.

Follow the signatures of the local presidents of the provinces, of Cavite and many others.

x x x x x x

The undersigned, secretary of the interior, certifies that the present document is a literal copy of the original, which is deposited in the secretaryship under his charge, in proof of which he signs it with the approval of the president of the revolutionary government in Bacoor the 6th day of August, 1898.

V. B.

El Presidente del G. R.,
EMILIO AGUINALDO

El Secretario del Interior,
LEANDRO IBARRA

SD 208. I: 100-101

FIRST PROCLAMATION, WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN, PROTESTING PROCLAMATION ISSUED JANUARY 4, 1898 BY THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINES

The government of the Philippines has considered in its duty to set forth to the civilized powers the facts determining the rupture of its amicable relations with the Army of the United States of America in these islands, to the end that they may thereby reach the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything possible to avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.

After the naval combat, which occurred on May 1 of last year, between the Spanish squadron and that of America, the commander of the latter consented to my return from Hongkong to this beloved soil, and he distributed among the Filipinos some rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of reestablishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention of Biacnabato, in order to have the Filipinos on his side.

The people, influenced by the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, understood the necessity of fighting for its liberty, feeling sure that Spain would be destroyed and rendered incapable of leading it along the road to prosperity and progress. The Filipinos hailed my advent with joy, and I had the honor of being proclaimed leader on account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolution. Then all the Filipinos, without distinction of classes, took arms and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of Mindanao.

Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage and which had saved them much blood and great hardships, and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery; which posed as the champion liberator of

oppressed peoples. We felt ourselves under the safeguard of the faith of a free people.

The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Parañaque and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops as far as Maytubig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my people by the employment of astuteness not unaccompanied by violence. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified, my forces reaching as far as the suburbs of Malate, Hermita, Paco, Sampaloc, and Tondo.

Notwithstanding these services and although the Spaniards would not have surrendered but for the fact that my troops had closed every avenue of escape to the towns of the interior, the American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

I represented to the American generals the injustice done me and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my cooperation, but they utterly declined to do so. Nevertheless, being always desirous of showing friendliness and good feeling toward those who called themselves liberators of the Philippine people, I ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Hermita, Malate, Sampaloc, and Tondo, retaining only a portion of the suburbs of Paco.

In spite of these concessions not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent. Almost at the same time I received a letter from General Otis, commander of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond the lines marked on a map which he also sent me, and which showed within the lines the town of Pandacan and the hamlet of Singalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area of Manila and its suburbs.

In view of this unjustifiable attitude of both American leaders, I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I named commissioners, who placed themselves in communication with these Americans. Although Admiral Dewey received in an insolent manner and with aggressive

phrases my commissioners, whom he did not permit to speak, I yielded to the friendly suggestions of General Otis, withdrawing my forces to the desired line for the purpose of avoiding contact with his troops. This gave rise to many misunderstanding, but I hoped that once the Paris Conference was at an end, my people would obtain the independence promised them by the consul-general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly assured and proclaimed in manifestos and speeches would be established by the American generals who have reached these shores.

But it did not turn out thus. The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is that, with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government.

Such procedures, so foreign to the dictates of culture and the usages observed by civilized nations, give me the right to act without observing the usual rules of intercourse. Nevertheless, in order to be correct to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners charged to solicit him to desist from his rash enterprise; but they were not listened to.

My government can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of humankind.

Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

MALOLOS, *January 5, 1899*

SD 208, I: 101-103

SECOND PROCLAMATION, THE ONE ISSUED AND PUBLICLY POSTED

Proclamation from the president of the revolutionary government to my brothers, the Filipinos, all the honorable consuls, and other foreigners

Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis's proclamation published yesterday in the Manila papers obliges me to circulate the present one, in order that

all who read and understand it may know of my most solemn protest against said proclamation, for I am moved by my duty and my conscience before God, by my political obligations with my beloved people, by my official and private relations to the North American nations.

In the above-mentioned proclamation General Otis calls himself "Military governor in the Philippines," and I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy in my soul, against such an authority.

I solemnly proclaim that I have never had, either at Singapore or at Hongkong or here in the Philippines, any verbal or written contract for the recognition of American sovereignty over this cherished soil.

On the contrary, I say that I returned to these islands, conveyed by an American man-of-war, on the 19th of May of last year, with the firm and clear purpose of fighting the Spaniards in order to reconquer our liberty and independence, and so I expressed myself in the declaration made on the 24th of said month of May. Thus I published it in a proclamation directed to the Philippine people on the 12th of last June, when in my natal town, Kawit, I for the first time unfurled our sacred national flag, as a holy emblem of that sublime aspiration; and, lastly, the American general, Merritt, predecessor of Mr. E. S. Otis, has confirmed that same thing in a proclamation addressed to the Philippine people days before the surrender of the town of Manila was proposed to General Jaudenes, which proclamation clearly and decisively stated that the land and naval forces of the United States came to give us our freedom and to displace the bad Spanish Government.

In a word, our countrymen and foreigners are witnesses that the land and naval forces of the United States existing here have recognized by act the belligerency of the Philippines, not only respecting but also doing public honor to the Filipino banner, which triumphantly traversed our seas in view of foreign nations represented here by their respective consuls.

As in his proclamation General Otis alludes to some instruction issued by His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippines, I solemnly protest in the name of God, root and source of all justice and all right, who has visibly acceded me the power to direct my dear brethren in the difficult task of our regeneration, against this intrusion of the United States Government in the administration of these islands.

El Heraldo de la Revolución

SUSCRIPCION

Suscripción mensual . . . [illegible]
Número suelto . . . [illegible]
Anuncios, esquelas mortuorias y remitidos.

Precios convencionales

REVISTA BI-SEMANAL BILINGUE
DIRECCION Y ADMINISTRACION
Casa del Sr. Gregorio Ramos
MALOLOS

PAGPAPASULAT

Bauat isang buan . . . 2 pesos.
Bauat isang papel . . . sicolo.

Ang mga anuncio, ang halagang pagcasunduan.

Año 1. | Malolos 29 de Septiembre de 1898 | Núm. 1.

AVISO IMPORTANTE

El Gobierno Revolucionario se ha servido disponer, en decreto de fecha 4 de Julio de 1898, que los Decretos, Ordenes, bandos y demás disposiciones oficiales que se publiquen en este periódico tengan carácter obligatorio.

MAHALAGANG PAUNAUA

Ayon sa decreto ó cautusan ng Gobierno Revolucionario, nang icaapat ng Julio, ang lahat na Decreto, Ordenes at iba pang cautusan na masusulat sa papel ó periodicong ito, ay dapat sundin at tupdin nang lahat.

EL HERALDO DE LA REVOLUCION

Hay cosas que se definen por su mismo nombre, y tal sucede á EL HERALDO DE LA REVOLUCIÓN. Pero su objeto no es tan solo formar ciudadanos enérgicos y decididos y prontos siempre á obedecer los mandatos del Jefe Supremo de nuestra naciente República; misión suya es también hacer que la hermosa luz de la libertad irradie hasta la cabaña del humilde labrador y que el espíritu de independencia sea el medio ambiente que todos respiremos, para que, penetrados de una misma idea y animados de un mismo pensamiento, trabajemos solidariamente en pró de nuestra querida Patria Filipinas, de esta tierra privilegiada, encanto del extremo Oriente jardin de la Malasia, adorada de propios y codiciada de extraños.

La Revolución, como todos saben, es el medio violento, sí, pero necesario, á que el País ha recurrido para revindicar sus derechos conculcados por el mal Gobierno español, su fin es la libertad é independencia de nuestra Patria, tanto tiempo ultrajada por opresora dominación; y las causas que la han producido, aunque varias y múltiples, reducidas á su más sencilla expresión son las siguientes: 1.ª el despotismo de los frailes, 2.ª el orgullo de raza de los españoles, 3.ª la tiranía de su política y 4.ª su viciosa administración colonial.

La existencia de estas causas no necesita demostración; porque los hechos que las acusan son tan recientes y tan evidentes, que no

ANG HERALDO NG REVOLUCION

May mğa bagay na ang malinao niyang casaysayan ay ang caniya ring sariling pangalan: isa nğa rito'y ang HERALDO NANG REVOLUCIÓN. Datapua't ang tungo niya'y di lamang magpalitao ng taong matatapang at laguing nacahandang sumunod sa cautusan nğ Pangulong Puno nğ ating bagong sipót na República; cundi naman pasapitin ang masanghayang liuanag ng Kalayaan hanggang sa damping tahanan ng abang magsasacá at tayong lahat ay sumamyó ng casaysayang simoy ng inihahandog ng natimauang bayan, upang ding cung magcaisa ang tungo at pacay ng lahat, ay magcatulong ng pagpapala sa guiliu nating Inang Filipinas, nğ lupang itong puspos nğ biyaya, ligaya nğ Silanganan, jardin nğ Malasia, minumutyá ng tagarito, at pinacananais nğ taga ibang lupá.

Tahó nğ lahat, na ang Panghihimagsic, ay siya ang marahás na paraang quinailangang gamitin ng bayan sa pagbaui nğ caniyang carangalang niyuracan ng maraual na Gobiernong castila; ang pacay niya'y ang Kalayaan ng ating Inang bayan, na mahabang panahong pinaslang nğ mapang-inis na pamamahalá; at ang mğa dahilang pinagbuhatan, baga man madla at iba't iba, sa catagang sabi 1.a ang malang tulong panğinis ng fraile, 2.a ang calalaboong cabambugan nğ castila; 3.a ang cabangisan ng caniyang politica, at 4.a ang maraming pamamahalá niya sa lupang nasasacop.

HERALDO DE LA REVOLUCION
Organ of the Philippine Revolution

In the same manner I protest in the name of the Filipino people against the referred to intrusion. For when they gave me their votes in confidence, electing me, although unworthy to be so, president of the nation, they imposed upon me the duty of sustaining unto death its liberty and independence.

And, in conclusion, I protest against such an unexpected act which treats of American sovereignty in these islands in the face of all the antecedents that I have in my possession referring to my relations with the American authorities, which are unequivocal testimony that the United States did not take me out of Hongkong to make war against Spain for their own benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty and independence, to which end said authorities verbally promised me their active support and efficacious cooperation.

So that you all may understand it, my beloved brothers, it is the principle of liberty and absolute independence that has been our noble ambition for the purpose of obtaining the desired object, with a force given by the conviction, now very widespread, not to retrace the path of glory that we have passed over.

EMILIO AGUINALDO

MALOLOS, *January 5, 1899*

SD 208, I: 103-104

PROCLAMATION DECLARING OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WITH AMERICAN FORCES OF OCCUPATION IN MANILA

GENERAL ORDER TO THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

Nine o'clock p.m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who, in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifest of January 8 last; such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences, and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation intrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions—

I order and command:

1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war.

Given at Malolos February 4, 1899.

EMILIO AGUINALDO
General in Chief

SD 208, I: 104-105

MESSAGE ENJOINING THE FILIPINO PEOPLE TO RALLY TO THE CAUSE OF THE WAR

To the Philippine People:

By my proclamation of yesterday I have published the outbreak of hostilities between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation in Manila, unjustly and unexpectedly provoked by the latter.

In my manifest of January 8 last I published the grievances suffered by the Philippine forces at the hands of the army of occupation. The constant outrages and taunts, which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and, finally, the useless conferences and the contempt shown the Philippine government prove the premeditated transgression of justice and liberty.

I know that war has always produced great losses; I know that the Philippine people have not yet recovered from past losses and are not in the condition to endure others. But I also know by experience how bitter is slavery, and by experience I know that we should sacrifice all on the altar of our honor and of the national integrity so unjustly attacked.

I have ried to avoid, as far as it has been possible for me to do so, armed conflict, in my endeavors to assure our independence by pacific means and to avoid more costly sacrifices. But all my efforts have been useless against the measureless pride of the American Government and of its representatives in these islands, who have treated me as a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country and do not make myself an instrument of their dastardly intentions.

Past campaigns will have convinced you that the people are strong when they wish to be so. Without arms we have driven from our beloved country our ancient masters, and without arms we can repulse the foreign invasion as long as we wish to do so. Providence always has means in reserve and prompt help for the weak in order that they may not be annihilated by the strong; that justice may be done and humanity progress.

Be not discouraged. Our independence has been watered by the generous blood of our martyrs. Blood which may be shed in the future will strengthen it. Nature has never despised generous sacrifices.

But remember that in order that our efforts may not be wasted, that our vows may be listened to, that our ends may be gained, it is indispensable that we adjust our actions to the rules of law and of right, learning to triumph over our enemies and to conquer our own evil passions.

EMILIO AGUINALDO
President of the Philippine Republic

MALOLOS, *February 5, 1899*

SD 208, I: 105-106

MANIFESTO RECOMMENDING PEACE

To the Filipino People:

I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who

have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has but recently come to my knowledge, suggest to me with irresistable force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.

The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along this path impeded by an irresistible force — a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen who are already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust, in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.

The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish can not be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.

So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I can not refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.

By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do, without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be thine!

EMILIO AGUINALDO

MANILA, *April 19, 1901*

WD, 190, I: 100-101

Highlights of General Emilio Aguinaldo

1869, March 22 — Emilio Aguinaldo is born in Kawit (then Cavite Viejo) to Carlos Aguinaldo and Trinidad Famy.

1886 —He is chosen cabeza de barangay of Kawit, serving as such for 8 years.

1895, January 1 — He takes oath as Capitan Municipal of Kawit; in the evening, he is initiated as Mason in Imus, Cavite.

1895, March — He joins the Katipunan in Manila.

1896, January 1 —Aguinaldo marries Hilaria del Rosario of Imus, Cavite

1896, August 31 — He starts the uprising in Kawit with the help of Candido Tria Tirona.

1896, September 3 — He scores his big triumph against the Spanish forces in the battle of Imus during which General Aguirre, in retreating, lost his Toledo sword to Aguinaldo.

1896, October 31 — Aguinaldo issues his first two manifestoes urging the Filipino people to rally to the cause of the Revolution.

1897, February 17 — Aguinaldo repulses the Spanish forces under Gen. Polavieja in the Battle of Zapote Bridge in which Gen. Edilberto Evangelista perished.

1897, March 22 — He is elected in absentia as President of the Revolutionary Government at the Tejeros Convention.

1897, March 23 — In the evening of this date, in the church convent of Sta. Cruz de Malabon (now Tanza), he is sworn in as President of the Revolutionary Government.

1897, November 2 — He is chosen President of the Biak-na-bato Republic.

1897, December 14 — He signs the Pact of Biak-na-bato for the cessation of hostilities against Spain.

1897, December 27 — Under the terms of the Pact, Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders leave the port of Sual, Pangasinan, aboard the *Uranus* for Hong Kong.

1897, December 29 — Aguinaldo and his party reach Hong Kong and receive ₱400,000 from the Spanish Government as first installment of the indemnity to be paid them.

1898, April 7 — He goes to Singapore to avoid the lawsuit initiated by Isabelo Artacho claiming his part of the said indemnity.

1898, April 22 — He is interviewed by Consul E. Spencer Pratt of Singapore regarding Filipino-American collaboration against Spain.

1898, May 19 — He returns with other revolutionists to the Philippines and meets Commodore George Dewey for the first time.

1898, May 24 — He sets up a Revolutionary Government, dictatorial in form, with him as Dictator.

1898, June 23 — His title as "Dictator" is changed to "President of the Revolutionary Government.

1898, July 15 — He forms his first Cabinet consisting of Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary of war and public works; Leandro Ibarra, secretary of the interior; and Mariano Trias, secretary of finance.

1898, September 9 — Aguinaldo moves his government from Bacoor, Cavite, to Malolos, Bulacan.

1899, January 2 — He appoints Apolinario Mabini, president of his Cabinet and secretary of foreign affairs.

1899, January 21 — He promulgates the Malolos Constitution, approved by the Revolutionary Congress.

1899, January 23 — He takes oath as President of the Philippine Republic under the Malolos Constitution.

1899, February 5 — He declares open hostilities against the American army of occupation in the Philippines.

1899, March 29 — He moves once more his government to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.

1899, May 7 — He directs Pedro A. Paterno to form a new Cabinet replacing Mabini's.

1899, November 12 — Aguinaldo disbands the regular army and orders guerrilla warfare against the American army.

1900, September 6 — He and party arrive at Palanan, Isabela, to serve as his place of refuge to avoid capture by the enemy.

1901, March 23 — By means of a clever ruse, he is captured by Colonel Funston with the connivance of native Macabebe soldiers in the service of the U.S. Army.

1901, April 1 — He takes his oath of allegiance to the United States of America.

1915, -- He is elected head of the Asociacion de los Veteranos de la Revolucion.

1920, March 24 -- The Philippine Legislature passes Act No. 2922, granting Gen. Aguinaldo an annual life pension of P12,000.

1921, March 6 -- Hilaria del Rosariom his first wife, dies.

1930, July 14 -- He marries as his second wife Maria Agoncillo of Taal, Batangas.

1942, January 23 --- Gen. Aguinaldo is appointed member of the Provisional Council of State under the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

1943, June 20 -- He is appointed member of the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence.

1943, October 18 — He is appointed member of the Council of State of the Republic of the Philippines established during the Second World War.

1948 —He is again appointed member of the Council of State by then President Elpidio Quirino.

1953, June 12 — He is conferred the degree of Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa,* by the University of the Philippines.

1963, May 29 — His second wife, Doña Maria Agoncillo, dies.

1963, June 12 — Gen. Aguinaldo turns over to President Macapagal the documents donating his Kawit mansion to the Philippine Government.

1964, February 6 — General Aguinaldo dies at the Veterans Hospital, Quezon City, at the age of 95.

1964, February 16 — He is buried behind his house in Kawit, Cavite.

1965, June 19 — The town of Bailen, Cavite, is changed to Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo by R. A. No. 4346.

1967, October 23 — President Marcos issues E. O. No. 92, creating the Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo National Centennial Commission.

1969, March 19 to 21 — The Commission holds a convention to commemorate the centenary of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo.

1969, March 22 — The First Centenary of the Birth of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo is observed under the auspices of the Commission.

THE GEN. EMILIO AGUINALDO CONVENTION
March 19-21, 1969

First Day, Wednesday, March Nineteen

Registration/Social

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM BUILDING, QUEZON CITY

8:00 a.m.

OPENING CEREMONIES

PAMBANSANG AWIT —
The Philippine Army Band

INVOCATION —
The Most Reverend Vicente Reyes

OVERTURE —
The Philippine Army Band

OPENING REMARKS AND PRESENTATION OF THE GUEST SPEAKER —
The Hon. Ernesto S. Mata, Secretary of National Defense, and Chairman, General Emilio Aguinaldo National Centennial Commission

ADDRESS BY THE GUEST SPEAKER —
His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos

RECESSIONAL —
The Philippine Army Band

Master of Ceremonies — Col. Leonardo T. Miciano

FIRST OPEN SESSION

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM BUILDING, QUEZON CITY

2:00 p.m.

OPENING REMARKS —
Prof. Esteban A. de Ocampo, President, Philippine Historical Association

EMILIO AGUINALDO; A SKETCH —
Dr. Pedro A. Gagelonia

AGUINALDO'S PLACE IN PHILIPPINE HISTORY —
Prof. Leopoldo Y. Yabes

MARCH 22 IN THE LIFE OF EMILIO AGUINALDO —
Mr. Carlos Quirino

Open Forum

Moderator —
Mrs. Gloria M. Santos
Resource Persons —
Prof. Gregorio C. Borlaza
Prof. Celedonio A. Ancheta
Interrogators/Discussants —
Dr. Antonio Molina
Dr. Eufronio M. Alip
Dr. Domingo Abella
Mr. Emilio P. Virata

First Day, Wednesday, March Nineteen

A cultural program will be presented under the auspices of the Board of Travel and Tourist Industries — Commissioner Jose S. Clemente, In-charge

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Second Day, Thursday, March Twenty

SECOND OPEN SESSION

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM BUILDING, QUEZON CITY

9:00 a.m.

THE CRISES IN THE CAREER OF EMILIO AGUINALDO
Prof. Teodoro A. Agoncillo

THE EDUCATIONAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS OBTAINING DURING THE REGIME OF EMILIO AGUINALDO AS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC —
Prof. Esteban A. de Ocampo

Open Forum

Moderator —
Prof. Celedonio O. Resurreccion
Resource Persons —
Very Rev. Horacio de la Costa, S.J.
Prof. Isabelo Tupaz
Mr. Carlos Quirino
Interrogators/Discussants —
Dr. Mercedes Grau Sta. Maria
Prof. Ricardo A. Arcilla
Dr. Juan R. Francisco

THIRD OPEN SESSION

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM BUILDING, QUEZON CITY

2:30 p.m.

THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT AGUINALDO IN CONTEMPORARY SETTING —

Dr. Eufronio M. Alip

HIGHLIGHTS IN THE LIFE OF EMILIO AGUINALDO —

Prof. Gabriel F. Fabella

AGUINALDO AS MILITARY LEADER —

Col. Uldarico Baclagon

Open Forum

Moderator —

Mrs. Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil

Resource Persons —

Prof. Gregorio F. Zaide

Dr. Dalmacio Martin

Interrogators/Discussants—

Prof. Nicolas Zafra

Prof. Mamerto Miranda

Prof. Vincent Balanag

Second Day, Thursday, March Twenty

A cultural program will be presented under the auspices of the Department of Education — Director Jose T. Enriquez, In-charge

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Third Day, Friday, March Twenty-one

FIELD TRIP TO BIAK-NA-BATO

San Miguel, Bulacan

(Separate Program in Tagalog is found below)

OPENING OF EXHIBITS OF ENTRIES IN THE NATIONAL CONTESTS AT THE NATIONAL LIBRARY

4:00 p.m.

Third Day, Friday, March Twenty-one In the Evening

CLOSING CEREMONIES

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM BUILDING, QUEZON CITY

7:00 p.m.

AWARDING OF PRIZES—

INTRODUCTION OF THE GUEST OF HONOR—

ADDRESS BY THE GUEST OF HONOR—

Hon. Jose B. Laurel, Speaker of the House of Representatives

Master of Ceremonies — Col. Leonardo T. Miciano

PAGDALAW SA MAKASAYSAYANG BUNDOK NG BIAK-NA-BATO

(Pook ng Kasunduan o Pakto ng Biak-na-Bato)

San Miguel de Mayumo, Bulakan

Biernes, Marso 21, 1969

PALATUNTUNAN

Unang Bahagi

10:00 n. u. — Pagdating sa San Miguel ng 300 delegado na galing sa Maynila at mga kalapit na lalawigan

10:30 n. u. — Pagsapit at pamamalagi sa maalamat na pook ng Biak-na-Bato

12:00 n. h. — Pagbalik sa San Miguel

12:30 n. h. — Pananghalian (Salusalo) sa San Miguel High School—
Handog ni G. Ricardo Silverio
Pangulo, DELTA MOTORS, INC.

Ikalawang Bahagi

1:30—3:00 n.h.—Palatuntunan pagkatapos ng Pananghalian

1. PAMBANSANG AWIT—Ang Madla sa pangunguna ng mga Ang Madla sa pangunguna ng mga Guro at subaybay ng San Miguel High School Band
2. PAGTANGGAP — Abugado Marcelo G. Aure, Alkalde, San Miguel de Mayumo
3. PANGMARAMIHANG AWIT (Choral Ensemble) — Mga Guro sa Mababang Paaralan ng San Miguel
4. PANANALITA — G. Jose P.W. Tantoco, Pangulo, Samahang Pangkasaysayan ng Bulakan

5. SAYAW — Mga Guro at Nag-aaral sa Mataas na Paaralan ng San Miguel
6. PANANALITA — Kgg. Ignacio Santiago, Punong Lalawigan ng Bulakan
7. PANANALITA (Tugon) — Koronel Leonardo T. Miciano, Patnugot-tagapagpaganap, GEANCC
8. "RECESSIONAL"

G. AMANDO E. LIBUNAO
Guro ng Palatuntunan

LUPON SA PAGTANGGAP AT PAGAAYOS
SA SAN MIGUEL

ALKALDE MARCELO G. AURE — Taga-Pangulo
SUPT. JOSE C. CRUZ — Katulong na Taga-Pangulo
BB. FIDELA DOMINGO — Pang. Taga-Pangulo
Mga Katulong —

Reb. P. Jose M. Salas
Direktor Amando E. Libunao
Punong Guro Emilio Domingo
Supervisor Nicanor Beltran
Mother Joseph de Chantel
Gng. Estanislawa P. Reyes
Gng. Clara L. Roura
Bb. Imelda O. Santos
G. Sergio S. Sison

The CEREMONIES at KAWIT
Saturday, March 22

I

7:00 a.m.
Kawit
FIELD MASS AT THE AGUINALDO SHRINE
Sponsored by the Cavite Women's League
Floral offerings after the Mass

II

7:00 a.m
Binakayan
Assembly of CIVICO-MILITARY PARADE
8:00 a.m.
Start of Parade

III

10:00 a.m.
Tabon
UNVEILING OF AGUINALDO MONUMENT AT THE AGUINALDO MEMORIAL ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Program

1. The National Anthem
2. Invocation —
3. Welcome Address —
   Hon. Florentino Bautista, Jr
   Mayor of Kawit
4. Presentation of Guest of Honor and Speaker —
   Hon. Delfin N. Montano
   Governor of Cavite
5. Address by the Guest Speaker —
   H. E. Ferdinand E. Marcos
   President of the Philippines
6. Presentation of Awards

IV

2:00 p.m.
Pilgrimage to the site of the Tejeros Convention

LECTURE-SYMPOSIUM HELD AT KAWIT, CAVITE
June 12, 1969

Theme:

"AGUINALDO AND JUNE 12, 1898—SIGNIFICANCE AND RELEVANCE TO OUR TIMES"

PART ONE — MORNING SESSION

8:00 A.M.—Registration of delegates and observers
(P2.00 registration fee per person)

9:00 A.M. — LECTURE-FORUM:

1. Philippine National Anthem
   Philippine Army Band
2. Invocation
   Mons. Jocson, Parish Priest of Kawit
3. Opening Remarks
   Prof. Esteban A. de Ocampo, President, Philippine Historical Association
4. Welcome Address —
   Mayor Florencio Bautista, Kawit, Cavite

5. Reading of "Philippine Independence Declaration" —
   Col. Leonardo T. Miciano, Executive Director, GEANCC
6. Musical Number —
   Teachers, Division of Cavite

COFFEE BREAK

7. "Historical Background of June 12, 1898" —
   Dir. Carlos Quirino, Curator, Ayala Historical Museum
8. "June 12, 1898 Independence Proclamation" — An Evaluation —
   Prof. Lino Ynciong, UE Dept. of Pol. Science
9. Open Forum: —
   Moderator — Prof. Leopoldo Y. Yabes, Dean, UP Graduate School
   Panel of Interrogators — Prof. Vincent M. Balanag, UE; Mr. Vicente L. Escasa, NU; Mr. Isagani Medina, UP; Dr. Ricardo A. Arcilla, UM; Prof. Asuncion Sarreal, PNC
   Master of Ceremonies —
   Mr. Guillermo Florencio, Principal, E. T. Tirona Memorial School

12:00 Noon — LUNCHEON

Luncheon Speaker —

Hon. Delfin N. Montano, Governor of Cavite & Member, Member, GEANCC

PART TWO — AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30 P.M. — LECTURE-FORUM:

1. "Our Country's Flag and Anthem" —
   Dr. Pedro A. Gagelonia, Far Eastern University
2. "June 12, 1898: Significance and Relevance to Our Times"—
   Dr. Gregorio F. Zaide, Professor Emeritus, FEU
3. Musical Number — Teachers, Division of Cavite

COFFEE BREAK

4. Open Forum:
   Moderator — Mr. Abdon P. Baybay, Principal, Tanza Comprehensive National High School
   Panel of Interrogators — Prof. Benjamin Bolivar, MLQU; Mr. Jose C. Concepcion, Tanza; Prof. Julita R. Sta. Romana,

UE; Prof. Francisco Calabiao, JRC; Prof. Felizardo Ordoñez, UE

Master of Ceremonies —

Mr. Jose T. Bernal, Principal, Cavite National High School

5. Awarding of "Certificates of Appreciation" to important participants in the Aguinaldo National Convention (March 19-21, 1969), this Lecture-Symposium (June 12, 1969). and winners in the Aguinaldo National Contests.

4:30 P.M. — Visit to Zapote Bridge, Aguinaldo Shrine, and Site of Tejeros Convention.

SPECIAL GUESTS: The Family of General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy

Letter to Felipe Buencamino in the Realm of the Eternal*

Sr. D. Felipe Buencamino

The Realm of the Eternal

Dear Sir:

It is comforting that you should be where time is no more. You would not then begrudge us that, twenty-one and one hundred years since your earthly birth, we should gather here to take stock of your place in the annals of our country and of your relevance to our people today and, mayhap, in all the years to come.

For our part, we find refuge in the Spanish assurance, "Más vale tarde que nunca", to account for this observance. To be sure, it is well that it be so, for chronological distance makes for correct perspective and a reliable assizing.

Moreover, if the commonplace, "Life begins at forty", holds true, then we have met at just the opportune moment. This year is exactly forty since your passing away and death, we so believe, is the beginning of genuine life.

Be that as it may, I would, with these lines, convey to you what has been asked of me at this celebration.

My view is being sought in regard to your actuation as a public official. And you were so for quite a considerable period and under momentous circumstances.

But then, which should be the standard to employ; which, the frame of reference? Shall I compare you with our contemporary officials? Or were it better the other way round? I think it is best that we leave these unanswered.

Instead, allow me a reminiscence. Some thirty years ago, President Quezon — yes, a bosom friend of your sons, Victor and Felipito — had practically goaded our National Assembly to enact a measure of his own

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* Read at a dinner-forum held under the auspices of the Philippine Historical Association to commemorate the 121st birthday anniversary of Felipe Buencamino at the Philippine Columbian Hall, Manila, on August 23, 1969.

inspiration and making. When such was done amidst loud denunciations of our legislators as mere "rubber stamps", and the act reached the President for signature, he unceremoniously vetoed it. In no time, our "gentlemen of the press", privy to the genesis of said piece of legislation, accosted the Chief Executive in demand of an explanation for the volte-face. Quezon lost no time either to oblige: "Only fools," he declared, "do not change their minds." That ended any further speculation.

How much a measure of your mind does the Quezonian dictum afford us? For, if one were to summarize the highlights, nay, the very *raison d' etre* of your actuations as a public official, there could be no better way than by resorting to the word "change." As the immortal bard from Ermita, Don Fernando Maria Guerrero, expressed it in your eulogy: Buencamino "fue un Proteo político de lo más sorprendiente y encantador. Cambiaba de opinión con la mayor facilidad y siempre con un bien alegado fundamento."

You "changed your mind easily", true — far from the fools, indeed! —, but only because, for every change you had "un bien alegado fundamento." I notice that the phrase was penned by Guerrero, the unrivalled academician of the Spanish language. Let no one then recklessly glide through the words in translating them. "Un bien alegado fundamento" is not well rendered should it be translated as "an allegedly good basis." If this were the meaning intended, the word used would be "supuesto" or "presunto." But, "alegado", as employed here, is equivalent to "addressed" or "expressed."

And so it was, indeed.

From 1884 you were already called to public service, shortly after having been incarcerated for alleged complicity in the subversive plan of Andres Novicio. You did not allow the bitterness of the injustice to dissuade you from an exemplary discharge of your duties, whether as acting *relator* of the Real Audiencia, *promotor fiscal* of Binondo, judge of first instance for Batanes Islands, staff-member of the secretariat of the Real Audiencia, and judge of first instance in Tayabas (now Quezon) province.

When you ceased as such judge, you were to be named acting *abogado fiscal,* but you chose to decline, for you would not have it understood as a reward for your denunciation of the protest against the friars and the Archbishop of Manila in 1888.

So you took up the practice of your profession, in the course of which you earned a name synonymous with ability and probity. Such that, once again, you were called to public service, this time as acting register of deeds in Ilocos sur.

When in 1897 Primo de Rivera, whom you had befriended in 1880, returned for a second term as governor general, he called you to appraise him of the situation. You briefed him frankly and to the point. He then asked you to accept the commission of honorary lieutenant in command of 200 volunteers under General Monet. Once more you agreed to serve.

With the signing of the pact of Biak-na-Bato, you were asked by the governor general to entertain General Emilio Aguinaldo and his party as they repaired to Calumpit in their journey to exile. That was the first time you met the Filipino leader. How did he strike you? There is no way of knowing it now.

Several times were you summoned to Malacañang, for the chief executive would seek your advice. You proposed that Aguinaldo be won to the government side as against the Americans, by commissioning him brigadier general with a salary of five thousand pesos. Your proposals were ignored. Instead, you were appointed lieutenant colonel of a battalion of 600 volunteers, known as the Simon de Anda y Salazar column, with headquarters in Zapote. It was there that you told General Alejandrino that we would be better off fighting with the Spaniards, thus enabling us to receive arms and ammunitions, which we could later on use against the Americans, should the latter, after defeating the Spaniards (a denouément you almost prophesied), would be of a mind to subdue the Filipinos. Again you were unheeded.

In view of the impasse, you were instructed to offer Aguinaldo the commission of brigadier general with a compensation of five thousand pesos — exactly as you had, at first, proposed. On 22nd May, 1898, you sought an interview, which request was granted.

Meeting Aguinaldo in Cavite, you not only failed to convince him, but, what is more, you were held prisoner for lack of written credentials.

It was then that you saw Spanish General Peña brought in as prisoner without having put up a fight. That was, to you, most revealing. How much you had to debate yourself! Yours was the excruciating agony of Humabon, when weighing his alliance with the Spaniards

as against the readiness of the latter to depart following the death of Magellan, or of Diego Silang when he saw himself misunderstood by the Spaniards, who would turn the islands over to the British, while he, a Filipino, raised an army round the rallying war cry of "Filipinas por siempre española."

Then you made your first big change.

You bluntly told General Peña that if the Spaniards were no longer ready to defend their cause here, you considered yourself relieved of your oath of allegiance and loyalty to Spain and could, therefore, join Aguinaldo's forces to fight for the independence of your country. For you would not out-Spaniard the Spaniards. You believed that if the fate and destiny of the Philippines were no longer to be linked with Spain, it were better to seek them by ourselves alone rather than submit to another master.

Thus, you joined the Revolution.

I need not remind you of your contribution to the cause. You were private secretary of our Generalissimo, mediator in the Luna-Mascardo affaire, *secretario de fomento,* colonel detailed at the General Auditing office of our Army, legal counsel for general headquarters, and secretary of foreign affairs.

In this last capacity, yours was that stirring memorandum to the United States Congress, convincingly stating the case for Philippine independence and scathingly demolishing American sophistry.

Guided always by your loyalty to convictions, you pleaded the Philippine cause with as much sincerity and logic as you had supported the Spanish position vis-a-vis our revolutionary government.

How tellingly you marshalled our stature as a nation and a people deserving of an emancipated existence: we were possessed of a stable government enjoying popular support. We had an official language — Spanish — of world-wide acceptance; we had accepted "an enlightened faith — Catholicism" and the tenets of Christian morality influenced our ways. We possessed all requisites laid down by international law to be admitted into the concert of free nations. This right could not be denied the Filipinos.

You also advanced the principle of big powers being duty bound to help and protect small developing countries in their independent life. How much were you in anticipation of "Mater et Magistra", "Pacis

in Terram", and "Populorum Progressio", as well as of the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress.

But then, my dear Don Felipe, why did you submit to American authority?

It was another change, for which you had "un bien alegado fundamento."

Again the change came when you were in prison after your capture by the enemy, who held you incommunicado for five months. Your keen mind and your heart, open only to the welfare of your people, made you ponder again. As a result, you arrived at the conclusion that the Filipinos should lay down their arms, recognize American sovereignty, and work for incorporation into the Federal Union.

Why? Because you saw our armies close to annihilation; you surmised that the ensuing guerrilla warfare could last some ten years or more, during which time our youth would be denied education, whilst those of our people who had some higher studies — only about 75,000 all told in a population of 8,000,000! — would grow old and die with no adequate replenishments; you had read the recent legislation introduced by the Americans, all exuding an encouraging democratic spirit of freedom and equality; you shuddered at the possibility of 8,000,000 Christian Filipinos being gobbled up by their 400,000,000 Buddhist neighbors; you felt the need for American protection until our people shall have been physically and morally ready for independence. All these you told us and yourself.

This, you also told General Otis, who felt so well for it that he offered you money and post, as he invited you to join in the pacification drive. Consistent with your new-formed convictions, you agreed to help pacify the country, but declined the employment and compensation. You would not put a price to your beliefs. And even in joining the new masters, you had made it clear to them that the United States grant our war victims a loan of $100,000.00 at 4% interest to help them tide over, and proclaim general amnesty, besides recognizing in us all the basic constitutional rights enjoyed by American citizens.

You, indeed, changed your mind, Don Felipe, but only because, once again, you had "un bien alegado fundamento."

The joy of the American general at your apparent defeat was far outweighed by yours in the thought that you were again serving the

best interests of your country. And served her you did by helping in the pacification drive and the establishment of the Federal Party. Such was your fidelity to your convictions that you risked defamation, contempt, and misunderstanding. Consistent with your newly established credo, you even sent your sons, Felipe and Victor, to the United States to imbibe all that was needed for their future role as leaders of your people along the new path to tread.

As a good, typical Filipino family man, however, you would not let them totally alone in a foreign land, away from the paternal home. So you visited them in the continent. This afforded you an opportunity to see American reality at close range.

Again, there was a change.

You returned utterly disillusioned with what, until then, you had cherished as the formula for Filipino progress and salvation. You, therefore, left the Federal Party and soon joined the nationalistic party being engineered by Dr. Justo Lukban. You, once more, militated within the ranks of those that labored hard for "immediate, absolute and complete independence."

Yes, Don Felipe, there are today countrymen of yours and mine who would, like you, shift from one party to another. But for some of them, there is where the resemblance ends. For their change is more of "turn-coatism", propelled by personal ambition, than a "turn-about" motivated by a "bien alegado fundamento." They would seek haven in a party without forsaking their own completely. Not so with you. Your changes, because grounded on the logic of conviction and the desire to serve the people, were unequivocal, unconditional, and utterly unselfish.

And as the years began to take their toll of your sojourn amongst your fellowmen; as your powers and faculties seemed to fail you here, eager to be of use to you elsewhere, "donde la fe no mata, donde el que reina es Dios", you managed to bequeath us gems of advice that to this day retain their luster of relevance and urgency: "To love God above all things" and "To love your fellowman as you love yourself."

You wanted us to cultivate wisdom, justice, goodness and mercy; you would have us respect honor, liberty, family, and property; you advocated for closer union between Filipino Muslims and Christians;

you urged political, social, and economic discipline; you relished that Filipinos sincerely cooperate with one another; and you advocated a simple government, devoid of red tape, with an understanding mind and an open heart.

These things you told us on the eve of your departure that month of February in 1929.

It has been forty years since.

How have we taken to your counsel?

The answer is not yet.

Meanwhile, Don Felipe, this small group here gathered may well serve the purpose.

Good night and pray for us.

Sincerely yours,

ANTONIO M. MOLINA

23rd AUGUST, 1969

Ambeth Ocampo